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Abstract 
Accidental actions on structures may be characterized as low probability - high consequence events. On 
one hand, their occurrence during the envisaged design working life of the structure is unlikely. On the 
other, if not appropriately accounted for, the associated effects on structures might entail significant 
damage. Since moreover such effects are subjected to high uncertainties, decision-making related to 
structural safety accounting for accidental actions is generally difficult and prone to be based on 
irrational grounds. Among such actions, gas explosions, are a good example. Despite the continuous 
modernization of gas installations and appliances, available statistics from different countries show that 
the occurrence rate of such explosions in buildings does not seem to decrease in a significant way. While 
the hazard potential is known and recognized, and although dealt with in many design codes, gas 
explosions are seldom accounted for in the design and evaluation of ordinary building structures. The 
low occurrence probability evokes reluctance to allocate resources to mitigate the associated risks, 
which, as a consequence, are often ignored and sometimes consciously accepted. The question if “doing 
nothing” is a justified practice cannot be easily answered however, since under the implicit approach 
adopted in everyday practice for verification of structural safety the risks are not quantified nor are 
acceptable risk levels established. 
On this background, the study aims at exploring methods and tools for the practical application of 
explicit risk analysis in connection with gas explosions in buildings. A procedure is established for 
quantification of implicitly acceptable structure-related risks to persons, based on the probability of 
structural collapse and the consequences of such a failure in terms of loss of human life. The procedure 
adopted is applied to a representative set of building structures with RC members (beams and columns), 
which is obtained by varying the parameters with the greatest effect on design within reasonable limits. 
Following their identification, the most relevant hazard scenarios to these members are represented in 
terms of limit state functions (LSF). Based on the established LSF’s, a strict design (Ed = Rd) according to 
a consistent set of codes is carried out, so that structural member performance complies exactly with 
the safety requirements that reflect current best practice. The basic variables involved in the LSF are 
stochastically characterized, where special attention is paid to the dynamic effects associated with the 
explosion-induced high loading rates on the members, such as the contribution of inertia forces, energy 
dissipation and strain rate-sensitive material behaviour. 
Quantification of these effects is addressed in a deterministic dynamic analysis where the explosion load 
is represented as an idealised pressure-time function, compatible with simplified models. Under 
consideration of dynamic material properties, member flexural response is obtained assuming a single 
degree of freedom system, whereas the reaction forces, representative for the shear forces, are 
determined from the dynamic equilibrium formulation applied to the members themselves. For the 
beams, a comparative study is conducted, where the deployed simplified models are validated by means 
of non-linear finite element analysis. The analysis of the columns under dynamic bending moment-axial 
force interaction requires a specific solution algorithm that accounts for the axial force dependent 
formulation of structural resistance under consideration of both the material- and geometrical non-
linearities involved. 
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In the subsequent reliability analysis of the structural members, the mentioned algorithm is coupled to 
a purpose-developed FOSM-based iterative procedure in order to obtain the most likely failure point for 
the established LSF. Taking account of the occurrence probability of a gas explosion event, implicitly 
acceptable structural failure probabilities for both columns and beams are derived and analyzed in the 
light of target ceilings demanded by structural codes. The findings suggest significant scope for a more 
rational formulation of design rules for accidental situations related to gas explosions.  
For the estimation of the structural failure consequences, a regression model is developed from 
previously compiled and statistically evaluated data on explosion-induced structural collapse scenarios 
in buildings. The model delivers estimations for the number of fatalities as a function of the area affected 
by structural collapse and the occupancy rate of this area. Reasonable hypothesis are adopted in order 
to account for the possibility of system collapse given a local member failure. 
Subsequently, implicitly acceptable risk profiles are obtained for each of the representative building 
structures where account is taken of the fact that, in addition to the considered accidental load scenarios, 
certain member failure modes might be triggered by persistent load arrangements associated with 
normal building use conditions. Acceptance criteria for structure-related life safety risks are deduced 
from the findings. Such criteria facilitate the adoption of rational decisions on both, the need and the 
appropriate choice of risk-reduction measures to counteract the effects of gas explosions in buildings. 
The design of key elements, upon which depends the stability of the structure, or a large part of it, may 
be one of these strategies. For this purpose, acceptable risks are translated into target failure 
probabilities for individual structural members, defined as a function of the potential failure 
consequences. In spite of their notional character, such target values provide a rational basis for the 
calibration of the implicit rules in structural codes and standards for verification of structural safety in 
relation to gas explosions.
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Resumen 
Las situaciones accidentales sobre estructuras se pueden considerar como eventos poco frecuentes, 
pero de importantes consecuencias. Por un lado, su probabilidad de ocurrencia durante el periodo de 
vida útil previsto de la estructura es remota, por otro, los efectos asociados sobre la estructura pueden 
acarrear importantes daños si no se han tenido en cuenta de forma apropiada. Como además estos efec-
tos están normalmente afectados por un alto grado de incertidumbre, la adopción de decisiones relacio-
nadas con la seguridad estructural en conexión con acciones accidentales es generalmente difícil y pro-
pensa a carecer de una base racional. Entre tales acciones, las explosiones de gas son un buen ejemplo. 
A pesar de la modernización continua de los equipamientos e instalaciones para el suministro de gas en 
los edificios, estadísticas disponibles de diferentes países muestran que estas explosiones se siguen pro-
duciendo con cierta frecuencia. Mientras su potencial de amenaza para la seguridad estructural es obje-
tivamente conocido, la consideración de explosiones de gas en el dimensionado y la evaluación de es-
tructuras de edificación es muy poco frecuente. La baja probabilidad de ocurrencia provoca rechazo a la 
hora de asignar recursos destinados a la mitigación de los riesgos asociados, que, por consecuencia, a 
menudo se ignoran o se aceptan conscientemente. Sin embargo, la respuesta a la pregunta de si “no 
hacer nada” es justificado no es evidente, puesto que, según el enfoque implícito adoptado en la práctica 
habitual para la verificación de los requisitos de seguridad estructural, los riegos no se cuantifican ni se 
establecen los niveles de riesgo aceptables. 
Ante este trasfondo, el presente estudio se centra en el desarrollo de unos métodos y herramientas para 
el análisis explícito de los riesgos asociados con las explosiones de gas en edificios residenciales. Se es-
tablece un procedimiento para cuantificar los riesgos implícitamente aceptados para las personas, aso-
ciados con las estructuras. Este procedimiento está basado en la determinación de las probabilidades 
de colapso de los elementos resistentes del sistema analizado y de las pérdidas esperadas de vidas hu-
manas en caso de producirse estos fallos. El procedimiento se aplica a un conjunto representativo de 
estructuras de edificación con elementos de hormigón armado (vigas y pilares), que se obtiene variando 
los parámetros característicos para su dimensionado dentro de unos límites razonables. Tras la identi-
ficación de los escenarios de riesgo más relevantes para estos elementos, dichos escenarios se repre-
sentan en términos de las funciones de estado límite (FEL). Basado en estas FEL, los elementos estruc-
turales se dimensionan de forma estricta (Ed = Rd) de acuerdo con los requisitos de seguridad estructural 
que se ajustan a la mejor práctica actual. Las variables básicas que intervienen en la FEL se caracterizan 
estocásticamente con énfasis en los efectos dinámicos asociados con las elevadas velocidades de carga 
a las que se someten los elementos en una explosión de gas, entre ellos la contribución de fuerzas de 
inercia, disipación de energía y la alteración de las propiedades de los materiales. 
La cuantificación de estos efectos se abarca en el marco de un análisis dinámico determinista donde la 
carga explosiva se representa a través de una función presión-tiempo idealizada, compatible con mode-
los dinámicos simplificados. Teniendo en cuenta las propiedades de materiales dinámicas, la respuesta 
en flexión se analiza mediante un sistema equivalente de un grado de libertad, mientras que las reaccio-
nes de apoyo, representativas para los esfuerzos de cortante, se determinan a partir de las ecuaciones 
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de equilibrio a nivel de elemento. Para las vigas, se lleva a cabo un estudio comparativo que permite 
validar los modelos simplificados mediante un análisis no lineal por elementos finitos. El análisis de los 
pilares sometidos a interacción de momentos flectores y esfuerzos axiles dinámicos requiere un algo-
ritmo de solución específico que tiene en cuenta la dependencia de la resistencia estructural del nivel 
del axil, así como el comportamiento no lineal de los materiales y geométrico. 
En el subsiguiente análisis de fiabilidad, el mencionado algoritmo se implementa en un procedimiento 
de análisis iterativo basado en el método FOSM, desarrollado para la determinación del punto de fallo 
más probable en la FEL establecida. Teniendo en cuenta la probabilidad de ocurrencia de una explosión 
de gas, se obtienen las probabilidades de fallo implícitamente aceptables tanto para los pilares como 
para las vigas. Los resultados sugieren un margen de mejora significativo para una formulación más 
racional de las reglas de dimensionado en situaciones accidentales caracterizadas por explosiones de 
gas. 
Para la estimación de las consecuencias de fallos estructurales se desarrolla un modelo de regresión a 
partir de datos previamente recopilados sobre colapsos totales o parciales de edificios inducidos por 
explosiones. El modelo proporciona el número de víctimas mortales en función del área afectada por el 
colapso, así como de la ratio de ocupación de dicha área. Se adoptan hipótesis razonables para contem-
plar la posibilidad de un colapso de sistema a partir de un fallo local de un elemento estructural. 
A continuación, se obtienen los perfiles de riesgo implícitamente aceptado para cada una de las estruc-
turas representativas. Se considera la posibilidad de que ciertos modos de fallo puedan desencadenarse 
tanto como consecuencia de un escenario accidental como también por escenarios persistentes, en con-
diciones de uso normales de los edificios. A partir de los resultados obtenidos, se deducen unos criterios 
de aceptación de los riesgos para las personas, asociados con las estructuras de edificación. Estos crite-
rios facilitan la adopción de decisiones racionales sobre la necesidad de adoptar medidas para mitigar 
los efectos de explosiones sobre estructuras y la elección adecuada de estas medidas. El dimensionado 
de los denominados elementos clave (“key elements”), de los que depende la estabilidad de una estruc-
tura, o de una gran parte de ella, podría ser una de estas estrategias. Para este fin, los riesgos aceptables 
asociados con las estructuras se traducen en probabilidades de fallo admisibles para elementos indivi-
duales, que se definen en función de las potenciales consecuencias del fallo. A pesar de su carácter no-
minal, estos valores admisibles proporcionan una base racional para la calibración consistente de las 
reglas implícitas en los códigos estructurales para la verificación de la seguridad estructural en relación 
con las explosiones de gas.
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Symbols 
Latin upper case letters 
A  :  Area; Building net room area 
Aav  :  Average building net room area 
Abw  :  Building area affected by the blast wave 
Acol  :  Building area affected by the collapse 
Acol,j  :  Building area affected by the collapse associated with hazard scenario j 
Acol,min  :  Building area affected by the collapse below which a specific design solution would be 
acceptable without need for any intervention regarding explosion-related structural 
safety 
Ad  :  Design value of an accidental action 
AEX  : Tributary area for a member under explosion load exposure 
AG+Q  : Tributary area for a member under gravitational load exposure 
Ahu  :  Net room area of a housing-unit 
Ahu,av  :  Average net-room area of a housing-unit 
Ai  :  Average net room area A per person i 
Al  :  Loaded area 
As  : Cross-sectional area of reinforcement; Total cross-sectional area of reinforcement in col-
umns (As = As1 + As2) 
As,av  : Average net-room area of a building storey 
As,req,acc  :  Cross-sectional area of reinforcement layer demanded by accidental design situation 
As,req,per  :  Cross-sectional area of reinforcement layer demanded by persistent design situation 
Asw  : Cross-sectional area of shear reinforcement 
Asw/s  : Cross-sectional area of shear reinforcement per unit length  
(Asw/s)req,acc :  Cross-sectional area of shear reinforcement per unit length demanded by accidental de-
sign situation 
(Asw/s)req,per : Cross-sectional area of shear reinforcement per unit length demanded by persistent de-
sign situation 
(Asw/s)min  : Minimum cross-sectional area of shear reinforcement per unit length 
As1  : Cross-sectional area of tensile reinforcement layer 
As2  : Cross-sectional area of compression reinforcement layer  
Av  :  Area of venting panels 
Av/V  :  Venting coefficient 
A0  :  Reference area 
B  : Building width B 
BLS  :  Buckling limit state 
BC  :  Failure domain associated with exceedance of BLS due to M-N interaction, characterized 
by yielding of compression reinforcement 
BT  :  Failure domain associated with exceedance of BLS due to M-N interaction, characterized 
by yielding of tensile reinforcement 
C  :  Consequence; Constant 
CoV  :  Coefficient of variation 
CoVpEX,peak  :  Coefficient of variation for explosion peak pressure (population) 
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CoVpEX,peak,s  :  Coefficient of variation for explosion peak pressure (sample)  
Cb  : Constant accounting for location of collapse-triggering beam 
Cc  : Constant accounting for location of collapse-triggering column 
Ci   :  System component  
Cij,k   :  Consequence of type k associated with event j due to hazard i 
D  : Damage (local), Distribution type; Number of disappeared persons 
DIF  : Dynamic Increase Factor taking account of strain rate effects 
DIFEc  : Dynamic Increase Factor for concrete modulus  
DIFfc  : Dynamic Increase Factor for concrete compressive strength  
DIFft  : Dynamic Increase Factor for reinforcing steel tensile strength  
DIFfy  : Dynamic Increase Factor for reinforcing steel yield strength 
DIFfyws  : Dynamic Increase Factor for transverse reinforcing steel yield strength  
DIFm  : Dynamic Increase Factor for material property m 
DIFc1  : Dynamic Increase Factor for concrete compressive strain at maximum stress 
DLF  : Dynamic Load Factor taking account of inertia forces and energy dissipation 
DLFE  : Dynamic Load Factor associated with action effect E 
DLFM  : Dynamic Load Factor associated with bending moments M 
DLFN  : Dynamic Load Factor associated with axial forces N 
DLFV  : Dynamic Load Factor associated with shear forces V 
E  : Action effect; Modulus of elasticity; Energy 
E  : Action effect vector (in the bending moment - axial force space) 
E*  : Action effect vector (in the bending moment - axial force space) corresponding to most 
likely failure point on the limit state surface 
EI  : Cross-sectional stiffness 
EII  : Cross-sectional stiffness in the uncracked state 
EIII  : Cross-sectional stiffness in the cracked state 
ESS  : Explained sum of squares  
EX  :  Explosion 
E(N)  : Expected number of fatalities associated with an undesired event 
Ec  :  Concrete modulus of elasticity  
Ec,stat  :  Concrete modulus of elasticity under static loading conditions 
Ec,dyn  :  Concrete modulus of elasticity under dynamic loading conditions 
Ed  :  Design value of action effect E 
Edyn  :  Dynamic action effect due to explosion loading (including model uncertainty)  
EEX  : Dynamic action effect due to explosion loading (excluding model uncertainty) 
EEX,peak  : Action effect due to static application of explosion peak pressure pEX,peak 
Eij  : Event j caused by hazard i 
Ek  : Kinetic energy 
Es  :   Reinforcing steel modulus of elasticity (under static and dynamic loading conditions) 
F  : Frequency; Force; F distribution by Fisher; Cut-off value corresponding to F distribution 
by Fisher 
F*  : F-statistic corresponding to F distribution by Fisher 
FORM  : First Order Reliability Method 
F(n)  : Frequency of occurrence of an event with N ≥ n fatalities 
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F(n)adm  : Admissible frequency of occurrence of an event with N ≥ n fatalities 
F(n)EX  : Frequency of a collapse scenario with n≥N fatalities associated with explosion load ar-
rangements 
F(n)PER  :  Frequency of a collapse scenario with n≥N fatalities associated with persistent load ar-
rangements 
F(n)t  : Target value for frequency F(n) 
F(n)TOT  : Total frequency of a collapse scenario with n≥N fatalities associated with all kind of load 
arrangements potentially affecting the structure in question 
F(n)t,PER  : Target value for frequency F(n)PER  
F(n)t,TOT  : Target value for total frequency F(n)TOT  
FX(x)  :  Cumulative distribution function 
F(1)  : Frequency of occurrence of an event with N ≥ 1 fatalities 
F(1)t  : Target value for frequency F(1) 
Fc   : Force resisted by concrete in compression  
Feq  : Equivalent force (SDOF system) 
Feq,peak  : Equivalent peak force (SDOF system) 
Fk  : Characteristic value of an action 
Fpeak  : Peak force 
Fy  : Yield force of reinforcing steel 
Fs   : Force resisted by the reinforcement layer 
G  :  Gumbel distribution; Permanent action 
Gf  : Fracture energy of concrete in tension under static loading conditions 
Gk  : Characteristic value of a permanent action 
H  :  Hazard; Building height 
H  : Hat matrix (relates the vector of observations Yi to the vector of model predictions Ŷi) 
Hi  :  Hazard i related to a specific system 
H0  : Hypothesis for testing significance of a regression model and its parameters 
I  : Resulting inertia force; Second moment of area; Impulse; Non-cracked state; Number of 
injuries 
II  : Cracked state prior to yielding 
III  : Post-yield state 
Icol  :  Number of injuries due to structural collapse 
Isev  :  Number of severe injuries 
Isev,col  :  Number of severe injuries due to structural collapse 
Isli  :  Number of slight injuries 
Isli,col  :  Number of slight injuries due to structural collapse 
K  : Reduction coefficient for the resistance of the compression strut taking account of the 
stress state in the compression chord 
Ki  : Transformation factor 
KIL  : Inertia-load factor 
KL  : Load factor 
KLM  : Load-mass factor 
KM  : Mass factor 
L  : Building length L 
LN  :  Lognormal distribution 
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Ln  :  Natural logarithm 
LQI  : Life Quality Index 
LSF  : Limit State Function 
M  : Bending moment; Safety margin; Ratio between observed and predicted value 
M(+)  : Positive bending failure scenario of beams 
M(-)  : Negative bending failure scenario of beams 
MDOF  :  Multi degree of freedom 
MLSC  : Marginal Life Saving Cost 
MSE  :  Mean square error 
MSR  :  Regression mean square 
ME  : Applied bending moment (action effect) 
ME*  : Applied bending moment (action effect) corresponding to FORM design point 
MEd  : Design bending moment (action effect) 
MEd,I  : First order contribution to design bending moment (action effect) 
MEd,II  : Second order contribution to design bending moment (action effect) 
MEd,acc  : Design bending moment (action effect) for accidental situation 
MEd,per  : Design bending moment (action effect) for persistent situation 
ME,dyn  : Applied bending moment due to dynamic actions 
ME,dyn,I  : Applied first order bending moment due to dynamic actions 
ME,dyn,II  : Applied second order bending moment due to dynamic actions 
ME,stat  : Applied bending moment due to static actions 
ME,stat,I  : Applied first order bending moment due to static actions 
ME,stat,II  : Applied second order bending moment due to static actions 
ME,stat,d  : Contribution of static actions to design bending moment MEd 
MEX  : Bending moment at the mid-span cross-section of the beams due to the vertical explosion 
load ?̃?EX; First order bending moment at the intermediate cross-section of the columns 
due to the horizontal explosion load ?̃?EX,h 
MEX,d  : Design value for first order bending moment at the intermediate cross-section of the col-
umns due to the horizontal explosion load ?̃?EX,h 
MFc   : Moment resisted by concrete in compression  
MFs   : Moment resisted by the reinforcement layer 
MG  : Bending moment due to permanent actions 
MNEX   : First order bending moment at the intermediate cross-section of the columns due to the 
eccentrically applied axial force NEX 
MQ  : Bending moment due to variable actions 
MR  : Resisting bending moment 
MR*  : Resisting bending moment corresponding to FORM design point 
MR,b  : Resisting bending moment corresponding to the balance point 
MR,cr  : Cracking moment 
MRd  : Design value for resisting bending moment 
MRd,u  : Design value for ultimate moment 
MRd,y  : Design value for yield moment 
MR,dyn  : Resisting bending moment available to sustain dynamic actions 
MRm  : Mean value for resisting bending moment 
MR,u  : Ultimate moment 
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MR,y  : Yield moment 
N  :  Number of fatalities; Axial force; Normal distribution 
NA  : Numerical analysis 
Ncol  :  Number of fatalities due to structural collapse 
NE  : Applied axial force (action effect) 
NE*  : Applied axial force (action effect) corresponding to FORM design point 
NEd  : Design axial force (action effect) 
NEd,acc  : Design axial force (action effect) for accidental situation 
NEd,per  : Design axial force (action effect) for persistent situation 
NE,dyn  : Applied axial force due to dynamic actions 
NE,stat  : Applied axial force due to static actions 
NE,stat,d  : Contribution of static actions to design axial force NEd 
NEX  : Axial force due to explosion load 
NEX(-),(+)  : Accidental load arrangements for columns 
NG  : Axial force due to permanent actions 
NGf  : Axial force due to permanent loads of the building floor systems 
NG+Q  : Axial force due to gravitational loads 
Nj  :  Number of fatalities associated with hazard scenario j 
Nmax  : Maximum number of fatalities associated with an undesired event (e.g. a structural col-
lapse scenario) in a system (e.g. a building structure) 
NQ1  : Axial force due to leading variable action 
NQ2  : Axial force due to accompanying variable action 
NR  : Resisting axial force 
NR*  : Resisting axial force corresponding to FORM design point 
NR,b  : Resisting axial force corresponding to the balance point 
NRd  : Design value for resisting axial force 
NRd,max,acc  : Design value for maximum resisting axial force in the accidental situation 
NR,dyn  : Resisting axial force available to sustain dynamic actions 
NR,max  : Maximum resisting axial force (corresponding to e/h = 0) 
NR,u  : Resisting axial force corresponding to the ultimate moment MRu 
NR,y  : Resisting axial force corresponding to the yield moment MRy 
Ocu  : Total building occupancy 
Ocucol  : Occupancy of the area affected by the collapse Acol 
Ocuhu,av  :  Average occupancy per housing unit 
P  :  Probability, Representative value of a prestressing action 
PER  : Persistent 
PRM  : Predictive residual mean 
P(D|H)  : Conditional probability of (local) damage in case the hazard occurs 
P(Eij)  : Occurrence probability of event j due to a set of hazards i 
P(Eij|Hi)  : Conditional probability of event j due to hazard i given occurrence of hazard  
P(H)  : Occurrence probability of a hazard 
P(Hi)  : Occurrence probability of hazard i 
P(S|D)  : Conditional probability of a partial or total system failure in case of (local) damage 
Pf  :  Accumulated failure probability of a structural member or a structural system 
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Pf,adm  : Implicitly admissible, accumulated failure probability  
Q  :  Variable action 
Qk  :  Characteristic value of a variable action 
R  :  Risk; Societal risk associated with a technical system (e.g. a structure); Resistance 
R  : Resistance vector (in the bending moment - axial force space) 
R*  : Resistance corresponding to most likely failure point on the limit state surface (FORM 
design point) 
R*  : Resistance vector (in the bending moment - axial force space) corresponding to most 
likely failure point on the limit state surface 
R2  :  Coefficient of determination 
R̅2  :  Adjusted coefficient of determination 
RC  :  Reinforced concrete  
RF  :  Response function  
RSS  : Residual sum of squares  
R()  : Resistance function 
Radm  :  Implicitly acceptable risks to persons (in terms of the expected number of fatalities) as-
sociated with a particular structure 
Radm,m   : Mean value of implicitly acceptable risks to persons associated with a particular struc-
ture 
Radm,5%   : 5%- fractile value of implicitly acceptable risks to persons associated with a particular 
structure 
Radm,95%   : 95% - fractile value of implicitly acceptable risks to persons associated with a particular 
structure 
Rd  :  Design value of resistance R 
Rd,req  : Required design resistance  
Rd,req,acc  : Required design resistance for accidental situations 
Rd,req,per  : Required design resistance for persistent situations 
Rdyn  :  Effective resistance to sustain dynamic actions 
Rdyn,eq  :  Equivalent effective resistance to sustain dynamic actions 
Rdyn()  : Effective resistance function to the applied dynamic loading 
Req  :  Equivalent resistance (SDOF system) 
Req,y  :  Equivalent yield resistance (SDOF system) 
Rj  : Societal risk to persons associated with hazard scenario j 
Rk  :  Risk associated with consequence component k 
Rk,adm  :  Admissible risk associated with consequence component k 
Rm  :  Mean resistance 
Rprov  :  Provided resistance 
Rreq  :  Required resistance 
Rstat  :  Resistance corresponding to static loads 
Ru  :  Ultimate resistance 
Ru,dyn  :  Effective ultimate resistance to sustain dynamic actions 
Ry  :  Yield resistance 
Ry,dyn  :  Effective yield resistance to sustain dynamic actions 
S  :  System failure 
SA  : Simplified analysis 
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SDOF  :  Single degree of freedom 
SEE  :  Standard error of estimate 
SLS  :  Serviceability limit state 
SM  :  Safety Margin in the M-N space 
T  :  Natural period 
TSS  : Total sum of squares  
Tref  :  Reference period 
U1 – U5  :  Failure domains associated with exceedance of UMLS due to M-N interaction  
ULS  :  Ultimate limit state 
UMLS  :  Ultimate moment limit state 
V  : Volume of enclosure or compartment where explosion occurs; Reaction force; Shear 
force 
Vc  : Shear failure scenario characterized by crushing of the compression strut 
Vcu  :  Contribution of concrete in compression to shear resistance VR,s  
VE  : Applied shear force (action effect) 
VEd  : Design shear force (action effect) 
VEd,acc  : Design shear force (action effect) for accidental situation 
VEd,per  : Design shear force (action effect) for persistent situation 
VE,dyn  : Applied shear force due to dynamic actions  
VE,stat  : Applied shear force due to static actions 
VEX  : Shear force due to explosion loading  
VG  : Shear force due to permanent actions 
VQ  : Shear force due to variable actions 
VR  : Resisting shear force 
VR*  : Shear resistance corresponding to FORM design point 
VR,c  : Shear resistance limited by failure of the compression strut 
VR,c*  : Shear resistance limited by failure of the compression strut corresponding to FORM de-
sign point 
VRd  : Design value for resisting shear force  
VRd,c  : Design value for resisting shear force limited by crushing of the compression strut 
VRd,s  : Design value for resisting shear force limited by failure of the tension tie 
VR,dyn  : Resisting shear force available to sustain dynamic actions 
VRm  : Mean value for resisting shear force  
VRm,c  : Mean value for resisting shear force limited by crushing of the compression strut  
VRm,s  : Mean value for resisting shear force limited by failure of the tension tie  
VR,s  : Shear resistance limited by failure of the tension tie 
VR,s*  : Shear resistance limited by failure of the tension tie corresponding to FORM design point 
Vs  : Shear failure scenario characterized by failure of the tension tie  
Vsu  :  Contribution of the shear reinforcement to shear resistance VR,s 
Vsu,d  :  Contribution of the shear reinforcement to the design shear resistance VRd,s 
W  : Section modulus 
Ws  : Strain energy 
Ws,BL  : Strain energy dissipated under assumption of a bilinear resistance function 
Ws,M  : Strain energy dissipated until bending failure  
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Ws,ML  : Strain energy dissipated under assumption of a multilinear resistance function 
Ws,Vs  : Strain energy dissipated until shear failure due to failure of the tension tie  
X  : Vector of basic variables Xi 
Xi  : Basic variable; Explanatory variable of a regression model 
XR  : Vector of basic variables Xi involved in structural resistance 
Y  : Observed value; Dependant variable of a regression model 
Ŷ  : Predicted value of variable Y 
Y̅  : Sample mean of variable Y 
Z  : Vector of standardized variables Zi 
Zi  : Standardized basic variable 
Latin lower case letters 
ac  : Integration coefficient determining the resulting concrete compressive force Fc under 
assumption of a parabola-rectangle diagram 
acc   : Coefficient taking account of long-term effects on the concrete compressive strength 
anom  : Nominal value of a geometrical property 
b  : Mid-span cross-section width 
bi  : Regression coefficient (represents the sample estimate of the corresponding population 
parameter i) 
bmin  : Minimum mid-span cross-section width  
bw  : Support cross-section width 
bw,req,acc  : Support cross-section width demanded by accidental design situation 
bw,req,per  : Support cross-section width demanded by persistent design situation 
c  : Factor which accounts for the dependency between different failure events; Constant de-
pending on the curvature distribution along the member 
d  : Effective cross-section depth 
d1  : Concrete cover  
e  : Eccentricity; Exponential function 
e/h  : Normalized eccentricity (for cross-section depth h) 
(e/h)d  : Normalized design eccentricity (for cross-section depth h) 
(e/h)d,acc  : Normalized design eccentricity (for cross-section depth h) corresponding to the acci-
dental design situation 
ed  : Design eccentricity 
eE  : Applied eccentricity  
ei  : Regression model residual  
emin  : Minimum eccentricity 
eR  : Failure point eccentricity  
eR,b  : Balanced eccentricity (corresponding to balance point) 
etot  : Nominal eccentricity  
ey  : Yield eccentricity 
eI  : First order eccentricity  
eII  : Second order eccentricity 
f  : Failure; Material strength 
f(t)  : Load-time function  
fc  : Concrete compressive strength 
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fcd  : Design concrete compressive strength 
fc,dyn  : Concrete compressive strength under dynamic loading conditions 
fck  : Characteristic concrete compressive strength  
fcm  : Mean concrete compressive strength  
fc,stat  : Concrete compressive strength under static loading conditions 
fct  : Concrete tensile strength  
fct,dyn  : Concrete tensile strength under dynamic loading conditions 
fct,stat  : Concrete tensile strength under static loading conditions 
fk  : Characteristic value of a material strength 
fs  : Strength of reinforcement (fy or ft) 
fs,dyn  : Strength of reinforcement under dynamic loading conditions  
fs,stat  : Strength of reinforcement under static loading conditions 
ft  : Tensile strength of reinforcement  
ft,dyn  : Tensile strength of reinforcement under dynamic loading conditions 
ftk  : Characteristic tensile strength of reinforcement 
ft,stat  : Tensile strength of reinforcement under static loading conditions 
fX(x)  :  Probability density function for variable X 
fX(x)  :  Joint probability density function for vector of basic variables Xi 
fXY(x,y)  :  Joint probability density function for variables X and Y 
fy  : Yield strength of reinforcement 
fyd  : Design yield strength of reinforcement 
fy,dyn  : Yield strength of reinforcement under dynamic loading conditions 
fyk  : Characteristic yield strength of reinforcement 
fy,stat  : Yield strength of reinforcement under static loading conditions 
fyw  : Yield strength of shear reinforcement  
fyw,dyn  : Yield strength of shear reinforcement under dynamic loading conditions 
fywk  : Characteristic yield strength of shear reinforcement  
fyw,stat  : Yield strength of shear reinforcement under static loading conditions 
fZ(z)  :  Probability density function for variable Z 
fZ(z)  :  Joint probability density function for vector of standardized variables Zi 
g(…)  : Function of (…) 
g(X)  : Structural performance function in terms of basic variables Xi 
gf  : Uniformly distributed permanent loads of floor system, excluding self-weight of the prin-
ciple beams (force/area) 
gf,k  : Characteristic value for uniformly distributed permanent loads of floor system, exclud-
ing self-weight of the principle beams (force/area) 
gr  : Uniformly distributed permanent loads of roof system, excluding self-weight of the prin-
ciple beams (force/area) 
gr,k  : Characteristic value for uniformly distributed permanent loads of roof system, excluding 
self-weight of the principle beams (force/area) 
g̃c  : Self-weight of the principle beams (force/length) 
g̃c,k  : Characteristic value for self-weight of the principle beams (force/length) 
g̃f  : Uniformly distributed permanent loads of floor system, excluding self-weight of the prin-
ciple beams (force/length) 
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g̃f,k  : Characteristic value for uniformly distributed permanent loads of floor system, exclud-
ing self-weight of the principle beams (force/length) 
g̃r  : Uniformly distributed permanent loads of roof system, excluding self-weight of the prin-
ciple beams (force/length) 
g̃r,k  : Characteristic value for uniformly distributed permanent loads of roof system, excluding 
self-weight of the principle beams (force/length) 
h  : Cross-section depth 
hu  : housing unit 
hc  : Column height 
hii  : Leverage of observation Yi (ith diagonal element of hat matrix H) 
hs  : Storey height 
i  : Number; Person; Distributed inertia forces  
j  : Number; Hazard scenario (collapse scenario of a structural member) 
k  : Number; Consequence type, Stiffness; Ratio between tensile- and yield strength of rein-
forcing steel; Member failure mode 
kc  : Coefficient for determining the depth of the resulting concrete compressive force Fc un-
der assumption of a parabola-rectangle diagram 
kdyn  : Effective stiffness (during response to dynamic actions) 
kdyn,eq  : Equivalent effective stiffness (during response to dynamic actions) 
keq  : Equivalent stiffness (SDOF system) 
kM,dyn  : Effective stiffness (during response to dynamic actions) in terms of moment/displace-
ment 
l  : Beam span ( = distance between frames in longitudinal sense of the building); Member 
load arrangement 
lEX  : Tributary width for a member under explosion load exposure 
lG+Q  : Tributary width for a member under gravitational load exposure 
lij  : Lethality rate for person i due to hazard scenario j 
l0  : Effective length of a column (buckling length) 
m  : Mass; Material property; Slope 
m̅  : Mass per unit length 
mi  : Ratio between observed value Yi and model prediction Ŷi 
mdyn  : Material property under dynamic loading conditions 
mdyn  : Set of material properties under dynamic loading conditions 
meq  : Equivalent mass (SDOF system) 
mR  : Slope of the plastic response stage of the moment curvature function 
mstat  : Material property under static loading conditions 
mstat  : Set of material under static loading conditions 
mII  : Slope (at y) of step-function ME() representing action effect ME as function of   
n  : Number of fatalities 
nhu  : Number of housing units 
nhu,bw  :  Number of housing units affected by the blast wave 
nhu,col  :  Number of housing units affected by the collapse 
ni  : Number of risk-exposed persons 
nj  : Number of hazard scenarios 
nk  : Number of failure modes 
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nl  : Number of load arrangements 
nm  : Number of structural members 
ns  : Number of storeys (excluding ground floor and roof) 
ns,bw  :  Number of storeys affected by the blast wave 
ns,col  :  Number of storeys affected by the collapse 
ns,f  : Number of storeys where member failure occurs 
p  :  Pressure; Probability 
p(EX)  : Occurrence probability of a gas explosion in a gas-supplied housing-unit during refer-
ence period Tref 
pd  : Nominal explosion pressure 
pd|f  : Conditional probability of death of a person in the event of failure 
pe  :  Member exposure probability 
pEX  :  Explosion pressure 
pEX,peak  :  Explosion peak pressure 
pEX(-),(+)  : Accidental load arrangements for beams 
pf  : Probability of failure 
pf,adm  : Implicitly admissible failure probability 
pf,adm|EX  : Implicitly admissible conditional probability of member failure provided that a gas ex-
plosion has occurred and the associated effects influence the member loading conditions. 
pf,adm,EX  : Implicitly admissible failure probability due to an explosion load arrangement 
pf,adm,PER  : Implicitly admissible failure probability due to a persistent load arrangement 
pf|EX  : Conditional probability of failure provided that a gas explosion has occurred and the as-
sociated effects influence the member loading conditions 
pf,EX  :  Probability for a structural member to fail (in a certain failure mode) under an explosion 
load arrangement 
pf,kl  :  Probability for a structural member to fail in mode k under load arrangement l  
pf,kl|EX  : Conditional probability of member failure in mode k provided a gas explosion occurred 
and the associated effects influence the member loading conditions l 
pf,PER  :  Probability for a structural member to fail (in a certain failure mode) under a persistent 
load arrangement 
pft,code  : Nominal target probability of failure according to current design codes 
pft|EX  : Target value for conditional probability of failure pf|EX 
pft,EX  : Target value for failure probability pf,EX 
pft|EX,code : Nominal target value for conditional probability of failure pf|EX according to current de-
sign codes 
pft|EX,IR  : Individual risk-based target value for conditional probability of failure pf|EX  
pft|EX,max : Maximum target value for conditional probability of failure pf|EX 
pft|EX,min :  Minimum target value for conditional probability of failure pf|EX 
pft|EX,SR  : Societal risk-based target value for conditional probability of failure pf|EX 
pft|EX,SR,max : Maximum societal risk-based target value for conditional probability of failure pf|EX 
pft|EX,SR,min : Minimum societal risk-based target value for conditional probability of failure pf|EX 
pft,IR  : Target probability of failure based on individual risk 
pf,TOT  : Total probability for a structural member to fail (in a certain failure mode) under all kind 
of load arrangements potentially affecting the member in question 
pft,PER  : Target value for failure probability pf,PER 
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pft,SR  : Target probability of failure based on societal risk 
pft,TOT  : Target value for total failure probability pf,TOT  
pj  : Occurrence probability of hazard scenario j 
pkey  : Nominal pressure for design of key elements against unidentified accidental actions 
pN|f  : Conditional probability of N ≥ n fatalities in the event of failure  
pstat  : Static failure pressure of venting panels 
p̃  :  Uniformly distributed load (force/length) 
p̃d  : Nominal explosion load (force/length) 
p̃EX  :  Uniformly distributed explosion load (force/length) 
p̃EX,h  :  Uniformly distributed explosion load in horizontal direction (force/length) 
p̃EX,peak  :  Uniformly distributed explosion peak load (force/length) 
p̃N  :  Equivalent, uniformly distributed explosion load on a column taking account of eccentric 
axial force (force/length) 
qi  : Uniformly distributed imposed loads on building floors (force/area) 
qi,k  : Characteristic value for uniformly distributed imposed loads on building floors 
(force/area) 
qs  : Uniformly distributed snow load on roof (force/area) 
qs,k  : Characteristic value for uniformly distributed snow load on roof (force/area) 
q̃i  : Uniformly distributed imposed load on building floors (force/length) 
q̃i,k  : Characteristic value for uniformly distributed imposed load on building floors 
(force/length) 
q̃s  : Uniformly distributed snow load on roof (force/length) 
q̃s,k  : Characteristic value for uniformly distributed snow load on roof (force/length) 
s  : Number; Distance between stirrups along the longitudinal member axis; building storey 
sbi   : Standard deviation of regression coefficient bi 
ri  : Individual risk to person i 
ri,adm  : Admissible individual risk 
ri,EX  : Individual risk to person i due to collapse scenarios associated with explosion load ar-
rangements 
rij  : Individual risk to person i associated with hazard scenario j 
ri,PER  : Individual risk to person i due to collapse scenarios associated with persistent load ar-
rangements 
ri,TOT  : Total individual risk to person i due to collapse scenarios associated with all kind of load 
arrangements potentially affecting the structure in question 
rit,PER  : Target value for individual risk ri,PER  
rit,TOT  : Target value for total individual risk ri,TOT 
rQ  : Coefficient of correlation associated with a quantile plot 
rQ,  : Critical value for coefficient of correlation associated with a quantile plot 
t  : Time; t distribution by Student; Cut-off value corresponding to t distribution by Student 
tbi   : t-statistic corresponding to t distribution by Student 
ti  : Regression model studentized residual  
tcr  : Time at cracking of concrete 
tdec  : Time at decompression of cross-section 
tmax  : Time at maximum response 
tp  : Explosion pressure pulse duration 
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tr  : Explosion pressure rise time 
tu  : Time at ultimate deflection 
tV  : Time at maximum shear force 
ty  : Time at yield 
t  : Time required to attain a specific stress state  
x  : Neutral axis depth, coordinate of the longitudinal axis of a beam 
x  : Specific realization of vector X 
𝐱∗  : Design point vector  
𝐱∗𝐓  : Transposed design point vector  
xi  : Specific realization of basic variable Xi 
xi*  : Design point coordinates 
xid  : Code-based design value 
xpEX,peak,p  :  p-fractile value of explosion peak pressure  
xpEX,peak,p,est:  Estimated p-fractile value of explosion peak pressure  
xR  : Specific realization of vector XR 
y  : Year 
z  : Specific realization of vector Z  
z*  : Design point vector in standardized normal space 
zi  : Specific realization of standardized basic variable Zi 
zi*  : Design point coordinates in standardized normal space 
Greek upper case letters 
M*  : Difference between bending moments ME* and MR* corresponding to FORM design point 
ME  : Increment of bending moment ME 
MEX  : Increment first order bending moment at the intermediate cross-section of the columns 
due to the horizontal explosion load p̃EX,h 
ME,I  : Increment of first order bending moment ME,I 
ME,II  : Increment of second order bending moment ME,II 
MNEX   : Increment first order bending moment at the intermediate cross-section of the columns 
due to the eccentrically applied axial force NEX 
N*  : Difference between axial forces NE* and NR* corresponding to FORM design point 
NE  : Increment of axial force NE 
a  : Deviation of a geometrical property a from its nominal value 
h  : Increment of cross-section depth h 
s  : Load step size 
t  : Time step size 
  : Standard normal distribution function 
d,req  : Required value for design parameter 
  : Ratio between the design values for the ultimate and the yield moment 
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Greek lower case letters 
  : Risk aversion exponent in F-n criterion; Angle between the shear reinforcement and the 
longitudinal member axis; Constant model parameter in a regression model 
A  : Reduction factor for imposed loads on beams 
i  : Sensitivity factor 
n  : Reduction factor for imposed loads on columns 
  : Reliability index 
c  : Coefficient taking account of shear crack inclination 
i  : Model parameter of a regression model
req  : Required reliability index 
req,EX  : Required reliability index associated with explosion scenario 
req,PER  : Required reliability index associated with persistent scenario 
t  : Target reliability index 
t,code  :  Nominal target reliability index according to current design codes 
  : Curvature 
cc  : Curvature due to concrete creep 
cr  : Cracking curvature 
stat  : Curvature due to static actions 
tot  : Nominal curvature 
u  : Ultimate curvature 
y  : Yield curvature 
  : Displacement; Deflection; Resulting deflection at mid-span of the columns  
δ̇  : Velocity 
δ̈  : Acceleration 
dyn  : Displacement due to dynamic actions  
max  : Maximum displacement; Maximum deflection 
max,dyn  : Maximum displacement (deflection) due to dynamic actions 
stat  : Displacement of the intermediate cross-section of the columns due to static actions  
u  : Ultimate displacement; Ultimate deflection 
u,dyn  : Ultimate displacement due to dynamic actions 
y  : Yield displacement; Yield deflection 
y,dyn  : Yield displacement due to dynamic actions 
  : Strain 
c  : Concrete compressive strain 
c,stat  : Concrete compressive strain due to static actions 
ct  :  Strain in the most loaded concrete cross-section fiber in tension 
ct,stat  :  Strain in the most loaded concrete cross-section fiber in tension due to static actions 
cu  : Ultimate concrete compressive strain  
cu,dyn  : Ultimate concrete compressive strain under dynamic loading conditions 
cu,stat  : Ultimate concrete compressive strain under static loading conditions 
cv  : Strain in the concrete compression strut at time of maximum shear (t=tv) 
cv,stat  : Strain in the concrete compression strut due to static actions 
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c,y  : Concrete compressive strain at yield of the longitudinal reinforcement (t=ty) 
c1  : Concrete compressive strain at maximum stress 
c1,dyn  : Concrete compressive strain at maximum stress under dynamic loading conditions 
c1,stat  : Concrete compressive strain at maximum stress under static loading conditions 
s  : Strain of reinforcement 
sv  : Strain in the transverse reinforcement close to the member support cross-section at time 
of maximum shear (t=tv) 
sv,stat  : Strain in the transverse reinforcement close to the member support cross-section due to 
static actions   
s1  : Strain of tensile reinforcement layer 
s1*  : Strain of tensile reinforcement layer corresponding to FOSM design point 
s1,stat  : Strain of tensile reinforcement layer due to static actions   
s1,y  : Strain of tensile reinforcement layer at yield (t=ty) 
s2  : Strain of compression reinforcement layer  
s2*  : Strain of compression reinforcement layer corresponding to FOSM design point 
u  : Strain of reinforcement at maximum load 
u,dyn  : Strain of reinforcement at maximum load under dynamic loading conditions 
uk  : Characteristic value for strain of reinforcement at maximum load 
u,stat  : Strain of reinforcement at maximum load under static loading conditions 
y  : Yield strain of reinforcement  
y,dyn  : Yield strain of reinforcement under dynamic loading conditions 
yk  : Characteristic value for yield strain of reinforcement 
y,stat  : Yield strain of reinforcement under static loading conditions 
,dyn  : Strain corresponding to a specific stress-state  under dynamic loading conditions 
ε̇  : Strain rate 
ε̇c  : Strain rate of concrete in compression 
ε̇c,av  : Average strain rate of concrete in compression 
ε̇ct,av  : Average strain rate of concrete in tension 
ε̇cv,av  : Average strain rate in the concrete compression strut  
ε̇c0  : Quasi-static strain rate of concrete in compression 
ε̇m,av  : Average strain rate 
?̇?𝐦,𝐚𝐯  : Set of average strain rates  
ε̇s  : Strain rate of reinforcing steel 
ε̇s,av  : Average strain rate of reinforcing steel 
ε̇s0  : Quasi-static strain rate of reinforcing steel 
ϵ  : Error or disturbance term in a regression model 
MII   : Ratio between the dynamic, second order moment ME,dyn,II and the total dynamic bending 
moment ME,dyn  
MII,d   : Ratio between the second order design moment MEd,II and the total design bending mo-
ment MEd  
(x)  : Ordinate of the shape function of a structural member at distance x 
  : Confidence level 
c  : Partial safety factor for concrete 
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Ed  : Partial safety factor covering uncertainty in the action and/or action effect model 
F  : Partial safety factor covering uncertainty in the action and/or action effect model and in 
the corresponding model 
f  : Partial safety factor for actions or action effects 
M  : Partial safety factor covering uncertainty in the material properties resistance and in the 
resistance model 
m  : Partial safety factor for material properties 
Rd  : Partial safety factor associated covering uncertainty in the resistance model 
s  : Partial safety factor for reinforcing steel 
  : Policy factor 
c  : Reduction factor for concrete cracked in shear 
  : Slenderness ratio; Probability of an explosion event per unit of time  
  : Mean value 
μfm,dyn    : Mean value of dynamic material strength  
μfm,stat    : Mean value of static material strength  
μmdyn    : Mean value of dynamic material property  
μmstat    : Mean value of static material property 
μpEX,peak    : Mean value of peak pressure (population) 
μpEX,peak,s   : Mean value of peak pressure (sample) 
X  : Mean value of variable X 
   : Displacement ductility ratio 
,dyn   : Effective displacement ductility ratio during dynamic response 
,dyn,eq   : Equivalent effective displacement ductility ratio during dynamic response  
   : Curvature ductility ratio 
μξE,dyn    : Mean value of model uncertainty coefficient for determining action effect E due to dy-
namic actions 
acc   : Ratio between the nominal explosion load p̃d and the total nominal load supported by the 
beams 
  :  Angle between the concrete compression strut and the longitudinal member axis 
  :  Correlation coefficient, reinforcement ratio 
c  :  Material density (reinforced concrete) 
l  :  Longitudinal reinforcement ratio 
XY  :  Correlation coefficient between variables X and Y 
w  :  Shear reinforcement ratio 
  :  Standard deviation; Stress 
2  :  Variance 
c  :  Axial stress state in the concrete cross-section (c > 0 for compression) taking account of 
the force resisted by the longitudinal reinforcement 
σpEX,peak    : Standard deviation of peak pressure (population) 
σpEX,peak,s   : Standard deviation of peak pressure (sample) 
X  :  Standard deviation of variable X 
X2  :  Variance of variable X 
X,Y  :  Covariance between variables X and Y 
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σξE,dyn    : Standard deviation of model uncertainty coefficient for determining action effect E due 
to dynamic actions 
ξ  : Model uncertainty coefficient 
ξEdyn    : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining action effect E due to dynamic actions 
ξME,dyn    : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining bending moments due to dynamic actions 
ξME,stat   : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining bending moments due to static actions 
ξMR    : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining resisting bending moments 
ξNE,dyn   : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining axial forces due to dynamic actions 
ξNE,stat   : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining axial forces due to static actions 
ξNR    : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining resisting axial forces 
ξVE,dyn    : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining shear forces due to dynamic actions 
ξVE,stat   : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining shear forces due to static actions 
ξVRc    : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining the shear resistance limited by crushing of 
the compression struts 
ξVRs    : Model uncertainty coefficient for determining the shear resistance limited by yielding of 
the shear reinforcement 
0  : Factor for combination value of a variable action 
1  : Factor for frequent value of a variable action 
2  : Factor for quasi-permanent value of a variable action 
  : Tensile reinforcement index  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Risks and their treatment in structural engineering  
In everyday life risk is a common term used interchangeably with words like chance, likelihood and 
probability to indicate that there is uncertainty about the state of the activity, item or issue under dis-
cussion [1]. In a technical context, and particular when referring to the field of decision making problems 
in engineering, risk is to be understood as a mathematical expectation of the consequences of an unde-
sired event [2], e.g. a structural failure. Considering a single event, the risk (R) is expressed by (1.1) as 
the probability (P) that this event will occur multiplied with the possible consequences (C) it might en-
tail. Since probabilities are dimensionless quantities, the risk (R) is given in the units of the conse-
quences (C), e.g., number of fatalities, monetary units, environmental losses, etc.     
R = P ∙ C          (1.1) 
Risk, as given per (1.1), is a measure for the magnitude of a hazard which can be defined as a set of 
circumstances with the potential for causing undesired events within a given system [2], as for instance 
an abnormal action or an insufficient resistance. Figure 1.1 adopted from [3], is an attempt to 
schematically categorize the hazard potential associated with a specific technical system, e.g. a building 
structure. Naturally, only objectively known hazards, i.e., which have been appeared somewhere before, 
can be subjectively recognised as a threat for structural safety. Subjectively realised hazards might be 
taken into account by counteracting, suitable safety measures. Alternatively, they might be consciously 
accepted, in case the corresponding risk is judged sufficiently small. Along with the hazards stemming 
from human errors, which might have their origin either in unknown, unrealised or simply ignored 
hazards, or as well in erroneous safety measures, the consciously accepted risks constitute the so-called 
residual risks, with which, as Schneider [3] points out, «…we have to live – whether we like it or not…» 
and which are the cause of failures in daily practice. Schneider’s analysis [3] of about 800 structural 
failures published in [4] reveals that in around 75% of these incidents or accidents some sort of human 
error was the triggering event, rising to even 85% when considering only those cases where casualties 
were involved (Figure 1.1). These numbers allude to scope for improvement, especially with regard to 
efficiency of control and checking mechanisms [5-7]. Moreover, they imply that around 25% of the 
studied 800 accidents and incidents, and approximately 15% of those where casualties were among the 
consequences, may be attributed to consciously accepted risks, what merits further attention.  
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Figure 1.1 Categorization of hazard potential associated with a technical system; adapted from [3] 
The consciously accepted risks associated with a structural system are the natural consequence of un-
certainties involved in the demands on the system, in its geometrical or material properties or in mod-
eling of both action effects and structural performance. While, as shown before, risk cannot be avoided, 
it can be managed in the public interest [8]. Risk management concerns the analysis, assessment and 
decision-making in regard to the risks involved in a certain problem. It includes the joint consideration 
of all uncertainties prevailing in a particular problem and all possible consequences. In this process, a 
central role for engineers is to provide a basis for decision-making in regard to the cost efficient safe-
guarding of personnel, environment and assets [1]. The notion cost efficient safeguarding alludes 
thereby to the fact that each safety measure, or equivalently, risk-reducing measure, has a certain cost 
and that the available financial resources for this purpose are limited and, consequently, must be aimed 
at being allocated with the highest possible efficiency.  
In daily structural design practice, the treatment of safety is based on an implicit approach where the 
risks associated with a certain structural solution are not explicitly quantified and the question of their 
acceptability is judged on the base of prescriptive, codified rules. These rules, mainly based on experi-
ence and knowledge gained in the past, are deemed reasonable for the type of structure and problem 
concerned [2]. They represent the state of best practice and provide a reasonable basis for the design of 
most type of structures under normal loading, operational and environmental conditions [1]. Neverthe-
less, the prescriptive character inherent to the implicit treatment of safety entails scope for improve-
ment in certain aspects. For instance, in everyday practice many objectively known hazards remain un-
detected, as reflected by the significant influence of human errors among the residual risks (Figure 1.1). 
Moreover, the implicitly (and consciously) accepted risks associated with structures designed to current 
standards diverge widely for a number of reasons, among them the lack of a fully consistent calibration 
of the standards themselves [9, 10], what alludes to a certain margin for a more efficient allocation of 
the available resources for reduction of these risks.  
A growing acknowledgement of the consequences of such shortcomings has prompted the inclusion of 
explicit risk analysis in some of the more recent structural design codes, as for instance the Eurocodes 
[11]. As the notion explicit refers to, in such an analysis the risks associated with a certain structural 
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system or solution are explicitly quantified and compared with safety targets in terms of maximum ac-
ceptable risks [2]. Often, such an approach is referred to as performance-based, since design or evalua-
tion is based on performance-based requirements rather than a closed set of prescriptive rules. In com-
parison to the implicit approach adopted in daily practice, an explicit analysis and assessment of risks 
entails a number of significant advantages [12]. For instance, a systematic qualitative risk analysis might 
contribute to detection of relevant hazards and thereby to prevent structural failures. Moreover, on the 
grounds of a quantitative risk analysis, suitable acceptance criteria may be derived which provide a ra-
tional basis for decision-making in structural engineering [9, 10, 13]. For instance, they may constitute 
the basis for a consistent calibration of the semi-probabilistic models used in the current standards. 
Other applications where explicit risk analysis provides significant advantages are the assessment of 
existing structures [14] or the forensic analysis of failed or collapsed structures [15], where site-specific 
data obtained from the structure may be included in an adequate manner in the evaluation procedure. 
Moreover, such methods may contribute to the justification of innovative technologies and the optimi-
zation of certain solutions, which are substantial advantages of performance-based design codes. 
1.1.2 Risks associated with accidental design situations 
Another field where explicit analysis and assessment of structural risks delivers significant benefits con-
cerns the accidental design situations which are governed by so-called accidental or abnormal actions, 
e.g. due to fire, explosion or impact. Accidental actions, which may be considered as the most common 
causes of structural failure [16], may be characterised as low probability - high consequence events [8]. 
The meaning of this is that it is unlikely that they will occur during the envisaged design working-life of 
the structure, but that in case they do, they might entail considerable load effects, which, if not appro-
priately accounted for, might lead to significant consequences.  
A number of structural design codes, among them Eurocode EN 1991-1-7 [17], provide specific guidance 
concerning design for accidental actions. Given the aforementioned, specific nature of such actions, the 
general design philosophy differs from the usual approach followed for normal actions in persistent 
design situations. Design for accidental situations according to EN 1991-1-7 is in particular imple-
mented to avoid structural catastrophes [18]. This is reflected by the general performance requirement 
stated in the Eurocodes, that the structure shall be designed and executed in a way that it will not be 
damaged by events such as fire, explosion, impact and the consequences of human errors, to an extent dis-
proportionate to the original cause [11, 17]. As a result of this principle, local failure, in most cases iden-
tified as a member or component failure, might be acceptable in accidental design situations provided 
that neither the whole structure nor an important part thereof will collapse [18]. Other strategies for 
risk-control or mitigation when designing for accidental actions according to [17] are: 
- Preventing the action from occurring or reducing the probability and/or magnitude of the action 
to a reasonable level (e.g., by fire alarm or sprinkler systems). 
- Protecting the structure against the action (e.g. by traffic bollards). 
- Designing the structure to resist the action (or designing key elements, on which the structure 
would be particularly reliant). 
- Applying prescriptive design/detailing rules which provide a minimum level of robustness (e.g., 
tri-orthogonal tying for resistance to explosions, or minimum level of ductility of structural ele-
ments subject to impact). 
- Mitigating the consequences of structural failure. 
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In practice, the appropriate choice of one or several of the aforementioned strategies will depend on the 
particular circumstances of each individual design problem at hand. Regardless of this, the practical im-
plementation of these strategies might be associated with certain difficulties. For instance, in  [18] the 
limited effect of preventing or protective measures is mentioned for they depend on factors which, over 
the life span of the structure, might be outside the control of the structural design process. On the other 
hand, providing specific local resistance to members might not be justified measure from an economical 
point of view taking account of the low probability of occurrence and the high uncertainties associated 
with accidental actions. The fact that for purpose of an economical design the nominal values for some 
of the loads laid down in [17] are kept usually unrealistic small, such as in the case of impact loads due 
to vehicles [16], may neither be considered a solution on rational grounds, even if in a context of a linear-
elastic structural analysis the design might nevertheless be conservative [19]. In that sense it might be 
more rational to focus on controlling the consequences of local damage as suggested, for instance, by 
[20]. However, the tolerance of local failure in view of preserving general structural system performance 
might also be associated with problems regarding practical implementation. For instance, Ellingwood 
highlights that this concept may not be attractive to certain stakeholders [8], what is especially the case 
when risk for human life is involved.  
The foregoing considerations indeed underline that, despite the significant advances made in the past, 
a rational design of structures for accidental actions remains a challenging issue [16]. Vrouwenvelder 
points out that the current European design standard [17] should be seen as a first step only, which 
offers scope for improvement from both the theoretical and practical point of view [21]. The advantages 
that an explicit risk analysis and assessment procedure might offer in this context are numerous: 
A systematic, qualitative risk analysis might contribute to the detection of objectively known, but diffi-
cult to recognize accidental actions (Figure 1.1). 
- Out of all potential hazards to a structure, it should be focused on those that lead to an unac-
ceptable increase in risk. To identify those hazards, a quantitative risk analysis based upon ra-
tional acceptance criteria constitutes an essential decision tool. Thereby, the aforementioned 
specific characteristics inherent to accidental actions, such as low occurrence probabilities, on 
one hand, and high uncertainties and failure consequences, on the other, might be put into per-
spective and judged in a rational manner, in terms of risk.  
- The availability of rational risk acceptance criteria is moreover helpful in view of devising ap-
propriate strategies and measures for risk mitigation, which should be given high priority in 
design for accidental actions [18]. For instance, the efficiency of preventive measures could be 
judged within the scope of an explicit risk analysis. The same is true for structural measures, like 
specific design of certain structural elements to withstand the action. In addition, decisions on 
the acceptance of a certain amount of damage could be judged in a suitable manner by means of 
explicit risk analysis, provided rational acceptance criteria are at hand. 
- Explicit risk-analysis enables global decision making regarding treatment of technical risks in 
general, and in structural engineering in particular. In this respect, the quantification of risks 
associated with accidental actions would enable a direct comparison to risks associated with 
other design situations, such as the persistent design situations [11]. Moreover, comparison be-
tween risks associated with different types of structures (buildings, bridges, etc.) might be es-
tablished. In summary, the explicit methods provide a base for a unified safety concept and, con-
sequently, for an efficient allocation of resources designated for risk-reduction. 
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The benefits provided by methods geared to risk based decision making in the field of structural engi-
neering, in general, and related to accidental actions in particular, are generally recognized [1, 12, 16, 
22]. In the last years, significant advances have been made with respect to development and application 
of such methods. However, for the time being the existing regulations establish only a general frame-
work for this purpose. The lack of practical tools and methods, as well as administrative obstacles, still 
hinders the implementation of explicit approaches in routine practice to date. A key issue in this context 
is the lack of rational risk acceptance criteria. The Eurocode on accidental actions [17], for instance, 
identifies the need for defining the accidental actions to be taken into account in design, as well as the 
corresponding design strategies, as a function of the acceptable level of risk, among others. However, 
acceptable risk levels are not explicitly established and it is up to authorities, owners or other stake-
holders to prescribe these [23]. 
On this background, the present thesis aims to contribute to the development of practical models and 
criteria designated for the analysis and acceptance of structural risks associated with accidental actions. 
In particular, the work focuses on risks due to gas explosions in building structures. 
1.1.3 Risks due to gas explosions in building structures 
Gas explosions account for a substantial number of accidental actions in buildings [24]. The most famous 
case is without doubt the accident in an apartment on the 18th floor of the 22-storey Ronan Point build-
ing (London) in 1968. A gas explosion blew out an external load-bearing wall what made the upper floor 
slab fell onto the floor below, initiating a progressive collapse of one corner of the whole block [25], as 
shown in Figure 1.2 (left) [26]. Five people died and 16 were injured. The incident alerted experts in the 
field of structural engineering to the problem of progressive collapse [27] and finally let to modification 
of building codes and regulations. Since then, and despite the continuous modernization of gas installa-
tions and appliances, the occurrence rate of gas explosions in buildings across different western coun-
tries does not seem to decrease in a significant way. In Spain, for instance, such incidents caused at least 
132 fatalities in the last decade [28], many among them attributable to structural collapse. As an exam-
ple, Figure 1.2 (right) shows the complete collapse of a residential building in Palencia, in 2007, involv-
ing 9 fatalities and more than 30 injured [29]. 
 
Figure 1.2 Partial collapse of Ronan Point building (London), in 1968 (left) [26] and total building collapse in 
Palencia (Spain) in 2009 (right) [29]. 
Gas explosions are dealt with in the Eurocodes [17]. Given their well-known hazard potential for struc-
tural safety, they are classified as identified accidental actions, and demanded to be accounted for “in 
Acceptable life safety risks associated with the effects of gas explosions on reinforced concrete structures 
 
6 
the design of all parts of the building (or other engineering works) where gas is burnt or regulated…”. 
In some other part of [17] it is specified that for buildings classified as consequence class CC2, such as 
residential buildings [11], the design for gas explosions should be based on the design of key elements 
“to resist the action by either using an analysis based upon static equivalent load models or by applying 
prescriptive design/detailing rules”. Specific guidance on practical applications is provided in [30]. 
In spite of their, at least, apparent importance with regard to structural safety, and despite the specific 
consideration in the Eurocodes [17], it is felt that in the vast majority of ordinary buildings designed 
nowadays in Spain, and probably elsewhere, risks associated with gas explosions are not counteracted 
by any kind of measures. In other words, such risks are often ignored and sometimes consciously ac-
cepted (Figure 1.1). Among possible reasons therefore, one might quote the occurrence rate of explosion 
events, by most engineers probably perceived as very low, and the reluctance to allocate funds to miti-
gate such kind of low-probability future events [8]. Whatever the reasons are, the question that rises is 
if “doing nothing” is a justified practice, or if, on the contrary, certain risk reduction measures would be 
appropriate. A knowledgeable answer to this question cannot be easily given however, since according 
to the implicit approach in current practice the risks are not quantified nor are the acceptable risk levels 
established. Indeed, addressing these issues would contribute to a more rational and transparent treat-
ment with regard to decisions on both the need and the appropriate choice of risk-reduction measures 
to counteract the effects of gas explosions in buildings. These subjects are being addressed in the present 
thesis. The particular objectives and the scope of the work will be outlined in advance. 
1.2 Scope 
As stated before, equation (1.1) describes, in general terms the risk associated with a certain undesired 
event. Generally, any type of structural failure or behaviour might constitute such an event. However, in 
the context of accidental actions, the most relevant, undesired event is a structural collapse scenario and 
consequently the study focuses thereon only. Under consideration of an abnormal design situation, such 
as a gas explosion, the probability (P) for structural collapse can, in general terms, be itemized as ex-
pressed per (1.2): 
P = P(H) ∙ P(D|H) ∙ P(S|D)        (1.2) 
where H represents the hazard, D the local damage and S a failure scenario related to system failure 
[31]. Referring to the hazard gas explosion in building structures, probability P(H) represents the occur-
rence probability of such an explosion, P(D|H) the conditional probability of a member failure in case 
the explosion occurs and P(S|D) the conditional probability of a partial or total collapse of the structure, 
given the local damage. The idealized representation of the collapse probability given by equation (1.2) 
provides the basis for the current treatment of load combinations for abnormal loads in ASCE Standard 
7-10 [32], as reported by [33], and is generally used within the context of a risk-based approach for 
evaluation of structural robustness [34], [35]. 
Probability P(H) can be estimated from statistics and is essentially independent of any structural design 
strategy adopted to increase safety, whereas P(D|H) and P(S|D) fall in the purview of the structural en-
gineer [22]. The probability of member failure given the hazard, P(D|H), can be assessed by means of 
structural reliability methods for which purpose suitable probabilistic models for both action and re-
sistance variables are required. Finally, probability for system failure P(S|D) depends on the character-
istics of the entire structure and demands an analysis in the damaged state where load-carrying mech-
anisms not normally considered in building design (e.g., membrane action of floors, large deformations, 
significant non-linear action in the post-peak range) are mobilized [22]. Such an analysis is difficult and 
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impractical for design, although it might naturally be justified for research purpose, as for instance in 
[34]. In the present work the explicit analysis of a structural system in the damaged state, and conse-
quently the explicit estimation of the conditional system failure probability 𝑃(𝑆|𝐷) is not included. Con-
sequently, the quantification of the effectiveness of prescriptive design or detailing rules, affecting sys-
tem behaviour rather than member behaviour, such as providing continuity through tie forces, is neither 
addressed in the study.  
Concerning the other main constituent of risk, as defined per (1.1), the consequences (C), it is to note 
that a gas explosion might entail loss of live, injury or significant monetary losses, among others. In the 
present study, representation of consequences will be simplified by consideration of fatalities only. This 
is justified since risks to personal integrity generally prevail in (civil) engineering, for both ethical and 
legal reasons [9]. Although according to the new international standard about general principles on re-
liability of structures [36], there is no need for defining acceptable levels of risk to persons, in the opin-
ion of social scientists it is unlikely that the public would accept higher failure rates than those associ-
ated with current best practice [13], even if they are based on rational acceptance criteria such as the 
Marginal Life Saving Cost principle (MLSC), demanded by [36]. Indeed, the aforementioned standard 
[36] states that “an activity which is found to be acceptable should be assessed in regard to the corre-
sponding absolute level of life safety risk”, and that the practical implementation of the MLSC principle 
by using the Life Quality Index (LQI) might require the specification of “absolute values of the acceptable 
life safety risks”. The LQI principle itself is not addressed in the work. 
Finally, the scope will be limited with respect to building types and their structural systems. Gas explo-
sions may occur in any type of building were gas is burnt for purpose of energy supply. However, the by 
far highest numbers of explosions occur in ordinary, residential buildings. In Spain, the vast majority of 
residential building structures are made of reinforced concrete (RC). The most common type of struc-
tural system is shown in Figure 1.3, constituted essentially by beams and columns resisting to both grav-
itational and wind loads. Consequently, the scope of the study is limited to such type of reinforced con-
crete structures, designated for residential use. Other construction materials or structural typologies, 
although they might be generally more vulnerable to explosions, such as non-reinforced masonry [37] 
or concrete panel structures [38], are not considered. 
 
Figure 1.3 Typical building structure with reinforced concrete members 
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The present study will be based on the Spanish building codes (CTE) on basis of design and actions while 
for structural resistance reference will be made to the national standard EHE. To a large extend, these 
codes are compatible with the respective Eurocodes. 
1.3 Objectives and approach 
The main objectives of the present thesis are the following: 
- To deduce and establish models for estimation of both the probabilities and the consequences 
of a gas explosion-induced collapse in ordinary, residential RC building structures. 
- To employ these models in order to determine the implicitly accepted risks to persons associ-
ated with such structures.  
- To deduce rational acceptance criteria that may be employed for the assessment of explosion 
related structural risks within the context of an explicit risk analysis, or serve as a basis for a 
risk-based calibration of semi-probabilistic models used in daily practice. 
The notion “implicitly accepted risks” refers thereby to the inherent risk set out in existing structural 
standards, which represent best practice (section 1.1.1) and which are regarded as intrinsically accepta-
ble. Risk acceptability therefore depends on the degree of reliability implicitly required by such stand-
ards. Taking account of the fact that structural design codes are based predominantly on the design of 
structural members or the consideration of individual member failure modes [39], this degree is directly 
associated with the implicitly accepted probability of cross-section or member failure. Strictly speaking, 
this is true for normal loading conditions (persistent design situations), since the design philosophy for 
accidental actions, as exposed before (section 1.1.2), differs from the traditional design approach for 
normal actions. Nevertheless, the Eurocode [11] offers, in compliance with the persistent design situa-
tions, the possibility to base the verification of structural safety in relation with gas explosions on cross-
section or member resistance (section 1.1.2), through application of the accidental design load combi-
nation. Although in daily practice member design for explosion loading might not be an economical so-
lution (section 1.1.2), and disregarding the fact that such a design, in contrast to the requirements in 
persistent design situations, is often neglected in practice (section 1.1.3), the failure probabilities asso-
ciated with cross-sections or members designed according to the accidental load combination, and by 
extension the corresponding risks, might indeed be referred to as intrinsically acceptable. Following this 
approach, the risks associated with gas explosions could be directly compared to the risks correspond-
ing to persistent design situations, which besides of being intrinsically accepted reflect general praxis. 
As stated before, one of the main advantages of explicit risk analysis and assessment is precisely that 
they provide a base for a unified, coherent safety concept including all type of situations to which a 
structure might be exposed. 
In light of these considerations, the following tasks have to be addressed in order to achieve the above-
defined objectives: 
The determination of structural failure probabilities requires the former definition of models in order 
to characterize the uncertainties associated with each of the basic variables involved in the problem at 
hand. Of special importance in the present context are those variables that refer to both the dynamic 
loading and resistance parameters. For instance, a probabilistic model for the gas explosion pressure is 
required. Moreover, dynamic effects on the structural behaviour, such as the contribution of inertia 
forces, energy dissipation by means of non-linear deformations or the strain rate sensitivity of materials 
should be accounted for in the reliability calculations, what calls for a previous dynamic analysis. For 
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purpose of an efficient data processing, and because excessive accuracy is not imperative in the present 
context, such an analysis should be based on simplified dynamic models.  
The estimation of the consequences of gas explosions in buildings demands for a suitable model. Since 
gas explosions occur with certain frequency (section 1.1.3), and since these, at least when fatalities are 
involved, are generally reported in press, a reasonable approach to obtain such a model from a statistical 
evaluation of data on real explosion-induced collapse events. Since the study focusses on risks to per-
sons, the model should deliver estimations for the number of fatalities as a function of some parameter 
characterizing the magnitude of structural damage induced by the explosion. Since the explicit analysis 
of damage to a structural system, provided a failure of one of its members, is out of scope (section 1.2), 
reasonable assumptions should be established regarding this issue. 
For the second of the established objectives, the estimation of the implicitly acceptable risks to persons, 
a procedure has to be defined which, for sake of a subsequent comparison, should be consistent with 
the approach adopted in former studies [9, 10, 13]. In broad terms, this procedure implies determining 
implicitly acceptable collapse probabilities of a representative set of structural members, strictly de-
signed according to a consistent set of code rules, so that structural member performance complies ex-
actly with the safety requirements that reflect current best practice. In a second step, the consequences 
of explosion-induced member collapse are to be estimated by means of the previously deduced conse-
quence models. Finally, the implicitly accepted risks to persons associated with a representative set of 
RC building structures should be determined as a function of both acceptable probabilities of structural 
failure and the associated consequences. 
Subsequently, risk acceptance criteria suited to practical applications should be deduced from the find-
ings. Thereby, risk acceptance from both the individual and the societal perspective should be ap-
proached. The results should be related and compared to previous developments associated with nor-
mal loading conditions [9, 10, 13]. Finally, the study should close with specific recommendations regard-
ing the acceptability of risks to persons due to gas explosions in building structures.  
1.4 Outline of the document 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The present chapter offers an introduction to the background of the present thesis. The concept of risk 
is introduced and their treatment in structural engineering is highlighted, with particular emphasis on 
accidental actions. It is argued that, in comparison with the implicit treatment of risks in daily practice, 
an explicit approach offers a variety of significant advantages that are all related to more rational deci-
sion making and hence to a more efficient allocation of resources designated for risk-reduction in prac-
tice. Specific reference is made to gas explosions in buildings. The need to quantify the associated risks 
and to deduce rational acceptance criteria for these is identified. On these grounds, the objectives and 
the scope of the present thesis are defined. 
Chapters 2 and 3: State of the art 
Given the different thematic areas to be dealt with in the present study, the state of the art will be treated 
in two different chapters. Chapter 2 adresses the basic concepts of risk and reliability. The main steps 
of an explicit risk analysis procedure comprising the establishment of risk acceptance criteria are ex-
plored. The principles of structural reliability are then presented and related to the treatment of risks 
in current design standards. Some consideration on the challenging issue of system reliability are made. 
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The chapter closes with a brief summary of the complex circumstances involved in the reliability analy-
sis of RC elements under moment-axial force interaction, since such calculations are addressed in the 
study. 
In Chapter 3, the occurrence and the physical backgrounds of gas explosions in building structures are 
explored. The behaviour of RC elements exposed to this type of action is described. Simplified ap-
proaches for modeling of this behaviour, employed in the presented study, are presented. 
Chapter 4: Approach and basic developments 
Chapter 4 addresses key issues regarding the approach to the study and the methodology (mathematical 
framework and procedure) followed in order to attain its objectives. Moreover, it contains basic devel-
opments upon which the following chapters are grounded. Among these are the definition of the repre-
sentative set of structures and structural members, the establishment of the hazard scenarios to these 
structures and the translation of these scenarios into limit state functions (LSF). Moreover, based these 
LSF, the strict design of the defined structural members is addressed. Finally, models are established for 
purpose of a stochastic characterization of the basic variables involved in the defined LSF. 
Chapter 5: Dynamic Analysis 
As stated before, the reliability analysis of explosion-induced member response may not obviate a spe-
cific dynamic analysis, what will be addressed in Chapter 5. In particular, the objectives of this analysis 
are the determination of dynamic load and increase factors, which account for certain dynamic influ-
ences on the structural behaviour of the members when exposed to the effects of an explosion. Moreo-
ver, second-order effects will be addressed in the analysis. The analysis procedure, based on simplified 
dynamic models is exposed, followed by a description and discussion of the results. Finite element cal-
culations are carried out for purpose of the validation of the simplified models used. 
Chapter 6: Implicit reliability level 
Chapter 6 addresses procedural aspects and the results of the FORM analysis carried out to establish 
the reliability level implicitly required by the employed design codes. A specifically developed reliability 
procedure for the analysis of column reliability under M-N interaction is described. The results for both 
beams and columns are then presented and discussed in the light of current target ceilings. Finally, 
Chapter 6 investigates into the accumulated failure probabilities of structural members, taking account 
of the fact that, in addition to the accidental load combination, their failure might be triggered by per-
sistent load arrangements. 
Chapter 7: Consequence models 
The deduction of models to estimate the consequences is outlined in Chapter 7. The procedure followed 
for data collection from press releases is exposed. Subsequently, the gathered data is statistically evalu-
ated and complemented by means of information from the National Statistics Institute (INE). A multi-
linear regression analysis is then performed. Different models are discussed on the background of sta-
tistical criteria in order to obtain the best possible solution. Comparisons to results in former studies [9, 
10, 13] are provided. 
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Chapter 8: Implicitly acceptable risks and requirements 
Once the probabilities for structural failure (Chapter 6) and the corresponding consequences (Chapter 
7) are being established, the implicitly accepted risks are deduced for the representative set of building 
structures and compared to former studies [9, 10, 13]. The statistically evaluated results will provide 
the basis for the deduction of acceptance criteria for risks to persons associated with building structures. 
Chapter 9: Conclusions 
The thesis closes with a summary of the most relevant findings. The main contributions of the study are 
highlighted and the possible subjects to be addressed in the future identified. 
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Chapter 2 Risk and reliability  
2.1 Principles of risk-informed decision making 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Engineering facilities such as buildings, bridges or power plants are generally intended to provide ben-
efit to the members of society. A beneficial engineering facility is normally understood as [1]: 
- Assuring safety to persons. 
- Being economically efficient. 
- Minimizing the adverse effects on the environment. 
In order to achieve these requirements, the ultimate task of civil engineers is to make decisions, or to 
provide a rational basis for decision makers (authorities, politicians, etc.), such that the benefits of the 
engineering facility will be as large as possible. Thereby, the uncertainties affecting all the circumstances 
or events to which the facility may be subjected must be dealt with in order to enable suitable estima-
tions of the probability for these events to occur. Moreover, the potential consequences of these events 
must be addressed. As outlined in the introduction of the present thesis (section 1.1), the joint consid-
eration of probabilities and consequences describes the risk (1.1), which provides a suitable measure 
for decision making in engineering.    
In the next section, a generally accepted and frequently applied framework for risk-informed decision 
analysis will be exposed and its constitutive individual steps described. In the following, section 2.1.3, 
addresses a crucial point for the assessment of risks - the setting of suitable risk acceptance criteria. In 
keeping with the scope of the thesis, the most relevant criteria for life safety risks will be outlined, from 
the perspective of both the individual and the societal risk acceptability.  
2.1.2 Explicit risk analysis procedure        
A generic representation of the steps comprising a risk-informed decision analysis is shown in Figure 
2.1. The procedure is based on the Australian New Zealandic Code 4369 [40] and has found acceptance 
in many other countries.  It is generic in a sense that it principally applies for any type of engineered 
facility [1]. 
The procedure is divided into two principal stages - qualitative and quantitative risk analysis. The for-
mer primarily intends to identify the hazards to which a system may be subjected and to combine them 
logically to establish possible hazard scenarios. The latter aims at delivering a quantitative evaluation 
of those scenarios, in terms of their occurrence likelihood and their potential consequences, and to as-
sess the risks with regard to previously established acceptance criteria. In the following, the individual 
steps characterizing the risk analysis procedure will be exposed according to the descriptions in [1, 2, 
41, 42]. 
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Figure 2.1 Generic representation of a risk-based decision making procedure, adapted from [40]. 
Definition of context and scope 
The definition of the context of a decision problem concerns the identification of the decision makers 
and all other stakeholders with interests in the decisions to be made (society, groups or individual risk 
receptors, clients, authorities, etc.). Moreover, it implies to detect and define all the constraints to the 
decision making process, irrespective of their nature (political, legal, social, financial, cultural, etc). A 
crucial step of the context definition is the setting of acceptance criteria, which, as Faber [1] points out, 
can be considered as a decision problem itself. 
In addition to the context, the scope of the analysis to be performed should be defined at the beginning 
of the procedure. This includes the clear definition of the system boundaries and the description of the 
assumptions regarding the system representation and idealization, what will have significance for the 
level of detail to be addressed in the analysis.  
Identification of hazards and hazard scenarios 
The qualitative identification of hazards and hazard scenarios is one of the most important steps within 
the risk analysis procedure [2]. Once the potential hazards and their possible combinations are recog-
nized, appropriate measures might be adopted to overcome their consequences. On the other hand, any 
unidentified relevant hazard necessarily introduces a bias in the decisions adopted during the subse-
quent evaluation, as a result of which misleading conclusions could be drawn.  
As introduced before (section 1.1.1), in the context of a risk analysis, a hazard describes a set of circum-
stances with the potential for causing undesired events within a given system. In general terms, it might 
be distinguished between natural and man-made hazards [2, 3]. Examples for the former are earth-
quakes, landslides, hurricanes, snow, etc., whereas the latter refer to influences like fire, explosions, ve-
hicle impacts or similar events. However, for purpose of the discussion of counter measures, such a dis-
tinction, which is not even straightforward in all cases, is of less importance. Special attention should be 
paid however to hazards due to human errors, such as design errors, material flaws, construction errors, 
etc. [7] for they are the most common cause of failures in practice (section 1.1.1). 
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Several hazards may concur in space and time, giving rise to what is known as a hazard scenario. Such 
situations normally generate higher risks than any individual hazard separately, what in the case of 
structures may be considered the rule rather than the exception [3]. Generally, each scenario can be 
characterized by a combination of leading and accompanying actions and influences. 
A variety of methodologies have been developed for identification of hazards (e.g. FMEA, PHA, HAZOP) 
and for modeling of relevant scenarios (e.g., fault tree, event tree, decision trees, causal networks) [2]. 
Detailed descriptions of these methodologies are beyond the scope of this thesis, but may be found in 
the specific literature [42, 43]. 
Estimation of probabilities 
Probability is, generally speaking, the likelihood or degree of certainty of a particular event occurring 
during a specified period of time [2]. Different interpretations of the probability concept are described 
in the literature, including the classical, the frequentistic or the Bayesian approach [1, 3]. In many prob-
lems related to mechanical or electronic engineering, probability estimations may be based on fre-
quentistic information, e.g. when the probability of failure of massively produced, in principle identical 
components, such as light bulbs or valves, is considered, where large amount of data on observed failure 
rates is available. However, in the field of structural engineering this is, as a rule, not the case, since the 
conditions characterizing both loading and resistance of a structure are generally unique and, conse-
quently, failure rate information is virtually nonexistent. In such cases the Bayesian interpretation of 
probability is far more appropriate [1]. The basic idea behind this approach is that lack of knowledge 
should be treated by probabilistic reasoning. In reality, decisions have to be made despite the lack of 
knowledge and probabilistic tools are a great help in that process. Modern structural reliability and risk 
analysis is based on this approach [1]. 
Assuming that a considered technical system or one of its components may be exposed to mutually ex-
clusive hazard situations Hi, and an undesired scenario Eij (such as a structural failure) given situation 
Hi occurs with the (conditional) probability P(Eij|Hi), then the probability of occurrence of the undesired 
event, P(Eij), is given by [2]: 
P(Eij) = ∑ P(Hi)i ∙ P(Eij|Hi)        (2.1) 
The conditional failure probabilities P(Eij|Hi) can be determined by means of reliability methods 
whereby account can be taken of the uncertainties involved in the problem. This will be addressed in 
more detail in sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3. For now it should be mentioned that these probabilities should be 
understood as nominal (or notional) values, i.e. they do not reflect the true probability of failure for a 
number of reasons, among them the fact that they do not account for human error [1, 2]. Regardless of 
their notional character, which precludes any interpretation in absolute terms, failure probabilities ob-
tained by means of reliability methods have been proven to be very useful when interpreted in compar-
ative sense only, for instance as operational values for the purpose of code-calibration and comparison 
of reliability levels of structures [44]. 
Estimation of consequences 
In general terms, consequences are possible outcomes of an undesired event that may be expressed to 
define the extent of human fatalities and injuries, environmental damage or economic losses [2]. The 
consequences to be expected in a certain failure scenario depend on the specific characteristics of both 
the hazard and the system where this hazard occurs. A distinction may be drawn between direct and 
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indirect consequences, such as proposed in the JCSS risk assessment framework [45]. Direct conse-
quences are related to damage of individual system constituents, whereas indirect consequences are 
understood as any consequences beyond the direct consequences. For instance, when a civil engineering 
structure is referred to, the direct consequences may describe the losses due to local structural damage, 
e.g. a member failure, whereas the latter, also referred to as follow-up consequences, describe the losses 
associated with the system failure, for instance a collapse scenario (S) given the local damage (D) (sec-
tion 1.2). 
A systematic procedure to estimate the consequences of undesired events in a technical context is called 
consequence analysis. The consequence types k to be considered in such an analysis are necessarily the 
same as those contained in the risk acceptance criteria, specified within the definition of the context of 
the risk analysis procedure (for example number of fatalities, number of injured or monetary conse-
quences expressed in a certain currency). Following the established nomenclature, Cij,k describes the 
consequence of type k associated with event j due to hazard i [2].  
Estimation of risks 
Having performed the analysis of the probabilities of occurrence of an undesired event, such as a struc-
tural failure, and its consequences, the corresponding risks may be determined as a function of both 
measures (1.1). Following the above introduced definitions of probabilities and consequences, the total 
risk Rk, expressed in terms of consequence component k, can be formulated as the sum over all hazards 
(Hi) and undesired events (Eij) these hazards might induce: 
Rk = ∑  (Cij,ki,j ∙ P(Eij|Hi)P(Hi))       (2.2) 
In cases where it is possible to deal with a single consequence type only, subscript k in equation (2.2) 
may be omitted and hence the analysis will be simplified. Moreover, it should be mentioned that (2.2) 
does not account for differentiation of direct and indirect consequences.  
Risk assessment 
Risk assessment refers to a mere comparison of the estimated risks Rk to previously established admis-
sible values, Rk,adm. Simply speaking, if equation (2.3) is fulfilled, the risks associated with the considered 
system are considered acceptable and no further actions are required. However, as mentioned before, 
the mayor difficulty lies in the definition of suitable and rational acceptance criteria, not in the compar-
ison itself. Section 2.1.3 deals with this subject. 
Rk ≤ Rk,adm          (2.3) 
Risk treatment 
Should the risks exceed the bounds of the specified acceptable values, different options for risk treat-
ment have to be analised. Possible strategies for risk treatment measures can be of technical or admin-
istrative nature, and might be associated with one or more of the following strategies [1]: 
- Risk mitigation or avoidance can be achieved by conceptual changes affecting the system and 
its components. An example would be the use of non-corrosive reinforcement in order to mit-
igate risk of corrosion damages in concrete structures. 
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- Risk reduction may be implemented by reduction of the consequences and/or the probability. 
In practice, risk reduction is normally performed by a physical modification of the considered 
system or its component, such as providing an adequate capacity.  
- Risk transfer may be performed, e.g., by insurance or other financial arrangements where a 
third party takes over the risk. Therefore, risk transfer is normally associated with a cost. 
- Risk acceptance might be an option if the risks do not comply with the risk acceptance criteria 
and other approaches for risk treatment are not effective. This may e.g. be the case when the 
costs of risk mitigation, reduction or transfer are higher than the desired risk reduction. 
Risk communication 
Risk-informed decision making usually affects a high number of stakeholders with different interests 
regarding the decisions to be made. A fluid and efficient (risk) communication between the different 
parties involved is therefore crucial. A mayor problem related to risk communication is that these par-
ties usually have different understandings about the concept of risk. The definition of risk in a technical 
context, as the product of probabilities and consequences (1.1), is unfamiliar to most of the involved 
stakeholders, and thus the perception of risks by experts and others may be completely different [2]. 
Hambly points out that the way in which the public perceives the seriousness of risks can be very dif-
ferent from the reality [46], what might be, at least partially, attributable to the way media report on 
accidents and hazardous activities. An example for this is the collapse of the Ronan-Point building (Fig-
ure 1.2), which, involving 5 fatalities made the news during weeks, contributed to the public’s percep-
tion towards high-rise accommodation [2] and finally entailed a modification of certain building codes. 
On the other hand, an everyday car accident with up to 5 fatalities, is in the most cases not even news-
worthy and the corresponding life safety risk is generally assumed by the public although it is definitely 
higher than the risk associated with a building collapse.  
Monitoring and review 
Risk analysis is a living process involving a constant feedback of information from the considered system 
to the analysis procedure. Therefore, monitoring and other data acquisition during construction or use 
of the system is useful. Whenever new information is obtained, the risk analysis may be updated and 
used for optimizing the system performance in regard to the specified acceptance criteria [1]. 
2.1.3 Acceptance criteria 
The establishment of rational risk acceptance criteria is one of the most important and challenging is-
sues in the context of risk-management in modern societies. The subject involves addressing questions 
like “How safe is safe enough?” and “How much are we willing to pay to reduce the risks to acceptable 
levels?” [3, 46]. As stated in the introduction of the thesis (Chapter 1), it is essential to recognize that 
risk-reduction implies a certain cost and that the funds for this purpose are generally limited. Hence, the 
establishment of risk acceptance criteria should, as a rule, pursue the most efficient allocation of the 
available resources for risk reduction. As stated before, the present section will focus on acceptance 
criteria for risks to persons. A key issue is the distinction between individual and societal risk criteria 
[2, 47-50]: 
- Individual risk criteria aim at limiting the risk exposure for individual persons.  
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- Societal risk criteria pursue the goal to limit the occurrence frequencies of events affecting 
groups of persons. This principle tries to capture the socio-political aversion to large-scale ac-
cidents with particularly severe consequences. 
The need for approaching risks to persons from both perspectives, the individual and the societal, can 
be explained in a simple manner by means of Figure 2.2, adapted from [48]. It distinguishes, schemati-
cally, two situations, A and B, describing the risk exposure of a certain population to a risk source, for 
instance a liquid petrol gas (LPG) station, situated at a certain distance from the population. Due to the 
higher population density in Situation B, an accidental explosion of the LPG station could cause very 
severe consequences in terms of loss of human life. Since society shows generally an aversion towards 
accidents implying many fatalities [51], the decision whether Situation B would be acceptable or not 
should be based on an acceptance criterion for societal risk, where the frequency of occurrence of an 
explosion should be assessed in conjunction with the consequences such an explosion might entail. On 
the contrary, in situation A, the population density and hence the potential nº of fatalities in case of an 
explosion of the LPG station is relatively small, and thus the risk might be judged acceptable from the 
societal point of view. However, such a decision might be in gross contradiction with the preferences of 
the individual population members exposed to the risk in situation A, who might, irrespective of the fact 
that for society the risk would be assumable, plead to the safeguarding of the basic human rights for 
individuals [1]. Indeed, while the societal risk is smaller in situation A, the risk for an individual popula-
tion member is the same in both situations, A and B. This clearly underlines the need for a distinction in 
risk criteria for respectively, individuals and the society. In the following, the commonly used ap-
proaches for defining both types of criteria will be exposed. 
 
Figure 2.2 Schematical illustration of individual (IR) and societal (SR) risk; adapted from [48] 
Individual risks 
In the context of the present study, the annual probability of a person being killed describes the risk to 
an individual. In order to derive acceptance criteria related to the individual risk, it is often proposed to 
take a look at the implicitly accepted risks by individuals, revealed in accident statistics. The fact that 
the individual risk levels associated with different activities show statistical stability over the years and 
are approximately equal for different Western countries, indicates a consistent pattern of preferences 
[49]. The probability of losing one's life in normal daily activities such as driving a car (Figure 2.3) ap-
pears to be one or two orders of magnitude lower than the overall individual risk, which is of the order 
of 10-3 y-1 for a person of 30 years of age [52]. Only purely voluntary activities, such as, e.g. mountain-
eering, entail higher risk (Figure 2.3). The fact that the public tolerates greater risks from voluntary than 
from involuntary activities is commonly known. Moreover, the benefit obtained from the activity is a 
Risk source Risk source
People
IR IR
IRA = IRB
SRA < SRB
A B
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decisive influence factor for the acceptability of risks to individuals. In general, the higher the benefit 
obtained from the activity, the higher is the willingness to accept the associated risks [49] (Figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3 Approximate individual risks for selected hazardous activities deduced from accident statistics and 
schematical representation of voluntariness and benefit on risk acceptance; adapted from [49] 
Taking the average death rate from risk-neutral activities, such as car driving, of about 10-4 y-1 as a ref-
erence, Vrijling et al. [49] and Diamantidis [50] suggested to define the acceptable individual risk 𝑟𝑖,𝑎𝑑𝑚 
as a function of a so-called policy factor . This factor accounts for both voluntariness of the activity and 
the benefit obtained, and ranges from 0.01, for involuntary activities with no kind of compensation, to 
100 for completely voluntary- and benefitious activities (Figure 2.3). 
ri,adm = η ∙ 10
−4     (y−1)        (2.4) 
Risks associated with structural collapse are invariably involuntary [47] and benefit is comparatively 
small. Consequently, the corresponding policy factor  should adopt small values, of about 10-2 to 10-1, 
and thus reasonable values for the admissible individual risk due to structural collapse would be of the 
order of 10-6 to 10-5 y-1. Indeed, this is consistent with the criteria laid down in standards, guidelines and 
technical papers on the safety requirements for built systems in general and structures in particular. 
The former version of standard ISO 2394 entitled “General principles on reliability for structures” [53], 
for instance, cites an average individual risk associated with structures of 10-6 y-1 as admissible. The 
Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) recommendations for indus-
trial activities distinguish between new and existing facilities, defining ri,adm  to be 10-6 y-1 for the former 
and 10-5 y-1 for the latter [49]. The Swiss code on the assessment of existing structures [54] also defines 
the admissible level of individual risk to be 10-5 y -1. That figure was likewise adopted by Steenbergen 
and Vrouwenvelder [55] to calculate the target reliability levels for existing structures. Similar develop-
ments by Sykora and Holicky [56] are based on ri,adm = 10-6 y -1, further to the ISO standard [53]. It is 
also noteworthy that admissible individual risks for structures of the cited order of magnitude are con-
sistent with the available, worldwide statistics for structural failure, mainly associated with extreme 
events like earthquakes, storms, landslides and flooding. Although these are inconclusive for several 
reasons, they allow for setting a rough fatality rate estimate of 10-6 to 10-7 per year for direct deaths and 
one order of magnitude larger for serious injuries [47]. 
Taking into account these considerations, it is possible to define a criterion for an individual risk-based 
target probability of structural failure (pft,IR). As suggested by several authors [47, 49, 55, 56], this can 
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be achieved by considering the conditional probability of death of a person present in or around a struc-
ture at the time of collapse (pd|f) in the following manner: 
pft,IR =
ri,adm
p𝑑|f
             (2.5) 
The available estimations for the conditional probability pd|f are widely dispersed. Based on the quali-
tative definition of the consequence classes (CC) according to [11], Steenbergen and Vrouwenvelder 
[55] estimated conditional probabilities of 0.03 for CC2 and 0.3 for CC3. The statistical analysis of the 
databases on structural failures by [57], reported in [56], reveals lower probabilities pd|f, especially 
what CC3 is concerned:  0.01-0.03 for CC2 and 0.03-0.05 for CC3. Finally, in a recent publication [58] the 
following values are proposed:  pd|f = 0.05 for CC2 and 0.2 for CC3. In general, a need for improving the 
estimates for pd|f is identified. 
Societal risks 
It seems generally accepted that frequency-consequence curves, also termed F-N curves, are a fairly ac-
curate description of the societal risk involving multiple fatalities [51]. They show the relationship be-
tween the annual frequency F of events with N or more fatalities and are usually shown in a log-log plot 
[47]. Some examples are given in Figure 2.4. In the left part, taken from [52], some early proposals to 
the acceptance of risks stemming from nuclear reactor accidents in the United States are plotted and 
compared to frequency-consequence curves associated with different natural hazards. It was argued 
that the risks associated with a nuclear incident would be acceptable if they were of the same order as 
risks from a meteorite impact [52]. More “daily-life risks” are represented in the right part of Figure 2.4 
[49] which shows the frequency - consequence relationships for different hazardous activities and in-
stallations in the Netherlands, among these, living in the surroundings of the Schiphol airport (Amster-
dam) in regard to a possible plane crash, living or being close to a LPG filling station or the risk associ-
ated with traffic accidents causing larger number of fatalities, like bus accidents. Moreover, Figure 2.4 
(right) contains the F-N acceptance criterion put forward by the Dutch authorities intended to limit the 
societal risks associated with particular technical facilities or activities. Note that it should serve as a 
guideline, though in [49] it is alluded to the fact that not all hazardous activities and installations comply 
with this criteria, as can be observed in the figure. 
 
Figure 2.4 Examples for F-N criteria from [52] (left) and [49] (right). 
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In practical applications, it is usual to define the risk-acceptance criterion by two F-N curves, as shown 
in Figure 2.5 [50]. The upper curve represents the just tolerable limit above which risks are not accepta-
ble, whereas the lower defines the limit below which risks might be accepted without further measures. 
The zone in between is called the ALARP zone (As Low As Reasonably Possible), where risk reduction 
measures should be considered and judged on an economical basis [2]. This principle has been applied 
in the past to various hazardous technical facilities, including the chemical and the transportation in-
dustries [50]. 
 
Figure 2.5 Schematical representation of F-N criteria illustrating the ALARP principle [50]. 
The mathematical definition of the F-n criterion is given by equation (2.6), where F(1) and  are con-
stants: 
F(n) = p(N ≥ n) ≤ F(1) ∙ n−α        (2.6) 
An exponent  greater than 1 accounts for social aversion to events implying greater consequences. 
Usually employed values are = 1 to 2 [2]. The Dutch criterion (Figure 2.4, right), for instance, limits 
the societal risk by a line that is inversely proportional to the square of the number of fatalities (=2), 
expressing lower accepted frequencies with increasing potential number of deaths.  
The constant F(1) represents the frequency of occurrence of an event with N ≥ 1 fatalities. As a general 
rule, its value should be consistent with the reference system to which the F-n criterion is applied. As 
contended by Vrijling et al. [49], it seems preferable to start from a societal risk criterion defined on the 
national scale, taking all hazardous systems and activities into consideration. In other words, both con-
stants, F(1) and , should reflect national safety policy [2]. Risk criteria for specific activities or locations 
should be established relative to this global criterion what can be achieved by determining the percent-
age of constant F(1) applicable to the activity or location at issue [2].  
The former version of international standard ISO 2394 [53] identifies the F-n criterion (2.6) as a possible 
requirement for structural safety, where the objective is to prevent accidents which may involve a large 
loss of human life. The standard recommends numerical values for constants F(1) (= 0.01 or 0.1) and  
(= 2) which, however, must be understood as merely indicative, for it specifies no reference system to 
which the F-n criterion applies.  
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The definition of an F-n acceptance criterion should be consistent with the expected number of fatalities 
E(N) associated with the system and the reference period considered, i.e., the area under the F-n ac-
ceptance line (2.7). If this circumstance is not taken into consideration, the result may be irrational de-
cision-making [59]. 
E(N) = ∫F(n) dn         (2.7) 
Further to Vrouwenvelder et al. [2], assuming a risk aversion exponent () greater than 1, expression 
(2.8) provides an approximate solution for integral (2.7). Nmax is the upper integration limit, i.e., the 
maximum number of fatalities associated with an undesired scenario that may arise in the system at 
issue. The lower integration limit is set at Nmin = 1, although F-n criteria are often being defined for Nmin 
≥10 only (see for instance Figure 2.4), since more frequent accidents with a relatively small number of 
fatalities (for instance car accidents) are more suitably addressed in the context of individual risk ac-
ceptance [2]. The expression may be further simplified, as in (2.9), by defining Nmax = ∞, since the for-
mulation is insensitive to variations in the upper integration limit. 
E(N) = F(1) ∙
α
α−1
 ∙ (1 −
1
α
∙ Nmax
1−α)     , α > 1       (2.8) 
E(N) = F(1) ∙
α
α−1
                                            , α > 1,Nmax = ∞    (2.9) 
For a risk neutral approach (=1), the solution for E(N) can be expressed as follows: 
E(N) = F(1) ∙ (ln(Nmax) + 1)                       , α = 1     (2.10) 
Finally, in compliance with equation (2.5), it would be desirable to deduce a target failure probability 
based on the societal risk to persons. To that end, an admissible failure frequency F(n)adm, expressed by 
(2.6), can be converted to a target probability (𝑝𝑓𝑡,𝑆𝑅) with equation (2.11), where subscript SR means 
societal risks and pN|f describes the conditional probability of N ≥ n fatalities in the event of failure [13]. 
F(n)adm ≅ pft,SR  ∙ pN|f                       (2.11) 
It should be noted that when applying this equation, care should be taken for keeping the analysis con-
sistent in regard to the reference system to which the F(n) criteria are suited for. Since failure probabil-
ities refer generally to a particular failure mode of structural elements, frequencies F(n)adm should con-
sistently refer to a system consisting of a single structural member only [13]. 
Relation between individual and societal risks 
The above-described relations may also be used to establish a relation between the societal risks, on 
one hand, and the individual risks, on the other. As stated in several studies, for instance [2, 48, 60], both 
risk types may be related to each other by the number of expected fatalities E(N). Based on the definition 
of individual risk ri, E(N) could, in most general terms, be obtained from equation (2.12) [48], where 
m(x,y) is the population density at a considered location (x,y) and ri(x,y) represents the individual risk 
to persons present at this location. A drastic simplification of (2.12) is given by (2.13), where it is as-
sumed that the totality of persons present at the location (Nmax) are exposed to the same individual risk 
ri [60]. 
E(N) = ∬ri(x, y) ∙ m(x, y) dx dy                      (2.12) 
E(N) ≈ Nmax ∙  ri                      (2.13) 
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2.2 Principles of structural reliability 
2.2.1 Uncertainties 
Most of the decision problems in engineering are subject to uncertainties. Usually, it is differentiated 
between uncertainties due to inherent natural variability, model uncertainties and statistical uncertain-
ties [1, 61]. 
Uncertainties due to inherent natural variability are also denoted physical or aleatory uncertainties. 
They are associated with the loading environment, the geometry of the structure, the material proper-
ties and the repair qualities [1]. According to ISO 2394 [53] they might be subdivided into those which 
can, and cannot, be affected by human activities. For instance, environmental loading characteristics, 
such as the snow load on a ground or wind speeds, belong to the latter category. The first category con-
cerns, for example, the uncertainties associated with material- or geometrical characteristics of a struc-
ture. Such kind of uncertainties can be reduced by use of more advanced production and quality control 
methods, which on the other hand, may imply an increase in costs. Hence, up to a certain limit, the level 
of uncertainty can be chosen with regard to economic consequences. Therefore, the distinction between 
the two mentioned categories may be important [53]. 
The model uncertainties account for the uncertainty associated with the idealised mathematical de-
scriptions used to approximate the actual physical behaviour of the structure. They must be considered 
in relation with models for both action effects and structural resistance [62]. The model uncertainty can 
be assessed as an auxiliary variable (Figure 2.6), based on comparisons between the observed value Y 
(e.g. a test result) and the values predicted by a particular model, Ŷ [63]:  
ξ =
Y 
 Ŷ  
             (2.14) 
Finally, statistical uncertainties arise due to incomplete statistical information. They may result from 
different sources, such as, for example, a limited number of test results or neglecting possible correla-
tions between certain variables. Statistical uncertainties can normally reduced by increasing test- and 
observational efforts [53]. 
 
Figure 2.6 Schematical illustration of estimation of model uncertainty statistics from a number of tests [62]. 
2.2.2 Basic variables and their stochastical characterization  
Modern methods of reliability- and risk analysis allow for a very general representation of the above 
described uncertainties ranging from non-stationary stochastic processes- and fields to time-invariant 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 experiment number
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random variables [43]. In most cases it is sufficient to model the uncertain quantities by random varia-
bles with given cumulative distribution functions and distribution parameters estimated on the basis of 
statistical and/or subjective information [1]. The fundamental random variables, that define and char-
acterise both actions on a structure and its resistance, are termed basic random variables, or just basic 
variables. Usually they correspond to the variables employed in conventional structural analysis and 
design, such as loads, geometrical dimensions or the basic mechanical material properties. The com-
pressive strength of concrete, for instance, would be considered a basic variable though it can be related 
to more fundamental variables such as cement content, water-to-cement ratio, etc. [43, 61]. Naturally, 
the model uncertainties (Figure 2.6) must also be represented by basic variables.  
The appropriate statistical characterization of basic variables by means of probability distributions and 
their parameters depend on the available knowledge. In many cases, distributions and parameters can 
be adjusted on the basis of statistical data obtained from observations of the properties of interest 
and/or subjective information [1]. In other cases this might not be possible and deterministic “point 
estimates” might be used instead [41].  
When characterizing basic variables, it is convenient to resort to one of the well-defined statistical dis-
tributions. The normal distribution, for instance, is generally employed to represent the uncertainties 
associated with geometrical properties, densities or permanent loads. The resistance of materials is well 
represented by lognormal distributions, whereas variable loads, such as life loads in buildings or loads 
due to climatic influences, like snow or wind, are commonly represented by extreme-value distributions 
such as Gumbel or Weibull. A detailed description of these and other distributions and their properties 
is given in the literature, for instance [43], and will be omitted here.  
In general, terms, there are two ways to represent a (continuous) statistical distribution (Figure 2.7): by 
means of a probability density function, fX(x), or its integral, the so-called cumulative distribution func-
tion, FX(x), related to each other by (2.15). 
FX(x) = P(X ≤ x) = ∫ fX(x)  dx         (2.15) 
 
Figure 2.7 Probability density function fX(x) (left) and cumulative distribution function FX(x) (right)  
Probability distributions may be defined in terms of their parameters or, alternatively, by their mo-
ments. While some distributions (e.g., the normal distribution) are fully described by the first two mo-
ments only, i.e. the mean X (1st moment) and the variance X2 (2nd moment), others, such as extreme-
value distributions, might require higher moments too for an adequate characterization of the inherent 
distribution properties, such as the skewness (3rd moment) and the kurtosis (4th moment). However, in 
most practical applications only the first two moments are used, which are mathematically defined as:  
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μX = ∫ x ∙ fX(x) dx
+∞
−∞
           (2.16) 
σX
2 = ∫ (x − μX)
2 ∙ fX(x) dx
+∞
−∞
         (2.17) 
For purpose of a simplified representation, the distribution type (D) for a certain basic variable Xi is 
commonly designated by capital letters (e.g., N: Normal, LN: Lognormal, G: Gumbel, etc.) followed by the 
moments in parentheses: 
Xi ~ D(μXi , σXi
2 )           (2.18) 
In some practical problems, it might be necessary to consider dependencies between random variables. 
For this purpose, the continuous distribution functions corresponding to the basic variables Xi of an n-
dimensional vector X can be “joined together” to a so-called joint probability density function fX(x). For 
the case of only two variables, this function is represented in Figure 2.8. The probability density func-
tions of the random variables, fX(x) and fY(y), are called marginal density functions since they can be 
represented by probability density functions on the margin. The joint probability density function 
fX,Y(x,y) shows a “hump” represented here by contour lines. From the shape and the direction of these 
lines, possible correlations can be detected [3]. Analytically, the correlation between variables X and Y 
can be expressed by the correlation coefficient X,Y (2.20) as a function of the covariance X,Y (2.19): 
σX,Y = ∬ (x − μX) ∙ (y − μY)
+∞
−∞
fX,Y(x, y) dx ∙ dy     (2.19) 
ρX,Y =
σX,Y
σX∙σY
           (2.20) 
The variables are fully positive- or negatively correlated if is 1 or -1, respectively, and independent of 
each other if  = 0. Attention should be paid to the fact that the correlation coefficient only recognises 
linear correlation whereas for correlations of higher order the analysis is more complex [3]. 
 
Figure 2.8 Joint probability density function fX,Y(x,y) and marginal density functions fX(x) and fY(y). 
Finally, it should be stated that in certain practical applications it might be convenient to mathematically 
combine certain basic variables. Consider for instance, the yield strength of a reinforcing steel bar, fy, 
and its cross-sectional area, As, which in a form of a product could be merged to the yield force Fy. For 
purpose of a subsequent reliability analysis, it could then be desirable to determine both the distribution 
function and the corresponding moments of the resulting variable Fy. Some important computational 
rules for stochastically independent variables can be found in [3, 43], for instance. Among them, the 
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X
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central limit theorem provides useful information on the shape of the probability density distributions 
for sums and products of independent variables. Provided that none of the variables dominates, this 
theorem says that the distribution of the sum of n arbitrary random variables Xi approaches the normal 
distribution with increasing n, independent of the distribution types of the variables. Moreover, it states 
that the distribution of the product of n arbitrary random variables Xi approaches the log-normal distri-
bution with increasing n, independent of the distribution types of the variables [3]. 
2.2.3 Probability of failure and reliability index: FOSM and FORM concepts 
The state of any structure may be classified as either satisfactory or unsatisfactory, where distinct con-
ditions separating both are called limit states [64]. Limit states can be associated with a certain struc-
tural performance criteria. In accordance with [53], it can be assumed that such a performance criteria 
can be brought into the form of a function g(X), where X is the n-dimensional vector of basic variables 
Xi that describe both the problem and the requirements for a particular basis of assessment. Based on 
this assumption and limiting the scope to problems related to structural safety- or failure, the safety 
requirement or desirable state for a structure can be expressed as: 
g(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) > 0            (2.21) 
The distinction between the desirable (safe) and undesirable (failure) state or domain is given by the 
limit state function (2.22). The limit state concept is illustrated in Figure 2.9 [53], for the case of two 
basic variables, X1 and X2. 
g(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) = 0            (2.22) 
 
Figure 2.9 Illustration of limit state concept for the case of two basic variables [53]. 
Based on the above-exposed definitions of limit states, the structural failure probability pf may be de-
scribed, in its most general form, by means of equation (2.23), 
pf =  P(g(𝐗) < 0) = ∫   fX(𝐱) d𝐱 g(𝐗)≤0           (2.23) 
where fX(x) is the joint probability density function (section 2.2.2) to be integrated over the failure do-
main, defined by the condition g(X) ≤ 0. Various methods for the non-trivial solution of the integral 
(2.23) have been proposed including direct integration, numerical integration, simulation techniques, 
such as Monte Carlo, or approximate, second-moment and/or transformation methods [43]. For they 
are very efficient and for they are used in the present thesis, the focus will be directed on the latter. 
As an introduction to the problem, the basic reliability problem is considered, defined by a single load 
effect E and the corresponding resistance R [3, 43]. The limit state function is given by: 
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g = R − E = 0           (2.24) 
The corresponding failure probability can be expressed as: 
pf =  P(R ≤ E) = ∬ fRE(r, e) dr de        (2.25) 
The volume of the joint probability density function fR,E(r,e) of R and E is 1.0 and its contours are con-
centric curves (Figure 2.10). As explained before (section 2.2.2), the variables R and E are plotted as 
marginal probability density functions on the r and e axes, respectively. The limit state equation (2.24) 
separates the safe- from the failure region and divides the volume into two parts. The volume located in 
the failure domain corresponds to the failure probability. Moreover it should be noted that the point on 
the limit state equation where the joint probability density is greatest corresponds to the most likely 
point of failure, commonly referred to as design point (r*, e*). 
If R and E are independent variables, the joint probability function fR,E(r,e) corresponds simply to the 
product of the marginal probability density functions fR(r) and fE(e) (Figure 2.10). The former can be 
substituted, by applying (2.15), in terms of the cumulative distribution function, FR(x), representing the 
probability that R is smaller than a given value x  The latter can be substituted for the probability that E 
= x, given by fE(x). Hence, (2.25) can be simplified into: 
pf =  P(R ≤ E) = ∫ FR(x) ∙ fE(x) 
+∞
−∞
 dx      (2.26) 
 
Figure 2.10 Joint probability density function fRS(r,s) and limit state surface for basic reliability problem 
The integral expressed by (2.26) is known as the convolution integral. Only for a few distributions of R 
and E it is possible to obtain an analytical solution of this integral [43]. The most notable example is 
when both are normally distributed, with means R, E and variances R2, E2, respectively. Following 
this assumptions, the safety margin M = R – E, likewise normally distributed according to the central 
limit theorem (section 2.2.2), can be defined with a mean and variance given by well known rules for 
addition (or subtraction) of normal random variables [43]: 
𝜇𝑀 = 𝜇𝑅 − 𝜇𝐸            (2.27) 
𝜎𝑀 = √𝜎𝑅2 + 𝜎𝐸2            (2.28) 
The failure probability is then given by the probability that M < 0 (2.29), i.e. the integral of the probabil-
ity density function of M, fM(x), between –∞ and the origin (Figure 2.11). 
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pf =  P(R ≤ E) = ∫ fM(x) 
0
−∞
 dx =  
1
σM∙√2π
 ∫ e
(x−μM)
2
2∙σM2  
0
−∞
 dx       (2.29) 
 
Figure 2.11 Probability density function fM(x) and reliability index  
By standardizing 𝑧 = (𝑥 − 𝜇𝑀) 𝜎𝑀⁄ , expression (2.29) can be reformulated in terms of the standard nor-
mal distribution function : 
pf =  P(R ≤ E) =  
1
√2π
 ∫ e
−z2
2  
−σM
μM
−∞
 dz =  Φ(−
μM
σM
)       (2.30) 
The ratio μM σM⁄  in (2.30) defines the so-called reliability index  according to Cornell [65]. It expresses 
how often the standard deviation M may be placed between zero and the mean value M (Figure 2.11). 
Failure probability pf and reliability index  are hence related by: 
pf =  Φ(−β)             (2.31) 
The above ideas for the specific case of two normally distributed random variables can be readily ex-
tended to the case where a linear limit state function (LSF) consists of n normal variables [43]. In most 
practical problems, however, the LSF is not linear and the first two moments are not easily obtainable. 
In this case, a suitable approach is to linearize the LSF by expanding it as a first-order Taylor series about 
some point x*. The corresponding equations are given, for example, in [43].  
Once the non-linear LSF has been linearized, the corresponding, first two moments ( and 2), and hence 
 (and pf), can be obtained as shown before. However, it was early recognized that this way of proceed-
ing entailed a significant shortcoming. Precisely, it was found that the solution of  was sensitive to the 
formulation of the LSF, i.e., different, but mathematically equivalent formulations of the LSF led to dif-
ferent , what was called the invariance problem [66]. 
Shortly after this discovery, Hasofer and Lind [67] presented a solution to this problem. They suggested 
to transform the limit state function into the so-called standard space by converting the basic variables 
Xi into standardized variables Zi, characterized by a zero mean value and a unity standard deviation: 
Zi =
 Xi−μXi
σXi
             (2.32) 
It should be noted that the transformation (2.32) can be performed without complication if the random 
variables Xi are all uncorrelated (i.e. linearly independent). On the contrary, an intermediate step is re-
quired to find a random variable set X’ from the correlated set X which corresponds essentially to the 
fM(m)
βσM
M<0 M>0
Failure Safety
pf[M<0]
m=r-s
0 μM
σM σM
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finding of the eigen-values and vectors [43]. Weak correlation ( < 0.2) usually can be ignored whereas 
strong correlations ( > 0.8) can be treated as fully dependent, i.e. with one of the two correlated varia-
bles expressed by the other. More detailed information can be found in [43]. 
Figure 2.12 illustrates the benefits from the transformation into the normalized z space, for the simpli-
fied case of two variables. The great rise of the joint probability density hump fZ(z) now coincides with 
the origin of the coordinates z1 and z2. Due to the axial symmetry of the hump, all contours (points of 
equal probability) are concentric circles around the origin. Consequently, the coordinates of the design 
point (z1*, z2*), and thus reliability index , are defined by the shortest distance between the LSF and the 
origin. The determination of  according to Hasofer and Lind [67] corresponds thus to a geometrical 
problem, expressed by (2.33), wherefore it is also being referred to as geometrical reliability index [68]. 
β = min(∑ zi
2)ni=1
0.5         i = 1, 2, . . . , n         subject to g(z) = 0     (2.33) 
In (2.33), zi represents the coordinates of any point on the limit state surface. The solution of (2.33) can 
be obtained by means of different iteration-based algorithms, described, e.g. in [43]. It should be noted 
that  and the design point coordinates zi* are related by the direction cosiness i (Figure 2.12): 
zi
∗ = −αi ∙ β                       (2.34) 
Where: 
∑α i
2 = 1      and  − 1 ≤  αi  ≤ 1          (2.35) 
The direction cosines i represent the sensitivity of the standardized limit state function g(z) at zi* to 
changes in zi [69] what has an important practical implication: it indicates the relative importance of the 
individual random variables xi for the reliability index  and the failure probability pf. 
 
Figure 2.12 Contrours of probability density function (fZ(z)) contours and original (non-linear) and linearized 
limit state surfaces in the standardized normal space. 
The described approach is also known as the First Order Second Moment (FOSM) method, since it is 
based on a first order approximation (linearization) of the (non-linear) LSF and considers only the first 
two moments of each random variable in the calculation of  and pf. The presented developments can 
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be extended to the frequent case of non-normal basic variables. Basically, this can be achieved by trans-
forming the non-normal distributions into equivalent normal distributions, for which purpose different 
algorithms have been developed over the years, such as the Rosenblatt- or the Nataf transformation, 
described e.g. in [43]. Once this transformation has been accomplished, the resulting normally equiva-
lent variables can be used directly in the above-described FOSM procedure. This way of proceeding is 
called the “advanced” or “extended” FOSM method, likewise known as the First Order Reliability Method 
(FORM).  
Finally, it should be emphasized that due to the introduced simplifications in the analysis (linearization 
of the LSF, approximate representation of non-normal variables, etc.), the probability of failure pf loses 
its mathematical exactitude. Keeping in mind too that pf depends on the uncertainties associated with 
the definition of the limit state function, on the probabilistic models used for the stochastical character-
ization of the basic variables involved, and the fact that pf does not account for human errors (section 
2.1.2), it is evident that the probabilities of failure can only be interpreted as notional values, which, 
instead of representing real failure rates, rather reflect the lack of knowledge about the performance of 
the structure [1]. 
2.3 Treatment of risks and reliability in design codes 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Standards and codes provide the basis of good engineering practice and a framework for implementing 
performance requirements in design rules [70]. While until the 1960’s the safety criteria in standards 
were mainly based on allowable stress principles, the developments of computational- and structural 
reliability methods, as well as the advances in the field of material technology during the last decades, 
contributed to the implementation of a new philosophy for structural design. The limit state principle 
was introduced and safety verification was based on the LFD (Load Factor Design) and later LRFD (Load 
and Resistance Factor Design) in the USA and Canada, or on the similar partial safety factor method in 
Europe. Simultaneously, robustness requirements were developed to address system performance, es-
pecially in relation with the design for accidental actions [17]. The significant improvements were man-
ifested in a number of important documents, standards and guidelines, among them the European 
standards [11]. Diamantidis and Vrouwenvelder [70] highlight the following advanced concepts for the 
design of civil engineering works, according to the current Eurocodes: 
- Reliability and robustness are major issues in the Eurocodes and are treated with specific pro-
visions, which are based on modern risk analysis and risk appraisal criteria. 
- A reliability class differentiation scheme is proposed in the Eurocodes with three different re-
liability classes. A measure of reliability is the probability of failure or the associated reliability 
index, which depends on the reliability class (type of structure, consequences of failure). 
- In the limit state design, reliability is reflected through the design values of the design param-
eters and consequently through the partial safety factors and characteristic values for the load 
and resistance parameters. 
- Limit state design is based on the consideration of local and not global failure, since design 
equations are usually defined and applied on a local level only. The global reliability i.e. the 
reliability against collapse of the entire system is treated in the robustness requirements. 
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- Robustness requirements and associated design rules are given in the Eurocodes. Risk analyses 
are recommended for important structures associated to high consequences of failure. 
In the following, the principles of reliability verification by means of the partial factor method, imple-
mented in the Eurocodes and other international standards, will be analysed in more detail (section 
2.3.2). Thereby the link between this semi-probabilistic approach and the probabilistic FORM (section 
2.2.3) will be highlighted. Likewise, an analysis of the nominal target reliability levels prescribed in the 
codes will be offered (section 2.3.3), followed by some particular considerations regarding the acci-
dental design situations in section 2.3.4. 
2.3.2 Reliability verification based on design values 
Reliability verification in the current structural codes and standards is based on the limit state principle. 
Two fundamentally different types of limit states are generally recognised: 
- Ultimate limit states (ULS) 
- Serviceability limit states (SLS) 
The nature of ULS is essentially different from that of SLS. ULS are associated with collapse or other 
similar forms of structural failure, whereas SLS refer to structural performance indicators in service 
conditions (deflections, vibration, cracks, etc.). While the infringement of ULS might entail loss of struc-
tural integrity, and hence considerable risks to persons, the infringement of SLS is mainly restricted to 
economical consequences, such as repair costs. Moreover, in contrary to the ULS, the criteria associated 
with SLS might depend on the requirements of the client and users (sometimes very subjective), and on 
the characteristics of the installed equipment or non-structural elements [64]. These differences be-
tween ULS and SLS result generally in a separate formulation of reliability requirements for both types 
of limit states. In advance, the focus will be placed on the ULS.  
Based on the general formulation of the reliability requirement expressed by (2.21), the design require-
ment may be written as [53], 
g(x1d,  x2d, . . . ,  xnd) > 0          (2.36) 
where x1d, x2d, ..., xnd are design values corresponding to a set of n basic variables Xi. Accordingly, the 
corresponding limit state function is expressed as: 
g(x1d,  x2d, . . . ,  xnd) = 0          (2.37) 
The design values xid can be obtained directly from the First Order Reliability Method (FORM). As ex-
plained in section 2.2.3, these values correspond to the individual components xi* of the design point 
vector x*, defined as the point on the limit state surface with maximum likelihood of failure (Figure 
2.12). Based on the FORM, the design value xid of a variable Xi following an arbitrary statistical distribu-
tion F(xi), can be established by (2.38), depending on: 
- The assumed type of distribution of the variable Xi. 
- The parameters or moments of the variable Xi (e.g. mean value and variance). 
- The target reliability index, t. 
- The sensitivity factors i. 
Acceptable life safety risks associated with the effects of gas explosions on reinforced concrete structures 
 
32 
F(xid) = Φ(−αi ∙ βt)             (2.38) 
Several codes and standards, like [11] or [36], offer tentative values for target reliability indices t, what 
will be addressed in section 2.3.3. The values of the sensitivity factors i should in principle be found 
from a number of representative FORM calculations. For purpose of convenience, a set of standardized 
i values has been developed based on experience, which is presented in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Standardized i values according to [11, 53]. 
 Variable Xi Sensitivity factor i 
Resistance (R) 
Dominating variable 
Other variables 
0.8 
0.4 · 0.8 = 0.32 
Action or action 
effect (E) 
Dominating variable 
Other variables 
- 0.7 
- 0.4 · 0.7 = -0.28 
 
According to the implicit approach adopted in daily practice (section 1.1.1), structural design codes for-
mulate the design requirement expressed by (2.36) in terms of design equations, from which the relia-
bility verification may be performed by a comparison of design values for resistance and action effects. 
Thereby, the design values are not directly introduced in the design equations. The basic variables are 
considered by means of their representative values (characteristic- or nominal value) in conjunction 
with a set of partial safety factors. This procedure is known as the partial factor method. In terms of 
design resistance Rd and design action effects Ed, requirement (2.36) is reformulated as: 
g(xd)  = R d − E d ≥ 0          (2.39) 
According to [53], the design values Rd and Ed can be expressed in the following way: 
R d =
1
γRd
∙ R( 
fk
γm
; anom ∓ Δa;… )         (2.40) 
E d = γEd ∙ E( γf ∙ Fk; γf ∙ ψ0 ∙ Fk; anom ∓ Δa;… )       (2.41) 
Where: 
R(…), E(…): Resistance (R) and action effects (E) as a function of… 
Rd, Ed: Partial safety factor covering uncertainty in the resistance model and the action 
and/or action effect model, respectively 
fk, Fk: Characteristic value of a material property (fk) and of an action (Fk), respectively. 
m, f:  Partial safety factor for a material property (m) and for actions or action effects (f), 
respectively. 
anom, a: Nominal value (anom) and deviation (a) from this value of a geometrical property 
0: Factor for combination value of a variable action 
It should be noted that the Eurocodes [11] offer an alternative safety format, in which the uncertainties 
in the representative values of actions and those associated with the action- and/or action effect models, 
might be jointly represented by merging partial factors f and Ed into a partial factor F. In the same way, 
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the uncertainties in the material properties and those associated with the resistance model might be 
represented by merging m and Rd into a partial factor M. This simplified approach is adopted by many 
standards, among them the Spanish building codes for basis of design [71] and structural concrete [72]. 
Finally, it is important to stress that the link, established by the design point xi* (Figure 2.12), between 
the explicit probability methods, such as FOSM and FORM (section 2.2.3), and the semi-probabilistic 
partial safety factor method provides significant benefit. By means of probabilistic methods the safety 
format of the design codes used in daily practice, i.e. the design equations, characteristic values and 
partial safety factors, may be chosen such that the reliability level of structures and its members de-
signed according to these codes is as close as possible to a certain target reliability level (section 2.3.3). 
This process is commonly understood as reliability-based “code calibration”. Code calibration studies 
have been carried out over the last decades by several researchers, e.g. Ellingwood and Galambos [73] , 
Nowak [74] , Sorensen et al. [75] , Faber and Sorensen [76] or Markova and Holický [77]. 
2.3.3 Inherent and target reliability levels 
The structural engineering profession has an exceptionally long tradition going several thousand years 
back. During these years, experience and expertise have been collected to some extent by trial and error. 
The design of new types of structures, with, for instance, new materials or subject to new loading con-
ditions had to be performed in an adaptive manner based on suitable extrapolations of existing 
knowledge and experience [1]. In other words, new developments in structural engineering are tradi-
tionally based on well-tested structural design performance. This applies not least to the level of safety 
inherent to the codes according to which present structures are being designed. Indeed, it is a common 
approach to establish the fundamentals for making decisions regarding the acceptance of risks related 
to new structures on the basis of the risks experienced and apparently accepted in the past, associated 
with best practice [1]. As stated at the end of the previous section, this can be achieved by means of code 
calibration procedures, where the reliability level for the structures designed according to the new code 
rules it is often sought to be as close as possible to the reliability level associated with structures de-
signed according to existing methods [75]. 
The Eurocodes, for instance, recognize that the design rules provided in the code are derived on the 
basis of “calibration to a long experience of building tradition” [11], along with the appreciation that 
“risks associated with structural failure, related to the present time are reasonable” [44]. Besides, sev-
eral studies show that the reliability- and risk level inherent to the rules of the current Eurocodes is 
subject to a large scatter [78, 79]. While part of this scatter can be attributed to the required approxi-
mations and simplifications introduced in the codified design rules to facilitate their straightforward 
application in daily practice [44], yet significant scope for a more consistent calibration of these rules 
has been identified [9, 78, 79]. For instance, it has been suggested that future calibration exercises for 
code rules should account for reliability differentiation for the consequences of structural failure [9]. 
While the current, implicit Eurocode design rules may be subject to improvement in a sense of a more 
consistent calibration, yet the code offers the designer the possibility to perform explicit safety verifica-
tions or to deduce partial safety factors for implicit verifications in case the provided design rules may 
not be sufficient (e.g. for existing- or innovative structures). Therefore, a set of target reliability indices 
t is suggested, derived through long studies combining criteria for risks to persons and economical 
optimization [47]. The values, shown in Table 2.2, refer to component failure and take account of possi-
ble failure consequences by differentiation of reliability classes, associated with the consequences of 
structural failure. The values refer to periods of Tref = 1 and 50 years. No specific rules are provided for 
the adjustment of the target reliability indices to reference periods different from these, what might be 
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necessary for bridges, for instance, where a design working life of 100 years is usually envisaged. Ac-
cording to the JCSS [80] a simplified approach for determining the life-time reliability of a structure is 
to multiply the annual failure probability by the design working life and a factor c which accounts for 
the dependency between different failure events within one year (c = 1.0 for independent failure 
events).  
Table 2.2 Reliability differentiation according to [11]. 
Reliability  
class 
Consequences for loss of 
human life, economical, so-
cial and environmental 
consequences 
Target reliability index t 
Examples of buildings and civil 
engineering works 
 Tref = 1 year  Tref = 50 years 
RC3 
RC2 
RC1 
High 
Medium 
Low 
5.2 
4.7 
4.2 
4.3 
3.8 
3.3 
Bridges; public buildings. 
Residential and office buildings. 
Agricultural buildings. 
 
Another set of target reliability indices has been proposed by the JCSS Probabilistic Model Code [80] and 
was later included in ISO 2394 [36]. As reported in [81], these target reliabilities are based on economic 
optimization principles. The values, which refer to a period of 1 year, are given in Table 2.3 as a function 
of the costs of the risk reduction measure and the consequences (failure costs), both defined relative to 
the initial construction costs. In [36], it is being specified that the target reliabilities may be used for 
failure events ranging from member failures, over partial- to total structural collapse by adjustment of 
the failure consequences. For instance, in case a member failure would trigger a system failure with 
large failure costs, the target reliability for that particular member should be higher than if the structural 
system would be redundant, since in that case the costs associated with the member failure might be 
lower [81]. In a similar way, it is suggested to distinguish the type of failure (ductile with reserve capac-
ity, ductile without reserve strength and brittle failure) when choosing the target reliability level. A 
structural element which would be likely to collapse suddenly without pre-warning should be designed 
for a higher consequence class than one for which a collapse is preceded by some kind of warning and 
hence enables measures to be taken to avoid severe consequences [81]. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that standard [36] alerts to the fact that the target reliabilities given in 
Table 2.3 should be seen as indicative for the support of economic optimization, and might not be ac-
ceptable for what concerns life safety risks. 
Table 2.3 Target annual reliability index t for ultimate limit states according to [80] and [36]. 
Relative Cost of 
Safety Measure 
Minor  
consequences 
Moderate  
consequences 
Large  
consequences Large 3.1 3.3 3.7 
Normal 3.7 4.2 4.4 
Small 4.2 4.4 4.7 
2.3.4 Accidental design situations 
Accidental design situations refer to exceptional conditions applicable to the structure or its exposure 
[11]. In section 1.1.2 it has already been explained that the design philosophy for these situations gen-
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erally differs from persistent situations referring to conditions of normal use. The general design objec-
tive for the latter, aimed at providing structural members with a sufficient resistance “to sustain, with 
appropriate degrees of reliability and in an economical way–all actions and influences than “can reason-
ably be foreseen to occur” or that are “likely to occur” during execution and use [11], is, by definition, 
somewhat conflicting when transferred to the context of accidental situations, precisely because acci-
dental actions cannot be easily foreseen, and if so, they are unlikely to occur within the design working 
life period of the structure (section 1.1.2).  
Recognizing these particularities, the Eurocode for accidental actions [17] suggests a variety of design 
strategies (section 1.1.2) based on a distinction between so-called unidentified and identified actions. 
The first refer to actions from an unspecified cause that might not be foreseen, as for instance, some 
kind of unforeseeable human error. The latter allude to actions which might be foreseen to occur (alt-
hough their occurrence is unlikely within the design working life period of the structure), as for instance, 
a vehicle impact on an unprotected bridge pier or a gas explosion within a building supplied with gas.  
The design strategies directed towards unidentified accidental actions are proposed to ensure a suffi-
cient robustness of the structure [21]. For building design, the following strategies are specified: 
- design of key elements: A uniformly distributed nominal load of Ad = 34 kN/m2 is recommended. 
- specifying the amount of acceptable damage induced by local failure: The indicative limit is an 
building area of 100 m2 or 15% of the floor area, whichever is less, on two adjacent floors caused 
by the removal of an load carrying column or wall. 
- Applying prescriptive design/detailing rules: By three-dimensional tying in view of providing 
structural integrity, by ensuring structural redundancy or ductile member behavior, etc. 
For identified accidental actions, some of these strategies, such as redundancy- or ductility-providing 
measures, might also apply. Moreover, in some cases, an identified action might be prevented from oc-
curring, or protection measures can be applied in order to reduce or eliminate its effects on the structure 
(such as barriers to avoid a vehicle impact). Finally, the structure can be designed to sustain the identi-
fied action. In view of the objectives of the present thesis (section 1.3), focus will be directed in advance 
to the latter option. 
For purpose of member design in the context of accidental actions, the Eurocode [11] offers the follow-
ing specific expression of the general formulation (2.41) for design load combinations: 
Ed = E( ∑ Gk,jj≥1 +  P + Ad +(ψ1,1 or ψ2,1) ∙ Qk,1 + ∑ Ψ2,i ∙ Qk,ii≥1 )     (2.42) 
Where: 
Gk: Characteristic value of a permanent action 
P: Representative value of a prestressing action 
Ad:  Design value of an accidental action 
Qk:  Characteristic value of a variable action 
1: Factor for frequent value of a variable action 
2: Factor for quasi-permanent value of a variable action 
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It should be noted that in comparison to the corresponding expression for persistent- or transient de-
sign situations no partial safety factors are to be applied to load effects within the accidental load com-
bination. The design value of the accidental action is directly defined by means of a value Ad, which in 
practice often corresponds to a nominal value [18], such as in the case of gas explosions, where Ad is 
represented by a nominal, static equivalent pressure [17]. The reason for the use of nominal values is 
that a reliable statistical characterization of both occurrence and magnitude of accidental actions can 
only seldom carried out [18] for the available data is generally poor. In any case, the Eurocode states 
that for individual projects, the suggested nominal values may be altered in accordance with the client 
[11, 17]. 
The design values of the variable actions Qi are introduced by their representative values 1·Qk or 2·Qk 
which take account of the fact that it is highly unlikely that the different Qi will attain their maximum at 
the time the accidental action occurs. The former (1·Qk) corresponds to a frequent value, used as well 
for verification of reversible serviceability limit states, which is chosen so that the time it is exceeded is 
1% of the reference period (for buildings) [11]. The latter (2·Qk) is the so-called quasi-permanent 
value, likewise employed for verification of reversible serviceability limit states and for the calculation 
of long-term effects. For loads on building floors, the quasi-permanent value is usually chosen so that 
the proportion of the time it is exceeded is 50% of the reference period [11]. Moreover, it is worth men-
tioning that the choice of 1,1·Qk,1 or 2,1·Qk,1 may be made upon national specifications. In Spain, stand-
ard [71] which, regarding the safety concept may be considered equivalent to the Eurocode [11], em-
ploys the frequent value1,1·Qk,1. The recommended values 1 and 2 (identical in [11] and [71]) are 
given in Table 2.4 for the case of imposed loads (use category A [82]: domestic, residential areas) and 
snow loads in buildings. 
Table 2.4 1 and 2 values for imposed and snow loads in buildings according to [11], [71]. 
Action 1 2 
Imposed loads (Cat. A [82]) 0.5 0.3 
Snow (h > 1000 m) 0.5 0.2 
Snow (h ≤ 1000 m) 0.2 0 
 
Regarding the formulation of structural resistance in accidental design situations, the codes contain a 
specific set of partial safety factors for the materials. For concrete, a value of c = 1.3 has been adopted 
in the national standard [72, 83], while Eurocode EN1992-1-1 [84] recommends a value of c = 1.2. The 
partial safety factor for reinforcing steel is s = 1.0 according to both codes, [72, 83] and [84]. 
2.4 Reliability of structural systems 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The structural failure probability, as described in section 2.2.3, refers to a specific failure mode of a par-
ticular element under exposure to a certain load arrangement, characterized by a particular limit-state 
function. Moreover, given the before-mentioned link between the probabilistic methods, and the partial 
factor method implemented in the design codes, the reliability verifications based on the design rules 
contained in these codes are likewise related to a specific failure mechanism of a structural member (or 
one of its cross-sections) in association with a certain limit state (section 2.3.2). 
However, each structural system comprises a certain number of elements whose failure, either isolated 
or combined with the failure of other elements, can trigger a system failure. Also, different mechanisms 
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can lead to failure of a particular element (even a simply supported girder can fail due to bending, shear, 
etc.), and most systems can be subjected to many different load arrangements [85]. Due to these reasons, 
and despite the fact that the explicit evaluation of the conditional system failure probability 𝑃(𝑆|𝐷), 
given an initial structural damage (section 1.2), is out of scope of the present thesis, it is considered 
necessary to include some basic considerations on reliability of structural systems.  
Within the context of the present section, a structural system failure is understood as the formation of 
a collapse mechanism. For statically indeterminate systems, this implies that a combination of several 
failing system components is required for the entire system to fail [85]. Component failure refers here to 
a particular failure mechanism of a specific system-constituent member, or one of its cross-sections. 
Two idealized limit cases can be distinguished [3, 43]: series systems and parallel systems (section 
2.4.2). However, real structural systems very often are mixed systems with series branches containing 
parallel elements [85], what will be addressed in section 2.4.3. 
2.4.2 Series and parallel systems 
As stated before, a particular structural failure mode can be represented by the corresponding limit 
state function, g(X), as expressed by (2.22). Hence, for defining the condition of system failure, it is sup-
posed that the limit state function is composed by several functions g1(X), g2(X), …, gm(X), where m cor-
responds to the total number of system components Ci.  
 
Figure 2.13 Series system (adapted from [3]) 
In a series system the individual components Ci are connected in series (Figure 2.13), and consequently 
the failure of a single component implies the failure of the whole system, wherefore it is also referred to 
as “weakest-link system” [53, 86]. The failure domain (undesirable state) for such a system can be ex-
pressed by the following condition: 
g1(𝐗) < 0     or  g2(𝐗) < 0     or  …  or gm(𝐗) < 0      (2.43) 
This condition is illustrated in Figure 2.14 (left) for the simplified case of m=2 system components and 
a limit state function characterized by n = 2 basic variables (X1 and X2). The functions represented by    
g1 = 0 and g2 = 0 represent the limit state functions corresponding to the m=2 two system components. 
If statistical independency of these components is considered, the probability of a series system failure, 
Pf, corresponds to the sum of the probabilities of failure of each of the m system components, pf,i: 
Pf ≈ ∑ pf,i
m
i=1              (2.44) 
According to this definition, the probability of a series system failure, Pf, increases with the number of 
system components m. In case of perfectly correlated system components, the system failure probability 
corresponds to the failure probability of the most unreliable element: 
Pf ≈ max (pf,i)           (2.45) 
C1 C2 Cm . . .   
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Figure 2.14 Failure domains (shaded) for series systems (left) and parallel systems (right) [53] 
In a parallel system, the individual components Ci are connected in parallel (Figure 2.15), and conse-
quently the failure of a single component does not imply the failure of the whole system.  
 
Figure 2.15 Parallel system (adapted from [3]). 
Failure of the parallel system will not arise before all the m system components fail. For this case, the 
failure domain can be expressed by (2.46). A graphical illustration is given in the right part of Figure 
2.14 for the simplified case of m=2 system components and a LSF characterized by n = 2 basic variables 
(X1 and X2). 
g1(𝐗) < 0     and  g2(𝐗) < 0     and  …  and gm(𝐗) < 0      (2.46) 
Based on this failure requirement, and assuming statistical independency of the system components, 
the probability of a parallel system failure can be obtained by the product of the probabilities of failure 
of each of these components, pf,i: 
Pf ≈ ∏ pf,i
m
i=1              (2.47) 
If all elements are perfectly correlated, the parallel system failure probability will correspond to the 
failure probability of the most reliable component. Consequently, in this case: 
Pf ≈ min (pf,i)           (2.48) 
2.4.3 Structural systems 
Structural systems can seldom be represented by one of the previous system idealizations alone. Nor-
mally, they correspond to mixed systems which exhibit series connections with parallel system compo-
nents [3]. Thereby, the capacity of the system and its components to redistribute loads and/or load ef-
fects, by means of ductile- and/or redundant structural behaviour, plays a major role. Moreover, it must 
X
2
X
2
X1 X1
Failure
domain
g2 = 0
g1 = 0
Failure
domain
g2 = 0
g1 = 0
C1 
C2 
Cm 
. 
. 
.   
 Chapter 2   Risk and reliability 
39 
be taken into account that the system components may present more or less statistical dependency as 
they have common variables. For all these reasons, the determination of failure probabilities of struc-
tural systems is anything but easy and is usually restricted to estimation of approximate values only 
[85]. 
 
Figure 2.16 Schematical representation of principal failure mechanisms of span A-B-C of a two-span girder [85]. 
In order to illustrate the influence of ductile structural behavior on the reliability of a realistic structural 
system, the symmetrical, continuous two-span girder under an arbitrary load configuration (Figure 
2.16), described in [85] will be considered. System failure arises if either of the spans A-B-C or A-B’-C’ 
will collapse. Regarding span A-B-C, for instance, any of the following individual- or combined failure 
modes (represented in Figure 2.16) will induce a collapse mechanism and hence a system failure:  
- Bending failure of section A, AM. Given failure of section A, bending failure of section B, BM. 
- Bending failure of section B, BM. Given failure of section B, bending failure of section A, AM. 
- Shear failure of section A, AV. 
- Shear failure of section C, CV. Given failure of section C, bending failure of section A, AM. 
- Failure of section A due to interaction of bending and shear, AMV. 
Based on the consideration of statistical independency between these principal collapse mechanisms 
connected in series (Figure 2.16), the system failure probability of span A-B-C can be formulated by the 
sum of the occurrence probabilities for each of these mechanisms (2.44): 
Pf,A−B−C ≈ pf,AM−BM + pf,BM−AM + pf,AV + pf,CV−AM + pf,AMV       (2.49) 
For those collapse mechanisms characterized by a combined failure mode, the series elements are com-
prised by sub-systems consisting of two parallel components (Figure 2.16). The corresponding sub-sys-
tem failure probability can then be evaluated by (2.47). For instance, probability pf,AM-BM for the com-
bined failure mode characterized by bending failure of cross-section A and subsequent bending failure 
of cross-section B, given failure of section A, is defined by, 
pf,AM−BM = pf,AM ∙ pf,BM|AM             (2.50) 
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where pf,AM is the probability of bending failure of cross-section A, and pf,BM|AM  the conditional proba-
bility of bending failure of cross-section B given previous failure of cross-section A. Assuming a brittle 
behavior of support cross-section A-A, it can be considered that once the ultimate bending moment is 
attained, the cross-section becomes inactive since the resisting moment M will drastically drop with 
increasing curvature  (Figure 2.16). This brittle cross-section behavior will entail a change of the static 
system with a subsequent, and almost instantaneous, redistribution of the bending moments towards 
the span. Usually, cross-section B-B will not have enough strength to resist the resulting bending mo-
ment and will fail immediately causing span A-B-C to collapse. This kind of failure chain, where the fail-
ure of one cross-section causes the entire system to fail is referred to as progressive collapse, which is 
characteristic of brittle systems [85].  
The situation changes, however, if a ductile behavior of cross-section A-A is assumed. In that case, after 
attaining its ultimate strength, the cross-section is characterized by a specific rotation capacity allowing 
it to stay active (Figure 2.16). Consequently, the redistribution of bending moments towards the spans 
will be progressive and collapse will not occur until the ultimate strength is attained in cross-section B-
B.  
From the foregoing considerations, it appears to be evident -at least intuitively- that the reliability of a 
system with a brittle behavior is considerably less than the reliability of a similar system characterized 
by ductile component behavior. Indeed, in [85] it is being demonstrated that the system failure proba-
bility related to bending-induced failure mechanisms of span A-B-C is notably smaller in case the cross-
section is provided with sufficient rotation capacity and hence enables failure in a ductile manner. While 
the corresponding demonstration is being obviated here, it should be emphasized that the brittle failure 
mode described before is characteristic for statically determinate elements. For such elements, it can be 
considered that failure of one cross-section, in spite of the fact that this cross-section might behave in a 
ductile manner or not, entails necessarily the entire system to collapse, what, as mentioned before, is 
characteristic for series systems. From the perspective of structural reliability, statically determinate 
elements may thus be defined as extreme cases of statically indeterminate elements with brittle behav-
ior. Consequently, one may arrive at the conclusion that the failure probability of a statically indetermi-
nate system with ductile behavior is generally lower than compared to similar systems consisting of 
statically determinate members. 
2.4.4 Final observations 
The foregoing descriptions for the case of a relatively simple structural system give an idea on the nu-
merous aspects that must be taken into account when analyzing reliability of systems. For more complex 
systems, like entire building structures, the here presented principles might still apply, but the analysis 
gets very involved. For instance, it requires the consideration of properties characterizing system re-
dundancy, such as the ability of a structure to develop alternate load paths in the often-considered case 
of an accidental column removal in a building [87-90]. Such an analysis must address load-carrying 
mechanisms not normally considered in ordinary building design, as e.g., membrane action of floors, 
large deformations, catenary action or the ductility characteristics of both members and member con-
nections. For analysis of system reliability, this calls for practical and simplifying mechanical and prob-
abilistic models and methods. Recent studies focusing on reliability-based assessment [34] or optimiza-
tion [86] of structural systems show that such an analysis is practically feasible, yet there is significant 
scope for further research and development.  
 Chapter 2   Risk and reliability 
41 
2.5 Reliability of RC elements under moment-axial force interaction 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Any number of studies have been carried out in the past to quantify the reliability of reinforced concrete 
(RC) members, the vast majority being dedicated to one dimensional problems related to individual 
failure mechanisms, like bending, shear or compression failure, for instance [78]. However, many addi-
tional difficulties arise when the analysis involves a multidimensional problem [91]. A typical example 
of utmost importance is the reliability of RC members under the joint influence of axial forces (N) and 
bending moments (M). In this case the reliability assessment has to be performed in the M-N space, 
linked to a deterministic structural analysis procedure which accounts for material and, if required, ge-
ometrical nonlinearities. Thereby important issues such as load-path dependency, possible correlations 
between load effects and the eccentricity-dependant statistical characteristics of structural resistance 
have to be accommodated. For the reliability analysis of RC columns is being addressed in the present 
thesis, the following sections provide a summarizing review of the available literature on this subject. 
2.5.2 Interaction diagram and load path dependency 
The resistance of a RC member depends on both the material (e.g. the concrete compressive strength fc, 
the reinforcing steel yield strength fy, etc.) and the geometrical properties (e.g. the cross-section dimen-
sions, etc.), all of which are random variables. Following the definitions in [92], let XR denote the (time-
invariant) vector of these random quantities, where R represents resistance. For a given value of XR, xR, 
the resistance of a RC column submitted to the combined effects of axial forces (N) and bending mo-
ments (M) can be represented by an interaction diagram (Figure 2.17). It is formed by the pairs of           
MR,i(xR) and NR,i(xR) that, according to the underlying definition of the ultimate limit state, will cause 
cross-section failure. The pairs (MR,i, NR,i) can be obtained based on strain compatibility assumption, 
stress-strain relationships of the constitutive materials and equilibrium formulations. The interaction 
diagram is defined implicitly, as the joint behavior of N and M is not expressed in closed form [93]. 
Two regions can be distinguished in the interaction diagram [93] as a function of eccentricity eR,I corre-
sponding to the failure point (2.51): At small eR,i, failure occurs when the concrete crushes before the 
steel has yielded in tension, termed a compression failure. At large eR,i, the reinforcement yields first, 
followed by a compression failure in the concrete (in case of large axial tensile forces, by tensile failure 
of the reinforcement), what is termed a tensile failure. Both regions are separated by the so-called bal-
ance point (MR,b, NR,b), corresponding to simultaneous yielding of the tensile reinforcement and crushing 
of concrete in compression (Figure 2.17). The corresponding eccentricity is called balanced eccentricity, 
eR,b. 
eR,i =
M𝑅,𝑖
N𝑅,𝑖
            (2.51) 
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Figure 2.17 Bending moment (M) – axial force (N) interaction diagram 
The interaction diagram separates the failure region from the safe region in the M-N space (Figure 2.17), 
i.e. any arbitrary combination of load effects ME,i and NE,i which falls inside the area enclosed by the in-
teraction diagram represents a safe state. Let such a point be given by (ME,0, NE,0) as represented in 
Figure 2.18. Assuming, for sake of simplicity, a linear relationship between M and N, this point defines, 
together with the origin of the coordinate system, the initial action effect vector E0. Any further (linear) 
increase in load effects can then be described by vectors Ei beginning from point (ME,0, NE,0) [94], as 
shown in Figure 2.18. Failure of the member is hence represented by any of these vectors Ei intercepting 
the interaction diagram at point (MR,i , NR,i), what will be the case if the length of vector Ei, |𝐄𝐢
∗|, exceeds 
a value |𝐑𝐢| given by: 
Ri = |𝐑𝐢| = √|
MR,i−ME,0
h
|
2
+ |NR,i −NE,0|
2
         (2.52) 
The safety margin M (section 2.2.3) is given by (2.53), where M = 0 represents the limit state:   
M = R− E = |𝐑𝐢| − |𝐄𝐢|           (2.53) 
From a theoretical point of view, there are infinite possibilities for the directions of vectors Ei and hence 
for the definition of safety margin M. A conservative approach is the so-called shortest distance criterion 
[91, 92, 95], which defines the direction of a vector E1 such that |𝐑𝐢| is minimized (Figure 2.18). The 
main advantage of this approach, which resides in its invariant character [91], faces the inconvenience 
for need of a cumbersome minimization algorithm [92] and the lack of practical relevance in many cases. 
It was early appreciated that the nature of the applied loads should determine the definition of the safety 
margin [93]. For instance, in many normal design situations, the analysis of RC columns can be restricted 
to gravitational loads only, such as dead- or life loads. For this case, the safety margin can be reasonably 
based on proportional growth of M and N (assuming that second order effects can be neglected), from 
the origin of coordinates to the failure point on the interaction diagram. This is referred to as fixed ec-
centricity criterion [93]. In Figure 2.18, this is represented by vector E2, who follows the direction of 
vector E0 up to the failure point (MR2, NR,2). 
However, there are many situations where the assumption of a constant eccentricity is not suitable, such 
as in the case of relevant horizontal load effects. Consider, for instance, a column initially submitted to 
gravity loads (ME,0, NE,0) and subsequently exposed to a horizontal force stemming from a wind action, 
as analized in [96]. In this case, it might be more appropriate to define safety margin and limit state 
M 
N
Failure region
Safe region
Interaction diagram
Balance point (MR,b , NR,b ) Compression failure
Tensile failure
(MR,i , NR,i ) 
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function based on the so-called fixed axial load criterion, reflected by vector E3 (Figure 2.18). While the 
axial force level in the column is kept constant, the safety margin is expressed in terms of bending mo-
ments only. One might consider as well an extraordinary loading condition, such as associated with an 
explosion in the interior of a building. In this case it might be reasonable to assume that the explosion 
pressure acting on floors and walls would entail an increase of the bending moment in the columns 
while the compression axial load level decreases [37], as represented by vector E4 and the correspond-
ing failure point (MR4, NR,4). 
 
Figure 2.18 Different load paths in M-N interaction problems 
Recognizing that the safety margins (2.53) corresponding to the four represented load vectors Ei are 
different, it is obvious that the consideration of the loading history (or the loading sequence) is crucial 
for an adequate reliability estimation of members exposed to M-N interaction. In this respect, it is high-
lighted in some contributions [91, 95] that columns (in buildings) are often designed for gravity loads 
only, based on the before mentioned fixed eccentricity criterion under the assumption of proportional 
growth of M and N (Figure 2.18, load path E0-E2), while the actual loading history to which the member 
might be subjected during its design working life might deviate from the design assumptions. 
Identifying the potential load paths to which a member might be subjected would correspond to the 
detection of hazards and hazard situations within the context of a systematic qualitative risk analysis 
(section 2.1.2). In the subsequent quantitative analysis, the member reliability related to the identified 
load-paths can be determined taking account of the corresponding uncertainties associated with the 
basic random variables characterizing both the loading and the member resistance (sections 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2). In the following, a brief overview will be provided on how these variables and the associated 
uncertainties affect the reliability level of RC columns, followed by a brief description of the most rele-
vant methods applied in the past to determine the reliability of such members. 
2.5.3 Basic variables and their influence on reliability 
Loads and load effect eccentricity 
Each load path or loading sequence of a column exposed to M-N interaction can be stochastically char-
acterized by means of probabilistic models taking account of the uncertainties associated with both the 
loads and the models used determine the corresponding load effects. Of specific interest for M-N inter-
action problems is the uncertainty in the eccentricity. For instance, in the previously mentioned, fixed 
eccentricity approach, usually applied to the analysis of columns under the effect of gravity loads, it is 
M 
N
(ME,0 , NE,0 ) 
(MR,1 , NR,1 ) 
(MR,2 , NR,2 ) 
(MR,3 , NR,3) 
(MR,4 , NR,4) 
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implicitly assumed that the applied axial force NE and the corresponding bending moment ME are per-
fectly correlated by eccentricity eE [92, 97]: 
eE =
ME
NE
            (2.54) 
The influence of varying correlations between NE and ME on the column reliability has been addressed 
in [92, 95, 98] considering correlation coefficients different from unity. It was generally observed that 
perfect (positive) correlation proves to be a conservative assumption when the failure mode is charac-
terized by compression failure (Figure 2.17), i.e. for relatively small eccentricities eR,i (2.51). On the other 
hand, it was shown that perfect (positive) correlation between NE and ME might not be conservative in 
case the failure point is being situated in the tensile failure zone (Figure 2.17).  
Another issue of interest in relation to RC column reliability corresponds to sustained load effects. As 
commonly known, such load effects may affect the concrete compressive strength and hence the re-
sistance of the column. Moreover, sustained loads induce concrete creep, which in turn increases the 
total strain and hence the member deflections, what is particularly important in case of slender columns. 
To account for such effects, a time-dependent reliability analysis may be performed [96]. In many cases, 
however, simplifying assumptions can be adopted to convert the problem into a time-invariant analysis. 
In [97], long-term reliability of both short and slender concrete columns was found to be smaller than 
short-term reliability, being the difference of minor importance however. 
Resistance variables 
As stated before, the resistance of a RC member depends on both material and geometrical properties. 
Since these properties are all random, the resistance of the member is a random variable. The statistical 
analysis of the cross-section resistance has been addressed in a previous study on the reliability of RC 
columns under gravity loads in persistent design situations [99]. In this study, resistance Ri was defined 
by (2.52) with ME0 = NE0 = 0, i.e. assuming a fixed eccentricity eR,i. Figure 2.19 shows the design interac-
tion diagram (Rd) corresponding to a symmetrical RC cross-section, based on code specifications for the 
resistance of RC elements [72] and obtained by linear connection of the Rdi values obtained at selected 
eccentricities eR,i (including eR = 0 and eR = ∞). The Monte Carlo technique was then applied to simulate 
1000 samples of resistance Ri at each selected eccentricity taking account of the uncertainties in the 
basic variables influencing the resistance (fc, fy, b, h, d, As). The corresponding results were plotted in 
histograms, as shown in Figure 2.19 for the normalized, balanced eccentricity (eR,b/h = 0.6). A subse-
quent statistical evaluation of the results delivered for each analyzed eR,i the mean value R,I and the 
coefficient of variation, CoVR. The interaction diagram corresponding to the mean R is compared in 
Figure 2.19 to the design diagram Rd. As could be expected, R exceeds Rd at all eccentricities. However, 
ratio R/Rd is found to vary considerably. Highest ratios R/Rd are obtained for small eR and vice versa, 
a finding confirmed in similar studies [93, 100-102] dedicated to the reliability analysis of RC columns 
designed according to ACI or ASCE code specifications.  
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Figure 2.19 Interaction diagram for a RC cross-section based on design values (Rd) and mean values (R) 
In addition, the coefficient of variation, CoVR, which represents the uncertainty in the cross-section re-
sistance Ri, varies significantly with eccentricity eR. In [93] it was shown that the concrete compressive 
strength fc appears to be an essential influence parameter on CoVR in case of relatively small eR. Higher 
uncertainties in fc were found to significantly increase CoVR in the compression controlled failure zone. 
In case of larger eR, however, the influence of fc on CoVR was observed to vanish at the same time the 
uncertainty in bar placement, represented by effective cross-section depth d, gained importance. The 
uncertainty in the yield strength of the reinforcing steel was likewise observed to significantly affect 
CoVR in case of larger normalized eccentricities. Due to these disproportional influences, the coefficient 
of variation CoVR was found to be higher in the compression failure region than in the tensile controlled 
failure zone, with a pronounced transition around the balance point. These findings were later con-
firmed in similar studies [100-102].  
When performing reliability analysis of structural elements, model uncertainties (section 2.2.1) have to 
be accounted for in relation with both action effects and resistance. The latter seem to depend on eccen-
tricity eR. In [101], a coefficient of variation for the resistance model uncertainty (taking account of M-N 
interaction) of CoVR,MN = 0.065 is suggested for the entire compression failure zone (eR < eR,b), reducing 
linearly to CoVR,MN = 0.03 when approaching pure bending failure (eR = ∞). In [97], where slender col-
umns are analysed, a higher CoVR,MN for compression controlled failure zone is adopted: CoVR,MN = 0.11. 
In both studies a normal distribution is recommended for the statistical representation of model uncer-
tainty R,MN with a bias (ratio of mean to nominal value) of 1.0.  
The previous observations regarding the dependency of the statistical properties of column resistance 
(including model uncertainties) on the failure mode, points to the fact the column reliability is affected 
by the eccentricity eR,i, ranging from higher reliabilities at small eR to smaller reliability levels at larger 
eR, as can be drawn from several studies [92, 97, 102, 103]. The transition zone around the balanced 
eccentricity eR,b is sometimes observed to be affected by fluctuations of the reliability index, probably 
due to the inaccuracy of approximate reliability methods (section 2.2.3) [92]. Tendentiously, the con-
crete compression strength fc and the longitudinal reinforcement ratio l seem to have a substantial 
influence on the reliability level of both short and slender RC columns, especially in the compression 
controlled failure zone (eR < eR,b). In any case, the absolute reliability levels obtained in the different 
analysed studies depend on the numerous deterministic and probabilistic modeling assumptions and 
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simplifications adopted. A detailed comparison between the results of these studies is therefore difficult, 
if not at all impossible, and will be obviated herein. 
Slenderness 
Lateral deflection in so-called slender columns result in non-negligible secondary moments due to the 
axial load acting through an additional eccentricity [101]. Since second order problems are character-
ized by interaction between action effects and resistance, no closed-form solution exists to determine 
the equilibrium configuration of slender columns and iterative procedures must be applied instead. Sim-
plified approaches for performing structural analysis of buckling critical members can be roughly clas-
sified into those where the first order bending moment is being complemented by a second order term 
(for instance, by means of a moment magnification factor or based on a nominal curvature), and those 
based on an equivalent reduction of the cross-section resistance. The herein analysed studies on relia-
bility of slender RC columns are mainly based on the latter approach [97, 100, 101, 103]. The main ad-
vantage thereby is that, in case only gravitational loads are under consideration, the perfect correlation 
assumption of ME and NE underlying the fixed eccentricity approach (section 2.5.2) may be maintained 
[97]. The studies show that, tendentiously, the reliability level of RC columns (of normal strength con-
crete) decreases with increasing slenderness ratio , which is defined by the ratio between the effective 
column length and the radius of gyration of the uncracked concrete section. The results presented in 
[95] show that for slenderness ratios  ≤ 30 no significant changes in reliability are to be expected. Diniz 
and Frangopol [97] who compared the reliability index  of short (=0) and slender columns (=50) 
made of normal and high-strength concrete, found that the latter experience a relatively small decrease 
in . The results, which must be interpreted with caution however, for they depend on the particular 
modeling assumptions and simplifications adopted, show to be sensitive to the eccentricity eR. Gener-
ally, the reliability of slender columns is more sensitive for small- and intermediate eR, whereas when 
pure bending conditions are approached the influence of slenderness vanishes due to the decreasing 
influence of the axial force.  
2.5.4 Reliability methods 
Several approaches for computing the reliability level of members under M-N interaction have been 
suggested in the past, among them Monte Carlo (MC) simulations [91, 98], numerical integration tech-
niques [95], approximate methods like FOSM, FORM or SORM [92, 95, 99, 104] or hybrid methods com-
bining MC simulation and such approximate methods [97, 99, 100, 102, 103]. 
The perhaps most general approach, in a sense that it requires fewer simplifications than other methods, 
is the MC simulation. It is therefore probably the most suitable for the treatment of reliability problems 
related to M-N interaction [105]. Basically, MC techniques might be used for simulation of both the re-
sistance, i.e. the interaction diagram, and the action effects. The failure probability can then be obtained 
by simply counting the outcrossings of the safe domain (Figure 2.17). Floris and Mazzucchelli [91] came 
up with a more elegant procedure where the shortest distance criterion (section 2.5.2) was established 
as safety margin and sampled by MC. This was followed by determination of the cumulative distribution 
function F() (Figure 2.7) of the safety margin. Since the limit state is reached when the safety margin 
is zero, the probability of failure simply corresponds to F(0) [91]. 
The large numerical expense associated with direct MC simulation methods prompted the use of more 
efficient, hybrid approaches. These are based on a previous MC simulation of the resistance Ri corre-
sponding to a certain (fixed) eccentricity eR,i, as exposed before (Figure 2.19). Subsequently, the derived 
statistical parameters of Ri (, CoV) are used, along with probabilistic models for action effects (E), for 
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purpose of a reliability analysis by means of the efficient FOSM- or FORM algorithm. In case, R and E are 
normally distributed, the reliability index based on Cornells approach [65] (2.30) can be deduced, as 
shown in [99, 102]. Otherwise, non-normal variables must be previously transformed into equivalent 
normal variables (section 2.2.3). The studies [97, 100] have been performed in this way. 
The described hybrid approaches might not be suitable for problems where the uncertainty in the load 
eccentricity should be accounted for. Moreover, they still require cumbersome simulation- and evalua-
tion techniques for the statistical analysis of the RC column resistance. Therefore, direct applications of 
the more efficient FORM and SORM algorithms have been proposed [92, 95, 99, 104]. The computational 
efficiency of these algorithms lies in the fact that, compared to the simulation techniques like MC, they 
call the limit state function a considerably fewer number of times [92]. In a previous study [99], a FORM-
based procedure has been successfully applied to RC columns exposed to gravitational design loads un-
der the assumption of a constant eccentricity. A generic description of this procedure and its application 
to the herein studied, explosion-exposed members will be given in section 6.1. 
2.6  Summary 
Chapter 2 provides a summary of relevant issues arising around risk and reliability in structural engi-
neering. 
The principles of risk-informed decision-making are introduced in section 2.1. A generally accepted and 
frequently applied procedure is introduced (section 2.1.2, Figure 2.1), divided into two principal stages: 
qualitative and quantitative risk analysis. The former primarily intends to identify the hazards to which 
a system may be exposed and to combine them logically in order to establish possible hazard scenarios. 
The latter delivers a quantitative evaluation of those scenarios in terms of their occurrence probabilities 
and their potential consequences. Based on both probabilities and consequences, the resulting risks may 
be assessed on the grounds of corresponding acceptance criteria. 
The difficulties and challenges related to the establishment of such criteria are subsequently discussed 
(section 2.1.3). In keeping with the scope of the thesis, the most relevant criteria for risks to persons are 
outlined, from the perspective of both the individual and the societal risk acceptability. Individual risk 
criteria aim at limiting the risk exposure for individual persons. Taking the average fatality rate from 
risk-neutral activities, such as car driving, as a reference, acceptable individual risk levels are suggested 
in the literature as a function of both voluntariness of the activity and the benefit obtained (Figure 2.3). 
For admissible individual risks associated with structural collapse, which are invariably involuntary and 
entail comparatively small benefit, different studies report values of the order of 10-6 to 10-5 y-1.  
On the contrary, societal risk criteria pursue the goal to limit the occurrence frequencies of events with 
particularly severe consequences. It seems generally accepted that frequency-consequence curves (F-
n) provide an accurate description of such criteria (Figure 2.4). Extremely important is to assure con-
sistency with the size of the reference system the F-n criterion is being applied to. Moreover, the F-n 
acceptance criterion should be consistent with the expected number of fatalities E(N) associated with 
the system and the reference period considered. Otherwise, irrational decision-making might be the re-
sult. 
Section 2.2 addresses the principles of structural reliability. The different types of uncertainties involved 
in structure-related decision problems are summarized (section 2.2.1). In most cases, it is sufficient to 
model the uncertain quantities by means of random variables with given cumulative distribution func-
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tions and associated distribution parameters (section 2.2.2). By means of these variables, structural per-
formance criteria can be brought into the form of a limit state function (LSF) (Figure 2.9), which serves 
as a base for computation of structural failure probabilities. An efficient method for this purpose is the 
enhanced First Order Second Moment concept (FORM), which, based on a first order approximation 
(linearization) of the non-linear LSF, considers only the first two moments of each random variable (sec-
tion 2.2.3). This method delivers the coordinates of most likely failure point on the limit state surface, 
termed FORM design point, for which a geometrical relationship to the reliability index  exists (Figure 
2.12). 
In section 2.3, it is shown how risk and reliability are treated in current structural design codes. The 
concept of limit state design is introduced (section 2.3.2). This concept is based on a semi-probabilistic 
approach, where the involved load and resistance parameters are established in terms of design values, 
for which a direct relationship to the coordinates of the FORM design point exists. This link provides the 
basis for a risk- or reliability based calibration of code design rules. Different sets of target reliabilities 
are suggested in codes and guidelines for such a purpose (section 2.3.3, Table 2.2, Table 2.3).  
Limit state design is based on the consideration of local (member or component) failure, whereas the 
global reliability i.e. the reliability against system collapse is treated in robustness requirements. The 
general performance requirement stated in the Eurocodes is that the structure shall be designed and 
executed in a way that it will not be damaged by events such as fire, explosion, impact and the conse-
quences of human errors, to an extent disproportionate to the original cause. As a result of this principle, 
local failure might be acceptable in accidental design situations provided that neither the whole struc-
ture nor an important part thereof will collapse (section 2.3.4). Associated design strategies for acci-
dental actions involve, among others, the design of key elements, on which the stability of the structure, 
or a large part of it, depends, the provision of ductile member behaviour and design of a sufficiently 
redundant structural system that disposes of alternate load paths in case of a local member failure event.  
Despite the fact that the explicit evaluation of the conditional system failure probability given a local 
structural damage is out of scope of the present thesis, some basic considerations on reliability of struc-
tural systems are nevertheless made (section 2.4). Two idealized limit cases are distinguished; series 
systems and parallel systems (section 2.4.2). An example (Figure 2.16) illustrates that one of these sys-
tem idealizations alone can seldom represent real structural systems (section 2.4.3). Moreover, the ex-
ample shows that the system failure probability is strongly dependant on the deformation capacity of 
the individual system components (cross-sections). Based on this appreciation, it is revealed that the 
failure probability of a statically indeterminate system with ductile behavior is generally lower than 
compared to similar systems consisting of statically determinate members. Significant scope for further 
research into the issue of system reliability is identified (section 2.4.4). 
Finally, section 2.5 provides an overview on the reliability analysis of RC members under the joint influ-
ence of axial forces (N) and bending moments (M), which is an in many aspects challenging subject. The 
reliability assessment has to be performed in a multi-dimensional space, linked to a structural analysis 
procedure that accounts for material- and, if required, geometrical nonlinearities (section 2.5.2). 
Thereby important issues such as load-path dependency (Figure 2.18), correlations between load effects 
and the eccentricity-dependent statistical characteristics of structural resistance (Figure 2.19) have to 
be accommodated (section 2.5.3). Among the different approaches in place for computing the reliability 
level of members under M-N interaction, FORM-based methods have proven to be computationally effi-
cient (section 2.5.4).
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Chapter 3 Explosions and their effects on 
structures 
3.1 Gas explosions  
3.1.1 Introduction 
The energy supply of buildings with gas for heating, cooking, and electricity generation implies the po-
tential for an accidental explosion. A gas explosion can be defined as a process where combustion of a 
premixed gas-air cloud causes a rapid increase of pressure. The succession of the following circum-
stances is required for a gas explosion to occur [106]. 
- A gas leakage or release occurs as a result of technical defects in gas installations (pipes, boilers, 
etc.), human errors during installing, repair or maintenance of such installations, or in conse-
quence of intentional manipulation.  
- The released gas forms, with the oxygen present in the air, an inflammable gas-air cloud in com-
pliance with certain physical requirements. 
- A delayed ignition of the gas-air mixture through an ignition source (spark, hot surface, etc) oc-
curs. If the ignition takes place immediately after the gas release, i.e. before an inflammable gas-
oxygen cloud is being formed, a fire might occur, but the mixture will not explode. 
The literature provides statistical data on the occurrence of gas explosions in buildings in different coun-
tries. An overview of this data is offered in section 3.1.2. Subsequently, section 3.1.3 provides insight to 
the principal physical backgrounds of the pressure build-up in a gas explosion in the interior of a build-
ing. Finally, section 3.1.4 summarizes available approaches for modeling the explosion pressure. 
3.1.2 Occurrence rate  
Over the last decades, several studies have been conducted with the aim to quantify the occurrence rate 
of gas explosions in buildings. One of the earliest surveys was performed by Burnett in 1975 [107]. 
Based on data collected by the American Gas Association and the Office of Pipeline Safety, the frequency 
of occurrence of piped-gas explosions in the United States between 1960 and 1970 was established. A 
distinction was drawn for gas explosions in general, and incidents involving damage in excess of $1000. 
For the latter, an occurrence rate of about  = 2·10-6 incidents per year and dwelling was observed (Ta-
ble 3.1). The occurrence rate of gas explosions in general, i.e. irrespective of the damage involved was 
found to be about one order of magnitude higher. Almost the same conclusions were obtained by Leyen-
decker and Ellingwood [108], whose study covered the occurrence of gas explosions across the US in 
1970. 
Ellis and Currie [109] published data on the occurrence of explosions in the United Kingdom (UK), rec-
orded between 1971 and 1994 by the Building Research Establishment (BRE). Mean frequencies of oc-
currence were deduced for a reference period between 1984 and 1994. Thereby, different damage levels 
were distinguished. The results are summarized in Table 3.1. For gas explosions in general, an annual 
occurrence rate of about  = 8·10-6 per dwelling supplied with gas was determined, what according to 
the authors could be an underestimate since the survey probably does not include all minor incidents. 
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More reliable seems the deduced frequency for “significant explosions”, involving “some kind of struc-
tural damage”, of approximately  = 2·10-6 per year. For more “severe explosions” entailing damage to 
heavier claddings, infills or partitions, as well as “weaker” loadbearing elements (e.g. gable walls, etc.), 
 reduces to 5·10-7 per year. Finally, “very severe incidents”, referring to explosions inducing failure of 
“stronger” loadbearing elements, like RC members, are characterized by annual occurrence probabili-
ties of about  = 2·10-8 per dwelling supplied with gas. 
In [110], relevant data regarding the frequency of occurrence of natural (piped) gas explosions in Ger-
many are given, based on data records by the organization Gas-und Wasserfach e.V. A mean value of 
about 42 gas explosions per year is reported for a 20-year reference period between 1981 and 2001. 
This corresponds to a mean frequency of occurrence of about  = 2 ·10-5 explosions per year and dwell-
ing supplied with piped gas. A smaller average value is indicated in [7, 24] for the Netherlands, namely 
 = 5 ·10-6 explosions per year, along with the indication that higher values would be expected if small 
explosions (giving little damage only) would also be taken into account. 
Data on the occurrence of gas explosions in Spain is provided in press releases. According to [111], 32 
explosions with at least one fatality were recorded between 1998 and 2007. Considering representative 
for this 10-year reference period an average of about 6.5 million housing units with gas supply [112], 
the annual occurance probability  for an explosion with at least one fatality is about  = 5 ·10-6. A similar 
calculation based on information in [28] delivers a value of  = 2 ·10-6 explosions with 3 or more fatalities 
(Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Annual frequencies of occurrence of gas explosions reported in different studies.  
Study Country Period 
Annual frequency of occurrence 
 (per dwelling or per dwelling supplied with gas a) 
Any  gas 
explosion 
Damage 
> 
$1000 
Any 
structural 
damage 
Damage to 
heavier 
claddings 
and 
“weaker” 
loadbearing 
elements  
Damage to 
“stronger” 
loadbearing 
elements 
(e.g. RC) 
≥ 1 
fatality 
≥ 3 
fatalities 
Burnett          
[107, 108] 
US 1960/70 2 ·10-5 2 ·10-6 - - - - - 
Ellis and Currie 
[109] 
GB 1984-94 8 ·10-6 a,b - 2 ·10-6  a 5 ·10-7  a 2 ·10-8  a - - 
Schmidt        
[110] 
DE 1981-01 2 ·10-5  a - - - - - - 
Vrouwenvelder 
and Leira [7, 24] 
NL n.a. 5 ·10-6 b - - - - - - 
Press release 
[111] 
ES 1998-07 - - - - - 5 ·10
-6 
a 
- 
Press release 
[28] 
ES 2001-10 - - - - - - 2 ·10-6 a 
b Excluding incidents with “little damage” 
A comparison of the data summarized in Table 3.1 shows a good correlation among the findings re-
ported. Interestingly,  seems to be almost independent of the considered time period, what in light of 
the continuous modernization of gas installations and appliances could not have been expected. The 
data compiled in Table 3.1 suggests that =10-5 provides a good estimate for the annual occurrence of 
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a gas explosion in a gas-supplied dwelling. Moreover, it is shown that  decreases with the severity of 
the explosion. Very severe incidents with the potential for failure of RC elements occur with frequencies 
of about two to three orders of magnitude lower than compared to gas explosions in general. 
In several studies it is suggested that, assuming a uniform distribution in time, the occurrence of gas 
explosions may be modelled as a Poisson process [24, 108, 110]. The probability of occurrence p(EX) of 
at least one explosion within a given reference period Tref can then be deduced from (3.1), depending on 
the probability of an explosion event per unit of time, . 
 p(EX) = P(x > 0|Tref, λ) = 1 − e
−λ∙Tref ≈ λ ∙ Tref     (3.1) 
3.1.3 Pressure generation 
The pressure build-up during a gas explosion in the inside of a building is a consequence of combustion 
in a confined environment. The combustion process results in increased temperatures due to the trans-
formation of chemically bound energy into heat. Thereby, the expansion of the combustion products, 
such as CO2 and vapour, will be limited due to confinement by the building closings such as walls and 
floors, what will cause the pressure to increase [106]. 
In a completely confined compartment, such as pipes or closed vessels in industrial installations, the 
maximum pressure generated during a gas explosion will depend primary on the burning velocity (ve-
locity of the flame front relative to the unburned gas immediately ahead of the flame [106]). This velocity 
depends on the composition of the inflammable gas cloud, i.e. the gas type and the proportions of gas 
and air. The highest pressures will arise if these proportions are such that there is no excess of fuel nor 
oxygen after the chemical reaction has been completed, what is referred to as the stoichiometric com-
position [106]. For methane gas, for instance, which is the principle constituent of natural gas, the high-
est explosion pressures will arise for gas concentrations of about 10%. Below a methane gas concentra-
tion of 4%, and above 17%, no explosion will occur. These so-called lower- and upper flammability limits 
depend on the type of gas involved, the initial pressure (p0) and temperature (t0). The mentioned values 
for methane gas correspond to ambient conditions (t0 = 20º, p0 = 1 bar). 
The ignition of a hydrocarbon gas-air cloud in a fully confined compartment might entail explosion pres-
sures up to approximately 8 bars (800 kN/m2) [106]. Gas explosion in buildings, however, do not cause 
pressures of this magnitude. The main reasons are imperfect mixing of the gas-air cloud and the fact 
that these explosions are only partly confined. Windows, doors, light partition walls or unrestrained 
brick walls act as venting elements, which, in case of failure provide explosion pressure relief. Table 3.2 
[113] gives typical failure pressures of these elements. Experimental observations on failure of venting 
panels can be found in [114, 115].  
Table 3.2 Typical failure pressures of different building elements [113]. 
Element Typical failure pressure (kN/m2) 
Glas windows 2 - 7 
Room doors 2 - 3 
Light partition walls 2 - 5 
Breeze block walls (50 mm) 4 - 5 
Unrestrained brick walls 7 - 15 
 
Figure 3.1, adopted from [110], shows an explosion pressure-time curve due to an explosion of a gas-air 
cloud in a cubic compartment equipped with a one-sided venting wall. The curve was deduced with 
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numerical simulations under use computational fluid dynamics (CFD). The pressure development in the 
compartment can be described as follows: 
During the initial phase (characterized by point nº 1), which commences with the ignition of the gas-air 
cloud, the explosion venting panel is still undamaged and consequently the explosion pressure rises 
following the so-called “closed-vessel curve” [24], i.e. the curve which describes the pressure develop-
ment in a fully confined compartment. As stated before, this development is principally influenced by 
the gas-type and the proportions of the gas-air mixture.  
At the end of the initial stage, the venting panel bursts. As soon as the flame front reaches the opening 
(point nº 2), the combustion products as well as the unburnt gas can escape and, consequently, the pres-
sure decreases (point nº 3). Generally, the higher are the failure pressures of the explosion venting pan-
els, and the larger their size, the faster will be the pressure relief. 
As shown in Figure 3.1, during the pressure relief through the venting panel, the flame surface in the 
compartment increases. Moreover, the venting process might entail the generation of turbulent flow 
fields. Both effects contribute to higher burning velocities, what in turn will induce a pressure rise. If the 
rate of pressure rise is higher than the rate that describes the simultaneous pressure relief due to vent-
ing, the pressure in the compartment will restart to increase (point nº 4) until the flame surface in the 
compartment, and consequently the explosion pressure, has reached its maximum (point nº 5). In other 
words, after breakage of the venting panel, the pressure build-up is governed by the balance between 
pressure generation by increased burning velocities, and the relief of the pressure through venting 
[106]. The corresponding physical backgrounds are complex since they depend on the interaction of 
numerous parameters including: 
- The composition of the gas cloud (fuel-air mixture) and filling ratio of the room with this cloud. 
- The geometry of the room where the explosion occurs (room proportions and volume). 
- The type, size and geometrical distribution of the venting panels. 
- The location of the point of ignition (with respect to the gas cloud and to the venting panels). 
- The generation of turbulences due to obstructed flow around obstacles. 
A detailed description of the physical relations between these parameters and the explosion pressure 
generation can be found in [106] and will be omitted here. 
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Figure 3.1 Simulated explosion pressure generation in a cubical, vented compartment [110]. 
For purpose of comparison to the numerically obtained pressure-time curve described before, Figure 
3.2 shows a pressure-time record of one of the tests conducted by Dragosavic [116] to deduce a method 
for predicting the explosion pressure that may occur in a standard dwelling. Some similarities can be 
observed between the curves in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, such as the qualitatively similar pressure-rise 
according to the “closed vessel curve” before venting occurs. However, some significant differences are 
also manifested. For instance, the test record shows that the pressure drop after the burst of the vents 
can reach negative values, which were observed to be of insignificant magnitude however. Another in-
teresting observation in the test record (Figure 3.2) is the relatively long low-pressure period (about 
0.5 seconds) after the initial pressure drop due to the burst of the venting panels. At the end of this 
period, a second, significant pressure-rise takes place, which is characterized by rapid fluctuations, 
probably in consequence of turbulent post-combustion of residual gas [116]. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Explosion pressure generation recorded in full-scale test [116]. 
3.1.4 Load models 
Generalities 
The prediction of the pressure generated in a gas explosion is a difficult task, since, as explained in the 
previous section, pressure build-up is subject to very complex physical relations. Moreover, many of the 
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above-mentioned influence parameters on the explosion pressure, such as the composition of the gas 
cloud, the filling-ratio of the compartment or the location of the point of ignition are of random nature 
in a sense that they are not predictable at all. The most appropriate way to account for such random 
variables when modeling the gas explosion pressure is by means of probabilistic approaches. However, 
the lack of data hinders a reliable stochastic description of these variables and hence requires a certain 
degree of conservatism in the model formulations.  
Several empirical models for the prediction of gas explosion pressure are available in the literature 
[116-119]. A summary and comparison of these models, which mainly depend on the geometry charac-
teristics of the enclosure and the properties of the venting elements, is provided in [24]. The comparison 
reveals important differences between the model results, indicative of the above-mentioned difficulties 
associated with the pressure prediction. Moreover, it is evidenced that the empirical models should not 
be applied beyond the scope of the experimental studies they are based on. 
Origin of the Eurocode model  
Of special interest for the present study is the empirical model deduced in [116], shortly after the col-
lapse of the Ronan-Point building (Figure 1.2). Dragosavic [116] conducted a systematic survey to study 
the effect of room geometry and different venting components on the pressure build-up inside a rectan-
gular enclosure due to natural gas explosions. A total of 34 tests were carried out (out of which 7 were 
initially designated for purpose of calibration of the test instrumentation) under varying room dimen-
sions and static failure pressures of the venting panels. In most of the tests, a stoichiometric composition 
of the gas-air cloud was provided. Before its ignition in the centre of the enclosure, the cloud was ho-
mogenously distributed by means of ventilators.  
The pressure was measured at several points on the enclosure’s walls and ceilings. The qualitative pres-
sure build-up in time, shown before (Figure 3.2), was similar in all the tests conducted. In line with the 
explanations in the previous section, two distinct pressure pulses were identified (Figure 3.2): a first 
pressure pulse with maximum p1, occurring immediately after bursting of the venting panels, and a sec-
ond pressure pulse during the venting phase, with maximum p2, in many cases significantly larger than 
p1. It should be noted that p2 does not represent the maximum of the represented high frequency pres-
sures since these are of limited structural significance [24]. Instead, p2 was derived by calculating a time-
average of the fluctuating pressures, as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 3.2. Subsequently, peak 
pressures p1 and p2 were reduced to 80 % of their measured values in order to account for enhanced 
material resistance when exposed to high loading rates. Finally, the envelope was plotted to deduce a 
model that estimates the static equivalent explosion pressure in terms of the relationship between the 
static failure pressure of the venting components (Table 3.2), pstat, and the so-called venting coefficient, 
i.e. the ratio of the area of the venting panels, Av, to the volume of the enclosure, V. The nominal, static 
equivalent explosion pressure (pd) proposed by Dragosavic was adopted by a number of structural de-
sign codes, Eurocode EN 1991-1-7 [17] among them. Figure 3.3 shows pd versus Av/V assuming pstat = 7 
kN/m2 (violet curve). The model is valid within the limits 0.05 m-1 ≤ Av/V ≤ 0.15 m-1 and V ≤ 1000 m3. 
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Figure 3.3 Gas explosion pressure versus venting coefficient Av/V: Design value pd, nominal value pkey = 34 
kN/m2 for design of key elements against unidentified accidental actions [17] and peak pressure mean value 
μpEX,peakaccording to [108] and [110]. 
Models for estimation of the peak pressure mean value 
Some years later, Leyendecker y Ellingwood [108] analyzed Dragosavic’s test data from a statistical 
point of view. An expression for the peak pressure mean value μpEX,peak  of a gas explosion in typical 
housing units was found with regression analysis, and is illustrated in Figure 3.3 (blue curve). Moreover, 
Figure 3.3 contains a model for predicting the mean value of the explosion peak pressure proposed in 
[110], based on CFD simulations of natural gas explosions in dwellings (green curve). The Figure shows 
that this model predicts far higher peak pressures than the EN 1991-1-7 design criteria [17] and the 
mean value according to [108], both based on test results [116]. Considering that these tests were con-
ducted under the conservative assumption of a homogenously distributed, stoichiometric mix of gas and 
oxygen, which seems highly unlikely to occur under real circumstances, this finding may seem surpris-
ing. The numerical study [110], however, took other random parameters into consideration, whose ef-
fects would favour pressure generation. These parameters, which included the adverse location of the 
point of ignition with respect to the location of the venting panels and especially the generation of ob-
stacle-induced turbulence, were not addressed in detail in the tests. This could explain the wide gap 
between the mean value based on a numerical approach and the empirically deduced models. However, 
for the time being no tests that might confirm the numerical results have been conducted. As highlighted 
by Vrouwenvelder and Leira [24], even for the most sophisticated CFD calculations a comparison with 
results from tests is crucial in order to verify that the modeling assumptions have been adopted in an 
appropriate manner. 
It should also be stressed that the described peak pressure models were derived for explosions in single-
room compartments. However, Ellis and Currie [109] point out that in case of large gas leakage rates, 
significant concentrations of gas might be built up in a number of interconnected rooms. In that case, an 
initial explosion in one room could propagate into others causing a progressively more turbulent situa-
tion with the potential for a much more violent explosion causing very high pressures. Such a type of 
“multi-room explosion”, also termed a “cascade explosion”, was probably in the origin of the Ronan-
Point collapse (Figure 1.2) [109]. In [27] it is stated that in this incident a pressure of about 34 kN/m2 
caused the failure of the loadbearing wall that triggered the progressive collapse of the building, what 
seems to be in contradiction to [25], where it is reported that a pressure of about 21 kN/m2 was required 
to displace this wall. In any case, the value of 34 kN/m2 has since been adopted in the Eurocode as a 
notional pressure for the design of key elements against unidentified accidental actions [17] (section 
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2.3.4). Moreover, in the UK, it is recommended as a design criterion in large panel system buildings 
where a piped-gas supply is present [38]. As Figure 3.3 shows, the 34 kN/m2 criterion (pkey) provides an 
upper bound to the overpressure models presented here. Specific models for the description of the pres-
sure development in cascade explosions are not available in the literature, nor is this explosion type 
covered by current design codes [17]. 
Statistical distribution and scatter associated with peak pressure models 
The fitting of a statistical distribution to the explosion (peak) pressure is a difficult exercise due to the 
short number of available test results. Further to the central limit theorem (section 2.2.2), Schmidt as-
sumed a normal distribution [110], as did Leyendecker and Ellingwood [108]. Vrouwenvelder et al. [7] 
adopted a lognormal distribution in the context of a numerical example adressed to the analysis of ro-
bustness measures in a residential building. 
From a maximum of seven tests under nominally identical conditions to study the scatter inherent in 
the generation of explosion pressure [116], a coefficient of variation of CoV=0.3 and 0.36 for the peak 
pressure loads p1 and p2, respectively, was deduced in [108]. A even lower CoV of 0.22 is recommended 
in [110] based on numerical results. These relatively low values are in contradiction to the indications 
in [24] where, based on a comparison of the Eurocode model to test results published in [120], a CoV of 
around 0.7 is considered reasonable for the description of the scatter associated with the gas explosion 
peak pressure.  
Pressure-time relationships 
Gas explosions in buildings are regarded as a relatively slow type of explosion event [121]. In most cases 
they can be described as deflagrations, characterized by a flame front which travels at subsonic speed 
relative to the unburnt gas [106]. In comparison to detonations (often associated with explosives), 
where the flame front travels at supersonic speed [106], deflagrations are characterized by a relatively 
slow pressure build-up.  
 
Figure 3.4 Typical idealized pressure-time relationships for deflagrations (left) and detonations (right)   
Figure 3.4 shows typical idealizations of pressure-time relationships for the deflagrative- (left) and det-
onative (right) explosion types. For the latter, often a zero rise time is considered (tr = 0) followed by a 
linear (or exponential) decay. For the former, of primary interest in the present study, Schmidt [110] 
suggested a symmetrical triangular pressure pulse (tr=tp/2). Figure 3.2 seems to confirm that this as-
sumption is reasonable, especially for the second pressure pulse (p2). Beshara [122] reports on recom-
mendations from Bela [123] according to which the pressure pulse rise time tr of an idealized triangular 
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pressure pulse of total duration tp can be assumed to depend on the relation between the venting coef-
ficient Av/V and the volume V of the enclosure: 
tr =
tp
2
     for  
Av
V
≥ V−
2
3     (3.2) 
tr =
tp
3
    for  
Av
V
< V−
2
3     (3.3) 
The total pulse duration tp is indicated to rise with the volume V [122, 123]: 
tp = 0.2 − 0.3 s   for  V ≤ 100 m
3     (3.4) 
tp = 0.4 − 0.5 s   for  100 < V ≤ 1000 m
3    (3.5) 
tp = 0.6 − 0.8 s   for  V > 1000 m
3     (3.6) 
The pressure pulses shown in Figure 3.2 acted for approximately 0.2-0.3 s on the closures of rather small 
room volumes of up to 36 m3, what seems to confirm the validity of (3.4).  
3.2 Behaviour of RC elements under blast loads 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Explosion-induced loading on structures is generally associated with high energies and short durations. 
When exposed to such conditions, the material properties might be significantly altered. Moreover, 
structural elements experience accelerations and hence inertia forces will influence their behaviour. 
Non-linear structural response gains importance for it will contribute to dissipation of kinetic energy 
associated with the dynamic loads. In addition, such loads may induce higher structural vibration modes 
and thus action effects different from those expected under quasi-static loading situations. In summary, 
structural response and failure modes under explosion load exposure can be significantly different from 
those under static loads [124]. 
Section 3.2.2 provides a brief description of the mechanical behaviour of concrete and steel under short 
load exposure. Subsequently, section 3.2.3 explores structural response and failure modes of RC ele-
ments exposed to such loads. 
3.2.2 Material behaviour 
It is widely known that the mechanical properties of both concrete and reinforcing steel are sensitive to 
strain rate, what is generally referred to as “strain rate effect”. The action of an explosion pressure wave 
on a structural member is characterized by high loading rates, and consequently by enhanced material 
strain rates. As stated before (section 3.1.4) gas explosions are regarded as a relatively slow type of 
impact loading [121] and consequently the influence of strain rate is fairly small compared to high ve-
locity impact scenarios (Figure 3.5). However, even under moderate strain rates of the order of about 
10-3 to 10-2 s-1, which a gas explosion pressure wave is expected to induce in concrete or reinforcing 
steel, some material parameters are sufficiently enhanced to be accounted for in the present study.  
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Figure 3.5 Typical strain rates for different dynamic loads [125] 
A review of the literature reveals that a large number of experimental studies has been carried out in 
the past with the intention to analyze the dynamic properties of concrete and reinforcing steel. The vast 
majority of these studies are focused on finding the stress-strain relationships at different constant 
strain rates 𝜀̇ and on deducing the corresponding dynamic increase factors (DIF) for the principal ma-
terial characteristics describing these relationships, i.e. the ratio between the dynamic- and the quasi-
static material property. In the following, a brief overview of these studies will be provided. Current 
simplified modeling approaches will be addressed in section 3.3.2. 
Concrete  
Figure 3.6 shows DIF’s for the concrete compressive strength (fc) compiled by Bischoff and Perry [126] 
from different experimental studies. The DIF are plotted versus the strain rate 𝜀̇ (on a log-scale). It is 
clearly demonstrated that fc generally increases with increasing strain rates. A qualitatively very similar 
diagram can be found in [127] for the DIF corresponding to the concrete tensile strength, fct, which is 
shown to be far more rate-sensitive than the compressive strength.  
At first glance, the wide variation in the test results attracts attention in Figure 3.6, which seems to gain 
importance as the strain rate increases. This might be indicative of a rate-dependant scatter of the con-
crete compressive strength. However, the study by Mihashi and Wittmann [128] showed that the coef-
ficient of variation for the strength of concrete and mortar specimen tested under high loading rates (of 
up to 10-3 s-1) was not significantly influenced. This suggests that the large variation observed between 
the test results may be mainly attributed to different testing and measurement techniques, different 
methods to analyse or interpret the results and different specimen characteristics, such as size, shape 
and aspect ratios. Bischoff and Perry concluded that comparison of results may only be possible within 
a particular test programme [126]. 
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Figure 3.6 DIF for the concrete compressive strength as a function of strain rate: Test results compiled from dif-
ferent studies (Figure adapted from [126]) and models according to [129, 130]. 
In Figure 3.6 it can be observed that, for very high strain rates, fc experiences a disproportionately high 
increase. According to [131], the strain rate effects in the ranges below and above a so-called transition 
strain rate are dominated by different physical mechanisms. Following [132], it can be assumed that 
these mechanisms are essentially the same for concrete in compression and tension:   
- For small to medium strain rates (below the transition strain rate), the influence of crack prop-
agation through aggregates and moisture effects are of crucial importance. 
- For very high strain rates (above the transition strain rate), inertia effects on the formation and 
propagation of micro-cracks will mainly control the increase of strength. 
It is well known that under an increasing quasi-static load, the fracture behaviour of concrete will be 
governed by the formation and propagation of microcracks. The cracks mostly propagate through the 
weakest link in the composite system, i.e. the interface between aggregate and surrounding cement 
paste matrix. When exposed to high strain rates, however, the crack velocity increases [133] and, con-
sequently, the time available for formation and propagation of microcracks will be reduced [126]. In-
stead of following the weakest path, the cracks are forced to propagate through regions of higher 
strength. This has been shown, for instance, in [134], where it was observed that the proportion of ag-
gregates fractured under dynamic loading conditions is higher when compared to tests under quasi-
static loading. Since fracture of the more resistant aggregates demands higher energies [135], the 
strength of concrete will increase when subjected to high loading rates. In [126] it is reported that the 
dynamic increase for fc is more significant for lower concrete grades (lower compressive strengths). In 
the light of the previous explanations and taking account of the fact that, under quasi-static conditions, 
concretes of higher strength usually fail under a greater number of aggregate fractures than lower grade 
concretes, the finding of higher DIF’s for the latter is indeed reasonable. 
The influence of moisture content on the dynamic resistance of concrete has been shown to have an 
important effect on strain rate sensitivity in several studies. Rossi [136], for instance, compared the 
concrete tensile strength (fct) of saturated and dry specimen under different strain rates and observed 
that only the former exhibited a significant strength increase. It was concluded that this increase was 
mainly due to the contribution of the free water content in the concrete pores. In [137] it was shown 
that the concrete strength (fc and fct) of dry specimen is relatively strain rate insensitive below the tran-
sition strain rates (for dry concrete) which are indicated to vary between 60 and 80 s-1 for concrete in 
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compression and 1 to 10 s-1 for concrete in tension. On the contrary, wet concrete was found to exhibit 
significant increases in strength at strain rates below as well as above the transition strain rates. More 
experimental evidence of the moisture effect on the concrete strength is given in [138]. 
The disproportionate strength increase above the transition strain rate can be traced back to a delay of 
micro crack propagation due to material inertia effects [131]. Since gas explosions do not induce such 
high strain rates, a more detailed description of the corresponding physical phenomena is out scope of 
the present thesis.  
It should also be mentioned that other concrete properties than strength are affected by strain rate ef-
fects. For instance, it is generally accepted that the elastic (secant) modulus of concrete loaded in com-
pression enhances with increasing strain rates. On the contrary, the rate sensitivity of the tangent mod-
ulus is subject to more controversy [126]. According to [131] the initial concrete stiffness is less sensitive 
to strain rate than the stiffness at higher load levels, confirming thereby that strain rate effects are 
strongly influenced by damage formation. Also regarding the concrete compressive strain at maximum 
stress c1 there seems to be no clear consensus on whether higher strain rates induce an increase of this 
parameter. The experimental results compiled in [126] from several studies denote a significant scatter, 
including DIF’s below unity. However, it is believed that the huge differences in reported test results are 
again indicative of the difficulties associated with test techniques, procedures and data evaluation [126]. 
Finally, it is worth to mention that the modulus (Ec) and the fracture energy of concrete in tension (Gf) 
are also strain rate sensitive [121]. As far as Gf is referred to, the dynamic increase might be very 
significant. However, the study of Weerheim and Van Doormaal [139] showed that such a significant 
increase only occurs if concrete is stressed under very high tensile loading rates (> 15 GPa/s). In a recent 
study [140], it was observed that the dynamic increase of Gf measured in plain concrete specimens was 
much higher than the one obtained in steel fiber-reinforced concrete specimens, a result which the au-
thors attributed to the smaller rate-sensitivity of fiber-matrix interaction than that of the unreinforced 
concrete matrix. 
Reinforcing steel 
Since the early study conducted by Manjoine [141], the behaviour of steel under dynamic loading con-
ditions has been subject to research. Brandes et al. [142], for instance, conducted an extensive experi-
mental survey where both hot rolled and cold worked reinforcing steel bars were submitted to tensile 
tests under different constant strain rates, ranging from 5·10-5 to 8.5 s-1. It was observed that the stress-
strain relationships of steels exposed to high strain rates are qualitatively similar to those obtained for 
quasi-static loading. The strength characteristics, like the yield stress or the tensile strength were none-
theless shown to be substantially enhanced under high loading rates, where the former was found to be 
far more rate-sensitive than the latter. In addition, the strain at maximum load was significantly in-
creased when dynamically loaded, especially in case of the cold worked steel. On the contrary, the prop-
erties in the elastic range, such as the Youngs modulus, were found to remain unaffected from strain 
rate effects. 
Similar conclusions were obtained in other studies. The perhaps most quoted work stems from Malvar 
and Crawford [143] who compiled data from several experimental surveys. Figure 3.7 shows the DIF’s 
for the upper yield strength of reinforcing steels characterized by different grades, i.e. different static 
yield strengths, ranging from fy,stat = 378 to 601 N/mm2. It is clearly shown that lower grade steels entail 
higher DIF’s. Similar observations were made for the tensile strength, although, in line with the findings 
in [142], the corresponding DIF’s were found to be substantially lower than those for the yield strength. 
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Moreover, it is interesting to mention that Malvar and Crawford [143] do not report any significant in-
crease of the strain at maximum load what seems to be in contradiction to [142]. A possible explanation 
for this might be the differences in the type of steel analyzed, especially with regard to its deformation 
characteristics. Several authors, for instance [132], point out that the type of steel may significantly af-
fect the strain rate sensitivity of reinforcing bars.  
 
Figure 3.7 DIF for the upper yield stress as a function of time: Test results compiled from different studies and 
model according to Malvar and Crawford [143] (Figure adapted from [143]) 
3.2.3 Structural response and failure modes 
For standard RC elements, two essential response modes can be distinguished: flexural- and shear re-
sponse.  
It is well documented that flexural behaviour of RC members is described by the moment-curvature re-
lationship. The corresponding failure mode is characterized by initial cracking of the concrete and sub-
sequent formation of plastic hinges at locations where the yield strength of the tensile reinforcing steel 
is being attained. Bending failure occurs due to crushing of concrete, when the ultimate compressive 
strain in the critical cross-section is being reached, or, in consequence of tensile failure of the reinforce-
ment. Whenever the structure is able to undergo large deformations in the nonlinear domain, what im-
plies a sufficient rotation capacity, the flexural failure mode will be ductile and energy absorbing. Provid-
ing RC elements with a significant energy absorption capacity by insuring a ductile structural behaviour 
is one of the key issues when designing for blast loads [121].  
The desired ductile, flexural behaviour can only be developed when the shear capacity exceeds the flex-
ural resistance of a member. However, several experimental studies reported in the literature show that 
structures designed to exhibit a ductile, flexural behaviour under quasi-static loading conditions might 
fail in shear when exposed to higher loading rates [144-147]. It has been found that this may be mainly 
associated with the influence of higher vibration modes. Whereas a quasi-static load cannot affect a 
member any more than in its fundamental mode, a load characterized by short rise times and corre-
sponding high frequency content will more likely excite higher vibration modes giving rise to higher 
shear forces [148]. The following shear failure mechanisms can be distinguished [124, 149]: diagonal 
(compression- or tension controlled), direct and punching shear failure:  
Diagonal shear failure is associated with inclined cracks occurring perpendicular to the principal tensile 
stress fields along the member (Figure 3.8, left). The studies performed by Magnusson et al. [145, 150] 
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showed that RC beams failing in diagonal shear under explosive loadings exhibited the same crack for-
mation- and propagation characteristics as under quasi-static loads. Normally, a certain amount of flex-
ure occurs prior to the development of diagonal shear cracks, and consequently, in many cases these 
cracks evolve from initially formed bending cracks. Therefore, diagonal shear is likewise referred to as 
flexural shear [148]. The principle mechanisms allowing for diagonal shear stress transfer across a crack 
are friction, aggregate interlock, dowel action and the contribution of transverse reinforcement. The 
provision of an appropriate shear reinforcement as well as proper detailing of the joints (for instance, 
beam-column connections) is especially important to enable significant deformation capacity and 
thereby to avoid brittle shear failure of RC elements subjected to blast loads [124]. The RC column 
shown in Figure 3.8 was tested under blast load and failed in diagonal shear [151]. However, it can be 
observed that it was able to undergo significant displacements in the plastic regime what contributed 
to dissipation of energy and thereby probably to avoidance of collapse.  
 
Figure 3.8 Left: Schematic representation of diagonal (upper) and direct (lower) shear failure modes [148]; Mid-
dle: RC columns failed in diagonal shear after exposition to blast load [151]. Right: Failure curve of a RC element 
with fixed support conditions [148, 152]. 
As stated before, diagonal shear requires structural members to exhibit some form of flexural behaviour. 
In the case of direct shear response, however, no such requirement is needed [124]. Direct shear failure 
is characterized by a rapid propagation of vertical cracks (Figure 3.8, left) through the depth of the ele-
ment [144] and usually occurs before significant flexural deformations have been developed [149, 153]. 
Since this implies a very reduced energy absorption capacity, direct shear is normally characterized by 
an extremely brittle failure mode [144]. Krauthammer [124], who studied the direct shear phenomena 
in detail, states that this type of response occurs frequently at areas of geometrical- or load discontinu-
ities. Experimental evidence for such a brittle failure type is given in [154], where the slabs of RC box-
type structures were subjected to extreme loads due to detonations of explosives. Failure curves for 
direct shear failure of RC elements, such as shown in the right part of Figure 3.8, were developed in 
[152] and used for purpose of a parametric study. The curve shows that the probability of direct shear 
failure increases with lower pressure rise times tr and higher magnitudes. Although the represented 
values are strictly valid for a specific structural RC element only, the order of magnitude of the indicated 
rise times suggests that the direct shear failure mode is not relevant for gas explosions, which are char-
acterized by rise times of the order of 0.1 s (section 3.1.4). 
Another type of shear failure in RC elements is the punching shear failure mode. The most common prob-
lem under quasi-static loading situations is the punching of RC slabs supported by columns. In relation 
with blast loads, punching shear has been observed to occur in case of closed-in detonations of explo-
sives (referring to a close distance between the source of the explosion and the target) and high velocity 
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impacts of rigid objects, with inclined shear cracks and the formation of conical shear plugs through the 
thickness of the member being the consequence [149]. In relation with explosions of deflagrative nature, 
however, neither punching shear failures nor other types of localized failures, in the form of spalling or 
cabbing of concrete covers [124, 149] have been reported. 
It is well known that both flexural and shear behaviour of RC elements is being influenced when axial 
forces are present (section 2.5). RC columns in building structures are submitted to axial compression 
forces due to gravitational loads, which interact with the bending moments or the shear forces induced 
by lateral influences, such as the pressure stemming from an explosion. In case of gas explosions in the 
interior of buildings, it must be considered that the pressure acting on the floors and roof of the storey 
in which the explosion takes place, might induce a tensile force component in the column which coun-
teracts the axial compression forces [30]. The behaviour of RC columns under this specific loading sce-
nario is not addressed in detail in the literature. Available studies mostly focus on the interaction of the 
blast-induced bending moments with constant, compression axial forces, as described below. 
Bao and Li [155] studied the effect of axial compression forces on the flexural- and shear capacities of 
RC columns by means of a previously validated Finite Element (FE) model. For relatively small, laterally 
applied explosion loads, they observed an enhanced flexural strength of the members, manifested by a 
decrease in their mid-height displacement, when axial forces were applied. However, when the blast-
load intensity was increased, so that plastic hinges formed at the supports and at the mid-span cross- 
section of the both-sided clamped columns, the axial loads considerably amplified the lateral deflection 
and the internal moment due to second order effects. In some cases, the consequence was a rapid loss 
of strength due to buckling of the longitudinal reinforcement. Of crucial importance thereby was the 
influence of the transverse reinforcement. In addition to its contribution to the shear capacity of the 
columns, transverse reinforcement was found to provide confinement to the core concrete and lateral 
restraint against buckling of the longitudinal reinforcement. It was concluded that such restraint is vital 
for RC columns bearing compressive forces to ensure a ductile failure mode when exposed to lateral 
blast load effects. The same conclusion was obtained by Shi et al. [156] who analysed the residual load-
carrying capacity predicted by a FE model of blast-loaded RC columns in buildings. In addition, in [157], 
where the response of blast-exposed RC columns was studied by means of a nonlinear, multi-degree of 
freedom model, it is stressed that the ductility capacity can be strongly influenced by the member stiff-
ness and the axial load level. It was found that the higher the axial load and/or the stiffness, the lower 
was the column’s end-rotation at failure and hence the corresponding energy absorption capacity.  
3.3 Simplified modeling approaches for explosion-induced structural re-
sponse 
3.3.1 Introduction 
A number of approaches are in place for determining internal forces and stresses in structural elements 
exposed to explosions, ranging from simplified models based on static equivalent loads to complex, nu-
merical simulations of the blast wave and its dynamic effects on the structure. The election of an appro-
priate modeling strategy primary depends on the available information concerning the explosion load-
ing characteristics. The fib Model Code [130] distinguishes three levels of approximations: 
- Level 1: If the explosion load can be represented by a quasi-static equivalent load, a linear- or 
nonlinear static calculation can be done. 
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- Level 2: If the explosion load can be represented by an appropriate pressure-time curve, a linear- 
or nonlinear dynamic calculation using a time-step method can be performed. 
- Level 3: For detailed modeling of the explosion load, hydrocode- or finite element (FE) analysis 
can be carried out and the internal forces and stresses can be obtained from these calculations. 
As an alternative, pressure-time curves can be derived from the hydrocode calculations and sub-
sequently be employed in a level 2 type structural analysis (or in FE calculations [158]).  
The sophisticated level 3 methods are supposed to entail the highest level of precision, especially when 
high non-linearities are involved, as usual in structural problems associated with explosion loading (sec-
tion 3.2.3). Strain rate effects (section 3.2.2) can also be introduced in an appropriate manner in the 
numerical level 3 approaches by defining strain-rate sensitive constitutive material models [131, 132, 
159]. Moreover, such approaches might be advantageous if structures of complex geometrical configu-
rations or complex support- or boundary conditions are in the focus of the analysis.  
On the other hand, it is obvious that the complexity, and hence the required effort and costs to perform 
the analysis, increases from level 1 to 3. Hydrocode- or FE models require a large amount of input data 
(for instance with regard to the definition of material models [160]), experience and knowledge to ob-
tain reliable results. This in addition to the costs associated with the building of the model [157]. In 
many applications, the large effort associated with level 3 approaches might not be justified, especially 
if the uncertainties associated with the loads are high, as in the case of gas explosions (section 3.1.3 and 
3.1.4). Indeed, if the magnitude of the loading is highly uncertain, the demand for a high precision in the 
structural response is somehow fallacious. Instead, level 2 calculations might be more suitable on the 
grounds of the reduced required effort. Such calculations are often based on simplified dynamic models, 
such as single degree of freedom (SDOF) models, which are usually efficient and simple to use [124]. 
In the present study, the dynamic analysis (Chapter 5) is restricted to beams and columns, i.e. elements 
of simple geometries and support conditions. The gas explosion pressure acting on these elements will 
be represented by an idealized pressure-time function, based on the considerations in section 3.1.4. 
Consequently, a dynamic analysis of level 2 type can be performed (Chapter 5) making use of simplified 
and computationally efficient dynamic models. On the grounds of these considerations, sections 3.3.3 
(Flexural response), 3.3.4 (Flexural response under the influence of axial forces) and 3.3.5 (Dynamic 
reaction- and shear forces) describe the backgrounds of these simplified dynamic modeling approaches. 
Previously, in section 3.3.2, models to estimate the strain rate effects on the material properties are 
presented, which can be applied in conjunction with the structural models described in sections 3.3.3 to 
3.3.5. Finally, section 3.3.6 shows some practical applications of the simplified modeling approaches for 
both flexural- and shear behavior, where the focus is placed on a comparison to experimental results. 
This is particularly important for an estimation of the model uncertainties associated with the dynamic 
load effects, such as displacements, bending moments or shear forces. 
3.3.2 Strain rate effects 
The present section addresses simplified models for quantifying the strain rate effects on the principal 
material properties of concrete and reinforcing steel (section 3.2.2).  
The simplest approach to account for strain rate effects is to consider approximate dynamic increase 
factors (DIF) such as those given in Table 3.3 for the concrete compressive strength fc, and the reinforc-
ing steel yield- and tensile strength, respectively, fy and ft [124, 130, 161]. It should be noted that these 
values are intended for design of structures exposed to the effects of detonations, where the distant 
design range represents detonations at larger scaled distances to the structure than the close-in design 
 Chapter 3   Explosions and their effects on structures 
65 
range. Since the pressure rise-times are much shorter for close-in detonations, the loading rates and, 
consequently, the recommended DIF’s, are higher. The DIF’s are intentionally conservative where the 
level of conservatism is related to the type of structural behavior. For instance, since the flexural re-
sponse is generally more ductile than the shear response, the shown DIF’s for bending are less conserva-
tive than those indicated for shear [124]. 
Table 3.3 Dynamic increase factors for design of RC structures [124, 130, 161]. 
Type of stress 
Distant design range Close-in design range 
Reinforcing bars Concrete Reinforcing bars Concrete 
fy,dyn / fy,stat ft,dyn / ft,stat fc,dyn / fc,stat fy,dyn / fy,stat ft,dyn / ft,stat fc,dyn / fc,stat 
Bending 1.17 1.05 1.19 1.23 1.05 1.25 
Diagonal tension 1.00 - 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.00 
Direct shear 1.10 1.00 1.10 1.10 1.00 1.10 
Bond 1.17 1.05 1.00 1.23 1.05 1.00 
Compression 1.10 - 1.12 1.13 - 1.16 
 
Due to the conservative approach followed in deriving the values presented in Table 3.3, it is believed 
that they could be applied as well, and without introducing large error, in the context of gas explosions. 
An alternative and somehow more accurate approach consists in applying average strain rates experi-
enced by the materials to calculate DIF’s from corresponding model formulations [124]. The most rele-
vant models for the present study will be presented in advance.  
Concrete  
Many studies have been conducted in the past to derive analytical- or empirical models for predicting 
the relative increase in concrete compressive strength (fc) under high loading rates. The former Model 
Code 90 [129] contains a model based on the power function suggested by Mihashi and Wittmann [128] 
to predict the effect of rising strain rates on concrete strength up to a transition strain rate of 𝜀?̇? =
30 s−1. Above this value, a cube-root law is proposed based on the work in [162], valid for strain rates 
𝜀?̇? < 300 s
−1. This frequently quoted model, accepted by most researchers as an accurate representa-
tion of actual behavior [127], is described by equations (3.7) to (3.9) below.  
 DIFfc =
fc,dyn
fcm
= (
ε̇c
ε̇c0
 )1.026α    for   |ε̇c| ≤ 30 s
−1   (3.7) 
 DIFfc =
fc,dyn
fcm
= 10(6.156α−2)(
ε̇c
ε̇c0
 )1/3   for   |ε̇c| > 30 s
−1   (3.8) 
Where: 
 α =
1
5+0.9fcm
            (3.9) 
fc,dyn: Concrete compressive strength under dynamic loading conditions (N/mm2) 
fcm: Mean concrete compressive  strength, fcm=fck +8 (N/mm2) 
ε̇c: Strain rate of concrete in compression (s-1) 
ε̇c0: Quasi-static strain rate, ε̇c0= 30 · 10-6 (s-1) 
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The model accounts for the previously mentioned, larger dynamic increase for concretes of lower 
strengths (section 3.2.2). This can be observed in Figure 3.6 where equations (3.7) and (3.8) have been 
plotted for mean compressive strengths of fcm = 33 and 58 N/mm2. It is shown that for these concrete 
grades, the model predicts increases in compressive strength between 5 and 20 % when the material is 
exposed to strain rates that can be expected in the context of gas explosions (𝜀?̇? ≈ 10
−3 − 10−2 s−1). 
Moreover, Figure 3.6 contains the model proposed by the current Model Code 2010 [130], expressed 
through (3.10) and (3.11). With respect to expressions (3.7) to (3.9), the model formulations are simpli-
fied since the dependency of the quasi-static concrete compressive strength fcm has been eliminated. 
Important to stress is that, although not explicitly mentioned in the Code, (3.10) and (3.11) aim at pre-
dicting a characteristic value as denoted by subscript k within the definition of the dynamic strength, 
fc,dyn,k. As Figure 3.6 shows, this model leads indeed to significantly lower predictions of dynamic in-
crease compared to its precursor and seems to provide a reasonable lower bound to the experimental 
data, including for high strength concretes as shown in recent tests [163]. 
 DIFfc =
fc,dyn,k
fcm
= (
ε̇c
ε̇c0
 )0.014    for   |𝜀?̇?| ≤ 30 s
−1   (3.10) 
 DIFfc =
fc,dyn,k
fcm
= 0.012(
ε̇c
ε̇c0
 )1/3   for   |𝜀?̇?| > 30 s
−1   (3.11) 
Similar models are contained in the current Model Code [130] for the DIF’s corresponding to the con-
crete tensile strength (fct), the modulus of elasticity (Ec) and the strain at maximum stress (c1). The 
models in [130] for Ec and c1 have been adopted from the former code [129] without any modifications, 
whereas the DIF formulation for fct has experienced similar changes as reported above for the concrete 
compressive strength. Interesting to note is that in this formulation the change in slope occurs at 10 s-1, 
instead of 30 s-1. In [127], another model is suggested for describing the dynamic increase of fct, accord-
ing to which the change in slope takes place at 1 s-1. 
When applying the presented DIF equations, care should be taken when a certain structural resistance 
model considers a specific material property in implicit terms. A good is example, although not of rele-
vance for the present study, is the shear resistance of concrete members without stirrups. The resistance 
model in [72, 84] considers the concrete tensile strength fct implicitly by means of the compressive 
strength fc. Hence, when applying the DIF formulation corresponding to fc, instead of fct, the dynamic 
increase in shear resistance is likely to be largely underestimated. 
Reinforcing steel 
The most quoted- and applied model to predict the increase in reinforcing steel yield- (fy) and tensile 
strength (ft) under dynamic loading is based on the research by Malvar and Crawford [143]. The model 
is shown in equations (3.12) to (3.14) below, where fs might refer to both fy and ft, what is specified 
through the exponent . The formulation is valid for bars with a yield stress between 290 and 710 
N/mm2, subjected to strain rates 𝜀?̇? ranging from 10-4 to 225 s-1. 
 DIFfs =
fs,dyn
fs,stat
= (
ε̇s
ε̇s0
 )α          (3.12) 
Where: 
 α = αfy = 0.074 − 0.04
fy,stat
414
     if  fs = fy    (3.13) 
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 α = αft = 0.019 − 0.009
fy,stat
414
     if  fs = ft    (3.14) 
fs,stat: Strength of reinforcing steel under static loading conditions (N/mm2) 
fs,dyn: Strength of reinforcing steel under dynamic loading conditions (N/mm2) 
ε̇s: Strain rate of reinforcing steel (s-1) 
ε̇s0: Quasi-static strain rate, ε̇s0= 10-4 (s-1) 
It should be observed that irrespective of whether fy or ft is considered, the model formulation is a func-
tion of the former (fy,stat) only. In Figure 3.7, where equation (3.12) (in conjunction with (3.13)) is graph-
ically represented, it is shown that the model predicts higher DIFs for lower grade steels, matching rea-
sonably well the experimental results compiled in [143]. For ordinary reinforcing steel of grade B500 
(fy,stat = 560 N/mm2) subjected to strain rates of the order of 𝜀?̇? ≈ 10
−3 − 10−2 s−1, reached during ma-
terial exposure to a gas explosion, the model predicts a dynamic increase of approximately 5-12 % in 
yield strength and 2-4 % in tensile strength. It should be mentioned that the model given by (3.12) to 
(3.14) has been adopted by the current Model Code 2010 [130] for use in structural problems governed 
by explosions or impact. The code alerts that the use of a DIF for reinforcing steel may only be possible 
if the steel has sufficient ductility [130]. 
3.3.3 Flexural response 
SDOF model 
For purpose of a flexural response analysis under dynamic loading conditions, many structural elements 
may be represented by a simplified, single degree of freedom (SDOF) system, as illustrated in numerous 
books [124, 164], guidelines and manuals [161]. An example is given in Figure 3.9, which shows a simply 
supported beam submitted to a dynamic, uniformely distributed load p̃(t), as well as its idealization by 
means of an equivalent SDOF system, consisting of a concentrated (or lumped) mass connected by a 
spring to a fixed bearing.  
The dynamic load p̃(t) is being represented in the equivalent system by a forcing function Feq(t) repre-
senting both the magnitude of this load and its time dependant variations. The equivalent lumped mass 
meq should account for the member’s self-weight as well as for a possible contributions stemming from 
permanent loads. Special attention has to be drawn to the spring properties that represent structural 
behavior by means of an idealized resistance function. In order to account for energy dissipation due to 
inelastic deformations (section 3.2.3), a linear elastic-perfectly plastic resistance function may be asso-
ciated with the spring (Figure 3.9). In the elastic range, equivalent resistance and deflection are related 
by the equivalent stiffness keq. At = y, corresponding to the transition of the elastic to the plastic re-
sponse, the maximum spring force Ry,eq has been attained. As the displacement increases further, this 
value is kept constant until the ductility capacity of the structural element is reached at u. In case the 
displacement attains a maximum value max < u, the rebound phase will be entered where the resistance 
decreases along a line parallel to the initial elastic slope. 
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Figure 3.9 Representation of a beam by an equivalent SDOF system. 
The behavior of the SDOF system is mathematically described by a set of (differential) equations of mo-
tion. According to the assumed elastic-plastic resistance function (Figure 3.9), three branches are being 
distinguished in the formulation of those equations, i.e. the elastic (3.15), the plastic (3.16) and the un-
loading branch (3.17). The equations of motion represent the dynamic equilibrium between inertia 
forces and resistance, on the left side of the equals sign, and the loading of the system on the right.  
meq δ̈  +  keqδ =  Feq(t)   if  0 ≤   𝛿 <  𝛿𝑦   (3.15) 
meq δ̈  +  Ry,eq = Feq(t)   if  𝛿𝑦  ≤   𝛿 <  𝛿𝑢   (3.16) 
meq δ̈  +  Ry,eq  − keq(δm −  δ)  =  Feq(t) if  (𝛿𝑚 − 2𝛿𝑦)  ≤   𝛿 <  𝛿𝑚 (3.17) 
It should be noted that structural damping has been neglected within the preceding equations. Though 
it is well known that the response of a structural element to a dynamic load involves a certain degree of 
damping, its effect on the maximum response of blast-loaded elements, which is generally of main in-
terest, can be almost neglected [124, 164]. The main reason for that is that the energy dissipated by 
plastic structural deformations is much higher than the energy absorbed by structural damping.  
The characteristics of the equivalent SDOF system are determined so that the deflection  of the lumped-
mass is the same as that for some significant point on the real structure, such as the mid-span cross-
section of the beam represented in Figure 3.9. In particular, the equivalent system parameters in equa-
tions (3.15) to (3.17), i.e. the equivalent mass, stiffness, resistance and load, respectively, meq, keq, Req 
and Feq, may be obtained from energy- and external work relationships between the equivalent and the 
real system. Therefore, an assumption concerning the deformed shape (x) of the considered structural 
element is required. Since the flexural response is generally well described by the fundamental vibration 
mode, it is normally assumed that this shape can be considered to be the same as that resulting from a 
static application of the dynamic load [164]. Prior to yielding, (x) can be deduced from elastic beam 
theory, whereas in the post-yield stage the formation of plastic hinges might be assumed. This is shown 
in Figure 3.10 for simply supported members under a uniformly distributed blast load. The correspond-
ing (x) are given by (3.18) and (3.19), respectively, where l denotes the member span. 
 
Figure 3.10 Deformed shapes (x) of simply supported members under uniformly distributed loads in the elastic 
(left) and plastic (right) response stage [164]. 
meq
Feq (t)

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l
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
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ϕ(x) =
16
5l4
(x 4 − 2lx3 + l3x)     if  0 ≤   δ <  𝛿y   (3.18) 
ϕ(x) =
2x
l
      if   𝛿𝑦  ≤   𝛿 <  𝛿𝑢   (3.19) 
For convenience of calculation, the relation between the idealized system parameters and their respec-
tive quantities in the real system is established by transformation factors, Ki [124, 164]. A mass factor 
KM is defined as the ratio between the mass of the equivalent system and the mass m of the real system: 
 KM = 
meq
m
          (3.20) 
The equivalent mass meq is deduced from (3.21) based on the balance of kinetic energy, where ?̅? repre-
sents the mass m per unit length of the real system. 
meq = ∫ m̅ϕ
2(x)dx         (3.21) 
In a similar way, a load factor Kl may be deduced based on equilibrium of external work imparted to the 
system: 
 KL = 
Feq
F
          (3.22) 
For an uniformly distributed load p̃, the equivalent load Feq on the SDOF system is given by (3.23), 
whereas the total force F acting on the real system will be simply F = p̃ · l. 
 Feq = ∫ p̃ ∙ ϕ(x)dx         (3.23) 
Since the structural resistance R represents a force that pushes against the applied force F, the resistance 
factor KR (= Req/R) is the same as the load factor KL [124]. The resistance R and deflection  are related 
in the elastic range by (3.24) and (3.25) for the real- and the equivalent system, respectively. Thereby k 
represents the member stiffness prior to yielding (Figure 3.9), which in case of a simply supported mem-
ber under distributed load is given by (3.26). It is hence obvious that the stiffness factor Kk (= keq / k) 
must equal the resistance factor and thus Kk = KL = KR.  
 R =  k ∙ δ          (3.24) 
 Req = keq ∙ δ          (3.25) 
 k =  
384EI
5l3
          (3.26) 
It is also convenient to introduce the so-called load-mass factor [124, 164], KLM, defined as the ratio of 
the mass and load factors (KLM = KM / KL). The natural period T of the equivalent system can then be 
expressed as per (3.27). It should be noted that since the time scale is not altered within the analysis, T 
represents as well the natural period of the real system. 
 T =
2π
ϖ
= 2π√
meq
keq
= 2π√
KM∙ m
KL∙ k
= 2π√KLM
m
k
      (3.27) 
Based on the foregoing equations and the deformed shapes shown in Figure 3.10, the mass, load and 
load-mass factors given in Table 3.4 can be deduced. Values for other support- and loading conditions 
are tabulated in [124, 161, 164]. It should be mentioned that in practice the transition from the assumed 
shape in the elastic stage to the plastic stage will be progressive, i.e., the plastic hinge (Figure 3.10) will 
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not arise instantaneously. To account for that, the transformation factors Ki corresponding to the plastic 
stage should as well experience a progressive change. However, for sake of simplicity this is normally 
disregarded and, instead, the Ki corresponding to the plastic stage are instantaneously used as soon as 
the end of elastic stage has been reached.  
Table 3.4 Mass (KM), load (KL) and load-mass (KLM) - factors for simply supported members under uniformly 
distributed load [164]. 
Response stage KM KL KLM 
Elastic 0.50 0.64 0.78 
Plastic 0.33 0.50 0.66 
 
Finally, the forcing function Feq(t), applied to the equivalent SDOF system is defined by (3.28) as the 
product of the equivalent peak force Feq,peak, obtained from (3.23) setting p̃ = p̃peak, and an load-time 
relationship, f(t). For a symmetrical triangular load-pulse (tr=0.5·tp), such as represented in Figure 3.4 
(left), this relationship can be described by (3.29) and (3.30). 
 Feq(t) =  Feq,peak ∙ f(t)         (3.28) 
 f(t) =  2 ∙
t
tp
   if  0 ≤   t <  
𝑡p
2
    (3.29) 
 f(t) =  2(1 −
t
tp
 )  if  
tp
2
 ≤   t <  tp    (3.30) 
There are generally different ways to obtain a solution of the system of differential equations given by 
(3.15) to (3.17). In case the load-time function f(t) may be idealized by some simple mathematical shape, 
such as given by (3.29) and (3.30), a closed solution could be obtained by direct integration. In order to 
take account of the non-linear resistance function (Figure 3.9), the response of the system in, respec-
tively, the elastic, plastic and rebound stage, would be computed making use of the corresponding trans-
formation factors Ki, and setting the initial conditions equal to the final conditions in the preceding stage. 
This, however, may be cumbersome and the application of numerical integration methods might be 
more convenient. Thereby, the differential equations of motion are being solved by a time-stepping 
method (level 2 approaches according to section 3.3.1) where the transformation factors Ki may be in-
troduced without difficulty in the corresponding structural response stage. Frequently employed meth-
ods are the constant velocity or the Newmark- method, both well-described in the literature [124, 164]. 
The general solution of the SDOF system equations is conveniently represented in so-called response 
charts [124, 164]. The graphs shown in Figure 3.11 (left: linear scale; right: log-scale), were obtained by 
means of numerical integration of equations (3.15) to (3.17) under use of the transformation factors Ki 
given in Table 3.4, valid for simply supported members subjected to uniformly distributed loads. The 
load was supposed to follow a symmetrical triangular pressure pulse of duration tp and peak load p̃peak. 
The assumed resistance function is elastic-perfectly plastic (Figure 3.9). 
On the axis of ordinate, the ratio of the maximum (yield) resistance Ry to the peak force Fpeak (Fpeak = 
p̃peak·l) is being represented. Equation (3.31) denotes that both R and F are directly related to their 
respective bending moments (at mid-span) MR and MF, as expressed by (3.32) and (3.33). Ratio Ry/Fpeak 
represents hence a dynamic load factor by which means a static equivalent moment can be inferred and 
applied in the context of conventional design methods in order to provide the required resistance mo-
ment MR [165], according to the level 1 approach (section 3.3.1). 
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R
F
=
MR
MF
           (3.31) 
 MR =
R∙l
8
          (3.32) 
 MF =
F∙l
8
=
p̃∙l2
8
          (3.33) 
On the axis of abscissa in Figure 3.11, the ratio of the pressure-pulse duration tp to the element’s natural 
period T is represented. As stressed in [144], rather than the actual value of either quantity, the non-
dimensional time ratio tp/T is a crucial parameter in structural dynamics. It should be recalled that T is 
given as a function of the load-mass factor KLM by (3.27). For purpose of the graphical solution (Figure 
3.11), a value of KLM = 0.7 has been adopted which reflects some intermediate stage between the elastic 
(KLM = 0.78) and plastic (KLM = 0.66) response of the member (Table 3.4) [164]. 
The ratio Ry/Fpeak is moreover represented as a function of the displacement ductility ratio , defined 
as the ratio of the maximum (mid-span) displacement, max, to the yield displacement, y.  
 μδ =
δmax
δy
          (3.34) 
 
Figure 3.11 Ratio between resistance Ry and force Fpeak for simply supported beam under uniformly distributed 
load with triangular forcing function (tr=0.5tp), as a function of  and tp/T (left: linear scale; right: log-scale). 
Figure 3.11 manifests the importance of ductility in blast-load induced structural response. As the duc-
tility ratio  increases, the required resistance Ry decreases in relation to the applied peak force Fpeak, 
what is indicative of the energy dissipation due to plastic structural deformations. From an alternative 
point of view, it might be stated that the ductility demand increases upon reduction of the available 
resistance Ry.  It may also be inferred from Figure 3.11 that the importance of ductility on the structural 
response depends significantly on ratio tp/T. It might be noted for instance, that in the elastic solution 
( = 1) the required resistance Ry may be more than 1.5 times higher than the applied peak force Fpeak, 
in case the load-pulse duration approaches the natural period of the beam (tp ≈ T). On the contrary, this 
value falls significantly below unity as the ductility ratio is being increased. However, as ratio tp/T in-
creases, the benefit provided by ductility vanishes. Figure 3.11 (right) manifests that ratio Ry/Fpeak ap-
proaches unity as tp/T adopts very large values. This is indicative of the decreasing importance of inertia 
forces and energy absorption during the transition from the dynamic regime to the quasi-static regime. 
On the contrary, the so-called impulsive regime [124, 164] is characterized by load durations tp signifi-
cantly shorter than the natural period T. In this case, little spring resistance (R) will develop during time 
t ≤ tp, which will be negligible compared to the applied force (F). The acceleration can then be considered 
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as constant giving the mass an initial velocity and then leaving the system to decelerate in the free vi-
bration phase [164]. Significant structural response will not develop before this phase is being entered. 
The required resistance will hence be independent of the load-pulse shape and can be simply deduced 
from the balance between the initially imparted kinetic energy to the system and the strain energy ab-
sorbed by it. Biggs [164] suggested that a dynamic load can be treated as impulsive if its duration tp is 
less than about 10 % of the natural period T.   
Approach based on energy balance and rigid plastic behaviour 
In [30], a simplified modeling approach is included to estimate the required flexural resistance of RC 
members subjected to the effects of a gas explosion. This approach is based on energy relationships 
under the assumption of an impulsive loading situation, described above, where the shape of the load-
pulse is of no importance for determination of structural behavior. Moreover, for sake of simplicity, 
structural response is considered as rigid plastic, i.e. displacements  will not arise before a yield force 
Ry has been attained (Figure 3.12, left). 
 
Figure 3.12 Idealization of resistance (left) and action (right) according to approach suggested in [30].   
The approach implies the assumption of an impulsive force Fimp (> Ry) which acts on the member during 
time tp (Figure 3.12, right) inducing a member displacement y (Figure 3.12, left). The velocity δ̇ initially 
imparted to the system is given by (3.35), where I denotes the impulse: 
 δ̇ =
I
m
= (Fimp − Ry) ∙
tp
m
        (3.35) 
The kinetic energy Ek associated with the initial velocity can then be formulated as: 
 Ek = 0.5 ∙ m ∙ δ̇
2 = 0.5 ∙ (Fimp − Ry)
2 ∙
tp
2
m
      (3.36) 
On the other hand, the maximum strain energy absorbed by the structural system is defined as:  
 Ws = ∫ R(δ) dδ = Ry
δy
0
∙ δy       (3.37) 
At maximum response, the entire kinetic energy has been converted to strain energy and hence Ws = Ek. 
Thus, equating (3.36) and (3.37) and solving for Fimp delivers the following expression: 
 Fimp = Ry ∙ (1 + √
2∙m∙δy 
Ry∙tp
2  )        (3.38) 
In [30] it is suggested to factor the term included in parenthesis (= Fimp/Ry) to the available resistance 
Ry of a given structural element in order to account for the energy dissipation associated with the short 
R
Ry

y
F
Fimp
t
tp
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load associated with gas explosions. Alternatively, it might also be reasonable to factor the inverse value 
of this term (= Ry/Fimp) to the applied force Fimp in order to deduce a static equivalent load effect which 
may be compared to Ry. 
3.3.4 Flexural response under the influence of axial forces 
As stated in section 3.2.3, the flexural behavior of RC elements might be significantly influenced by axial 
forces. In a SDOF analysis, this can be accounted for in a simplified way by means of an equivalent lateral 
load concept [166] what will be briefly exposed in the following. 
Figure 3.13 shows a simply supported member subjected to the combined influence of a uniformly dis-
tributed dynamic load p̃(t) and an eccentric dynamic axial force N(t). 
 
Figure 3.13 Simply supported member under combined influence of blast load p̃(t) and eccentric axial force N(t). 
Due to its eccentric application relative to the centroid of the cross-section, the axial force induces a first 
order bending moment N(t)·e in the mid-span cross-section of the member. Moreover, a second order 
term N(t)·(t) will evolve from the member deflection. Hence, the total bending moment MN(t) attribut-
able to the influence of the axial force N(t) will be: 
  MN(t) = N(t) ∙ (e + δ(t))        (3.39) 
By means of equation (3.40), an equivalent lateral load p̃N(t) can then be derived to cause a moment 
equal to MN(t) where C is a constant (C = 8 for a simply supported member under uniformly distributed 
load ?̃?(t)). The equivalent load ?̃?N(t) can then be added to load p̃(t) at each time step of the SDOF solution 
procedure.  
 p̃N(t) =
MN(t)∙C
l2
          (3.40) 
Finally, it should be stressed, that this simplified approach does not consider secondary moments from 
frame sway, or any other mechanisms that would allow the top of the columns to deflect relative to the 
bottom. Such kind of behavior must be considered as a part of an analysis of the horizontal load-resisting 
system of the whole building, rather than within an analysis of individual members [166]. 
3.3.5 Dynamic reaction forces 
In the previous section, it has been shown how the flexural behavior of simple structural members under 
explosion-induced loads can be analyzed by means of simplified dynamic models, such as SDOF models. 
However, SDOF models do not directly provide the member’s dynamic reaction forces since those forces 
do not have a direct counterpart in the equivalent SDOF system. In other words, the spring force in the 
equivalent system (Figure 3.9) is not the same as the real support reaction of the member since this 
𝑝(t)
N(t)
e
N(t)
(t)
l
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system was selected so as to have the same deflection as the real element, rather than the same force 
characteristics [164].  
Instead, the dynamic reactions can be derived based on force- or moment equilibrium considerations 
for the structural members [124, 164]. For that purpose, the distribution of acceleration δ̈(x, t), and 
hence inertia forces i(x,t), is regarded as identical to the deflected shape assumed for the beam,(x,t) 
[164]. Following this assumption, at any point the intensity of the inertia force is proportional to the 
ordinate of the deflected shape.  
 
Figure 3.14 Dynamic equilibrium in a simply supported beam [124, 164]. 
As an example, again a simply supported member under a uniformly distributed blast load p̃(t) is con-
sidered. Taking account of symmetry conditions, moment equilibrium can be formulated for the half-
beam model shown in the right part of Figure 3.14. Taking moments about the resultant inertia force 
I(t), the dynamic reaction forces V(t) may be obtained as a function of the resultant blast load F(t) and 
beam resistance R(t), which is related to the resisting bending moment MR(t) by (3.32). For the herein 
considered example, the dynamic reaction forces are given by [164]: 
 V(t) = 0.39 ∙ R(t) + 0.11 ∙ F(t)         if δ ≤ δy      (3.41) 
 V(t) = 0.38 ∙ R(t) + 0.12 ∙ F(t)         if δ > δy      (3.42) 
It should be emphasized that in the static case R equals F and hence, as expected, V = 0.5∙F. It might also 
be stressed that the distinction for, respectively, the elastic (3.41) and the plastic (3.42) range, is due to 
the different assumed deflected shapes (Figure 3.10). However, from  the preceding equations it be-
comes clear that the resulting difference in V(t) is very small and of few practical interest [164]. 
Alternatively, the dynamic reactions may be obtained from force equilibrium: 
 V(t) = 0.5 ∙ (F(t) − I(t))                 (3.43) 
This approach, however, requires a previous determination of the resulting inertia force I(t) what can 
be accomplished by equation (3.44) as a function of the uniformly distributed mass per unit length of 
the member, ?̅?, and acceleration δ̈(x, t). Since, as stated before, the acceleration across the length of the 
member is supposed to follow the distribution of the deflected shape (X), δ̈(x, t) can be expressed as 
the product of the mid-span acceleration δ̈mid−span(t) and (X), as expressed by (3.45). Substituting 
(3.45) into (3.44) and performing the integration will finally lead to expression (3.46), where m is the 
𝑝(t)
V(t) V(t)
i(t)
l
V(t)
0.5 F(t)
MR(t) 
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total mass of the member and KIL is defined as the inertia-load factor [124].  For the herein considered 
example, KIL is equal to the load factor KL (Table 3.4).  
 I(t) = ∫ m̅ ∙ δ̈(x, t)
l
0
dx            (3.44) 
 δ̈(x, t) = δ̈mid−span(t) ∙ ϕ(x)            (3.45) 
 I(t) = KIL ∙ m ∙  δ̈mid−span(t)           (3.46) 
3.3.6 Applications 
The simplified dynamic analysis methods presented in the previous sections have been proven to de-
liver results which, in general terms, compare quite well to available blast test results on a variety of 
structural components. This conclusion can be drawn from a number of studies.  Some selective studies 
will be summarized in advance.  
In [124], the results from impact tests on a simply supported RC beam [167] are compared to theoretical 
results from several modeling approaches, among them a SDOF model, a finite element model (realized 
with the commercial code ABAQUS) and an intermediate modeling approach based on Timoshenko 
beam equations [153, 168]. The beam was loaded by a localized impact at mid-span, described by the 
force-time function included in the left part of Figure 3.15 (small figure), characterized by a load dura-
tion tp of about 0.06 s.  
The comparison of experimental and theoretical results for the beam’s mid-span deflection is shown in 
the left part of Figure 3.15 as a function of time. The graphs show good agreement between the reported 
test data and the results from the different modeling approaches. This is true for both the amount of 
peak deflection and the time to reach peak. Somewhat higher discrepancies can be observed for the peak 
support reaction and the corresponding time, as shown in the right part of Figure 3.15. The simplified 
model based on the dynamic equilibrium equations presented in section 3.3.5 (in Figure 3.15 termed 
SDOF) underestimates the maximum support reaction by around 15%. Moreover, the time to peak is 
much shorter than predicted by the models, although the overall behaviour is well captured. It is also 
worth to mention that the test beam was not affected by the brittle direct shear mechanism what could 
be attributed to the relatively slow rise of the load (tr ≈ 15 ms). As reported in section 3.2.3, under rela-
tively long rise times a RC member is unlikely to fail in direct shear. 
 
Figure 3.15 Comparison between test [167] and modeling results for a RC beam under impact force (see small 
figure on the left): Left: Mid-span deflection; Right: Support reactions; adopted from [124]. 
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Another study designated to the analysis of RC beams under explosion loads was conducted by Magnus-
son [144]. The tests were performed in a shock tube with a detonating charge (plastic explosive) gener-
ating a blast wave. For purpose of the SDOF calculations, the registered load-pulse was idealized by a 
triangular load-pulse of zero rise time and linear decay (Figure 3.4, right). A bilinear elastic-perfectly 
plastic resistance function (Figure 3.9) was defined where strain rate effects were factored in by con-
sidering a 20% increase of the maximum bending resistance based on the DIF formulation given by 
(3.12) and strain rate measurements during the tests. The member stiffness k in the elastic range was 
computed from (3.26) under two different assumptions for cross-sectional stiffness EI: based on the 
assumption of a completely cracked cross-section (EIII) and based on an equivalent stiffness accounting 
for tension stiffening (EIeq = 1/5·EII + 4/5·EIII). Depending on this choice, the estimated tp/T ratios of 
the RC beams varied between 0.5 and 1.2 approximately, i.e. the members were predicted to perform in 
the dynamic regime (section 3.3.3).  
The study concluded that the experimental results may be predicted fairly well with SDOF analysis. Fig-
ure 3.16, adapted from [144], shows the ratio of the predicted to experimental maximum displacements 
m of the beams, m,SDOF/m,Test. The results corresponding to the stiffness assumptions based on, respec-
tively, EIII and EIeq, are distinguished. It may be observed that stiffness estimation might have an im-
portant influence on the SDOF model prediction, which not necessarily will be conservative, as postu-
lated in several studies. A statistical analysis of the results reveals that ratio m,SDOF/m,Test can be char-
acterized by a mean value of about 0.9 and 1.1 for the estimations based on EIII and EIeq, respectively, 
and corresponding coefficients of variation (CoV) of about 0.15. When accounting for the reduced sam-
ple size, a CoV of approximately 0.2-0.3 would seem to be a reasonable choice for purpose of a statistical 
characterization of the scatter associated with ratio m,SDOF/m,Test.  
 
Figure 3.16 Ratio of maximum deflection according to SDOF analysis and tests (adapted from [144]). 
The study conducted by Magnusson [144] showed that, in some cases, the failure mode of the RC beams 
changed from a flexural failure in comparative static tests, to a flexural shear failure mode in the air-
blast tests, as shown in Figure 3.17 for one of the members. Direct shear failures, however, were not 
observed in the tests. 
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Figure 3.17 Flexural shear failure after air blast-test of one of the RC beams studied in [144]. 
As a measure for the shear forces acting close to the member supports, Magnusson [144] determined 
the reaction forces based on the dynamic equilibrium formulations exposed in section 3.3.5. Figure 3.18 
[144] shows a comparison of the calculated and registered reaction forces, which were filtered in order 
to eliminate high frequency oscillations. It can be observed that the calculated results are in good agree-
ment with the filtered reaction forces, which represent a mean value of the unfiltered values [144]. 
Based on statements in [169], it was concluded that the simplified models (section 3.3.5), based on de-
flected shapes associated with static loading conditions, might under certain circumstances be inaccu-
rate for the estimation of the maximum shear forces close to the supports of blast-loaded members. In 
a recent, theoretical study [148], where a RC beam under blast load exposure was analysed under the 
assumption of elastic behaviour by means of Bernoulli-Euler beam equations, the author came to a sim-
ilar conclusion. 
 
Figure 3.18 Comparison of registered and calculated support reactions for RC beam studied in [144]. 
The influence of high frequency oscillations on the support reactions of blast-loaded beams was ana-
lysed as well in the numerical simulations carried out in [170]. Although the study does not include a 
model validation through comparison with experimental results, and despite the fact that it was ad-
dressed to structural steel beams, the obtained results are found worth to mention. Schachter et al. [170] 
showed that the distribution of inertia forces across the span of the simply supported members was 
significantly affected by contributions of higher frequency modes, which are not accounted for in the 
simplified, dynamic equilibrium formulations (section 3.3.5). In particular, it was observed that inertia 
forces do not always oppose the externally applied forces and, instead, might add load to the system 
while the external loads are still acting. A comparison between the numerical results obtained for the 
maximum support reactions and the corresponding values according to dynamic equilibrium formula-
tions (section 3.3.5) showed that the former might significantly exceed the latter. Thereby, higher dis-
placement ductility ratios () led to larger discrepancies between simplified and numerical results. 
Likewise, smaller tp/T and R/F ratios were found to increase these discrepancies [170].  
An extensive and interesting study on the flexural behaviour of RC beams under blast loading conditions 
was conducted by Rong and Li [171, 172]. With the intention to quantify the differences in the response 
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of real elements and equivalent SDOF models, they defined the following non-dimensional indices, 
where m and  represent the maximum displacement and the displacement ductility index, respec-
tively, and eq and rc refer to the equivalent (SDOF) system and the real RC member properties: 
 ζδm = 
δm
eq − δm
rc
δm
eq           (3.47) 
  ζμδ = 
μδ
eq − μδ
rc
μδeq
          (3.48) 
The study comprised the analysis of different member support conditions. For each of these conditions, 
a representative set of 2000 RC beams was defined by varying member span, material properties and 
blast-load characteristics within reasonable limits. Strain rate effects were considered according to Ta-
ble 3.3, by constant DIF factors of 1.19 for concrete in compression and 1.17 for the reinforcing steel in 
tension. The load was assumed to follow a triangular pressure pulse with zero rise time (Figure 3.4, 
right) and its characteristics varied in terms of variations of the explosive charge and its standoff dis-
tance to the target. Target values were then defined for the support rotation (t = eq), directly related 
to the maximum displacement (m,t = meq), and the ductility ratio (,t = eq) of the members, ranging 
from t = 1º to 4.8º and ,t = 3.0 to 16.5. Based on these target values, and the mentioned, predefined 
load- and member characteristics, the required reinforcement ratio  was then determined (for a par-
ticular cross-section geometry) on the grounds of an SDOF analysis. Subsequently, 500 out of the 2000 
designed beams for each of the member support configurations were analysed by means of an experi-
mentally validated numerical FE model. The obtained maximum displacements and ductility ratios were 
considered to represent the corresponding real quantities, mrc and rc.  
Finally, the displacement index 𝜁𝛿𝑚 and displacement ductility index 𝜁𝜇𝛿  were determined according to 
(3.47) and (3.48) and statistically analyzed. In Figure 3.19, the indices obtained for the 500 simply sup-
ported members analysed are plotted as a function of reinforcement ratio . The fact that 𝜁𝛿𝑚 is not 
significantly different from zero is indicative of only small discrepancies between maxrc and maxeq. In 
general, the influence of the reinforcement ratio  on 𝜁𝛿𝑚 appears to be small. On the contrary,  is an 
important parameter when referring to the displacement ductility index 𝜁𝜇𝛿 . As can be observed, the 
smaller  the higher is 𝜁𝜇𝛿  and hence the larger is 
eq in comparison to rc. Since, as stated before, maxeq 
≈ maxrc, large 𝜁𝜇𝛿  values necessarily imply large differences in the yield deflections, y
eq and yrc, respec-
tively. Precisely, the yield deflections predicted by the SDOF method are smaller than the values ob-
tained in the numerical analysis, especially if the reinforcement ratio is mall. To explain this finding, 
Rong and Li [171, 172] relegate to the formulation used for the stiffness estimation in the SDOF analysis, 
which is function of and which seems to overestimate the member stiffness in case the contribution of 
the concrete is large in relation to that of the reinforcing steel (i.e., for members with small ). Similar 
conclusions were deduced for RC members with other support conditions.  
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Figure 3.19 Displacement index (3.47) and ductility index (3.48) for 500 simply supported RC members as a 
function of reinforcement ratio  [171, 172]. 
Oswald and Bazan [173] present comparisons of maximum deflections based on SDOF analysis with test 
results for different type of structural components (corrugate steel panels, one-way RC walls, one-way 
reinforced masonry walls or two-way unreinforced masonry walls). The mean value () and coefficient 
of variation (CoV) of the ratio between computed- and measured deflections (m,SDOF / m,Test) for con-
crete walls are summarized in Table 3.5. The indicated values are based on 76 tests conducted in the 
framework of eight different test programs. The mean value of 1.19 indicates that the SDOF method 
tends to overestimate the dynamic deflections of the RC walls. However, the corresponding CoV of 0.3 
evidences that the results are subject to a significant scatter. According to [173], part of this scatter may 
be attributed to the incomplete information and the associated uncertainties in the SDOF input param-
eters for both the resistance and the loading characteristics of the test walls. 
Table 3.5 Mean value () and coefficient of variation (CoV) of ratio m,SDOF / m,Test for RC walls in 76 tests [173]. 
Element type Nº of test programms Nº of tests  CoV 
RC walls 8 76 1.19 0.30 
 
The performance of one-way reinforced concrete panels under blast loads was also analyzed by Bach et 
al. [174]. The dynamic analysis of the panels was based on SDOF analysis or pressure-impulse diagrams, 
and the results were validated with tests conducted in shock tubes. The pressure-time function charac-
terizing the blast applied to the panels could be described by a zero rise time followed by exponential 
decay according to the Friedlander function [165], with a duration of the positive phase varying from 
21 to 42 ms. Figure 3.20 (left) shows the elevation of the four simply supported test panels (span of 1.7 
m) with rectangular cross-section and reinforcement layout as shown. Moreover, a view of one of the 
panels after the tests is provided in the Figure, along with a comparison between experimental and test 
results in terms of the member mid-span deflections for three of the panels. It can be observed that the 
SDOF results (dotted lines) are generally in very good agreement to the experimentally obtained values 
(continuous lines) until the time of maximum displacement, tmax.  
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Figure 3.20 Left: Elevation, cross-section layout and view after shock-tube test of RC panels studied in [174]; 
Right: Comparison of registered and calculated panel mid-span displacements [174]. 
Figure 3.20 shows again that SDOF analysis does not compulsively leads to conservative predictions. In 
this context, it is interesting to mention that the deduction of the resistance function laid down in the 
SDOF analysis, accounted for an enhanced stiffness due to consideration of concrete tension stiffening. 
As pointed out before, this is indicative of the importance of an appropriate member stiffness estimation. 
In more general terms, it confirms that the degree of precision in the prediction of the dynamic member 
behaviour depends mainly on the SDOF input parameters and the associated degree of uncertainty ra-
ther than on the methodology itself. 
3.4 Summary 
Chapter 3 addresses the principal characteristics of gas explosions and their effects on structures.  
Section 3.1 is dedicated to the description of such an explosion event and the associated loads on struc-
tures. Data on the occurrence probabilities of gas explosions, reported in studies conducted in different 
countries and periods, shows a good correlation among the findings (section 3.1.2, Table 3.1). Interest-
ingly, the probability of an explosion event per time unit  seems to be almost independent of the con-
sidered time period during which data was collected, what in light of the continuous modernization of 
gas installations and appliances could not have been expected. The compiled data suggests that =10-
5 provides a fairly good estimate for the annual occurrence of a gas explosion in a gas-supplied housing-
unit in western countries. Assuming a uniform distribution in time, this figure can be used to model the 
occurrence probability p(EX) in a specific time period Tref based on a Poisson process (3.1). 
The physical backgrounds governing the pressure generation in a gas explosion are subsequently de-
scribed in section 3.1.3. It is highlighted that venting panels, like windows, doors or light-weight parti-
tion walls, play a major role in that process. Available experimental and numerical studies show that 
generally two pressure peaks can be distinguished (Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2). The first is mainly charac-
terized by the resistance pressure of the venting panels. The second peak, which can attain far higher 
values than the first, arises in consequences of turbulent combustion processes during the relief of gas 
and air through the venting openings and significantly depends on the dimensions of both the venting 
panels and the compartment where the explosion occurs. 
Different deterministic models are described in the literature, which intend to predict the maximum 
pressure generated in a gas explosion (section 3.1.4). A comparison reveals important differences be-
tween these models, indicative of the highly complex physical relationships and dependencies between 
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the many variables involved in the pressure build-up process. Moreover, some of these variables, such 
as the composition of the gas cloud, the filling-ratio of the compartment or the location of the point of 
ignition are not predictable at all by means of deterministic approaches. On the contrary, the lack of data 
hinders a reliable stochastic description of these variables and hence implies a certain degree of con-
servatism in most model expressions. Available models for a probabilistic description of the maximum 
explosion pressure are compared and the significant differences concerning both mean value (Figure 
3.3) and scatter, evaluated. Moreover, it is shown how pressure time-relationships associated with gas-
eous deflagrations can be idealized for purpose of simplified dynamic analysis. A triangular load-pulse 
reasonably approaches such relationships (Figure 3.4). The associated pressure rise-time and total 
pulse duration are substantially higher than compared to detonations of explosives.  
The behaviour of RC elements under the effects of explosion loads is subject of section 3.2. Such loads 
induce enhanced material strain rates what is commonly known as strain rate effect (section 3.2.2). 
Since gas explosions are regarded as a relatively slow type of impact loading, the influence of strain-rate 
is fairly small compared to high velocity impact or blast scenarios. Nevertheless, even under moderate 
strain rates, of the order of about 10-3 to 10-2 s-1, which a gas explosion pressure wave is expected to 
induce in RC members, some material parameters are sufficiently enhanced to be accounted for in the 
present study. Among these properties are, for instance, the concrete tensile- and compressive strength 
(Figure 3.6) or the reinforcing steel yield- and tensile strength (Figure 3.7). No evidence could be found 
for a significant alteration of the scatter associated with these material properties when subjected to 
dynamic loading conditions. 
Explosion-induced loading on structures is generally associated with high energies and short durations. 
When exposed to such conditions, structural elements experience accelerations and hence inertia forces 
will influence their behaviour. Moreover, non-linear structural response gains importance for it will 
contribute to dissipation of energy. Providing RC elements with a significant energy absorption capacity 
by insuring a ductile, flexural behaviour is one of the key issues when designing for blast loads (section 
3.2.3). Necessarily, such behaviour can only be developed when the dynamic shear capacity exceeds the 
flexural strength of a member. Several experimental studies reported in the literature show that struc-
tures designed to exhibit a ductile flexural behaviour under quasi-static loading conditions might fail in 
shear when exposed to higher loading rates, what may be mainly associated with the influence of higher 
vibration modes [148]. However, due to the relatively low rise times and amplitudes of gas explosion-
induced pressure waves, the extremely brittle direct- and punching shear failure modes are highly un-
likely to occur in consequence of gas explosions. The investigation focusses on the compression- or ten-
sion controlled diagonal shear failure mode (Figure 3.8), likewise referred to as flexural shear for in 
many cases a certain amount of flexure occurs prior to the development of diagonal shear cracks. 
A number of approaches are in place for determining internal forces and stresses in structural elements 
exposed to explosions, ranging from simplified models based on static-equivalent loads to complex, nu-
merical simulations of the blast wave and its dynamic effects on the structure. The election of an appro-
priate modeling strategy primarily depends on the available information concerning the explosion load-
ing. If the load can be represented by an appropriate pressure-time curve, simplified dynamic calcula-
tions using time-stepping schemes can be performed. The background of this simplified approach, em-
ployed in the present study (Chapter 5), is provided in section 3.3. Member flexural response can be 
obtained assuming a single degree of freedom system (sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, Figure 3.9), whereas the 
reaction forces, representative for the shear forces, might be determined from the dynamic equilibrium 
formulation applied to the members themselves (section 3.3.5, Figure 3.14). Strain rate effects can be 
accounted for by means of dynamic increase factors (section 3.3.2). These simplified models for dynamic 
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analysis have been proven to deliver results that compare reasonably well to available blast test results 
on a variety of structural members, especially regarding their flexural response (section 3.3.6). The de-
gree of precision in the prediction of the dynamic member behaviour depends mainly on the model in-
put parameters and the associated degree of uncertainty rather than on the methodology itself.
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Chapter 4 Approach and basic developments 
4.1 Assumptions for the inference of acceptable risks 
4.1.1 Introduction  
The point of departure for the definition of the study is constituted by the main objectives of the thesis 
formulated in section 1.3: the determination of structure-related risks to persons due to gas explosions 
in buildings and the subsequent establishment of rational acceptance criteria, which may be employed 
for the assessment of such risks. Achieving these objectives requires, at first, tackling methodological 
aspects such as the establishment of a mathematical framework for the quantification of structure-re-
lated risks or the definition of the procedural steps that, in a logical and clearly structured manner, 
should address the tasks identified in section 1.3. 
Before introducing both the mathematical framework and the procedure, subject of sections 4.2 and 4.3, 
respectively, the present section introduces the basic ideas and assumptions regarding the inference of 
an acceptable risk level. The fundamental postulate is that risks associated with structures designed and 
built in accordance with current best practice principles are considered to be reasonably small and ac-
ceptable to the public (section 2.3.3). On the other hand, current best practice is reflected in the struc-
tural design codes in force, whose correct application entails structures that, by definition, are consid-
ered sufficiently safe and reliable. In line with these considerations, the perhaps most logical approach 
is to define acceptable risk to persons as the inherent risk set out in the mentioned design codes [9, 10, 
13]. Acceptable risks are therefore directly linked to the reliability level implicitly required by these codes. 
As mentioned before, structural design is traditionally based on cross-section or member design where 
the corresponding reliability is ensured at a level which can be regarded as intrinsically acceptable. The 
coming section 4.1.2 discusses how and under which circumstances such a level can be defined for acci-
dental situations associated with gas explosions. Section 4.1.3 summarizes the most relevant conclu-
sions for the further development of the study. 
4.1.2 Implicit reliability level for accidental situations 
Hazards due to human errors 
Latest since the occurrence of the Ronan Point building collapse (Figure 1.2), gas explosions are objec-
tively known hazards to safety of building structures. However, although objectively known, the hazard 
potential associated with gas explosions is often not subjectively recognized, or sometimes simply ig-
nored (section 1.1.3). Whether not recognized or ignored, the logical consequence of this practice is that 
the hazard potential associated with gas explosions in buildings is seldom counteracted by explicit 
measures, i.e. the structural safety concept for a building is based exclusively on the anticipated normal 
loading conditions of the structure (disregarding here that other accidental loading situations might be 
relevant). In practice, this situation, which is reflected by path c of the flow chart shown in Figure 4.1, 
implies the design of each constitutive member of a structure to resist the action effects that would be 
expected according to the persistent design situation, as defined in the codes in question. Assuming a 
strict design, i.e. a member performance that complies exactly with the safety requirements laid down 
in the code rules (Ed = Rd), each member would then be provided with the strictly required design re-
sistance for the persistent situation Rd = Rd,req,per. 
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Given the relatively low occurrence probability of gas explosions (section 3.1.2), it is likely that no such 
accidental incident occurs during the envisaged design working life of a building. In this case, the struc-
tural members are expected to resist the (foreseen) action effects due to normal loads with a minimum 
reliability level  = req,PER, i.e. the reliability level implicitly required by the codes associated with the 
persistent load situation (path c2 in Figure 4.1). However, in the unlikely case a gas explosion occurs 
during the design working life of the structure, and influences the action effects on a specific member, 
its performance and the corresponding reliability level would be uncertain and subject to both the avail-
able resistance (provided to resist normal loading conditions only) and the action effects associated with 
the (unforeseen) accidental situation (path c1 in Figure 4.1). A possible failure event would have to be 
traced back to some category of human error (ignorance, negligence, etc.). Human errors, in turn, are 
not covered by the design rules laid down in current structural codes and standards (section 1.1.1). 
Consequently, in keeping with the objectives of the study, hazards due to human errors are not ac-
counted for in the present study. 
 
Figure 4.1 Event tree identifying design situations, load scenarios and corresponding reliability level associated 
with the hazard potential stemming from gas explosions in building structures. 
Member design as measure to counteract hazard potential 
Drawing attention again to Figure 4.1, in advance it will be considered that the hazard gas explosion has 
been subjectively recognized and taken into account by some kind of counteracting measure. As stated 
before, design codes such as [17], offer a variety of possible measures to counteract the effects of acci-
dental actions in building structures, based on the general performance requirement, that “the structure 
shall be designed and executed in a way that it will not be damaged to an extent disproportionate to the 
original cause” (section 1.1.2). Among those measures, one might quote prescriptive design and detail-
ing rules foreseen to enhance structural redundancy and/or robustness. Other strategies are related to 
the mitigation of consequences such as tolerating local member failure provided alternative load paths 
Hazard “Gas explosion”
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design situation
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might develop which ensure the overall stability of the structural system. Although it might not be an 
attractive solution from an economical point of view, design of structural members to withstand the 
effects of an accidental action constitutes another possible measure for which purpose the codes offer 
specific design rules (section 2.3.4). In compliance with the persistent design situations, the failure prob-
abilities associated with cross-sections or members designed for the accidental situation, and by exten-
sion the corresponding risks, might be referred to as intrinsically acceptable by the current legislation. 
The inference of requirements for structural safety will be based on this appreciation. 
Mandatory design situation and corresponding reliability level 
Having defined member design as the principle measure to reduce structure-related risks in relation 
with the hazard gas explosion in buildings, the question arises if in a particular practical situation, the 
accidental design situation would be indeed mandatory or, if on the contrary, structural design would 
be governed by normal loading conditions (i.e. the persistent situation). Simply speaking, the latter sit-
uation, represented by path b in Figure 4.1, would be at hand if the required resistance (e.g. in terms of 
the required amount of tensile reinforcement for a particular member cross-section under bending 
stresses) for a particular persistent load combination would be higher than demanded by the leading 
accidental load arrangement. Assuming again strict design provisions (Ed=Rd), in this case the member 
would be provided with a design resistance Rd = Rd,req,per. Conversely, if the accidental design situation 
would be mandatory (path a), design would demand a design resistance Rd = Rd,req,acc.  
In the latter of the two described design situations (path a), the element is supposed to perform in an 
adequate way according to the code provisions in case the unlikely, accidental loading scenario due to a 
gas explosion occurs during the design working life of the member (path a1). The corresponding pro-
vided reliability level would represent the reliability level implicitly required by the codes associated 
with the explosion load scenario (req,EX). However, in the more likely case that the explosion does not 
occur (path a2), the provided member resistance will probably largely exceed the action effects due to 
the normal loads to which the member is subjected during the design working life (Rprov >> Rreq). Hence, 
the corresponding member reliability level might be expected to largely exceed the value demanded by 
the codes for the abnormal loading conditions that prevailed in the member design (req,PER >>req,EX). 
Equivalently, it can be assumed that under these circumstances the failure probability of the member, 
and hence the corresponding risk to persons, would be insignificantly small. 
In case the mandatory design situation would have been governed by normal loading conditions (Rd = 
Rd,req,per), as represented by path b in Figure 4.1, structural performance of the strictly designed element 
is associated with a minimum reliability level req,PER if indeed no explosion occurs (path b2), i.e. the re-
liability level implicitly required by the codes associated with the persistent load scenario. Contrarily, 
in case of an unlikely explosion scenario, the member might be expected to perform “on the safe side” 
since this scenario was taken into account and judged to require a smaller resistance than the persistent 
loading scenario under normal building use conditions. Hence, as indicated in Figure 4.1 (path b1), the 
member reliability level associated with the explosion load scenario would be expected to exceed the 
required value for the persistent situation (req,EX > req,PER). However, this hypothesis needs to be vali-
dated given that the reliability of members exposed to highly uncertain load effects stemming from gas 
explosions is, to date, almost unstudied and might be governed by factors that do not allow for a straight-
forward conclusion regarding its magnitude. In any case, it seems evident that the failure probability of 
such members cannot be judged (a priori) to be insignificantly small, nor can be presupposed that the 
corresponding risk to persons is negligible.  
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It should be stated that in many practical situations the distinction between persistent and accidental 
situation as discussed is not relevant. Examples are structural elements that are situated outside the 
potential influence zone of a gas explosion (e.g. sufficiently far away from the potential explosion source) 
or the design for a specific member failure mode which might only be triggered by one out of the two 
situations. For these cases, the definition of the implicitly required reliability level is straight forward. 
4.1.3 Final remarks 
The following conclusions should be emphasized and kept in mind for the inference of risk-based re-
quirements for structural safety associated with gas explosions in buildings: 
- The acceptable risk level is related to the member reliability level implicitly required by the de-
sign codes which is a priori unknown. 
- Risks due to human errors (ignorance, negligence, etc.) are not covered by the design rules laid 
down in the codes and, consequently, will not be accounted for in the study. 
- Depending on the particular circumstances of each case, member design might be governed by 
the persistent or the accidental design situation, respectively. 
- If the accidental situation is mandatory for design, but the unlikely explosion event does not 
occur during the design working life of the structure, the member reliability, in this case charac-
terized by normal loading conditions, might be assumed to largely exceed the level implicitly 
required by the design codes associated with the explosion load scenario (Figure 4.1, path a2). 
- If the persistent situation is mandatory for design, but the unlikely explosion does occur during 
the design working life of the structure, it may not be stated a priori that the member reliability, 
in this case characterized by the abnormal, highly uncertain loading conditions, would largely 
exceed the level implicitly required by the design codes associated with the persistent load sce-
nario (Figure 4.1, path b1). Further investigation into this issue is required. 
4.2 Mathematical model for quantitative risk analysis 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In the previous section, the basic assumptions for the establishment of acceptable levels of structure-
related risks were established. The present section addresses the definition of a mathematical frame-
work for the quantification of such risks. The developments, which are in line with the main principles 
established in prior studies dedicated to risks in buildings under normal use conditions [9, 13], are 
based on the current state of knowledge regarding explicit approaches for the analysis, assessment and 
management of risks associated with technical systems, outlined in sections 2.1 and 2.2. The following 
sub-section establishes the basic equations for quantification of risks associated with such systems. Sub-
sequently, section 4.2.3 introduces building structure-related specifications.  
4.2.2 General framework 
In keeping with the considerations made in section 2.1.3, the probability that a person i will lose its live 
in a specific hazard scenario j associated with a given technical system is defined as the individual risk 
(rij). Formally, rij can be expressed by (4.1) as a function of the occurrence probability of the hazard 
scenario pj and the lethality rate for this person given the scenario, lij. 
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 rij = pj ∙ lij          (4.1) 
Where: 
lij: Lethality rate for person i due to hazard scenario j 
pj: Occurrence probability of hazard scenario j 
rij: Individual risk to person i associated with hazard scenario j 
In general, different hazard scenarios (j) associated with a particular technical system can contribute to 
the life safety risk of a particular person. In case of statistical independency between the nj hazard sce-
narios which might be relevant, and considering small values for the contributions rij to the overall in-
dividual risk ri to person i, the following  relationship holds: 
 ri = ∑ rij =
nj
j=1
∑ pj
nj
j=1 ∙ lij        (4.2) 
Where: 
ri: Individual risk to person i  
Considering that ni persons might be exposed to a particular hazard scenario j associated with a given 
technical system, the societal risk (section 2.1.3) to these persons, Rj, is defined as the sum over the 
individual risks rij (4.1) corresponding to each of the ni persons exposed: 
 Rj = ∑ rij =
ni
i=1 pj ∙ ∑ lij
ni
i=1         (4.3) 
Where: 
Rj: Societal risk to persons associated with hazard scenario j  
Finally, if it is again assumed that the nj relevant hazard scenarios which might occur within a given 
technical system are statistically independent of each other, the societal risk to persons associated with 
the entire system is defined as the sum over the risks Rj (4.3) corresponding to each of the nj hazard 
scenarios: 
 R = ∑ Rj =
nj
j=1
∑ (pj ∙ ∑ lij
ni
i=1
nj
j=1 )       (4.4) 
Where: 
R: Societal risk to persons associated with the considered technical system. 
4.2.3 Application to building structures  
Probabilities  
The preceding section describes a mathematical framework for quantification of risks to persons asso-
ciated with specific hazard scenarios (j) within a particular technical system. In the present context, the 
technical system considered is a building structure and the hazard scenario is defined as a particular 
collapse scenario triggered by failure (f) of one of the main constitutive members with specific structural 
properties. Such a failure is characterized by a specific failure mode (k) to arise under a particular load 
arrangement (l) on the member. The corresponding occurrence probability, i.e. the probability for the 
member to fail in mode k under the influence of load arrangement l, pf,kl, or simply pf, will represent 
probability pj in equations (4.1) to (4.4). 
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 pj ≡ pf,kl ≡ pf          (4.5) 
Where: 
pf,kl, pf : Probability of failure of a structural member (in failure mode k under load arrangement l)  
The failure probability pf can be formally expressed by equation (2.23). It can be determined by means 
of structural reliability methods (section 2.2.3) provided that the uncertainties associated with the basic 
variables involved in the limit state function associated with the considered failure mode (k) and load 
arrangement (l) of the member can be properly quantified (section 2.2.1). The relation between failure 
probability pf and the reliability index  is established by (2.31). 
For load arrangements associated with accidental situations, such as internal gas explosions, the occur-
rence rate of the accidental action itself must be factored into pf, as expressed by equation (1.2). In line 
with the definition of the occurrence rate of a gas explosion, p(EX), in section 3.1.2, the failure probabil-
ity pf of a structural member is defined as: 
 pf = p(EX) ∙ pf,kl|EX ≡ p(EX) ∙ pf|EX       (4.6) 
Where: 
p(EX):  Occurrence rate of a gas explosion in a gas-supplied housing unit 
pf,kl|EX,  pf|EX : Probability of failure of a member (in mode k) provided that a gas explosion has 
occurred and influences the loading conditions (l) of the member. 
In general, a specific structural member might fail under different circumstances. In the present context, 
where members in building structures are addressed, different load arrangements (l) due to normal 
(persistent) and/or abnormal (accidental) loading conditions must be distinguished (section 4.1.2). 
Moreover, it must be considered that, depending on the loading particularities a member might be sub-
jected to, different failure modes (k) might trigger its collapse. In summary, each structural member is 
exposed to several potential failure (f) or hazard scenarios (j). Assuming statistical independency be-
tween these scenarios, the accumulated failure probability of a structural member, Pf, can be expressed 
as the sum over the nj individual failure probabilities associated with each of the nl load arrangements 
(l) and nk failure modes (k) the member might be subjected to. 
 Pf = ∑ pj =
nj
j=1
∑ ∑ pf,kl
nk
k=1
nl
l=1         (4.7) 
It should be noted that equation (4.7) is based on the assumption that a structural member can be ide-
alized by a series system constituted by nj system components (section 2.4.2), corresponding to the nj 
potential failure scenarios (j) of the member. Since in a series system the failure of a single system com-
ponent implies necessarily the failure of the whole system it is implicitly assumed here that the occur-
rence of each of the nj failure scenarios will necessarily induce member collapse.  
Following the exposed assumptions concerning series system, and taking account of the fact that a build-
ing structure is comprised by several constitutive members, the use of equation (4.7) can be extrapo-
lated from the member to the system (structure) level. In that case, the series system components cor-
respond to the nj potential failure scenarios associated with the totality of the structure-comprising 
members. It hence appears that the risk associated with a specific structure increases with the number 
of potential failure scenarios, i.e. with the number of constitutive members, load arrangements and 
member failure modes, and consequently, is affected by an important scale effect [9]. 
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Consequences 
Following the mathematical framework defined by equations (4.1) to (4.4), the quantification of build-
ing structure-related risks would require suitable estimations of the lethality rate lij for a person i given 
a particular hazard scenario j. The probability for a specific person to lose its life in a particular struc-
tural collapse scenario depends on multiple influences, such as:  
- The nature of the collapse scenario which, in turn, will depend on manifold aspects such as the 
structural typology, dimensions, materials, connections and details, the type and intensity of the 
triggering event, etc.  
- The building occupancy conditions such as the density and the distribution of persons present on 
the area affected by the collapse scenario, etc. 
- The functional building characteristics, like the availability and arrangement of emergency exits, 
etc. 
For the time being no models are available for the estimation of lethality rate lij taking account of the 
mentioned influences. Simplified approaches are hence necessary for consequence modeling within the 
context of the present study. Instead of modeling lij, it seems more feasible to realize an estimation of 
the number of fatalities Nj due to a particular hazard scenario j, which formally corresponds to the sum 
over the (unknown) lethality rates lij, corresponding to each of the ni exposed persons to scenario j: 
  Nj = ∑ lij
ni
i=1           (4.8) 
Hence, substituting (4.8) into (4.3) and (4.4), the societal risks to persons associated with a particular 
collapse scenario on one hand, and the totality of the potential collapse scenarios in the entire structure, 
on the other, can be readily quantified by means of equations (4.9) and (4.10), respectively.  
 Rj = pj ∙ Nj          (4.9) 
 R = ∑  pj ∙ Nj
nj
j=1           (4.10) 
For the estimation of the individual risks it will be assumed, for sake of simplicity, that the lethality rate 
lij is equal for each of the ni exposed persons to a particular hazard scenario j. Consequently, equation 
(4.8) simplifies into (4.11): 
 Nj = ni ∙ lij           (4.11) 
It should be noted that since lij has been assumed as a constant, the individual risk rij (4.1) and ri (4.2) to 
each of the ni exposed persons appear to be constant as well. As expressed by (2.13), individual and 
societal risks, are then simply related by the number of exposed persons, ni. Indeed, solving (4.11) for lij 
and substituting it into expressions (4.1) and (4.2), the individual risk rij and ri can be readily deduced 
from expressions (4.12) and (4.13), respectively, as a function of ni and the societal risks Rj associated 
with one or nj particular hazard scenarios (j): 
 rij = pj ∙
Nj
ni
=
Rj
ni
         (4.12) 
 ri = ∑ rij =
nj
j=1
1
ni
∑ Rj
nj
j=1         (4.13) 
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Probability-consequence plots 
The mathematical framework defined in the previous sections is based on the assumption of statistical 
independency between the nj hazard scenarios (j) associated with a particular building structure. In line 
with this assumption, these scenarios can be represented in a probability-consequence diagram, shown 
schematically in Figure 4.2, also termed risk profile [12]. 
In such a risk profile, the j = 1, 2,…, nj hazard (collapse) scenarios are numbered and arranged according 
to the magnitude of the consequences associated with these scenarios, in terms of the number of fatali-
ties, Nj, represented on the axis of abscissa. The axis of ordinates represents the occurrence probabilities 
of the scenarios pj, in the present context represented by the probability pf (4.5) for a structural member 
to fail within a specific reference period, in a particular failure mode (k) when exposed to a specific load 
arrangement (l). The maximum value on the ordinate represents the accumulated failure probability Pf 
associated with the entire structural system (4.7), i.e. the probability that the structure will be affected 
by a collapse scenario of one of its constitutive members within a specific reference period. 
The area under the risk profile for a given structure corresponds to the societal risks to persons, R, as-
sociated with the structure, according to (4.10). It should be noted that these risk profiles are closely 
related to the frequently employed F(n) diagrams introduced in section 2.1.3 (Figure 2.5). This relation-
ship constitutes a fundamental piece for the establishment of acceptance criteria for societal risks in the 
present study. 
 
Figure 4.2 Schematic representation of a probability-consequence diagram (risk profile)  
4.3 Procedure 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Having established the basic assumptions for the inference of requirements for the assessment of struc-
ture-related risks due to gas explosion in buildings (section 4.1), and once defined the mathematical 
framework for the quantification of such risks (section 4.2), the present section identifies the specific 
tasks to be addressed in the present study in order to achieve the defined objectives. Based on the ge-
neric description of a risk-informed decision analysis in section 2.1.2, a procedure comprising eight 
main steps has been defined. Following its description in section 4.3.2, section 4.3.3 offers a brief sum-
mary of this procedure including indications on the subsequent sections of the present thesis where the 
corresponding tasks will be addressed. 
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4.3.2 Description 
The procedure initially requires the definition of the general context, scope and objectives of the study 
(step 1), what has been basically addressed in Chapter 1 of the present thesis. The necessary mathemat-
ical framework for the estimation of structure-related risks (step 2) was previously established in sec-
tion 4.2. 
With the principle aim to cover the vast majority of the cases encountered in practice, step 3 involves 
selecting representative sets of hypothetical but realistic building structures and their constitutive mem-
bers choosing the parameters with the greatest effect on design, concerning geometry, loads or material 
strength.  
In step 4, a qualitative risk analysis (section 2.1.2) is being carried out with the principal aim to identify 
the relevant (accidental) hazard scenarios (j) associated with the previously defined structures. Accord-
ing to the definition in section 4.2.3, in the present context a hazard scenario describes a particular 
structural collapse scenario induced by failure (f) of a structural member according to a specific failure 
mode (k) induced by a certain load arrangement (l). Suitable assumptions to describe the extensions of 
a system collapse given the member failure are to be adopted. 
According to the established mathematical framework (step 2), structure-related risks to persons are 
quantified as a function of both the occurrence probabilities (pj) of the identified hazard scenarios (step 
3) and their consequences in terms of loss of human life (Nj). The establishment of pj and Nj is subject of 
steps 5 and 6, respectively. 
According to equation (4.5), the occurrence probability pj is represented by the failure probability of a 
particular structural member pf. Further to the considerations in section 4.1.2, assuring member perfor-
mance to comply exactly with the safety requirements laid down in a consistent set of design codes, the 
associated failure probability pf can be assumed to be acceptable by definition and represents hence the 
reliability level implicitly required by the codes in question. In line with these statements, the establish-
ment of the probabilities pj (step 5) comprises the following four sub-steps:  
- The mathematical formulations of the relevant member failure modes (k) under a specific load 
arrangement (l), identified in step 4, are defined in terms of limit state functions (LSF’s) and their 
comprising basic variables. 
- Based on the established LSF’s, the selected structural members (step 3) are strictly designed 
(Ed = Rd) for the accidental situation in accordance with the specifications of a consistent set of 
structural codes. Subsequently, it is verified if the design resistance Rd should indeed be pro-
vided according to the accidental design assumptions, or, if on the contrary, the persistent situ-
ation under normal loading conditions prevails (section 4.1.2). The strict design in accordance 
with the mandatory design situation provides the members with the required resistance prop-
erties according to the code rules employed. 
- Since the standardized rules for structural design are not based on any explicitly established 
probabilistic models for the design variables, the degree of uncertainty associated with these 
rules is unknown and must be quantified. This step corresponds to the stochastic characteriza-
tion of the basic variables involved in the previously defined LSF’s. 
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- Moreover, the code rules for the accidental design situation do not explicitly consider dynamic 
effects (structural inertia, energy dissipation and strain rate effects) which arise as a conse-
quence of the relatively high loading rates gas explosions induce in structural members (section 
3.2). To quantify such effects, a specific, deterministic dynamic analysis based on efficient, sim-
plified models is carried out. The findings from this analysis are factored into the LSF’s.  
- Finally, based on the defined LSF’s, a reliability analysis of the members based on the FORM 
algorithm (section 2.2.3) will be carried out for each of the relevant load arrangements and fail-
ure modes identified (step 4). Due to the involved complexity, the analysis of the columns under 
the combined influence of bending moments and axial forces (section 2.5), requires a specific 
reliability solution algorithm. 
The estimation of the consequences Nj due to the considered hazard scenarios calls for suitable conse-
quence models what is the subject of step 6 of the analysis procedure. An empirical model will be deduced 
from compiled data on explosion-induced collapse events reported in the literature and in the press. In 
keeping with the general scope of the study, the model should enable a prediction of the number of 
fatalities as a function of relevant parameters characterizing the magnitude of the damage associated 
with a particular hazard scenario, in line with the assumptions met under step 4. 
In step 7, the implicitly accepted risks associated with each of the defined building structures (step 3) 
are deduced according to the following sub-steps: 
- Establishment of the occurrence probabilities pj (step 5) of each of the identified hazard scenar-
ios (step 4). 
- Determination of the corresponding failure consequences Nj on the grounds of the model de-
duced in step 6.   
- Construction of the implicitly accepted risk profiles (Figure 4.2) as a function of both member 
failure probabilities pj and consequences Nj. This should be done under the inclusion of hazard 
scenarios associated with normal loading conditions (Figure 4.1), considering the results of 
prior studies [9, 10, 13]. 
- Integration of risk profiles 
The final step (step 8) involves a detailed evaluation and interpretation of the results obtained. Based 
on these results, a proposal regarding the acceptance of structure-related risks to persons associated 
with gas explosions in RC structures should be made taking account of earlier proposals [9, 10, 13]. 
4.3.3 Summary 
The main steps comprising the procedure described in the previous section are briefly summarized as 
follows (see also Figure 4.3):  
1. Definition of context, scope and objectives of the study (Chapter 1). 
2. Establishment of a mathematical framework (section 4.2). 
3. Choice of a representative set of building structures and constitutive members (section 4.4). 
o Selection of analysis variables and range of corresponding numerical values. 
4. Identification of relevant hazard scenarios (section 4.5). 
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o Definition of member loading characteristics and corresponding failure modes. 
o Assumptions for extensions of system collapse given a local member failure.  
5. Determination of the reliability level implicitly required by the codes.  
o Establishment of LSF’s (section 4.6). 
o Strict design of members according to design codes (section 4.7). 
o Characterization of basic variables (section 4.8). 
o Dynamic analysis of members (Chapter 5). 
o Reliability analysis of members (Chapter 6). 
6. Deduction of consequence models (Chapter 7). 
7. Determination of implicitly acceptable risks associated with building structures (Chapter 8.) 
o Establishment of the occurrence probabilities of the defined hazard scenarios. 
o Estimation of the consequences to persons associated with these scenarios. 
o Construction of risk profiles under inclusion of results from prior studies corresponding 
to buildings under normal use conditions [9, 10, 13]. 
o Integration of risk profiles. 
8. Analysis, evaluation and interpretation of the obtained results (Chapter 8) 
o Deduction of acceptance criteria for life safety risks  
 
Figure 4.3 Procedural flow-chart  
1. Context, scope, objectives
(Chapter 1, section 4.1)
2. Mathematical model (s. 4.2)
4. Hazard scenarios (s. 4.5)
3. Repres. set of structures (s. 4.4)
5. Implicit reliability level
Limit states (s. 4.6)
Strict design (s. 4.7)
Basic variables (s. 4.8)
Dynamic analysis (Ch. 5)
Reliability analysis (Ch. 6)
6. Consequence models (Ch. 7)
7. Implicitly acceptable risks (Ch. 8)
8. Acceptance criteria (Ch. 8)
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4.4 Representative set of structures and members 
4.4.1 Introduction 
In relation with the definition of the technical systems to be analysed in the present study, the scope has 
been previously limited to ordinary RC building structures, intended for residential use (Figure 1.3). 
Step 3 of the established procedure (section 4.3) involves the definition of representative sets of such 
kind of structures and their constitutive main members. For this purpose the most relevant structural 
design parameters are identified and varied within practically realistic ranges. The subsequent sections 
summarize the selection of the parameters and their corresponding nominal values along with the hy-
pothesis on which grounds this selection has been based. The mentioned parameters are related to: 
- The geometry of the building structures (section 4.4.2). 
- The characteristics of the explosion venting components used in these buildings (section 4.4.3). 
- The characteristics of the main constitutive structural members (section 4.4.4). 
Finally, section 4.4.5 addresses the combination of the selected parameters in order to define the repre-
sentative sets of structures and members. 
4.4.2 Geometry of structures 
The structures are supposed to be provided with a rigid concrete core (containing staircase or lift shaft) 
in order to guarantee sway stability and overall structural resistance to global horizontal influences, 
such as wind or seismic actions. Around this core, RC frames are placed which are geometrically de-
scribed by the following parameters (Figure 4.4):  
- Building height H, width B and length L; 
- Building proportions, H : B : L  
- Number of storeys, ns (excluding ground floor and roof) 
- Storey height, hs 
- Distance between axes of load-bearing columns in longitudinal sense of the building, l; 
- Distance between axes of load-bearing columns in transverse sense of the building, l/2; 
 
Figure 4.4 Designation of geometrical building parameters (Left: Elevation; Right: Plan view) 
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The RC frames are constituted by columns, spaced at a distance l in the longitudinal sense of the struc-
ture, and by beams spanning this distance. The beams give support to a secondary floor system (sec-
ondary beams, slabs) with a spanning distance l/2 between the principal frames in transverse sense of 
the buildings. It is being assumed that a potential collapse of these secondary floor elements would affect 
a locally confined zone with negligible consequences for building users in comparison to those at-
tributed to the failure of a main member. For this reason, the contribution of the secondary structure to 
the risks will not be taken into account in the further development of the study.  
The numerical values adopted for the mentioned geometrical parameters are summarized in Table 4.1 
It should be noted that the indicated building proportions (H : B : L) are approximate only. The number 
of storeys (excluding ground floor and roof) are varied from ns = 0 to ns = 30. Considering a constant 
storey height of hs = 4 m, the height of the structures varies between 4 and 124 m. In the plan view, main 
building dimensions (L and B) between 5 and 300 m are accounted for. The distance between the axes 
of the load-bearing columns in the longitudinal sense of the building, l, is varied from 5 to 40 m.  
Table 4.1: Variation of geometrical parameters for definition of a representative set of RC buildings structures  
H : B : L 
(aprox.) 
ns H [m] B [m] L [m] l [m] 
1 : 1 : 1 
1 
10 
15 
20 
8 
44 
64 
84 
10 
40 
80 
60 
10 
40 
80 
60 
5; 10 
5; 10; 20 
10; 20 
10; 15 
1 : 8 : 8 
0 
0 
3 
5 
10 
10 
4 
4 
16 
24 
44 
44 
20 
40 
120 
200 
300 
300 
20 
40 
120 
200 
240 
300 
10; 20 
5; 10; 20 
5; 10; 20; 40 
5; 10; 20; 40 
10; 15; 30 
10; 15; 30 
8 : 1 : 1 
10 
20 
30 
44 
84 
124 
5 
10 
15 
5 
10 
15 
5 
5; 10 
5; 15 
1 : 2 : 2 
1 
3 
5 
10 
8 
16 
24 
44 
20 
30 
40 
60 
20 
30 
40 
60 
20 
5; 15; 30 
5; 40 
5; 10; 20; 30 
2 : 2 : 1 
5 
10 
20 
24 
44 
84 
20 
30 
60 
10 
15 
30 
5; 10 
5; 15 
10; 15 
2 : 1 : 2 
5 
10 
20 
24 
44 
84 
10 
15 
30 
20 
30 
60 
5; 10; 20 
5; 15; 30 
5; 15 
1 : 2 : 1 1 8 20 10 5 
1 : 4 : 1 
1 
5 
15 
8 
24 
64 
40 
80 
180 
10 
20 
45 
5; 10 
10; 20 
5;15 
1 : 1 : 4 
1 
5 
15 
8 
24 
64 
10 
20 
45 
40 
80 
180 
5; 10 
10; 20 
5;15 
1 : 4 : 8 
0 
5 
10 
4 
24 
44 
10 
100 
180 
20 
200 
300 
20 
5; 10; 20; 40 
10;15; 30 
4 : 8 : 1 
10 
20 
30 
44 
84 
124 
60 
120 
200 
10 
15 
20 
5; 10 
5; 15 
10;20 
4 : 1 : 8 
10 
20 
30 
44 
84 
124 
10 
15 
20 
60 
120 
200 
5; 10; 20 
10; 15 
10;20 
1 : 8 : 4 10 44 300 120 10; 15; 30 
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The described geometrical parameter selection accounts for a large variety of practical cases, yet it is 
noted that buildings of extreme dimensions, such as high-rise buildings are out of scope of the study. 
4.4.3 Explosion venting components 
In section 3.1.3 it has been exposed that the pressure generation of gas explosions in buildings is 
strongly influenced by the characteristics of the venting components. It was explained that these non-
structural elements are intended to fail at a relatively early stage of the pressure development proce-
dure and thereby to provide a pressure relief. Further, in section 3.1.4 it was summarized that several 
of the currently available models to predict the maximum pressure generated in internal gas explosions 
consider the venting effect by two parameters: the static resistance pressure of the venting panels, pstat, 
and the venting coefficient Av/V (Figure 3.3). Both parameters will depend on the geometrical- and me-
chanical properties of the building facades (including windows), floor- and ceiling systems or internal 
partition walls (including doors). 
In order to define a representative set of venting components in residential building structures, pstat will 
be varied between 2 and 7 kN/m2 in order to account for typical failure pressures of windows, doors 
and light partition walls (Table 3.2), values likewise adopted in Schmidt’s study [110]. The venting co-
efficient Av/V will be varied from 0.05 to 0.15 m-1 corresponding to the application limits of the current 
Eurocode load model [17]. According to this model, the here assumed best case scenario (with regard 
to pressure development), characterized by relatively large venting panels of relatively low failure pres-
sure (Av/V = 0.15 m-1 and pstat = 2 kN/m2), will entail a nominal explosion pressure of around pd = 6 
kN/m2. In the worst case scenario, characterized by relatively small panels of relatively high failure 
pressure (Av/V = 0.05 m-1 and pstat = 7 kN/m2), the Eurocode model delivers a nominal design pressure 
of about pd = 23 kN/m2.  
The described best case scenario could be representative of enclosures with light partition walls (plas-
terboards, etc.) and/or facades with a relatively high percentage of ordinary glass windows. On the other 
hand, the assumed worst-case scenario would represent situations where windows of relatively high 
resistance provide venting in enclosures covered with cladding panels capable to sustain the expected 
explosion pressure (including their anchorage to the main structure), such as concrete panels. Available 
experimental studies [114, 175] provide evidence that concrete cladding panels may resist explosion 
pressures significantly higher than the nominal value associated with the here assumed worst-case sce-
nario, pd = 23 kN/m2.  
On the other hand, there are manifold incidents in practice which show that cladding panels often do 
not resist the explosion pressure, in case of which they act as venting components. An example is shown 
in Figure 4.5, where the masonry façade panels were blown out due to the action of the blast. According 
to the indication in Table 3.2, such masonry panels may resist static pressures of up to 15 kN/m2, ap-
proximately, i.e. far larger values than the maximum failure pressure for the venting components 
adopted herein, pstat = 7 kN/m2. However, it should be taken into account that these situations are char-
acterized at the same time by relatively large venting areas Av as manifested in Figure 4.5. It can be 
observed that almost the entire masonry panel, corresponding to the enclosure where the deflagration 
took place, has collapsed, what in addition to the observable failure of internal partition walls and the 
floor system, provided significant pressure relief during the explosion event. For such situations it is 
reasonable to assume venting coefficients Av/V higher, in many cases probably significantly higher, than 
0.1 m-1. According to the Eurocode load model, the described situations (pstat > 7 kN/m2, Av/V > 0.1 m-1) 
are characteristic of explosion pressures exclusively governed by the failure pressure of the venting 
components, pstat (see peak p1 according to Figure 3.2). Assuming the before-mentioned value of pstat = 
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15 kN/m2 as an indicative value for ordinary masonry panels, the Eurocode model delivers a nominal 
explosion pressure of pd = 18 kN/m2, which is covered by the herein assumed worst case scenario with 
an associated nominal value of pd = 23 kN/m2.  
 
Figure 4.5 Explosion-induced damage to a residential, RC building with masonry facade panels [176] 
Taking into account the preceding considerations, it may be assumed that the parameter selection for 
the relevant characteristics of the building venting elements, and thereby of the expected explosion 
loading, covers the majority of potential situations which might exist in practice.  
4.4.4 Main member characteristics 
Boundary conditions 
The RC frames geometrically defined above (section 4.4.2) are constituted by beams and columns. For 
sake of simplicity and since it is a conservative approach with regard to the reliability level, statically 
determinate members will be considered. As previously stated (section 2.4.3), the failure probabilities of 
statically determinate members are generally higher than those of statically indeterminate members 
(with ductile behavior) under identical loading conditions. Taking account of this circumstance and dis-
regarding the fact that the member boundary conditions might influence as well the magnitude of the 
consequences in case of collapse, it can be assumed that the risks to persons associated with statically 
determinate structures are generally higher than those related to comparable, statically indeterminate 
structures. Therefore, the analysis of statically indeterminate structures could lead to an important un-
derestimation of the implicitly acceptable level for structure-related risks.  To this extent, the consider-
ation of structures with statically determinate members is justified. 
Materials and loads  
In order to define a representative set of beams and columns, the material characteristics and loads 
listed in Table 4.2 are selected and varied within the indicated ranges. A brief description of the adopted 
parameters and their corresponding nominal values is given below. 
The study is limited to members of normal strength concrete with characteristic values for the concrete 
compressive strength between fck = 25 and 50 N/mm2. The widely used reinforcing steel type B500 is 
being assumed for purpose of the analysis, with a characteristic value for the yield strength of fyk = 500 
Failure of partition walls 
Failure of floor system 
Failure of masonry panels 
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N/mm2. Class B steel according to [84] implies a characteristic strain at maximum load of uk = 5% and 
a minimum ratio between tensile and yield strength of k = (ft/fy)k = 1.08. 
Table 4.2: Definiton of member parameters and corresponding nominal values  
Parameter Symbol Nominal Values Unity 
Concrete compressive strength fck 25; 35; 50 N/mm2 
Yield strength of longitudinal reinforcement fyk 500 N/mm2 
Yield strength of shear reinforcement fywk 500 N/mm2 
Reinforcing steel strain at maximum force  uk 0.05 - 
Ratio of reinforcing steel tensile strength to yield 
stress  
k = (ft/fy)k 1.08 - 
Material density (reinforced concrete) c 25 kN/m3 
Permanent loads of floor system (excluding self-
weight of the principle beams) 
gf,k 
0.5; 5; 8 if l = 5; 10 m 
kN/m2 4; 9; 13 if l = 15; 20 m 
6; 10; 13 if l = 30; 40 m 
Permanent loads of roof system (excluding self-
weight of the principle beams) 
gr,k 
1.0; 5 if l = 5; 10 m 
kN/m2 1.1; 9 if l = 15; 20 m 
1.2; 10 if l = 30; 40 m 
Imposed loads on building floors (Cat A [82]: Do-
mestic/ Resident. Areas) 
qi,k 2 kN/m2 
Reduction factor for imposed loads on beams A 5 ∙ 𝜓0
7
+ 
𝐴0
𝐴𝑙
 ≤ 1.0 
- 
Reduction factor for imposed loads on columns n 2 + (𝑛 − 2) ∙ 𝜓0
𝑛
 - 
Snow loads on roof qs,k 1.5; 2; 2.5; 3 kN/m2 
Static activation pressure of explosion vents 
(section 4.4.3) 
pstat 2; 5; 7 kN/m2 
Venting coefficient (section 4.4.3) Av/V 0.05; 0.10; 0.15 m-1 
Explosion pressure pd max (3 + 𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡; 3 + 0.5𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 +
0.04
(
𝐴𝑣
𝑉 )
2) kN/m
2 
Note: The values represented in italic are taken into account exclusively for determination of the member reliability level re-
quired by the codes (step 5 of the analysis procedure) whereas the non-italic values are considered as well for the establishment 
of the implicitly accepted risks (step 7) associated with the building structures geometrically defined in Table 4.1 and the sub-
sequent deduction of risk-based acceptance criteria (step 8). This distinction is introduced in order to assure that the total num-
ber of building structures analyzed remains within reasonable limits. 
For determination of the structural member’s self-weight and dynamic mass, a material density of c = 
25 kN/m3 is being accounted for. Permanent loads of floor- or roof system are varied as a function of the 
beam span l (section 4.4.2), distinguishing three categories: small spans (l = 5, 10 m), medium spans (l 
= 15, 20 m) and large spans (l = 30, 40 m). This hypothesis is being adopted since the type, and hence 
the self-weight of the secondary elements constituting the floor or roof system, usually depends on the 
distance these elements span, which, as assumed herein, is frequently defined as a function of the prin-
ciple beam span (l). Three different characteristic values for permanent actions of the floor system (gf,k) 
are considered for each of the three mentioned beam span categories: a minimum value representing 
light floor systems, a maximum value, accounting for heavy systems and an intermediate value for stand-
ard solutions. The self-weight of the non-structural components comprising the roof-system (gr,k) is be-
ing accounted for with two different values representing, respectively, a light- and a heavy solution.  
Based on the assumption of residential building use, a characteristic value of qi,k = 2 kN/m2 is considered 
for uniformly distributed, imposed loads in buildings [82]. For the definition of the beams, this load is 
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reduced by factor A (Table 4.2) in function of the loaded area Al and the combination value 0 for vari-
able actions according to [11]. Complementary, a reduction factor n (Table 4.2) is being applied to qi,k 
if the imposed loads (from the same category) acting on a column stem from n > 2 storeys situated above 
this member and have not been reduced by factors [82].  
In addition to the imposed loads, snow loads on the building’s roof are considered. Four different load 
categories are distinguished taking account of different climatic zones in Spain. In line with previous 
studies [9, 78], the corresponding characteristic values vary from qs,k = 1.5 to 3 kN/m2.  
Finally, the magnitude of the nominal explosion load pd is defined by the Eurocode model (Figure 3.3), 
and parameters pstat and Av/V characterising the venting components of the buildings, according to the 
indications in section 4.4.3.  
4.4.5 Combination of parameters 
The combination of the material- and loading parameters defined in Table 4.2 leads to a representative 
set of 486 RC floor beams with varying span lengths l from 5 to 40 m (section 4.4.2). Moreover, the 
combination of the values given in Table 4.2 yields a representative set of 28512 RC columns, charac-
terized by a constant member height (hc = hs = 4 m) and a varying number of ns = 0 to 30 storeys situated 
above the member in question (section 4.4.2).  
The representative sets of structural members defined as described are employed to determine the re-
liability level implicitly required by the codes for the accidental situation gas explosion. In addition, out 
of these sets a number of members is selected (see subscript in Table 4.2), which constitute the building 
structures geometrically described in Table 4.1, to be employed for the establishment of implicitly ac-
cepted risk profiles (Figure 4.2) and the subsequent derivation of risk-based acceptance criteria. Com-
bining the selected member parameters with the geometrical building parameters, a representative set 
of 4512 building structures is being obtained, constituted by nm = 6 to 40931 RC members and varying 
building net room areas between A = 200 and 990000 m2. 
4.5 Accidental hazard scenarios 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The present section addresses, in accordance with step 4 of the established procedure (section 4.3), the 
identification of the relevant hazard scenarios to the defined structures. Based on the definition of an 
accidental scenario characterized by a building-internal gas explosion (section 4.5.2), this step involves 
identifying the most relevant load arrangements the constitutive structural members defined in section 
4.4 might be subjected to and to establish the corresponding potential failure modes (section 4.5.3). 
Moreover, suitable assumptions have to be met concerning the question under which circumstances, 
and to which extent, a local member failure might induce a structural system failure (section 4.5.4).   
4.5.2 Accidental scenario 
The accidental loading scenario considered in the present study is schematically reflected in Figure 4.6. 
Two subsequent stages can be distinguished: 
Previous to the explosion event, the building structures are subjected to gravitational loads of both per-
manent and variable character, corresponding to the normal use conditions of the buildings (stage 1). 
The gravitational loads are homogenously distributed on the floors (gf+qi) and the roof (gr+qs) of the 
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structure, from where they are transferred to the principle load bearing elements, i.e. beams and col-
umns. The corresponding tributary width for the beams, lG+Q= l/2 and the tributary area for the columns, 
AG+Q= l · l/2 = l2/2, are defined in accordance with the geometrical assumptions exposed in section 4.4.2 
(Figure 4.4).  
 
Figure 4.6 Loading scenario in building structures; Stage 1: Normal use conditions; Stage 2: Explosion 
In stage 2, a gas explosion occurs in a certain zone of the building. The explosion generates a blast over-
pressure pEX(t) which will act simultaneously with the gravitational loads identified in stage 1. Based on 
the considerations in section 3.1.4, a symmetrical pressure pulse (tr=tp/2) is adopted for the pressure-
time relationship characterized by a peak-value, pEX,peak, as shown in Figure 4.7. The magnitude of pEX,peak 
will be exclusively described by the venting parameters pstat and Av/V (section 4.4.3).  
 
Figure 4.7 Explosion pressure - time relationship assumed in the study 
In line with [17], pressure pEX(t) is supposed to act homogenously distributed on the nearest closures 
(floor, ceiling, walls, façade panels, etc.) of the room or compartment where the explosion event occurs. 
These closures are aligned with the axes of the load bearing columns in both directions of the building. 
From the closures, the pressure is transferred to the principle load bearing elements of the structure. 
Due to the locally confined influence zone of the explosion, it is reasonable to assume for this purpose 
smaller tributary widths and areas than those adopted for the gravitational loads (stage 1). For sake of 
simplicity, the tributary width for the explosion pressure transfer from the ceiling- or floor systems to 
the beams below or above, lEX, will be defined as lEX = lG+Q/2 = l/4. Accordingly, the tributary area to 
pEX(t)
tp
pEX,peak
t
tr = tp/2
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determine the explosion-induced axial force in the columns will be defined as AEX = l/2 · l/4 = l2/8. More-
over, it is assumed that a horizontal blast load component ?̃?EX,h will be transferred from the vertical 
closures to the columns situated in the alignments of these closures under an tributary width lEX = l/2.  
4.5.3 Load arrangements and failure modes of members  
Based on the considerations in the preceding section, in the following the most relevant load arrange-
ments and failure modes of the principle structural members will be identified. From section 3.2.3 it can 
be concluded that the relevant failure modes for standard RC elements like beams and columns under 
the influence of gas explosions in building structures are essentially the same which have to be ad-
dressed under persistent, quasi-static loading conditions. In particular, bending- and diagonal shear fail-
ure must be considered, taking account of interactions with axial forces in case of the columns. In har-
mony with the assumption of static determinate members, the analysis of bending-shear interaction will 
be obviated in the present study. 
Beams 
For the beams, the following load arrangements are distinguished (see Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8): 
- Load arrangement pEX(+): The beams supporting the bottom floor system of the enclosure where 
the explosion occurs are subjected to a blast load component p̃EX(t) (stage 2) which adds to the 
previously present gravitational loads, g̃+q̃i (stage 1).  
- Load arrangement pEX(-): The beams supporting the ceiling of the enclosure where the explosion 
occurs are subjected to a blast load component p̃EX(t) (stage 2) which counteracts the previously 
present gravitational loads (stage 1). Since in this case the contribution of the latter to the re-
sulting action effects is favourable, only permanent loads g̃ will be considered (q̃=0). 
 
Figure 4.8 Load arrangements pEX(+) (upper) and pEX(-) (lower) for beams; Stage 1: Normal use conditions, stage 2: 
Explosion 
The first of the two described load arrangements, pEX(+) is considered relevant for failure due to exces-
sive, positive bending (M(+)) at mid-span of the beams. Moreover, situation pEX(+) is critical for shear fail-
ure close to the support cross-section of the beams, where failure of the compression strut (Vc) should 
be distinguished from failure of the tension tie (Vs). In addition to pEX(+), the consideration of load ar-
rangement pEX(-) is only justified in case the static equivalent action effects induced by the explosion 
loading p̃EX equal at least those stemming from the gravitational loads ?̃?. Following this assumption, a 
potential negative bending failure (M(-)) at the mid-span cross section of the beams will be investigated. 
pEX(+)
?̃?EX(t)
pEX(-)
Stage 1 Stage 2
?̃? + ̃I
?̃? + ̃I
?̃??̃?
?̃?EX(t)
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In turn, a shear failure of the beams due to load arrangement pEX(-) is considered to be comparatively 
unlikely and is not being accounted for. As stated before, such a scenario should be analysed under the 
influence of load arrangement pEX(+), where the explosion load is added to the gravitational loads. 
Columns 
The most relevant load arrangement in view of the reliability analysis of the columns is highlighted in 
Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.9 as NEX(-): The columns situated in the alignments of the vertical closures 
confining the compartment where the explosion occurs are subjected to a blast-induced tensile axial 
force component NEX(t) (stage 2) which counteracts the previously acting axial compression force due 
to gravitational loads, NG+Q (stage 1). Moreover, the explosion will induce a horizontal blast load 
component p̃EX(t) on the columns. 
Under the described influences, the mid-span cross section of the columns might be subject to a potential 
bending failure under the presence of axial forces (M-N). The bending moment (M) stems from the 
horizontal, explosion-induced component p̃EX,h(t) and from the eccentrically acting axial force in the 
member (including second order effects). For sake of simplicity, the eccentricity emin (Figure 4.8), which 
accounts for geometric imperfections, will be applied to both axial force components, due to, 
respectively, the gravitational loads NG+Q and the explosion load NEX(t). In order to account for the most 
unfavourable combination of M and N, two axial force combinations are established, leading to, 
respectively, a minimum value (Nmin), which considers exclusively permanent loads,  and a maximum 
value (Nmax).  
In addition to the described bending failure scenario, load arrangement NEX(-) might induce shear failure 
close to the support cross sections of the columns. Again the influence of axial forces on the failure 
mechanism should be accounted for. Thereby, a distinction should be drawn for failure of the 
compression strut (Vc-N) and the tension tie (Vs-N), respectively. For the former, the maximum axial 
compression force level (Nmax) should be accounted for, while the assessment of the latter should be 
conservatively based on the minimum value (Nmin). 
 
Figure 4.9 Load arrangements NEX(+) (left) and NEX(-) (right) on columns; Stage 1: Normal use conditions; Stage 2: 
Explosion  
The columns situated below and above the alignments of the vertical closures confining the 
compartment where the explosion occurs are subjected to an axial force component NEX(t) (stage 2) 
which enhances the compression force level in the member, initially characterized by the gravitational 
loads, NG+Q (stage 1). Assuming again an initial eccentricity emin, this load arrangement, termed NEX(+) 
NEX(t)
NG+Qemin
NG+Q
NG+Qemin
NG+Q
NEX(+)
Stage 1 Stage 2
𝑝EX,h (t)
NEX (t)
NG+Qemin
NG+Q
NG+Qemin
NG+Q
NEX(-)
Stage 1 Stage 2
NEX(t) NEX (t)
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(Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.9), will induce bending moment (including second order term)- axial force 
interaction at mid-span of the members. However, the occurrence of a corresponding failure scenario is 
considered to be comparatively unlikely and will not be accounted for in the present study. This 
appreciation is supported by a performed design check according to which load arrangement NEX(+) is 
not found to be mandatory for any of the studied columns. The mandatory design situation is governed 
either by the persistent load scenario (only gravitational loads), or by the before-introduced accidental 
load arrangement NEX(-) (see also section 4.7.3). 
Finally, it should be stressed that the study does neither account for biaxial bending of the columns, nor 
will bending-shear interaction at the member support be considered. 
Summary 
The most relevant hazard scenarios to be considered in the present study are: 
For the beams: 
- Positive bending failure M(+) at the mid-span cross-section due to load arrangement pEX(+)  
- Negative bending failure M(-) at the mid-span cross-section due to load arrangement pEX(-) 
- Shear failure Vc or Vs close to the support cross-section due to load arrangement pEX(+) 
For the columns: 
- Failure at the mid-span cross-section induced by bending-axial force interaction M-N due to load 
arrangement NEX(-) 
- Failure close to the support cross-section induced by shear-axial force interaction, Vc-N or Vs-N, 
due to load arrangement NEX(-) 
4.5.4 Member failure-induced system collapse 
The foregoing section focuses on member failure scenarios. In addition, a number of simplifying assump-
tions are adopted in the present study to account for the possibility of a partial or total system collapse 
scenario induced by member failure: 
In line with the assumption of statically determinate structural members (section 4.4.4), a beam failure 
is supposed to induce immediate loss of equilibrium of the secondary floor system (secondary beams or 
slabs) to which it provides support. In addition, due to falling debris, the beam collapse will affect the 
area of the floor situated immediately below, without inducing its collapse, however.  
The assumption of statically determinate members implies that the loss of a specific column would give 
rise to the immediate collapse of the columns corresponding to the same alignment in the floors above, 
and necessarily of the floor systems supported by these. On the other hand, as assumed in case of beam 
failure, a column failure will not entail a progressive collapse of the floors below, due to, for instance, 
impact of debris and/or uncontrolled redistribution of loads, as could be observed in the collapsed 
buildings shown in Figure 1.2. 
Moreover, the lack of structural continuity associated with the assumption of statically determinate 
members implies that a member collapse will not entrain and drag down structural elements situated 
in adjacent frames, as reported in explosion-induced structural collapse scenarios of continuous struc-
tural systems [177, 178]. 
Acceptable life safety risks associated with the effects of gas explosions on reinforced concrete structures 
 
104 
4.6 Limit state functions  
4.6.1 Introduction 
Subsequent to their qualitative description, in the present section the hazard scenarios are represented 
in terms of limit state functions (LSF’s) according to step 5 of the established procedure (section 4.3). 
With a few exceptions, these LSF’s are based on the codes employed for member design, i.e. the Spanish 
builing codes (CTE) for basis of design [179] and actions [180], as well as standard EHE [83] for the 
resistance of RC structures (see also section 4.7.1). To a large extend, these codes are compatible with 
the respective Eurocodes [11, 17, 82, 84]. 
The mentioned exceptions are introduced in order to consider in an explicit manner certain aspects, 
which in the mentioned code rules, if at all accounted for, are being addressed in an implicit way. This 
concerns particularly the dynamic effects (inertia forces, energy dissipation and strain rate effects) due 
to the relatively high loading rates gas explosions might entail (section 3.2). The defined LSF’s 
accommodate such effects. The following section 4.6.2 describes the functions established for the beams. 
Subsequently, section 4.6.3 addresses the developments for the columns. 
4.6.2 Beams 
Bending failure at mid-span (M(+) or M(-)) 
The most generic formulation of the limit state corresponding to bending failure at the mid-span cross-
section of the beams is given by equation (4.14), which expresses equilibrium between the applied and 
the resisting bending moment, respectively, ME and MR. 
 MR −ME = 0          (4.14) 
The action effect ME (4.15) can be divided into a static (ME,stat) and a dynamic (ME,dyn) contribution, re-
spectively, due to the gravitational- and the explosive loading on the members. The latter takes account 
of inertia forces and energy dissipation during the structural response to the dynamic load.  
 ME = ME,stat +ME,dyn = ξME,stat ∙ (∓ MG +ψ1 ∙ MQ) + ξME,dyn ∙ MEX   (4.15) 
Where: 
ξME,stat :  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining bending moments due to static actions 
MG :   Bending moment at mid-span due to permanent actions (including member self-weight 
g̃c and permanent loads of the floor system, g̃f, Table 4.2) 
MQ :   Bending moment at mid-span due to variable actions (imposed loads q̃i including reduc-
tion factor A, Table 4.2) 
ψ1 :    Factor for frequent value of a variable action (section 2.3.4) 
ξME,dyn:  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining bending moments due to dynamic actions 
MEX :  Bending moment at mid-span due to explosion load p̃EX 
It should be remarked that equations (4.14) to (4.17) are valid for both positive (M(+)) and negative      
(M(-)) bending failure of the beams (section 4.5.3). In case of the former, the moments due to gravita-
tional loads (MG+MQ) are added to the explosion-induced moment MEX, whereas for the latter moment 
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MG is rested and MQ=0 (Figure 4.8). Coefficient 1 [11] is introduced in the LSF as a simplification to 
account for combination of variable actions in accidental situations.  
The resisting moment MR (4.16) is function of force Fs1 in the tensile reinforcing steel layer As1 (Figure 
4.10), defined under assumption of a bi-linear stress-strain law (4.17). A contribution of the compres-
sion reinforcement (As2) is not considered in case of the beams. Parameters kc and ac define the parab-
ola-rectangle law adopted for concrete under compression [84]. The definition of the material parame-
ters of both steel and concrete take account of the dynamic stress rates induced by gas explosions.  
 MR = ξMR ∙ (Fs1 ∙ d −
kc
ac
∙
Fs1 
2
b ∙ αcc ∙ fc,dyn
)       (4.16) 
Fs1 = (fy,dyn+
(εs1−εy,dyn)
(εu,dyn−εy,dyn)
∙ (ft,dyn − fy,dyn))  ∙ As1             (4.17) 
Where: 
ξMR  :  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining resisting bending moments 
b :   Width of the mid-span cross-section 
d :   Effective depth of the mid-span cross-section 
acc :   Coefficient taking account of long-term effects on the concrete compressive strength 
fc,dyn:   Concrete compressive strength under dynamic loading conditions 
ac:   Integration coefficient for determination of the resulting concrete compressive force Fc 
under assumption of a parabola-rectangle diagram  
kc:  Coefficient for determination of the depth of the resulting concrete compressive force Fc 
under assumption of a parabola-rectangle diagram  
Fs1:   Force resisted by the tensile reinforcement layer 
As1:   Cross-sectional area of the tensile reinforcement layer 
fy,dyn:   Yield strength of reinforcing steel under dynamic loading conditions 
ft,dyn:   Tensile strength of reinforcing steel under dynamic loading conditions 
εy,dyn:   Yield strain of reinforcing steel under dynamic loading conditions 
εu,dyn:   Strain at maximum force of reinforcing steel under dynamic loading conditions 
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Figure 4.10 Rectangular RC cross-section, strain () and stress () distribution and internal forces 
Shear failure at support (Vc or Vs) 
The most generic formulation of the limit state corresponding to shear failure of the beams is given by 
equation (4.18), which expresses equilibrium between the applied- and the resisting shear forces, re-
spectively, VE and VR.  
 VR − VE = 0          (4.18) 
The action effect VE (4.19) can be divided into a static (VE,stat) and a dynamic (VE,dyn) contribution, respec-
tively, due to the gravitational and the explosive loading on the members. The latter should consider the 
fact that dynamic shear forces induced by blast loads might attain significantly higher values than under 
static loading conditions (section 3.2). 
 VE = VE,stat + VE,dyn = ξVE,stat ∙ (VG + ψ1 ∙ VQ) + ξVE,dyn ∙ VEX    (4.19) 
Where: 
ξVE,stat :  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining shear forces due to static actions 
VG:   Shear force at the support cross-section due to permanent actions (including member 
self-weight g̃c and permanent loads of the floor system, g̃f, Table 4.2) 
VQ:   Shear force at the support cross-section due to variable actions (imposed loads q̃i includ-
ing reduction factor A, Table 4.2) 
ξVE,dyn:  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining shear forces due to dynamic actions 
VEX:   Shear force at member support due to explosion load p̃EX 
The shear resistance limited by failure of the compression struts (VR,c) and the tensions tie (VR,s) is de-
fined by means of expressions (4.20) and (4.21), respectively. Although in case of members subject to 
uniformely distributed loads, as supposed herein, resistance VR,s does not need to be  verified at a dis-
tance less than the effective depth of the cross-section from the face of the member support [84], the 
investigations into shear failure in the present study will be generally based on the support cross-sec-
tion. 
It should be noted that expressions (4.20) and (4.21) are based on the assumption of a 90º-angle be-
tween the shear reinforcement and the longitudinal beam axis (and a 45º-anglebetween the concrete 
NR
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compression strut and this axis (. Furthermore it must be stressed that the contribution of the con-
crete to VR,S (by aggregate interlock) is being neglected. 
 VR,c = ξVRc ∙ (bw ∙ d ∙ 0.5 ∙ ηc ∙ fc,dyn)       (4.20) 
 VR,s = ξVRs ∙ (
Asw
s
∙ fyw,dyn ∙ 0.9 ∙ d)       (4.21)  
Where: 
ξVRc :  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining the shear resistance limited by crushing 
of the compression struts 
bw:   Width of support cross-section 
ηc:   Reduction factor for concrete cracked in shear (ηc = 0.6 if fck < 60 N/mm2) 
ξVRs:  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining the shear resistance limited by yielding of 
the shear reinforcement 
Asw
s
:   Cross-sectional area of shear reinforcement per unit length along the longitudinal beam 
axis 
fyw,dyn:  Yield strength of shear reinforcement under dynamic loading conditions. 
4.6.3 Columns 
Failure due to bending-axial force interaction at mid-span (M-N) 
The LSF corresponding to a failure of the intermediate cross-section of the columns is based on the M-
N interaction sequence shown in Figure 4.11 (M normalized for cross-section depth h), induced by load 
arrangement NEX(-) (Figure 4.9). Two sequential M-N paths are distinguished: 
- Path nº1 (blue) describes the M-N interaction due to the initially acting gravitational loads. 
These cause a static axial compression force, NE,stat, which, due to its eccentric action with respect 
to the center of gravity of the cross-section, entails a bending moment ME,stat. 
- Path nº2 (red) represents the behavior during the explosion event, which introduces a dynamic 
axial force component NE,dyn reducing NE,stat to a resulting force NE (4.22). Simultaneously, a dy-
namic moment ME,dyn evolves from the horizontal explosion load p̃EX,h (Figure 4.9), on one hand, 
and the eccentric action of the axial force on the other, increasing the initial moment ME,stat to a 
resulting value ME.  
NE = NE,stat − NE,dyn           (4.22) 
ME = ME,stat +ME,dyn           (4.23) 
The limit state corresponding to the described M-N sequence is reached if the point characterizing the 
resulting action effects (ME, NE) falls on the M-N interaction diagram, and hence the safety margin (SM) 
is reduced to zero (Figure 4.11). Formally, this limit state can be expressed, in its most general terms, 
by simultaneous fulfilling of the following two equations: 
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 NR −  NE = 0          (4.24) 
 MR −  ME = 0          (4.25) 
Taking account of the fact that the reliability of RC elements subjected to M-N interaction is load-path 
dependent (Figure 2.18), a more problem-specific definition of the LSF can be formulated based on di-
rection of path nº2, which describes the structural response during the explosion. Assuming this path 
to be reasonably well represented by a linear function, the limit state can be expressed as follows:  
[(
MR,dyn
h
)2 + NR,dyn
2]
0.5
− [(
ME,dyn
h
)2 + NE,dyn
2]
0.5
= 0    (4.26) 
Where : 
ME,dyn: Bending moment due to dynamic actions (explosion loading) 
NE,dyn:  Axial force due to dynamic actions (explosion loading) 
MR,dyn:  Resisting bending moment available to sustain dynamic actions  
NR,dyn:  Resisting axial force available to sustain dynamic actions 
h :   Depth of the mid-span cross-section 
The available resisting bending moment and axial force to face the explosion-induced, dynamic action 
effects, respectively, MR,dyn and NR,dyn, can be substituted by the difference between the total resistance, 
MR and NR, and the initially acting, static action effects, ME,stat and NE,stat: 
 [(
MR−ME,stat
h
)2 + (NR − NE,stat)
2]
0.5
− [(
ME,dyn
h
)2 + NE,dyn
2]
0.5
= 0   (4.27) 
 
Figure 4.11 Sequential exposure of column mid-span cross-section to M-N interaction (left) and corresponding 
deformed member shape (right); Path 1 (blue): Static loading stage; Path 2 (red): Dynamic loading stage 
The initially, prior to the explosion event, present action effects, stemming from the gravitational loads 
are defined by equations (4.28) and (4.29). The bending moment MEstat is composed by a first and a 
second order term, respectively, ME,stat,I (4.30) and ME,stat,II (4.31). The former arises due to the initial 
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eccentricity emin [83], given by (4.32), whereas the latter is a consequence of the member deflection at 
the intermediate cross-section due to the gravitational actions, stat (Figure 4.11). This deflection takes 
account of concrete creep-effects.  
 NE,stat = ξNE,stat ∙ (NG + ψ1 ∙ NQ1 + ψ2 ∙ NQ2)      (4.28) 
 ME,stat = ME,stat,I +ME,stat,II         (4.29) 
 ME,stat,I = NE,stat ∙ emin        (4.30) 
 ME,stat,II = NE,stat ∙ δstat        (4.31) 
 emin = max (
h
20
; 2 cm)         (4.32) 
Where: 
ξNE,stat :  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining axial forces due to static actions 
NG:   Axial force due to permanent actions (including self-weight of principle beams and col-
umns supported by the column in question as well as permanent loads of the floor and 
roof system, respectively, gf and gr, Table 4.2) 
NQ1:  Axial force due to the leading variable action (imposed loads qi including reduction factor 
A or snow load qs, Table 4.2) 
NQ2:   Axial force due to the accompanying variable action (imposed loads qi including reduc-
tion factor A or snow load qs, Table 4.2) 
ψ1, ψ2:  Load combination coefficients for accidental design situations (section 2.3.4) 
emin :  Minimum eccentricity (Figure 4.11). 
δstat :  Deflection at the intermediate cross-section due to static actions (Figure 4.11). 
The action effects due to the explosion-induced, dynamic loading on the members, which take account 
of inertia forces and energy dissipation during the short-term load exposure of the members, are given 
by the expressions established below, respectively for the axial force (4.33) and the bending moment 
(4.34). Again, the resulting bending moment is composed by a first order (4.35) and a second order term 
(4.36). The first order terms MEX and MNEX  stem from the horizontal load p̃EX,h and from the eccentrically 
applied axial force NEX, respectively (Figure 4.11), whereas the second order term arises due to the com-
bined action of the resulting axial force NE and the resulting deflection  at the intermediate cross-
section, reduced by the initial term caused by the gravitational actions (NE,stat ∙ stat). 
NE,dyn = ξNE,dyn ∙ NEX = ξNE,dyn ∙ NEX       (4.33) 
ME,dyn = ME,dyn,I +ME,dyn,II        (4.34) 
ME,dyn,I = ξME,dyn ∙ (MEX − MNEX)       (4.35) 
ME,dyn,II = NE ∙ δ − NE,stat ∙ δstat        (4.36) 
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Where: 
ξNE,dyn:  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining axial forces due to dynamic actions 
NEX:  Axial force due to the explosion pressure  
ξME,dyn: Model uncertainty coefficient for determining bending moments due to dynamic actions 
MEX: Bending moment at the intermediate cross-section due to horizontal explosion load p̃EX,h 
MNEX: Bending moment at the intermediate cross-section due axial force NEX 
NE:  Resulting axial force (4.22) 
δ:   Resulting deflection at mid-span of the column (Figure 4.11). 
The member resistance (MR, NR) depends on the geometrical- and material characteristics of the sym-
metrically reinforced concrete cross sections (As/2 = As1 = As2, Figure 4.10), as expressed by (4.37) and 
(4.38). It should be noted that reinforcement layers As1 and As2 will be referred to as the tensile- and the 
compression reinforcement layer, respectively, although depending on the considered case, As1 might 
as well be under compressive stress exposure and/or As2 under tensile stress.  
NR = ξNR ∙ (Fc − Fs1 + Fs2)         (4.37) 
MR = ξMR ∙ (MFc +MFs1 +MFs2)         (4.38) 
Where : 
ξNR:   Model uncertainty coefficient for determining resisting axial forces  
Fc:   Internal force resisted by concrete in compression 
Fs1,2:   Internal forces resisted by the reinforcement layers As1 and As2 
ξMR:   Model uncertainty coefficient for determining resisting bending moments  
MFc:   Internal moment resisted by concrete in compression 
MFs1,2:   Internal moments resisted by the reinforcement layers As1 and As2 
The resisting internal forces and moments, referred to the center of gravity of the mid-span cross-sec-
tion, are given by equations (4.39) to (4.44) below: 
Fc = ac ∙ x ∙ b ∙  αcc  ∙  fc,dyn        (4.39) 
Fs1,2 = εs1,2 ∙ Es ∙ As1,2                                                                                   if    εs1,2  <  εsy  (4.40) 
Fs1,2 = (fy,1,2,dyn+
(εs,1,2−εy,dyn)
(εu,dyn−εy,dyn)
∙ (ft,1,2,dyn − fy,1,2,dyn))  ∙ As1,2       if    εs1,2  ≥  εsy  (4.41) 
MFc = Fc ∙ (
h
2
− kc ∙ x)         (4.42) 
MFs1,2 = Fs1,2 ∙ (d −
h
2
)        (4.43) 
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x =
(εs2−εs1)∙d+εs1∙h
εs1+εs2
         (4.44) 
Where: 
x:  Neutral axis depth 
εs1,2:   Strain in the tensile (s1) and compression (s2) reinforcement layers  
As1,2:   Cross-sectional area of the tensile (As1) and compression(As2) reinforcement layers  
Es:   Modulus of elasticity of reinforcing steel  
fy1,2,dyn:  Yield strength of steel in tensile (fy1,dyn) and compression (fy2,dyn) reinforcement layers 
under dynamic loading conditions 
ft1,2,dyn:  Tensile strength of steel in tensile (ft1,dyn) and compression (ft2,dyn) reinforcement layers 
under dynamic loading conditions 
εy1,2,dyn:  Yield strain in the tensile (y1,dyn) and compression (y2,dyn) reinforcement layers under 
dynamic loading conditions 
εu1,2,dyn:  Strain at maximum force in the tensile (u1,dyn) and compression (u2,dyn) reinforcement 
layers under dynamic loading conditions 
The resistance (MR, NR) may be limited by exceedance of the ultimate curvature (u) of the intermediate 
cross-section, or by member buckling. In general terms, the former failure mode is representative for 
smaller axial loads and/or insignifcant slenderness ratios  whereas members characterized by larger 
and/or axial forces are generally prone to buckling. In the present study, the difficulty arises from the 
fact that the axial force level NE in the columns is variable due to the dynamic contribution NE,dyn (4.33). 
Moreover, as stated before, simultaneously to the decrease in axial force, the explosion induces an in-
crease of the bending moment in the members and thereby of the member deflection. Consequently, 
buckling of the columns might only ocurr if this increase is relatively high in relation to the decrease in 
axial force. On the contrary, second order effects will be insignificant and failure will not arise until u 
will be reached in the critical (intermediate) cross section, coincident with the ultimate moment resisted 
by this cross-section (MR,u). In advance, the corresponding limit states will be termed buckling limit state 
(BLS) and ultimate moment limit state (UMLS), respectively (Figure 4.12). 
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Figure 4.12 Differentiation of buckling limit state (BLS) and ultimate moment limit state (UMLS) in M-N (left) 
and M- (right) representation  
It should be noticed that buckling necessarily entails a cross-section failure as well, i.e. u in the critical 
cross-section will be necessarily exceeded when the column buckles and in that sense the distinction 
between the BLS and UMLS does not seem to be straightforward. However, in a buckling-critical mem-
ber an unstable equilibrium situation arises before u will be attained in the critical cross-section, at a 
point, where any additional curvature increase, no matter how small, triggers an uncontrolled and irre-
versible collapse mechanism of the member [181]. This point corresponds to the initation of yielding of 
the reinforcement at the critical cross-section (Figure 4.12, right). Assuming a certain curvature distri-
bution along the member, the corresponding yield eccentricity ey (including first and second order 
terms) can be inferred from the yield curvature y of the critical cross-section. The BLS will be attained 
when upon reaching y the function representing the applied bending moment, ME(, NE), is tangent to 
the resisting moment MR(NE = NR,y). On the contrary, buckling will not occurr at y. Instead, the plastic 
response stage will be entered and the limit state (UMLS) will not be attained before ME(NE), = 
MR(NE = NR,u)  at u. Consequently, in the UMLS, energy dissipation due to plastic deformations can be 
accounted for in the analysis, whereas this cannot be done in case of the BLS. 
Failure due to shear-axial force interaction at support (Vc –N or Vs-N) 
Regarding a potential shear failure of the support cross-section of the columns, the general limit state 
equation formulated for the beams (4.18) applies (VR –VE = 0).  
Action effect VE can be exclusively attributed to the horizontal explosion load p̃EX,h on the columns (Fig-
ure 4.9) where account is taken of dynamic effects due to the short load duration. 
 VE = VE,dyn = ξVE,dyn ∙ VEX        (4.45) 
Where: 
ξVE,dyn:  Model uncertainty coefficient for determining the shear forces due to dynamic actions 
VEX:   Shear force at column support due to the horizontal explosion load p̃EX,h 
The formulations of the shear resistance of the column’s support cross-section (assuming  90º and  
= 45º) under influence of the axial force level in the members are given by (4.46) and (4.48). For the 
uy
M(NE = NR,y)
M(NE = NR,u)
M

ME = MR
M
N
ME = MR
(MR – NR)y
(MR – NR)u
NE = NR,y
NE = NR,u
M(NE)
M(NE)
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resistance of the compression struts VR,c, this influence will be accounted for by reduction coefficient K 
(4.47), according to [83], which takes account of the stress state in the compression chord.  
 VR,c = ξVRc ∙ (K ∙ bw ∙ d ∙ 0.5 ∙ ηc ∙ fc,dyn)      (4.46) 
 K = min (
5
3
∙ (1 −
σc
fc,stat
) ; 1.0)        (4.47) 
Where: 
K:  Reduction coefficient taking account of the stress state in the compression chord 
σc:   Axial stress state in the concrete cross-section (c > 0 for compression) taking account 
of the force resisted by the longitudinal reinforcement. 
fc,stat:   Concrete compressive strength under static loading conditions 
The shear resistance of the tension tie, VR,s (4.48), is composed by two terms, respectively, the contribu-
tion of the shear reinforcement, Vsu, and the contribution of the concrete in compression, Vcu. It should 
be noted that Vcu might adopt negative values, i.e. act unfavorably, in case the resulting axial force NE 
(4.22) is a tensile force what will be the case if the explosion-induced axial force component NE,dyn (4.33) 
exceeds the previously acting compression force in the columns, NE,stat (4.28), due to the gravitational 
actions. As assumed for the beams, the concrete contribution due to aggregate interlock is being ne-
glected in the formulation of VR,s. 
 VR,s = ξVRs ∙ (Vsu + Vcu) = ξVRs ∙ (
Asw
s
∙ fyw,dyn ∙ 0.9 ∙ d + 0.15 ∙ σc ∙ bw ∙ d ∙ βc) (4.48)  
Where: 
Vsu:   Contribution of the shear reinforcement to shear resistance VR,s 
Vcu:   Contribution of concrete in compression to shear resistance VR,s  
βc:   Coefficient taking account of shear crack inclination E. If E = , as assumed 
herein,c
4.7 Strict design 
4.7.1 Introduction 
In section 4.4 a representative set of RC members has been defined by selecting, within reasonable 
ranges, the nominal values for the most relevant member design parameters (Table 4.2). Once 
established the accidental hazard scenarios these members might be subjected to (section 4.5), and 
represented these scenarios in terms of LSFs (section 4.6), the present section addresses the structural 
design of the relevant member cross-sections. The design is based on the semi-probabilistic safety 
format (section 2.3.2) where partial safety factors are employed along with the representative values 
specified in Table 4.2 to deduce the design values for both action effects (Ed) and resistance (Rd). 
Inasmuch as conservative design has a significant effect on the reliability level, it should be performed 
strictly (Ed = Rd) so the structural members comply exactly with the structural safety requirements laid 
down in the consistent set of codes employed (section 4.1.2). The detailed design procedure and 
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assumptions are presented in section 4.7.2, followed by a summary of the results obtained (section 
4.7.3). 
As stated before in section 4.6.1, the Spanish building codes [179], [180] and standard EHE [83] on, 
respectively, basis of design, actions and resistance of structures are used in the present study. It must 
be stated that by now the mentioned set of codes has been replaced by updated versions [71, 72, 182]. 
In this context it is important to highlight that gas explosions are not explicitly dealt with in the current 
version of the national standard for actions on structures [182]. Only a brief statement is made on the 
need to specify, « in the design project of buildings used as chemical plants, laboratories or for storage 
of explosive materials, the accidental actions to be considered along with the characteristic value and 
the corresponding model ». No further guidance is given, nor is any specific indication made concerning 
gas explosions in residential buildings. In the light of the hazard potential such incidents might entail 
(section 1.1.3), this is considered a deficiency in the current national legislation. In any case this 
observation justifies the adoption of draft [180] for purpose of the present study, which regarding 
actions in general, and accidental actions in particular, is equivalent to the respective Eurocodes [17, 
82]. Also the herein employed CTE code-draft [179] and standard EHE-98 [83] are, to a large extend, 
compatible with the respective Eurocodes on, respectively, basis of design [11] and design of RC 
structures [84]. In section 4.7.4, the main differences between the codes used in the present study and 
the corresponding standards in force (national standards and Eurocodes) are described.  
4.7.2 Design procedure and assumptions 
A design procedure has been established consisting essentially of three steps: 
- Based on the hazard scenarios identified in section 4.5 and the corresponding LSFs defined in 
section 4.6, the intermediate and support cross-sections of the selected members are designed 
for the accidental design situation (section 2.3.4). 
- Where relevant, the next step involves a design of the same cross-sections according to the 
persistent situations, which refer to conditions of normal use. The corresponding hazard 
scenarios and design assumptions are adopted from prior studies [78, 99]. 
- Where relevant, a design check (Figure 4.1) is carried out to identify the mandatory design 
situation, i.e. the situation which fits the cross-section in question with the largest resistance. 
Beams - Bending failure at mid-span (M(+) or M(-)) 
The design of the mid-span cross-section of the beams will be based on the limit state function for bend-
ing (4.14). For a given design bending moment MEd, given characteristic material strengths (fck and fyk), 
cross-section dimensions (b and h) and concrete cover (d1), the strict design should deliver the required 
amount of longitudinal (tensile) reinforcement. When positive bending (M(+)) is concerned, this amount 
should result from a comparison of the accidental- (load arrangement pEX(+)) and the persistent design 
situation, respectively, As1,req,acc and As1,req,per: 
 Πd,req = max (As1,req,acc; As1,req,per)       (4.49)  
The mid-span cross-section width will be defined as b = max(0.2 m; h/2), with an initially fixed miminum 
depth hmin a function of the beam-span l: hmin = l/15. For the established cross-sectional dimensions the 
design parameter As1,req,acc will then be determined, such that MRd, based on (4.16) will equal MEd,acc. This 
is being followed by a verification of the cross-sectional ductility according to (4.50). In case this 
requirement is not met, depth h will be successively increased (in steps of h = 5 %) and As1,req,acc 
determined again until the cross-section ductility is verified. Finally, the required reinforcement due to 
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the persistent design situation, As1,req,per, will be obtained such that MRd = MEd,per, under assumption of the 
cross-sectional dimensions laid down for determination of As1,req,acc.  
 
x
d
≤ 0.4           (4.50)  
The previously fixed cross-sectional dimensions are subsequently employed for design of the mid-span 
cross-section subjected to negative bending (M(-)). Since under the assumptions met such a failure can-
not be triggered by the persistent load scenario, the required amount of the tensile reinforcement will 
be directly deduced from the accidental design situation (load-arrangement pEX(-)): 
 Πd,req = As1,req,acc         (4.51)  
It should be recalled that the design for M(-) makes only sense for members exposed to a design-explo-
sion load which exceeds the opposed, gravitational design loads (Figure 4.8).   
Beams - Shear failure at support (Vc or Vs) 
The design of the support cross-section of the beams will be based on the limit state function for shear 
(4.18). For a given design shear force VEd, a given characteristic concrete compressive strength (fck), 
cross-section depth (h) and concrete cover (d1), the strict design should deliver the required width of 
the support cross-section bw in order to assure the resistance of the compression strut, VRd,c (4.20). This 
width should result from a comparison of the accidental (load-arrangement pEX(+)) and the persistent 
design  situation, respectively, bw,req,acc and bw,req,per: 
 Πd,req = max (bw,req,acc; bw,req,per)       (4.52)  
Depth h of the support-cross-section will be adopted from the design of the mid-span cross-section. The 
required widths bw,req,acc and bw,req,per will then be determined in compliance with the design limit state 
conditions VRd,c = VEd,acc and VRd,c = VEd,per, respectively. 
Moreover, the support cross-section of the beams should be designed in order to garantize the re-
sistance of the tension tie, VRd,s (4.21). Therefore, for a given design shear force VEd, a given characteristic 
yield strength of the shear reinforcement (fywk), cross-section depth (h) and concrete cover (d1), the 
strict design should deliver the required amount of transverse reinforcement per unit length (Asw/s). 
Again, this amount should result from a comparison of the accidental- (load arrangement pEX(+)) and the 
persistent  situation, respectively, (Asw/s)req,acc and (Asw/s)req,per: 
 Πd,req = max [(Asw/s)req,acc; (Asw/s)req,per]      (4.53)  
The required amounts of shear reinforcement (Asw/s)req,acc and (Asw/s)req,per will be determined in com-
pliance with the design limit state conditions VRd,s = VEd,acc and VRd,s = VEd,per. 
Columns - Failure due to bending-axial force interaction at mid-span (M-N) 
The design of the intermediate cross-section of the columns will be based on the general limit state 
functions for bending-axial force interaction (4.24, 4.25). For a given pair of design axial force NEd and 
bending moment MEd (including second order effects), given characteristic material strengths (fck and 
fyk), cross-section dimensions (b and h) and concrete cover (d1), the strict design should deliver the re-
quired amount of longitudinal reinforcement, As,req (As,req = 2∙As1,req = 2∙As2,req). Also in this case, As,req 
should result from a comparison of the accidental (load arrangement NEX(-)) and the persistent design 
situation, respectively, As,req,acc and As,req,per: 
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 Πd,req = max (As,req,acc; As,req,per)       (4.54)  
The initial, quadratic cross-sectional dimensions of the columns will be defined as a function of the axial 
compression force level due to the gravitational loads, NG+Q (Figure 4.9), where a minimum value of bmin 
= hmin = 0.2 m will be respected. Under addition of the explosion-induced action effects, which will prin-
cipally cause a simultaneous decrease of N and increase of M (Figure 4.11), As,req,acc should be determined 
such that the resulting pair (MEd, NEd)acc falls exactly on the M-N interaction-diagram defined according 
to the accidental design situation. In case the corresponding failure point falls within the tensile failure 
domain (Figure 2.17), characterized by yielding of the tensile reinforcement As1, ductility requirement 
(4.50) is to be checked. If not fulfilled, the cross-section depth h is to be increased (in steps of h = 5 %) 
followed by a new determination of As,req,acc. This procedure is being repeated until (4.50) is fulfilled. For 
compression failure, the ductility requirement can be ignored. Finally, the required amount of reinforce-
ment due to the persistent design situation, As,req,per, will be obtained under assumption of the cross-
sectional dimensions laid down for determination of As1,acc.  
Under the assumption that member deflection under exclusively vertical loads can be neglected, second 
order effects have been ignored in design for the persistent design situation. In the accidental design 
situation, however, such effects might be important and should consequently be considered. For this 
purpose, the bending moment MEd,acc (4.55) is determined for a nominal eccentricity etot [83], based on 
developments in [181]. Eccentricity etot, represented in the left part of Figure 4.13, is defined as a func-
tion of the first order eccentricity eI, the second order eccentricity eII and coefficient The latter is 
defined as the ratio between the design values for the ultimate- and the yield moment ( = MRd,u / MRd,y) 
and introduced to convert the yield eccentricity to the ultimate eccentricity, enabling thereby an ordi-
nary cross-sectional design according to the UMLS (section 4.6.3) under use of the corresponding strain 
limits provided by the design code [83], shown in the right part of Figure 4.13. The determination of  
is based on an approximate design formula given in the mentioned code.  
 
Figure 4.13 Eccentricity (e) – curvature () relationship (without creep-induced term) assumed in member 
design for accidental design situation (left); Strain limits for ultimate limit state design according to [83] (right) 
The first order eccentricity eI (4.56) takes account of the minimum eccentricity emin and the moment MEX 
due to the horizontal explosion load on the columns (Figure 4.9). Second order effects are considered 
by eccentricity eII (4.57) as a function of the effective column length l0, constant c depending on the cur-
vature distribution along the member and nominal curvature tot. For constant c, standard [83] suggests 
u
e = eI + · l0
2/ c

e
y
eI
eI + eII
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a value of c = 10 corresponding to a sinusoidal curvature distribution. The nominal curvature tot is con-
stituted by the yield curvature due to loads of short durations, y, and a concrete creep-induced term, 
cc. It should be observed that the determination of y is not straightforward since it depends on the, a 
priori unknown, required amount of longitudinal reinforcement As,req in the cross-section. Hence, unless 
simplified design formulations are employed, y (and As,req) can only be determined in an iterative design 
procedure, such as proposed in the Model Code [130]. Similar to the method based on nominal curvature 
proposed by the Eurocodes [84], the herein used design code [83] suggests approximate design formu-
lations for the determination of y. In many cases, the use of such approximate design formulas will 
result in conservative design solutions. However, the design might nevertheless be termed as strict since 
it delivers the strictly required amount of reinforcement according to the code rules employed. 
 MEd,acc = NEd,acc ∙ etot = NEd,acc ∙ Ψ(eI + eII)     (4.55)  
 eI = emin +
MEX,d
NEd,acc
         (4.56) 
 eII = 
l0
2 
c
∙ χtot          (4.57) 
 χtot = χy + χcc          (4.58) 
Columns - Failure due to shear-axial force interaction at support (Vc –N or Vs-N) 
The design of the support cross-section of the columns will be based on the limit state functions for 
shear-axial force interaction. For a given pair of design axial force NEd and shear force VEd, based on 
(4.45), given characteristic material strengths (fck and fyk), cross-section depth (h), concrete cover (d1) 
and cross-sectional area of the longitudinal reinforcement (As), the strict design should deliver the re-
quired width of the support cross-section bw in order to assure an adequate resistance of the compres-
sion strut, VRd,c (4.46). Since, according to the assumptions met, the persistent load scenario involves 
exclusively gravitational actions, which, according to the assumptions met, do not contribute to the 
probability of column shear failure, the design of width bw is only required for the accidental situation 
(load arrangement NEX(-)): 
 Πd,req = bw,req,acc         (4.59)  
The depth h of the support-cross-section, as well as the amount of longitudinal reinforcement As, will be 
adopted from the design of the mid-span cross-section. The required width bw,req, will then be deter-
mined in compliance with the design limit state condition VRd,c = VEd,acc. 
The strict design of the tension tie should be carried out in a way that for a given pair of design axial 
force NEd and shear force VEd, given characteristic material strengths (fck, fyk and fywk), cross-section di-
mensions (bw and h), concrete cover (d1) and cross-sectional area of the longitudinal reinforcement (As), 
the required amount of transverse reinforcement per unit length (Asw/s) is being provided. As explained 
before, column design for shear is only required for the accidental situation (load arrangement NEX(-)): 
 Πd,req = Asw,req,acc         (4.60)  
Besides from cross-section depth h, width bw will be adopted from the previous design of the compres-
sion strut. The required amount of shear reinforcement (Asw/s)req,acc will then be determined in compli-
ance with the design limit state condition VRd,s = VEd,acc, where VRd,s is based on equation (4.48). It should 
be observed that, for high axial compression forces NEd, the contribution of the concrete (Vcu) to the shear 
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resistance might suffice to resist the action effect VEd,acc without any need for a shear reinforcement. In 
this case, a strict design of the support cross-section is still possible if the longitudinal reinforcement As 
is being increased ensuring the axial stress state in the concrete cross-section c, and consequently Vcu, 
to diminsh, and, at the same time, the required shear reinforcement (Asw/s)req,acc to increase. Hence for 
these cases, As is being gradually enhanced until the first of the following two events occurs: (Asw/s)req,acc 
equals the minimum shear reinforcement according to [83], given by (4.61), or the concrete contribu-
tion to the shear resistance becomes negligibly small (Vcu ≅ 0). 
 (
Asw
s
)
min
=
0.02∙fcd∙bw
fyd
         (4.61)  
4.7.3 Results 
Mandatory design situations and influencing variables 
Table 4.3 identifies the mandatory design situations for the structural members designed according to 
the procedure outlined in the previous section. Concerning positive bending failure (M(+)), the strict de-
sign leads to 213, out of the initially defined 486 beams, governed by the accidental design situation, 
whereas in 273 cases the persistent design situation is mandatory. Unsurprisingly, the same proportion 
(213/273) is obtained for the design of the compression strut (Vc) and the tensile tie (Vs) at the support 
cross-section of the beams. A strict design for negative bending moments (M(-)), relevant only for the 
accidental design situation, is possible in only 136 out of the 486 beams, since for the remaining 350 
members the design moment due to gravitational loads exceeds the value due to the explosion, acting 
in the opposed sense (Figure 4.8). 
The design for M-N interaction at the mid-span cross-section of the columns concludes with 4755 out of 
28512 members governed by the accidental design situation and 23757 members where the persistent 
design situation is mandatory. As mentioned before, column design for shear (Vc-N, Vs-N) is only re-
quired for the accidental design situation. 
Table 4.3: Identification of mandatory design situation 
Element Cross-sec-
tion 
Failure 
mode 
Design- pa-
rameter d 
Mandatory design situation Total 
Accidental Persistent 
Beams 
Mid-span M(+) As1 213 273 486 
M(-) As2 136 - 136/486* 
Support Vc bw 213 273 486 
Vs Asw 213 273 486 
Columns 
Mid-span M-N As 4755 23757 28512 
Support Vc-N bw 28512 - 28512 
Vs-N Asw 28512 - 28512 
             * The design for negative bending (M(-)) is possible in only 136 out of 486 initially defined beams 
In the following, it will be analysed in more detail under which circumstances the design of the members 
is likely to be governed by the accidental design situation. In Figure 4.14 it can be observed that the 
variable with greatest effect on design of the beams is the explosion-venting coefficient Av/V (section 
4.4.3). As could be expected, the design of members situated in compartments characterized by small 
Av/V ratios, and hence by large explosion loads, is more prone to be governed by the accidental situation 
than if Av/V is large: 72% out of the 213 beams where this situation is mandatory are characterized by 
small Av/V ratios of 0.05, whereas the share reduces to 13% if Av/V = 0.15. The contrary effect is ob-
served for the gravitational loads. In 51% of the 213 beams, the permanent loads on the floor system gf,k 
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(Table 4.2) are low, whereas 21% of the members are subjected to high permanent load levels. It is 
further shown that the beam design is more likely to be determined by the accidental situation if span l 
is relatively small what can be mainly attributed to the established relation between l and the permanent 
load levels supported by the members (section 4.4.4).  
 
Figure 4.14 Percentages (corresponding to the most influent design variables) out of 213 RC beams strictly 
designed according to the accidental design situation. 
Summarizing the foregoing it can be concluded that the relation between the magnitude of the explo-
sion- and the gravitational loads on the beams is of utmost importance for member design and, most 
probably, for the member reliability level. In order to quantify this relation, parameter acc will be intro-
duced (4.62), defined as the ratio between the nominal explosion load p̃d and the total nominal load 
supported by the beams: 
   νacc =
p̃d
g̃c,k+g̃f,k+ψ1∙q̃i,k+p̃d
        (4.62)  
Varying, within the chosen limits indicated in Table 4.2, the explosion load-controlling parameters Av/V 
and pstat, on one hand, and the permanent loads gf,k, on the other, a wide range of ratios acc is covered. 
For the 213 beams strictly designed according to the accidental design situation (under load arrangment 
pEX(+)), acc varies between 0.38 and 0.86, with a mean of 0.57 (Table 4.4). For smaller acc ratios it be-
comes more likely that the design will be governed by the persistent design situation. For the 273 beams 
designed in that way, the acc ratios vary between 0.14 and 0.45, with a mean of 0.29. Thus a transition 
zone between acc = 0.38 and acc = 0.45 is being identified where, a priori, no conclusion on the manda-
tory design situation of the beams can be drawn. 
Table 4.4: Explosion load parameter acc for beams (load arrangement pEX(+))  
acc Mandatory design situation 
Persistent Accidental 
Min 0.14 0.38 
Mean value 0.29 0.57 
Max 0.45 0.86 
 
Figure 4.15 identifies the shares corresponding to different design variables out of the 4755 RC columns 
(Table 4.3) strictly designed for failure mode M-N, according to the accidental load-arrangement NEX(-). 
It can be observed that design of the columns is significantly influenced by the distance between the 
columns in the longitudinal sense of the building, l (Figure 4.4). It is shown that the accidental situation 
is likely to become mandatory for design if distance l is relatively small: In 87% of the 4755 columns, 
distance l equals 5 or 10 m, whereas in only 1 % of these members l corresponds to a length of 30 or 40 
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m. Moreover it can be drawn from Figure 4.15 that columns supporting a relatively small number of 
storeys (ns) are more prone to be governed by the accidental design situation than if ns is relatively large: 
49% of the 4755 columns do support the weight of less or equal to ns = 1 storey, whereas in only 3% of 
these members the number of storeys situated above is equal or larger than ns = 20. Other parameters 
of significant influence on column design are the permanent loads of the floor system, gf,k, and the venting 
coefficient Av/V of the compartments where the columns are being situated. Less influent, although of 
more importance than in case of the beams, is the nominal concrete compressive strength fck. A higher 
concrete strength implies comparatively smaller cross-section dimensions and hence a higher member 
slenderness, what makes the member more prone to be affected by second order effects triggered 
through the explosion-induced member deflection. 
 
Figure 4.15 Percentages (corresponding to most influent design variables) out of 4755 RC columns strictly 
designed according to accidental situation for M-N interaction. 
The significant influence of parameters l, ns and also gf,k on the design of the columns can be principally 
traced back to the axial force level supported by the members. Generally, the higher the number of sto-
reys situated above the column (ns), or the higher the permanent loads of the floor system (gf,k), the 
larger is the compression force in the members due to gravitational loads, NG+Q. Larger distances l do 
not only imply larger levels of permanent loads, gf,k (section 4.4.4), but also larger cross-section dimen-
sions, and consequently, a larger self-weight of the load-bearing structure. Thus, the larger l, the higher 
is the compression force in the columns due to gravitational loads, NG+Q.  
It seems self-explanatory that higher levels of NG+Q will enhance the likelihood that the column design 
for M-N interaction should comply with the rules of the persistent situation rather than the accidental. 
What should be highlighted here is that distance l significantly influences this likelihood not only due to 
its impact on the gravitational load level. Besides from this influence, l has a significant impact on the 
relation between the explosion-induced bending moment MEX, due to the horizontal explosion load p̃EX,h, 
and the axial force NEX due to the explosion pressure acting on floor and ceilings of the compartment 
(Figure 4.9). In consequence of the defined tributary widths and areas in section 4.5.2 (lEX and AEX), the 
larger distance l, the higher is the axial tensile force component NEX in relation to moment MEX. This, in 
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turn, has significant consequences for member design, as is being conceptually shown in the left part of 
Figure 4.16, where three cases are being distinguished, characterized by different levels of design bend-
ing moment MEd and, for sake of simplicity, a constant design axial force NEd: Case nº 1 represents small 
values for l and hence a relatively large explosion-induced increase of the bending moment in relation 
to the decrease of the axial force, i.e. a comparatively high ratio MEX/NEX. The corresponding design point 
(MEd,acc,1, NEd,acc) is situated on the M-N diagram representing the required resistance according to the 
accidental situation, termed Rd,acc,1. In case nº 2, the value of distance l is supposed to be higher than in 
the previous case. Consequently, ratio MEX/NEX decreases and so does the required resistance: Rd,acc,2 < 
Rd,acc,1. Necessarily, the likelihood that the accidental design situation governs the member layout dimin-
ishes as well. In case nº 3, where l is again increased, ratio MEX,d/NEX,d is even smaller and the corre-
sponding design point (MEd,acc,3, NEd,acc) calls for a required resistance Rd,acc,3,req which is not even suffi-
cient to face the, prior to the explosion event, present gravitational actions (G+Q). Hence, in this case the 
persistent design situation would be mandatory by all means. 
 
Figure 4.16 Conceptual representation of the influence of distance l on column layout according to the accidental 
design situation (load arrangement NEX(-)) (left); Definiton of angle e (right). 
As a measure for the location of the design point (MEd, NEd) on the M-N interaction diagram, the design 
eccentricity ed =MEd /NEd (2.51) is introduced and, in order to deal with a dimensionless parameter, nor-
malized with the member’s cross-section depth, h (Figure 4.16, right): 
   (𝑒/ℎ)𝑑 = tan(αe) =
MEd
NEd
∙
1
h
        (4.63)  
Figure 4.17 shows the ratio between the design axial force NEd,acc and the maximum design resistance 
under pure compression, NRd,max,acc (Figure 4.16, right) as a function of the normalized design eccentricity 
(e/h)d,acc as obtained for the 28512 columns designed according to the accidental situation. Very large 
or very small ratios (e/h)d,acc represent conditions approaching pure bending (NEd,acc → 0) whereas 
(e/h)d,acc values tending to zero are indicative of negligible bending moments (MEd,acc → 0). Positive ratios 
(NEd/NRd,max)acc represent design compression forces (NEd,acc > 0), prevailing in about 98.5 % of the shown 
results, whereas in 1.5% of the analyzed columns the explosion-induced axial force exceeded the value 
due to the gravitational loads resulting in a tensile axial  force (NEd,acc < 0). 
From Figure 4.17 it can be inferred that larger ratios (e/h)d,acc are indicative of members designed for 
the accidental situation, where the corresponding design point falls, in most cases, within the tensile 
failure domain. With a few exceptions, this situation is mandatory for member layout if (e/h)d,acc ≳ 1. On 
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the contrary, the design point will fall most probably into the compression failure domain if member 
design is governed by the persistent situation what is found to be very likely if (e/h)d,acc ≲ 0.4. In between 
these limits, no conclusions can be drawn a priori on the mandatory design situation of the columns. If 
the resulting axial force is a tensile force (NEd,acc < 0), the design is very likely to be performed according 
to the requirements of the accidental situation. Only in cases where the influence of bending moments 
is relatively small ((e/h)d,acc ≳ -1) it might be possible that the persistent design situation calls for a 
larger reinforcement degree.  
 
Figure 4.17 Ratio between design axial force NEd, acc and maximum design resistance NRd,acc as a function of 
normalized design eccentricity 
Figure 4.18 shows that the position of the design point on the M-N interaction diagram is likewise influ-
enced by second order effects. These are represented by ratio MII,d between the second order contribu-
tion MEd,II and the total design moment MEd, shown for the 4755 columns governed by the accidental 
situation as a function of the normalized eccentricity (e/h)d,acc. As could be expected, larger resulting 
axial force levels, represented by small (e/h)d,acc ratios, induce higher second order effects. Moreover, it 
is noteworthy that due to the conservative code formulations, even very large (e/h)d,acc still entail second 
order moments of about 6% of the total design moment. 
   φMII,d =
MEd,II
MEd,I+ MEd,II
=
MEd,II
MEd
        (4.64) 
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Figure 4.18 Ratio between second order- and total design bending moment as a function of normalized design 
eccentricity; Members strictly designed according to accidental design situation (load arrangement NEX(-)) 
Geometrical characteristics of the strictly designed members  
Table 4.5 shows the aspect- and reinforcement ratios characterizing the mid-span and the support 
cross-section of the 486 RC beams designed according to the mandatory design situation. The aspect 
ratio h/b of the mid-span cross-section varies between 1.67 and 2.00. For positive bending (M(+)), the 
reinforcement ratios for the longitudinal tensile reinforcement at mid-span range from l = 0.004 to 
0.029, whereas for negative bending (M(-)) far smaller values ratios are being obtained due to the fa-
vourable influence of the gravitational loads. 
In contrast to the findings from the mid-span cross-section, the aspect ratios of the support cross-section 
vary largely from h/bw = 5.6 to 41.6. The mean value is situated around h/bw = 10.5. Such high aspect 
ratios indicate that in practice the requirements for constructive feasibility in many cases probably en-
tail a conservative design of the compression strut. It should also be observed that the relatively small 
values obtained for bw entail relatively large shear reinforcement ratios w, fluctuating from 0.013 to 
0.026. 
Table 4.5: Geometrical characteristics of mid-span and support cross-section of RC beams strictly designed ac-
cording to mandatory design situation 
Parameter Ratio Mean Min Max 
Mid-span cross-section aspect ratio h/b 1.96 1.67 2.00 
Longitudinal reinforcement ratio (M(+)) l = As1 / (b∙h) 0.014 0.004 0.029 
Longitudinal reinforcement ratio (M(-)) l = As1 / (b∙h) 0.003 0.000 0.010 
Support cross-section aspect ratio h/bw 10.47 5.62 41.61 
Shear reinforcement ratio w = Asw / (s∙bw) 0.019 0.013 0.026 
 
The aspect and reinforcement ratios characterizing the intermediate- and the support cross-section of 
the 28512 RC columns designed according to the mandatory design situation are shown in Table 4.6. 
The mean value of the h/b relationship of the intermediate cross-section is only scarcely above the min-
imum of 1.0, which characterizes about 66% of the analysed members. Less than 2 % of the members 
are characterized by aspect ratios h/b > 2, the maximum is h/b = 4. The longitudinal reinforcement ratio 
oscillates between l = 0.005 to 0.187 with a mean value of 0.028. 
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The aspect ratios of the support cross-section are higher than those obtained for the intermediate cross-
section, although in comparison to the beams far smaller: The mean value of ratio h/bw is situated at 
about 1.8. In about 77% of the 28512 members, this ratio is smaller than 2 and in 85% of the cases 
studied smaller than 3. The obtained shear reinforcement ratios are likewise smaller than those found 
for the beams. 
Table 4.6: Geometrical characteristics of intermediate and support cross-section of RC columns strictly designed 
according to mandatory design situation 
Parameter Ratio Mean Min Max 
Intermediate cross-section aspect ratio h/b 1.1 1.0 4.0 
Longitudinal reinforcement ratio* l = As / (b∙h) 0.028 0.005 0.187 
Support cross-section aspect ratio h/bw 1.8 1.0 13.2 
Shear reinforcement ratio w = Asw / (s∙bw) 0.003 0.000 0.030 
                          * Based on As = As1 + As2  
4.7.4 Differences to codes and standards in force 
As mentioned in the introduction to section 4.7, the present study is based on a consistent set of national 
codes which in the meanwhile where substituted by updated versions. The relevant differences between 
the herein applied codes rules and those contained in the standards in force (national codes or Euro-
codes) are described as follows: 
- The perhaps most significant difference concerns the partial factors for the concrete compres-
sive strength in the accidental design situation. While a value of c = 1.3 has been adopted in the 
national standards [72, 83], Eurocode EN1992-1-1 [84] recommends a value of c = 1.2. 
- In the employed code for design of structural concrete members [83], the coefficient cc taking  
account of long term effects on the compressive strength was fixed to 0.85. The current version 
EHE-08 [72] recommends, in accordance with the current Eurocode EN1992-1-1 [84], a value of 
cc = 1.0 although values less than 1.0, but not less then 0.85 [72] or 0.8 [84], might be adopted 
as a function of the relation between the permanent- and the total loads.  
- The nominal curvature-based formulation of the design eccentricity etot (4.55) to take into ac-
count second order effects in problems characterized by M-N interaction was withdrawn from 
the current version of the design code for structural concrete, EHE-08 [72].  
- The formulation of coefficient K (4.47), to be factored into the shear resistance VR,c, taking ac-
count of the stress state in the compression chord, has experienced a change from EHE-98 [83] 
to the standard in force, EHE-08 [72]. This is shown in Figure 4.19. According to the formulation 
in [72], adopted from EN1992-1-1 [84], VR,c may increase up to 1.25 times the value suggested 
by the former EHE-98 [83] if the compressive stresses are moderate (0.25fcd < c < 0.5fcd). Be-
yond this limit, the larger the stresses in the compression chord, the smaller is the difference 
between both formulations. 
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Figure 4.19 Comparison of coefficient K for modification of shear resistance VR,c according to EHE-98 [83] and 
EHE-08/EN1992-1-1 [72, 84]. 
The impact of the mentioned differences on the overall results and conclusions of the present study is 
considered to be generally small, if not at all negligible, as probably in the case of the changes concerning 
coefficient cc. Section 6.2.4 adresses the influence of partial factor c for concrete, coefficient K for mod-
ification of shear resistance VR,c, and the eccentricity etot for design under influence of second order ef-
fects on the reliability level of the studied RC members . 
4.8 Characterization of basic variables 
4.8.1 Introduction 
As a part of step 5 of the established analysis procedure (section 4.3), the present section addresses the 
representation of the uncertainties associated with the reliability problems treated in the present study. 
As stated in section 2.2.2, this can be performed on the basis of a statistical characterization of the ran-
dom variables involved in the defined LSFs (section 4.6), such as the variables quantifying loads, geom-
etry or material properties. Therefore, probabilistic models in terms of appropriate statistical distribu-
tions and their corresponding moments have to be established. 
In a prior study [78], probabilistic models for the most relevant structural design variables were de-
duced which represent the uncertainty associated with the rules laid down in the herein employed con-
sistent set of design codes (section 4.7.1). These models, presented in Table 4.7, are generally consistent 
with the models laid down in the Probabilistic Model Code [80] and are suitable for practical applica-
tions. Although they were derived in the context of persistent design situations, some may also be 
adopted for the herein envisaged reliability analysis in connection with gas explosions. Models designed 
for static load variables or referring to the geometric dimensions of structural members, for instance, 
do not require modification for a use in the context of accidental situations. Other variables, however, 
are to be adapted to take into consideration the effects of high loading rates induced by gas explosions. 
This concerns particularly the variables characterizing the dynamic material behaviour, which might be 
subject to considerable modifications in comparison to a static load exposure (section 3.2.2). This is 
being addressed in section 4.8.3, preceded by the stochastic characterization of the variables represent-
ing the dynamic loads and load effects (section 4.8.2). 
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Table 4.7 Probabilistic models for static actions, action effects and resistance of RC members [78] 
Variable Notation Type* Bias (/vk)** 
CoV 
(/)*** 
Static actions  
Principle RC member self-weight  gc N 1.00 0.04 
Other permanent loads gf, gr N 1.00 0.10 
Imposed loads on building floors qi G 0.68 0.26 
Snow load qs G 0.33 0.81 
Uncertainties associated with modeling of action effects 
Bending moments ξME,stat LN 1.00 0.10 
Shear ξVE,stat LN 1.00 0.10 
Axial compression forces ξNE,stat LN 1.00 0.05 
Geometry of RC members 
Cross-sectional dimensions b, h, bw N 1.00 0.03 
Effective cross-section depth d N 1.00 0.04 
Reinforcing steel cross-section area As, Asw N 1.00 0.02 
Material strength 
Concrete compressive strength fc,stat LN 1.24 0.18 
Reinforcing steel yiel strength fy,stat, fyw,stat LN 1.12 0.05 
Reinforcing steel tensile strength **** ft,stat LN 1.24 0.06 
Uncertainties associated with modeling of resistance of RC members 
Bending moments ξMR LN 1.00 0.05 
Shear (tensile tie) ξVRs LN 1.00 0.05 
Shear (compression strut) ξVRc LN 1.40 0.25 
Axial compression forces ξNR LN 1.00 0.05 
* Distribution type: N = Normal, LN = Lognormal, G = Gumbel 
** Bias = ratio between mean value  and nominal value vk  
*** CoV (coefficient of variation) = ratio between standard deviation  and mean value   
**** Model derived in present study (see section 4.8.3) 
4.8.2  Dynamic loads and load effects 
Approach 
The present section addresses the probabilistic characterization of the explosion-induced action effects 
affecting the defined RC members (bending moments MEX, MN,EX, shear forces VEX and axial forces NEX). 
The approach followed in the present study is to deduce these action effects, referred to as EEX in the 
general notation, from the corresponding quantities EEX,peak which would result from a static application 
of the peak value pEX,peak of the time-dependant explosion pressure pEX(t) (Figure 4.7). For this purpose, 
dynamic load factors DLFM, DLFV, DLFN, in the general notation, DLFE, are introduced (Figure 4.20) which 
take account of dynamic effects, such as inertia forces and energy-dissipation, which arise in 
consequence of the short load durations. The DLFE relate the action effects EEX and EEX,peak as follows: 
EEX = DLFE ∙ EEX,peak         (4.65) 
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Figure 4.20 Schematic illustration of dynamic load factor DLFE for computation of dynamic, explosion induced 
action effect EEX from corresponding value EEX,peak due to statically applied peak-load pEX,peak  
Predicting the dynamic load effects as described is obviously subject to uncertainties. Factoring in the 
model uncertainties by means of coefficients ξE,dyn, the general expression for the dynamic action effects 
Edyn (ME,dyn,VE,dyn and NE,dyn), compatible with the definitions of the LSFs (section 4.6), is given as: 
Edyn = ξE,dyn ∙ EEX = ξE,dyn ∙ DLFE ∙ EEX,peak      (4.66) 
The determination of the magnitudes EEX,peak requires a probabilistic model for the explosion peak-load 
pEX,peak, what will be addressed below. Subsequently, reference will be made to the probabilistic 
representation of the DLFE including the associated model uncertainty. 
Explosion peak pressure 
In section 3.1.4, different models for a probabilistic characterization of pEX,peak were presented. It was 
shown that considerable differences exist between these models regarding both the definition of a mean 
value and the corresponding scatter. The huge differences concerning the variability of the peak pres-
sure generated in a gas explosion are especially noteworthy and, based on the available information, 
cannot be explained in a reasonable way. Since, on the other hand, the gas explosion pressure plays a 
fundamental role in the evaluation of the reliability level of the herein studied beams and columns it is 
considered essential to analyse this variable in more detail. For this purpose, the experimental results 
in [116], which, as exposed in section 3.1.4, constitute the basis of the current Eurocode load model 
(Figure 3.3), are subjected to a statistical analysis. 
A total of 15 test results within ranges of 1.2 kN/m2 < pstat < 21.4 kN/m2 and 0.05 m-1 < Av/V < 0.15 m-1 
are taken into account in the derivation of a model for the mean value of the explosion peak pressure 
μpEX,peak , all of which were obtained under the conservative assumption of a homogenously distributed, 
stoichiometric mix of gas and oxygen [116]. Four additional tests, where the gas concentration was var-
ied, are not included in the regression analysis for these tests were conducted only for a specific pstat 
value (pstat = 21.4 kN/m2) what would entail certain distortion in the statistical evaluation. The 15 test 
results are plotted in Figure 4.21, which distinguishes the peak pressures corresponding to the first 
(upper figure) and the second (lower figure) pressure pulse observed in the tests carried out [116], 
respectively p1 and p2 (see also Figure 3.2). Linear regression analysis is conducted to find the functions 
best representing mean μpEX,peak , shown in Figure 4.21. In line with the suggestion in [116], the expo-
nential model obtained for p1 depends alone on pstat, whereas the power-law model which characterizes 
p2 is function of both pstat and Av/V.   
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Figure 4.21 Derivation of mean value (lines) for explosion peak pressure from test results (dots) [109]; upper: 
first peak pressure pulse (p1); lower: second pressure pulse (p2) 
Following the approach in [116], the final expression for the mean peak pressure model pEX,peak, pub-
lished in [183], is given by the maximum of the functions found for p1 and p2. Under the assumption of 
pstat = 7 kN/m2, chosen for purpose of example, μpEX,peak  is compared in Figure 4.22 to the mean value of 
the empirical model determined in [108] (blue curve), which was likewise deduced from Dragosavics 
test series [116]. The fact that this model predicts different mean values of the peak pressure than the 
herein obtained model (lower pressures for ratios Av/V up to approximately 0.11 and higher values 
beyond that limit) can be mainly attributed to the circumstance that a total of 6 tests (encircled in Figure 
4.21), conducted to quantify the scatter associated with the pressure generation under nominally 
equally circumstances, where not taken into account in the statistical evaluation in [108]. Interestingly, 
the herein obtained model is qualitatively similar to the mean value of Schmidt’s model (green curve) 
based on numerical simulations [110]. However, this model predicts far higher explosion pressures 
across the entire range of Av/V, what, as already mentioned in section 3.1.4, can be probably traced back 
to the influence of random parameters, like the point of ignition or obstacle-induced turbulences, which 
Schmidt studied in detail. On the contrary, it should be kept in mind that the herein derived model 
μpEX,peak  is conservative (i.e. predicts comparatively high pressures) with regard to the gas concentra-
tion of the gas-oxygen mixture before ignition, as mentioned before. All in all, the derived model is 
judged to provide a fairly good estimate of the expected peak pressure in a gas explosion event. 
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Figure 4.22 Gas explosion peak pressure pEX,peak versus venting coefficient Av/V (pstat = 7 kN/m2): Mean value 
obtained in the present study versus mean values according to [108] and [110]. 
In order to analyse the scatter corresponding to the obtained pressure model, only the test results cor-
responding to a venting panel failure pressure pstat = 21.4 kN /m2 are taken into account for in this case 
the sample size is sufficiently high to perform a statistical evaluation. As shown in Table 4.8, the sample 
consists of sn = 8 test results if pressure pulse p1 is under concern, whereas for p2 this number reduces 
to 7. Sample coefficients of variation (CoVpEX,peak,s) of 0.33 and 0.36 are found for p1 and p2, respectively, 
confirming the findings in [108].  
Table 4.8 Test results [116] considered for quantification of scatter associated with peak pressure pEX,peak 
Test nº Av / V [m-1] 
pEX,peak,p1 
[kN/m2] 
pEX,peak,p2 
[kN/m2] 
17 0.05 27.0 * 
19 0.15 13.0 9.0 
25 0.15 18.0 22.5 
26 0.15 12.0 10.4 
27 0.15 18.5 12.3 
28 0.15 18.5 11.0 
29 0.15 10.5 10.0 
30 0.15 24.6 15.0 
μpEX,peak,s 17.8 12.9 
σpEX,peak,s 5.9 4.7 
CoVpEX,peak,s 0.33 0.36 
           *Not considered due to different venting coefficient Av/V 
In the following, the statistical uncertainties (section 2.2.1) due to the reduced sample size will be fac-
tored into the analysis. Therefore, the following two assumptions will be made: 
- the population mean μpEX,peak  (2.16) is known and equals the sample mean pEX,peak,s  
- the population variance σpEX,peak
2  (2.17) is unknown 
If, for example, a normal distribution is assumed to characterize variable pEX,peak, a p-fractile estimate 
xpEX,peak,p,est associated with a specific probability p can be made as a function of coefficient ks,p, taking 
account of the sample size [184]: 
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   xpEX,peak,p,est = μpEX,peak,s + ks,p ∙ σpEX,peak,s       (4.67)  
Subsequently, the population standard deviation σpEX,peak  can be estimated from (4.68) as a function of 
xpEX,peak,p,est and coefficient ks,p,∞ which accounts for an infinite sample size: 
   σpEX,peak =
xpEX,peak,p,est− μpEX,peak,s
ks,p,∞
        (4.68)   
The population coefficient of variation, CoVpEX,peak , can then be readily obtained by formulating the ratio 
between σpEX,peak  and μpEX,peak . It should be mentioned that coefficients ks,p and ks,p,∞, which can be 
derived from the noncentral t-distribution, depend on both the probability p corresponding to the 
desired fractile and on the confidence level  that the p-fractile estimate xpEX,peak,p,est will lie on the safe 
side of the real value xpEX,peak,p. Confidence levels greater than 0.75 are recommended in order to take 
into account statistical uncertainty [184].  
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the obtained results depending on different assumptions for the statistical 
distribution of variable pEX,peak, probability p and confidence level . The latter turns out to be the most 
influent parameter. While the population coefficients of variations CoVpEX,peakoscillate between 0.43 to 
0.49 if  = 0.75 is assumed, CoVpEX,peak  raises to values between 0.62 and 0.75 if a confidence level of  = 
0.95 is demanded. The choice between a normal and a lognormal distribution (for the latter, equations 
(4.67) and (4.68) change), however, has a minor impact on CoVpEX,peak . Nevertheless, it should be 
observed that the assumption of a normal distribution might entail negative p-fractile estimates, even if 
a probability of p = 0.05 is considered. Based on the experimental observations in [116] it is considered 
highly unlikely that peak pressures of the pressure pulses p1 or p2 might adopt negative values. It should 
also be recalled in that context that the negative pressure phase following pulse p1 is characterized by 
values of insignificant magnitude (Figure 3.2). Consequently, the assumption of a lognormal distribution 
seems to be a more appropriate choice, following recommendations in [7] (section 3.1.4). Defining a 
confidence level of  = 0.95 as a requirement, the adoption of CoVpEX,peak= 0.7 turns out to be a defendable 
value for both p1 and p2. For reasons of simplification and for want of more detailed data, this value is 
assumed as a constant across the entire range of possible values of Av/V and pstat. The finding 
CoVpEX,peak= 0.7 is in line with the indications in [24] (section 3.1.4). 
Table 4.9 Determination of coefficient of variation CoVpEX,peakfor pulse p1, taking account of sample size sn = 8 
Distribution Lognormal (LN) Normal (N) 
 0.75 0.95 0.75 0.95 
p 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 
xpEX,peak,p,est 8.07 6.06 5.76 3.89 4.86 -0.14 -1.02 -7.85 
σpEX,peak 0.45 0.44 0.65 0.63 7.84 7.69 11.42 11.01 
CoVpEX,peak  0.47 0.46 0.73 0.70 0.44 0.43 0.64 0.62 
 
  
 Chapter 4   Approach and basic developments 
131 
Table 4.10 Determination of coefficient of variation CoVpEX,peakfor pulse p2, taking account of sample size sn = 7 
Distribution Lognormal (LN) Normal (N) 
 0.75 0.95 0.75 0.95 
p 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 
xpEX,peak,p,est 6.09 4.63 4.26 2.89 2.40 -1.71 -2.97 -8.75 
σpEX,peak 0.43 0.42 0.65 0.62 6.38 6.27 9.64 9.30 
CoVpEX,peak  0.45 0.44 0.72 0.69 0.49 0.49 0.75 0.72 
 
In the notation of (2.18), the derived probabilistic model for variable pEX,peak can be summarized by 
(4.69), where μpEX,peak  is specified in Figure 4.22. In any case, it should be stressed that the foregoing 
developments are generally indicative of the high degree of uncertainty associated with the probabilistic 
model derived. An analysis of the explosion pressure influence on the reliability level of the RC members 
is recommended (Chapter 6). 
pEX,peak ~ LN(μpEX,peak , 0.7 ∙ μpEX,peak)        (4.69) 
Dynamic load factors 
As stated before, within the defined LSF, the estimation of dynamic action effects EEX (4.65) will be based 
on dynamic load factors DLFE. These will be deduced from a deterministic, structural analysis based on 
simplified dynamic models, such as described in section 3.3, what will be subject of Chapter 5 of the 
present thesis. The DLFE are subject to the uncertainties associated with the simplified models employed 
for their determination, accounted for by coefficients ξE,dyn (4.66). These coefficients will be 
represented by a lognormal distribution, with mean μξE,dyn= 1.0 and standard deviation σξE,dyn . In the 
notation of (2.18), it follows: 
ξE,dyn ~ LN(1.0, σξE,dyn)          (4.70) 
The combined, lognormally distributed variable ξE,dyn ∙ DLFE is thus characterized by mean μξE,dyn∙ DLFE 
and standard deviation σξE,dyn , as schematically shown in Figure 4.23.  
 
Figure 4.23 Lognormal density function for combined basic variable E,dyn ∙ DLFE 
Based on the reported comparison between the results obtained in, respectively, blast tests and 
calculations under use of simplified dynamic models (Figure 3.16, Table 3.5, Figure 3.20), a coefficient 
of variation of 0.2 to 0.3 seems to be a reasonable choice for bending-related action effects. For purpose 
of the present study the former will be adopted (σξM,dyn= 0.2). In view of the comparatively higher 
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discrepancies between the experimental and analytical results (based on simplified models) for the 
support reactions of RC members (Figure 3.15, Figure 3.18), a coefficient of variation of 0.3 will be 
adopted for model uncertainties associated with the determination of dynamic shear forces (σξV,dyn= 
0.3). In turn, the model uncertainty associated with dynamic axial forces is estimated to be significantly 
smaller. For want of detailed information, the value used for modeling axial forces under static loads 
(Table 4.7) will be assumed (σξN,dyn= 0.05). An improvement of these partially subjective estimates 
would require an extensive test campaign and/or the availability of detailed information on tests 
published in the literature, including a rigorous characterisation of the relevant properties defining both 
loading and resistance of the tested members. As emphasized in section 3.3.6, such a characterization is 
essential for an adequate estimation of the model accuracy.  
Strain and displacements 
The limit state functions corresponding to bending failure of both beams and columns are function of 
the internal forces Fs resisted by the longitudinal steel layers, which, in turn, are dependant on the steel 
strain, s. As defined by (4.17), bending failure of the beams arises after yielding of steel layer As1 (Figure 
4.10) and strain s1 can be readily obtained from a deterministic structural analysis under dynamic load-
ing conditions (Chapter 5). In case of the columns, the post-yield stage will only be entered for non-
buckling critical members (UMLS), as explained before (Figure 4.12). On the contrary, if buckling gov-
erns column failure (BLS), either s1 or s2 will equal the yield strain and the associated force in the steel 
layer Fs1,2 (4.41) corresponds to the yield force Fy. Irrespective of the governing failure mode, the strains 
s1 and s2, and directly related to these (via the curvature), the mid-span displacements , required for 
the determination of the second-order effects, are dependant on the location of the point of equilibrium, 
(ME, NE) = (MR, NR), on the interaction diagram (Figure 4.11). The finding of this a priori unknown point 
requires a specific solution algorithm which accounts for the axial force-dependant formulation of ac-
tion effects and resistance under consideration of both the geometrical- and material non-linearities 
involved. This will be addressed in Chapter 5 within the context of the dynamic analysis of the columns. 
Subsequently, the mentioned algorithm will be coupled to a purpose-developed FOSM-based [67] relia-
bility procedure (section 6.1) in order to obtain the s distribution (and the resultant ) corresponding 
to the most likely failure point on the LSF (Figure 2.12). Both the s and  are introduced in the reliability 
analysis as deterministic values. 
4.8.3 Material properties 
Approach 
As mentioned above, probabilistic models for persistent design situations were developed in a former 
study  which represent the uncertainty associated with the rules laid down in the Spanish design codes 
(Table 4.7). In the context of accidental design situations, the mentioned codes suggest a general reduc-
tion of partial safety factors for material strength (section 2.3.4). However, no distinction is made for 
the type of accidental action involved nor is any explanation given about the circumstances that in-
formed this reduction. In any event, strain rate dependant material behaviour (section 3.2.2) is not ex-
plicitly taken into consideration in the design codes. For these reasons, the deduction of a probabilistic 
model representing the state of uncertainty associated with the design rules for the accidental situation 
would not provide a realistic estimate of the increase in material properties induced by high loading 
rates [183]. 
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Figure 4.24 Static (black) and dynamic (red) stress-strain diagrams for concrete under compression (left) and 
reinforcing steel (right) 
The general approach followed in the present study is to represent the relevant material properties un-
der high loading rates, or simply, dynamic material properties, mdyn, as the product of the material prop-
erty associated with quasi-static loading, mstat, and a dynamic increase factor, DIFm (4.71). The dynamic 
properties mdyn define the stress-strain relationships under high loading rates, as shown schematically 
in Figure 4.24 for concrete in compression (left) and the reinforcing steel (right). The DIFm will be de-
termined by means of simplified models according to [129] and [143], introduced in section 3.3.2. Esti-
mation of the material strain rate is a pre-requisite to applying these models what will be addressed in 
the context of the dynamic analysis of the structural members (Chapter 5). 
mdyn =  mstat · DIFm         (4.71) 
Strength 
Previously developed probabilistic models, are used to describe the concrete compressive strength fc,stat 
and the reinforcing steel yield stress fy,stat and fyw,stat under quasi static loading conditions (Table 4.7). 
The in Table 4.7 represented model for the tensile strength of the reinforcing steel (ft,stat) has been de-
rived under the assumption of a lognormal distribution for ratio k = ft,stat/fy,stat with an associated p-frac-
tile value k = 1.08 (Table 4.2) corresponding to a probability of p = 0.1 according to [84].  
Based on (4.71), the mean values μfm,dyn  of the dynamic strength variables fm,dyn are derived by multiply-
ing the mean value μfm,stat  associated with quasi-static loading to the corresponding DIFm, as illustrated 
in Figure 4.25. The scatter for fm,dyn is assumed to be the same as in the respective properties under 
quasi-static loading, fm,stat. As far as concrete is concerned, this assumption was theoretically validated 
by prior research [128]. 
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Figure 4.25 Log-normal density function for dynamic strength variable fm,dyn 
Strain and modulus of elasticity 
In addition to the strength variables, the compressive strain in the concrete at maximum stress (c1), the 
ultimate compressive strain in the concrete (cu), the yield strain (y) and the strain at maximum load 
(u) of the reinforcing steel are required for a complete definition of the uni-axial stress-strain laws (Fig-
ure 4.24).    
The strains c1 and cu will be adopted from [83] if quasi-static loading conditions are referred to (c1,stat, 
cu,stat). Strain c1 will be converted to a dynamic property (c1,dyn) by means of the corresponding DIF 
(section 3.3.2) before being employed in the derivation of constants ac and kc defining the parabola-
rectangle shaped stress-strain relationship for concrete under compression. On the contrary, strain cu 
will be adopted as for static loading conditions due to lack of reliable indications which would allow for 
a different assumption (cu,stat = cu,dyn). 
The dynamic yield strain of the reinforcing steel y,dyn is implicitly defined by the ratio between the yield 
strength fy,dyn and the modulus of elasticity Es. In keeping with the observations in tests (section 3.2.2), 
the latter is considered as non-strain rate sensitive and will be introduced in the reliability analysis as a 
deterministic quantity, Es = 200.000 N/mm2 [83]. Due to a lack of experimental evidence (section 3.2.2), 
a non-strain rate sensitive behavior will be likewise assumed for the strain of the reinforcing steel at 
maximum load, u (u,stat = u,dyn). This material property is defined by (4.72), which assumes that the 
slope of the post-yield branch of the stress-strain diagram (Figure 4.24) is defined by the characteristic 
values, fyk, ftk, yk and uk according to Table 4.2. 
εu =
fy,stat
Es
+
εuk−εyk
ftk−fyk
∙ (ft,stat − fy,stat)       (4.72) 
4.9 Summary 
Chapter 4 addresses key issues regarding the approach to the study and the methodology followed in 
order to attain its objectives. Moreover, it contains basic developments upon which the following chap-
ters are grounded. 
The main assumptions for the inference of risk-based requirements for structural safety are described 
in section 4.1. Acceptable risk is established as the inherent risk set out in existing structural standards, 
which reflect current best practice and are regarded to be acceptable by definition. Risk acceptability 
therefore depends on the degree of reliability implicitly required by such standards, which is unknown 
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and which, as previous studies show, might differ fundamentally from nominal target ceilings estab-
lished in these standards. It was further discussed, how, and under which circumstances, such a level 
can be defined for accidental situations associated with gas explosions. The need for distinguishing dif-
ferent design situations (accidental or persistent situations) was highlighted (Figure 4.1).  
In section 4.2, a mathematical framework for the quantification of structure-related risks is defined. The 
developments, which are in line with the main principles established in prior studies dedicated to risks 
in buildings under normal use conditions [9, 10, 13], are based on the state of knowledge regarding 
explicit approaches for the analysis, assessment and management of risks associated with technical sys-
tems, outlined in Chapter 2. In the present context, such a system is described by a particular building 
structure. Each of the nj hazard scenarios (j) associated with such a structure is represented by a specific 
collapse scenario triggered by failure of one of its principle loadbearing members, where member fail-
ure is characterized by a specific failure mode induced by a particular load arrangement. The hazard 
scenarios are mathematically described by their occurrence probability pj and the associated conse-
quences Nj. Assuming statistical independency between the nj hazard scenarios, these can be repre-
sented in a probability (pj) -consequence (Nj) diagram, also termed risk profile (Figure 4.2). The integral 
of the risk profile corresponds to the risk R associated with the structure in question.  
Based on the established mathematical framework, in section 4.3 a procedure (Figure 4.4) is defined 
which specifies the tasks performed to comply with the established objectives. The procedure comprises 
the definition of a representative set of ordinary building structures with RC elements (beams and col-
umns) in section 4.4, followed by an identification of the most relevant hazard scenarios (j) associated 
with these structures in section 4.5. The determination of the occurrence probabilities pj and the asso-
ciated consequences Nj forms part of the subsequent quantitative risk analysis. Probabilities pj are ex-
pressed in terms of implicitly acceptable member failure probabilities pf,adm, which represent the relia-
bility level implicitly required by the structural standards. The tasks performed for their determination 
comprise the translation of the defined hazard scenarios into limit state functions (LSF) (sections 4.6), 
a strict design of the members (Ed = Rd) based on these LSF (section 4.7) and the characterisation of the 
basic variables involved (section 4.8). Moreover, the estimation of probabilities pf,adm calls for the quan-
tification of different dynamic effects associated with the defined member limit states (Chapter 5) and, 
finally, a reliability analysis (Chapter 6). For the estimation of consequences, Nj, in terms of the number 
of fatalities associated with the hazard scenario, a model is required what is subject of Chapter 7. As a 
function of both, pj and Nj, in Chapter 8 the implicitly acceptable risks associated with the selected struc-
tures are established and acceptance criteria deduced from the findings. 
A representative set of building structures with RC members (beams and columns) is obtained varying 
the parameters with the greatest effect on design within practically realistic ranges (section 4.4). The 
mentioned parameters are related to the geometry of the building structures (section 4.4.2, Figure 4.5, 
Table 4.1), the properties of the explosion venting panels used in these buildings (section 4.4.3) and the 
characteristics of the main constitutive structural members (section 4.4.4, Table 4.2). Since it is a con-
servative approach with regard to the reliability level, only statically determinate members are consid-
ered. The representative set of structural members comprises 486 RC beams and 28512 RC columns. 
Out of these, specific members are selected for the definition of a representative set of 4512 building 
structures (section 4.4.5). 
A qualitative risk analysis is being carried out with the aim to identify the relevant hazard scenarios to 
the defined structural members (section 4.5). Two subsequent load stages are distinguished (section 
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4.5.2, Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9). Previously to the explosion event, the structures are subjected to gravita-
tional loads corresponding to the normal use conditions of the buildings (stage 1). In stage 2, a gas ex-
plosion occurs, which will generate a blast overpressure that acts simultaneously to these loads. Under 
the defined load arrangements, bending and diagonal shear failure, in case of the columns influenced by 
axial forces, are identified as the relevant member failure modes (section 4.5.3). In compliance with the 
assumption of static determinate members, reasonable hypothesis are established to account for the 
possibility of a partial- or total system collapse scenario induced by a member failure (section 4.5.4). 
Following their qualitative description, the hazard scenarios are represented in terms of limit state func-
tions (LSF), what is addressed in section 4.6. With a few exceptions, the LSFs are based on the codes 
employed for member design. The mentioned exceptions are introduced in order to accommodate cer-
tain aspects, which in the code rules are being addressed in an implicit way or not at all accounted for. 
This concerns particularly the dynamic effects induced by the relatively high loading rates (inertia 
forces, energy dissipation and strain rate effects). Of particular interest is the suggested formulation for 
the RC columns subjected to M-N interaction, where account has been taken of the fact that the reliability 
level is strongly load-path dependent (section 4.6.3, Figure 4.11). The buckling limit state is distin-
guished from the ultimate moment limit state (Figure 4.12). 
Based on the established LSF’s, the selected structural members are designed according to structural 
safety requirements that reflect current best practice (section 4.7). The design is based on the semi-
probabilistic safety format (section 2.3.2) where partial safety factors are employed along with the rep-
resentative values for load effects and resistance to deduce the corresponding design values (Ed, Rd). 
Inasmuch as conservative design has a significant effect on the reliability level, it is performed strictly 
(Ed = Rd) so the members comply exactly with the safety requirements laid down in the consistent set of 
codes employed. In compliance with the considerations in section 4.1, design is based on the mandatory 
design situation, which demands the higher member resistance according to the employed design rules.  
Section 4.8 addresses the statistical characterization of the random variables involved in the defined 
LSFs. Therefore, probabilistic models in terms of appropriate statistical distributions and their corre-
sponding moments are being established. Special attention is being paid to both, the load effects and 
structural resistance under explosion load exposure. The dynamic action effects EEX are defined as a 
function of the respective quantities EEX,peak that would result from a static application of the peak value 
pEX,peak of the time-dependent explosion pressure pEX(t) (Figure 4.7) and a dynamic load factor DLFE (sec-
tion 4.8.2). A probabilistic model for pEX,peak is derived from a statistical analysis of the experimental 
results which constitute the fundament of the current Eurocode load model (Figure 4.21). The associ-
ated scatter, translated into a coefficient of variation of 0.7, matches well indications in [24]. The DLFE 
take account of the contribution of inertia forces and energy dissipation on the structural behavior dur-
ing the blast load exposure. Associated model uncertainties are factored to the DLFE by means of coeffi-
cients E,dyn, characterized by a lognormal distribution, with mean μξE,dyn= 1.0 and standard deviation 
σξE,dyn  (Figure 4.23), based on test observations (section 3.3.6) and/or subjective estimations      
(σξM,dyn= 0.2, σξV,dyn= 0.3, σξN,dyn= 0.05). For purpose of a characterization of structural resistance, the 
mean values μmdyn  of the relevant mechanical properties (strength, strain and modulus) of concrete and 
steel under high loading rates are represented as the product of the corresponding mean values associ-
ated with quasi-static loading, μmstat , and dynamic increase factors, DIFm (section 4.8.3, Figure 4.24, 
Figure 4.25). Due to a lack of evidence, the corresponding scatter is assumed, as far as strength variables 
are concerned, as in the respective properties under quasi-static loading conditions. All other properties 
are treated as deterministic quantities.
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Chapter 5 Dynamic analysis 
The LSFs defined in section 4.6 account for different dynamic effects, such as the activation of inertia 
forces, energy dissipation and increased material strain rates, which arise as a consequence of the rela-
tively high loading rates gas explosions might induce in the defined structural members. As a part of 
step 5 of the established procedure (section 4.3, Figure 5.1), these effects are to be quantified by means 
of a deterministic dynamic analysis based on simplified models. The following sections 5.1 and 5.2 sum-
marize, respectively, the approach and the procedure adopted to perform this analysis. Subsequently, 
the implementation of the procedure for the different member types and failure modes is being adressed 
in section 5.3. A detailed description and discussion of the results obtained is provided in section 5.4. 
Chapter 5 concludes with a comparative study carried out for the beams, where the employed simplified 
models are validated by means of non-linear finite element analysis (section 5.5). 
 
Figure 5.1 Procedural flow-chart 
5.1 Approach 
5.1.1 Introduction 
As reported before in section 3.3.1, different levels of approximations may be generally distinguished 
for structural analysis in association with explosions, with the grounds for calculations ranging from 
static equivalent loads to complex, numerical simulations of the blast wave and its dynamic effects on 
the structure. It was stated that the appropriate election of how to model the structural loading and 
resistance in specific circumstances depends on numerous aspects, as for instance, the type of structural 
elements involved, the required precision of its response to the explosion loading, or the state of uncer-
tainty associated with this loading. 
The fact that both the geometrical properties and boundary conditions of the selected members (section 
4.4) are relatively simple and that the dynamic load can be represented as an idealized pressure-time 
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(Chapter 1, section 4.1)
2. Mathematical model (s. 4.2)
4. Hazard scenarios (s. 4.5)
3. Repres. set of structures (s. 4.4)
5. Implicit reliability level
Limit states (s. 4.6)
Strict design (s. 4.7)
Basic variables (s. 4.8)
Dynamic analysis (Ch. 5)
Reliability analysis (Ch. 6)
6. Consequence models (Ch. 7)
7. Implicitly acceptable risks (Ch. 8)
8. Acceptance criteria (Ch. 8)
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function (Figure 4.7) enables a level-2 type analysis (section 3.3.1) in the present study. In this analysis, 
use is made of simplified and computationally efficient dynamic models, such as those described in sec-
tion 3.3 of the present thesis. In particular, the flexural response of the selected members is computed 
from a single degree of freedom (SDOF) system (sections 3.3.3, 3.3.4), whereas the reaction forces, rep-
resentative for the shear forces close to the member supports, are determined from the dynamic equi-
librium formulation applied to the members themselves (section 3.3.5). Strain rate effects are accounted 
for by means of the simplified modeling approaches described in section 3.3.2. 
Within the deterministic dynamic analysis, the formulations of action effects and structural resistance 
of the beams and columns are consistently based on the corresponding Limit State Functions (LSF) de-
fined in section 4.6. The gravitational loads, as well as the geometrical- and static material properties of 
the members are defined in terms of mean values according to Table 4.7.  
The main objective of the analysis is to determine the dynamic load- and increase factors (DLFE and 
DIFm) by which means the dynamic action effects (Edyn) and the dynamic material properties (mdyn) are 
being quantified within the LSF, as expressed by equations (4.66) and (4.71), respectively. The following 
subsections explain in more detail the approach adopted to deduce DLF’s (section 5.1.2) and DIF’s (sec-
tion 5.1.3).  
5.1.2 Dynamic load factors 
The dynamic action effects Edyn (bending moments, axial- and shear forces), to be accounted for within 
the reliability analysis of the RC members, are quantified by means of dynamic load factors DLFE (section 
4.8.2). The DLFE (4.66) which depend on the characteristics of both the explosion load and the structural 
resistance, are time-dependent quantities. However, with regard to the objectives pursued in the pre-
sent study, only the maximum values, related to the maximum structural response, are of interest.  
Beams – Bending failure at mid-span (M(+) or M(-)) 
In response to load arrangements pEX(+) or pEX(-) (Figure 4.8), the beams may undergo positive or negative 
flexural failure, repectively (section 4.5.3). In the former case, the explosion-induced deflections and 
bending moments (dyn and ME,dyn) are added to the previously present, static action effects (stat and 
ME,stat), as schematically shown in Figure 5.2. In the latter case, dynamic and static action effects oppose 
each other (Figure 5.3). In both cases, the envisaged failure mode is ductile, i.e. energy dissipation due 
to plastic material deformations may be accounted for. Failure does not occur until the mid-span dis-
placement  reaches the ultimate value u at time t = tu. 
 
Figure 5.2 Schematic representation of displacement-time (left) and bending moment-time (right) curves for 
positive bending failure of beams under load-arrangement pEX(+) 
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Figure 5.3 Schematic representation of displacement-time (left) and bending moment-time (right) curves for 
negative bending failure of beams under load-arrangement pEX(-) 
Subtracting from the ultimate moment MR,u the contribution ME,stat (4.15) due to the previously acting 
gravitational loads, yields the available resistance MR,dyn to oppose the explosion-induced action effect 
ME,dyn (4.15), as expressed per (5.1). Based on the general notation (4.66) and considering the equilib-
rium condition ME,dyn = MR,dyn, the dynamic load factor associated with the bending failure mode of the 
beams (DLFM) is defined by (5.2) as the ratio between MR,dyn and moment MEX,peak, which would result 
from a static application of the explosion peak pressure pEX,peak (Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3). This peak pres-
sure is derived from the SDOF analysis assuming that the mid-span cross-section of the beam attains its 
ultimate deformability (≅ u). 
MR,dyn =  MR,u −ME,stat        (5.1) 
DLFM =
MEX
MEX,peak
=
MR,dyn
MEX,peak
        (5.2) 
Beams – Shear failure at support (Vc or Vs) 
During the flexural response of the beams to load arrangement pEX(+) (Figure 4.8), reaction forces VE 
evolve at the member supports. The maximum value is considered representative for the maximum 
shear forces acting on the beams, limited by shear resistance VR associated with, respectively, crushing 
of the compression strut (VRc) or yielding of the shear reinforcement (VRs). 
 
Figure 5.4 Schematic representation of shear force-time curve for beams under load-arrangement pEX(+) 
In harmony with the previous developments for the flexural failure mode, the dynamic load factor asso-
ciated with the shear failure mode, DLFV, is defined by (5.4) as the ratio between the available shear 
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resistance to face the dynamic action effects, VR,dyn (5.3), and force VEX,peak which would result from a 
static application of peak pressure pEX,peak. This peak pressure is derived from the dynamic equilibrium 
conditions applied to the members themselves (coupled to the SDOF analysis by means of resistance R) 
assuming that VE,dyn ≅ VR,dyn. 
VR,dyn =  VR − VE,stat         (5.3) 
DLFV =
VEX
VEX,peak
=
VR,dyn
VEX,peak
        (5.4) 
It should be stressed that this approach does not account for energy dissipation due to plastic defor-
mations of the transverse reinforcement. A way to consider this is to model the beams by a MDOF-sys-
tem where both the flexural response and the development of diagonal shear cracks can be represented 
by separate degree of freedoms, as shown e.g. in [160]. In view of the expected failure probabilities, 
disregarding the stirrup contribution to the energy dissipation is conservative. 
Columns – Failure due to bending-axial force interaction at mid-span (M-N) 
The structural performance of the blast-exposed columns under load arrangement NEX(-) (Figure 4.9) is 
characterized by the combined influence of bending moments and axial forces. As previously explained 
(section 4.6.3), two limit states are distinguished, the ultimate moment limit state (UMLS) and the buck-
ling limit state (BLS). For buckling-critical elements no energy dissipation due to plastic deformations 
should be accounted for since the occurrence of member instability concurs with initiation of yielding 
of the longitudinal reinforcement at M = MR,y (Figure 4.12, Figure 5.5 (left)). However, among the strictly 
designed reinforced concrete columns (section 4.7.3), a large number is not buckling-critical since the 
member slenderness is small and/or the axial force level in the members is significantly reduced during 
the explosion event. For these members it can be assumed that, as in case of the beams, the plastic stage 
of the resistance curve will be entered, and hence a certain amount of energy might be dissipated until 
cross-section failure arises when the ultimate strain in the concrete or the reinforcing steel is attained 
at M = MR,u (Figure 4.12, Figure 5.5 (right)). 
 
Figure 5.5 Schematic representation of bending moment-time curves corresponding to buckling limit state (left) 
and ultimate-moment limit state (right) for columns under load-arrangement NEX(-) 
Subtracting the moment due to the previously acting gravitational loads ME,stat (4.29) from resistance MR 
(MR,u or MR,y depending on whether the UMLS or the BLS is concerned), the available resistance MR,dyn to 
oppose the explosion-induced action effect ME,dyn (4.34) is given by (5.5).  
MR,dyn =  MR,y(R,u) −ME,stat        (5.5) 
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The explosion-induced bending moment ME,dyn can be distinguished into a first order and a second order 
component. The former, ME,dyn,I (4.35), is attributable to the influence of the horizontal explosion load 
p̃EX,h and the eccentrically acting axial force NEX (Figure 4.9). The second order component, ME,dyn,II, arises 
in consequence of the member deflection  and will be accounted for by means of coefficient M,II (5.6), 
previously introduced in the context of the member design (4.64).  
φM,II =
ME,dyn,II
ME,dyn
=
ME,dyn,II
MR,dyn
        (5.6) 
Coefficient M,II, as defined per (5.6), is indicative of the importance of second order effects during the 
dynamic response of the member. If no such effects influence this response, i.e. M,II = 0, the entire re-
sistance MR,dyn can be allocated to oppose the explosion-induced, first order action effects, ME,dyn,I. With 
increasing second order contribution, hence increasing M,II, the available resistance to withstand these 
action effects vanishes. In the unrealistic case of M,II = 1.0, the resistance would be entirely consumed 
by second-order effects and any lateral influence, regardless of its magnitude, would be sufficient to 
trigger buckling. 
Taking into account these considerations, the dynamic load factor DLFM associated with the flexural fail-
ure mode of the columns is defined by (5.7) as the ratio between the available resistance to oppose the 
explosion-induced, first order moment at mid-span, MR,dyn – ME,dyn,II, and moment (MEX – MN,EX)peak, which 
would result from a static application of the explosion peak pressure pEX,peak. This peak pressure is de-
rived from the SDOF analysis under consideration of axial forces (section 3.3.4) assuming that  ≅ u for 
UMLS members, or  ≅ y if the BLS is relevant. 
DLFM =
MEX −MN,EX
 (MEX− MN,EX)peak
=
MR,dyn ∙(1−φM,II)
 (MEX− MN,EX)peak
       (5.7) 
In Annex A, the implementation of the SDOF analysis under influence of axial forces is illustrated by 
means of a simplified example-column. Thereby, special attention is being paid to second-order effects 
and their influence on the explosion peak-load (pEX,peak) the member is able is to resist. It is shown that 
an increase of such effects induces an almost proportional decrease of pEX,peak, hence resulting in only 
scarce variations of the DLFM. The finding applies especially to members with elastic behavior ( = 1.0), 
representative for buckling-critical members (BLS members), where second order effects are important. 
Non-bucking-critical columns (UMLS members), with certain plastic deformation capacity, are generally 
associated with comparatively lower compression axial force levels, i.e. lower second order effects. The 
definition of the member resistance functions in section 5.3.4 duly accounts for the influence of the axial 
force level on the member deformation capacity.  
Finally, it should be stated that oscillations in the longitudinal sense of the columns are of insignificant 
magnitude. This could be observed during preliminary FE calculations briefly summarized in Annex B. 
It was shown that the corresponding natural periods T are small in comparison to the load-pulse dura-
tion, tp what is indicative of a quasi-static behavior. Hence, the dynamic load factors for dynamic axial 
forces affecting the columns can be assumed as DLFN = 1.0.  
Columns – Failure due to shear-axial force interaction at support (Vc –N or Vs-N) 
In view of a potential column failure due to shear, dynamic load factors DLFV will be derived and subse-
quently introduced in the limit state functions corresponding to the tensile-controlled shear failure 
mechanism (Vs-N) or the failure of the compression strut (Vc-N). The corresponding definitions are 
equivalent to the developments for the beams, expressed by (5.3) and (5.4), where VE,stat = 0: Since in 
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case of the columns there is no shear force contribution from the gravitational actions, the entire re-
sistance can be allocated to resist the explosion-induced, dynamic action effects, hence VR = VR,dyn. More-
over, it must be considered that axial forces will influence the shear resistance VR, as defined by (4.46) 
to (4.48). Dynamic load actors of DLFN = 1.0 will be assumed for the dynamic axial forces (Annex B). 
5.1.3 Dynamic increase factors 
The reliability analysis of the structural members takes account of the dynamic material properties. As 
stated in section 4.8.3, these properties are estimated on the grounds of dynamic increase factors, DIFm 
(Figure 4.24), which are deduced from simplified models.  
For the concrete compressive strength, fc,dyn, the DIF model from Model Code (MC) 90 [129] is adopted. 
As explained in section 3.3.2, this model, expressed by (3.7) to (3.9), seems to be more appropiate for 
mean value estimations than the model contained in the current MC 2010 [130], which aims a predic-
ticing a characteristic value. The same consideration applies to the DIF model for the concrete tensile 
strength, fct,dyn, which, although it does not appear directly as a basic variable in the limit state function 
(section 4.6), is involved in the dynamic analysis of the beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(-), as 
will be shown below (section 5.3.3). The DIF models for the concrete compressive strain at peak-stress, 
c1,dyn, and the modulus of elasticity, Ec,dyn, are taken from MC 2010 [130]. As stated before, these models 
did not change with respect to MC 90. Just as the concrete tensile strength fct,dyn, the modulus Ec,dyn is not 
a basic variable in the strict sense but a required parameter for the dynamic analysis of the beams. 
The DIF for the reinforcing steel yield- and tensile strenght (fy,dyn, ft,dyn) is deduced from the frequently 
quoted model proposed by Malvar and Crawford [143], adopted by MC2010 [130] and given by equa-
tions (3.12) to (3.14). The model is also adopted for the prediction of reinforcing steel properties under 
dynamic compression forces. 
The estimation of the material strain rate ε̇ is a pre-requisite to applying the described DIF models. This 
will be accomplished by deriving constant average material strain rates ε̇m,av (5.8). These are defined 
as the quotient of strain ,dyn associated with a specific stress state in the material induced by the dy-
namic explosion loading, divided by the time t needed to attain that stress state [183]. Strain ,dyn can 
be obtained from cross-sectional analysis or estimated from the adopted constitutive material laws. 
Time t is computed from the SDOF calculations. 
ε̇m,av =
εσ,dyn
tσ
          (5.8) 
It should be emphasized that the way by which the material behaviour under dynamic conditions is 
being accounted for is in several ways a rough simplification only. Yet is is true that the above mentioned 
DIF equations were empirically derived from tests on specimen exposed to constant strain rates, where-
fore their use in association with an average strain rate seems to be at first glance a logical approach. 
However, it must be kept in mind that material strain rates under blast load influence on structural 
members are, in fact, not constant quantities, but undergo large variations in both time and space (the 
strain rate is different in each fiber of each cross-section). Taking account too that the dynamic increase 
of material properties is influenced by a memory effect [131], i.e. the increase depends on the entire 
loading history the member has experienced up to a certain point in time, including a possible static 
stress state prior to the dynamic load exposure [185], casts doubts on the suitability of the followed 
approach. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that, strictly speaking, the DIF equations adopted here 
account for the dynamic increase under uniaxial loading conditions, i.e. pure tension or compression 
stresses in unconfined cross-sections. The use of these equations in the context of explosion-exposed 
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structural members under bending- or shear stresses, including possible confinement effects, implies 
additional uncertainties.  
In spite of these shortcomings, the herein employed-, or similar DIF models have proven to provide ac-
curate results in a number of explosion- or impact related studies of structures and structural members 
[144, 155-157, 171, 186, 187], also in association with constant strain-rates [188]. The fact that the as-
sumption of a constant strain rate is actually a sufficiently close approximation for many practical cases, 
and the observation that the DIF equations are logarithmical, wherefore the prediction of ε̇ need not be 
overly precise [121], explains this to some extent.  
5.2 Procedure 
For simplified dynamic analysis, an iterative procedure (Figure 5.6) has been developed that factors in 
material non-linearity, strain rate effects and the gravitational pre-loading of the members prior to the 
explosion event. The steps comprising the procedure are described below. 
 
Figure 5.6 Dynamic analysis procedure  
Since the material strain rates are initially unknown, the first iteration step (i=1) is based on the static 
material properties. For sake of consistency, the constitutive material laws (Figure 4.24, black lines) and 
the corresponding static material parameters (mstat) comply with those defined under section 4.8.3.  
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The stress-strain curves are used to plot a simplified moment-curvature (M-) diagram (Figure 5.7, left) 
at the critical member cross-section where, depending on the member type and the considered load-
arrangements, different pre-yield response stages (MR ≤ MR,y) and, where relevant, a post-yield stage 
(MR,y < MR ≤ MR,u) are being distinguished. The individual response stages are idealized as linear func-
tions. The curvature ductility ratio  [189] is obtained from the M- diagram as per (5.9). 
μχ =
χu
χy
           (5.9) 
 
Figure 5.7 Idealised moment-curvature (left) and resistance-displacement (right) functions assumed for the mid-
span cross-section of the beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(+). 
The resistance function R( (Figure 3.9, Figure 5.7, right) is deduced in the following step from the M-
 diagram. For this purpose resistance values R are obtained from the respective bending moments M 
as per equation (3.32). The stiffness values k in the pre-yield response stages of the simply supported 
members are computed from (3.26) using the respective cross-sectional values, EI. Ultimate deflection 
capacity, u, is deduced from (5.10), adopted from [190], which relates curvature to displacement duc-
tility ratios, respectively  and (3.34). In Annex C, the suitability of (5.10) for purpose of the present 
study is being proved.  
μδ =
μχ+1
2
=
δu
δy
          (5.10) 
A resistance value, Rstat, and the corresponding deflection stat must be found for the gravitational loads 
borne by the beam at the time the explosion occurs (Figure 5.7). Point (stat, Rstat) defines the origin of 
the function for effective resistance to the dynamic blast load affecting the members (Figure 5.7, red 
line). This function is characterised by effective resistances Ry,dyn (5.11) and Ru,dyn (5.12), stiffness kdyn as 
well as the effective displacement ductility ratio, ,dyn (5.13).  
Ry,dyn = Ry − Rstat         (5.11) 
Ru,dyn = Ru − Rstat         (5.12) 
μδ,dyn =
δu,dyn
δy,dyn
=
δu−δstat
δy−δstat
        (5.13) 
It should be noted that Figure 5.7 represents the situation for the beams subjected to positive bending, 
which will be addressed in detail in section 5.3.2. The figure is anticipated here for purpose of a better 
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illustration of the involved variables in the development of the dynamic resistance functions of the mem-
bers. However, equations (5.9) to (5.13) shown before, as well as the corresponding explanations given, 
are of general validity for all the member types analyzed, i.e. including the beams subjected to negative 
bending and the columns due to M-N interaction, addressed in sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, respectively. 
In addition to the resistance function, a dynamic load function must be defined, to which end the trian-
gular load-pulse defined by (3.29) and (3.30), shown in Figure 4.7 is assumed. Load-pulse duration tp 
may be assumed to rise with volume of the enclosure where the explosion occurs (section 3.1.4). On 
these grounds and assuming room volumes smaller than 1000 m3, tp values from 0.2 s to 0.5 s are 
adopted depending on the member analysed [183]. Large-span beams (and the columns supporting 
them), present in larger volume enclosures, are consequently assumed to be exposed to load-pulses of 
a longer duration (Table 5.1). Moreover, an initial peak value for the pressure-pulse has to be adopted 
at this stage, pEX,peak,j=1 (Figure 4.7, Figure 5.6). 
Table 5.1: Load-pulse durations tp assumed for dynamic analysis of beams and columns  
Span l [m] tp [s] 
5-10 0.20 
15-20 0.35 
30-40 0.50 
 
Once the parameters of the dynamic resistance- and load functions are defined, the equivalent SDOF 
quantities are derived by means of transformation factors Ki (Table 3.4) as previously exposed in section 
3.3.3. The constant velocity procedure [164], is then applied for the stepwise, numerical integration of 
the equations of motions describing the behaviour of the SDOF system, given by (3.15) to (3.17). The 
integration yields the maximum explosion-induced deflection, m,dyn, which, added to the initial, static 
deflection, stat, gives the total deflection max. Where max - u exceeds the established tolerance, a new 
explosion peak-pressure pEX,peak,j=2 is estimated and the SDOF analysis is repeated (Figure 5.6). This pro-
cedure is iterated until the tolerance criterion is met, max ≈ u (section 5.1.2). In addition to , the anal-
ysis computes the bending moment M(t) at the intermediate member cross-section (Figure 5.2, Figure 
5.3, Figure 5.5). The reaction forces V(t) at the supports (Figure 5.4) are found from the dynamic equi-
librium conditions (3.41) and (3.42), coupled to the SDOF analysis by means of flexural resistance R. A 
separate iteration-loop j is required to determine the peak-pressure pEX,peak,j which complies with the 
condition VE = VR according to section 5.1.2.  
Strain rate effects are factored into the procedure by deriving DIFs based on a set of average material 
strain rates ?̇?𝐦,𝐚𝐯 (5.8) according to section 5.1.3. The resulting stress-strain laws characterised by the 
dynamic material parameters mdyn (Figure 4.24, red lines) then serve as a basis for a second iteration 
step (i=2). Further to the procedure described, the result of this step is a new set of updated, dynamic 
material properties mdyn. The procedure reaches conclusion when the difference between the updated 
and the previous values lies within the established tolerance (1%). Where the difference lies outside the 
tolerance, further iteration is initiated (i=3). A total of two to three steps suffice to obtain sufficiently 
accurate results.   
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5.3 Implementation 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The present section describes the implementation of the described dynamic analysis procedure for the 
different structural member types and failure modes. The focus is placed on the development of the 
dynamic resistance function based on the M- analysis (Figure 5.7) and the determination of average 
strain rates ε̇m,av (5.8) for the estimation of dynamic material properites.  
5.3.2 Beams submitted to load arrangement pEX(+) 
Resistance function 
Load arrangement pEX(+) considered for the beams is characterized by two subsequent load stages: stage 
1 due to the static action of gravitational loads and stage 2 in consequence of the dynamically applied 
explosion pressure (Figure 4.8). The flexural response of the beams to this load arrangement, repre-
sented by the M- diagram at the mid-span cross-section, can be described by three subsequent re-
sponse functions (RF) (Figure 5.7). 
- RF I: uncracked state  
MR =
MR,cr
χcr
∙ χ      if  ≤ cr   (5.14) 
- RF II: cracked state prior to yielding of the longitudinal reinforcement  
MR = MR,cr +
MR,y−MR,cr
χy−χcr
∙ (χ−χcr)   ifcr <  ≤ y   (5.15) 
- RF III: post-yield state  
MR = MR,y +
MR,u−MR,y
χu−χy
∙ (χ−χy)   ify <  ≤ u   (5.16) 
The transition between RF I and II is given by the cracking moment MR,cr (5.17) as a function of the 
concrete tensile-strength and the section modulus W of the mid-span cross-section. Since for the mem-
bers analyzed here the static action effect ME,stat exceeds MR,cr, this transition takes place under the influ-
ence of the previously to the explosion event acting gravitational loads. Consequently, the static value of 
the concrete tensile strength is involved in (5.17), remaining unaffected by strain-rate effects. The same 
applies to the concrete modulus Ec required for inference of crack-curvature cr as the ratio between 
MR,cr and the cross-sectional stiffness EII (Figure 5.7).  
MR,cr = fct,stat ∙ W         (5.17) 
Cross-sectional analysis is carried out to compute curvatures y and u corresponding to the yield- and 
ultimate bending moments, MR,y and MR,u, respectively, based on (4.16). Therefore, the relevant dynamic 
material properties (fc,dyn,c1,dyn, fy,dyn and ft,dyn) are employed for all iteration-steps i >1 (Figure 5.6), as 
will be outlined below. Response functions II and III are thereby completely defined. The curvature duc-
tility,  (5.9) and the cross-sectional stiffness in the cracked state, EIII (Figure 5.7) are subsequently 
deduced from the M- diagram. The contribution of the concrete between the cracks (tension stiffening) 
is being neglected. Consequently, a possible increase of the cross-sectional stiffness due to a dynamic 
increase of the concrete modulus Ec [126, 185] during response stage II is neither accounted for. 
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The effective (dynamic) resistance function Rdyn() to the applied explosion load is finally deduced as 
decribed in section 5.2. Its point of origin (stat, Rstat) is given by interception of RF II at R=Rstat, required 
to resist the initially present gravitational loads. The corresponding stiffness kdyn is represented by value 
kII converted from EIII (Figure 5.7). Displacement ductility ,dyn is given by (5.13).  
Average strain rates  
The dynamic increase factors DIFfc and DIFc1 for the determination of the dynamic concrete compres-
sive strength fc,dyn and the compressive strain at maximum stressc1,dyn (Figure 4.24) are based on the 
average strain rate ε̇c,av given by (5.18).  
ε̇c,av =
εc,y−εc,stat
ty
         (5.18) 
The numerator of (5.18) represents the compressive strain induced in the most loaded concrete fiber 
on top of the mid-span cross-section by the dynamic load at time ty (Figure 5.2). It is determined by 
subtracting compressive strain c,stat due to the gravitational loads at t = t0 (Figure 5.2) from the total 
strain c,y, both inferred from cross-sectional analysis (Figure 5.8). Time ty is computed from the SDOF 
analysis. 
 
Figure 5.8 Strain distribution in the mid-span cross-section due to initially acting static loads at t = t0 (stage 1), 
and total strain distribution at t = ty  
In an equivalent way, average strain rate ε̇s,av is deduced from (5.19) and employed to compute DIFfy 
and DIFft for the yield- and tensile strength of the reinforcing steel layer As1 (Figure 5.8) under dynamic 
loading conditions, respectively fy,dyn and ft,dyn. The total strain of the reinforcement layer at yield, s1,y, is 
given by Hook’s law, s1,y = y,dyn = fy,dyn / Es. It should be observed that the formulation for DIFft (3.12) is 
a function of the yield strength what seems to justify the use of the yield point as a reference for the 
derivation of a corresponding average strain rate. 
ε̇s,av =
εs1,y−εs1,stat
ty
         (5.19) 
The dynamic increase of the concrete compressive strength involved in the resistance of the compres-
sion strut (4.20) close to the beam support cross-sections is based on average strain rate ε̇cv,av given by 
(5.20). Within this formulation, cv is the total strain induced in the concrete strut by shear force VE, 
approximated by the compressive strain at maxium stress,c1,dyn. The contribution of the initially acting 
static loads cv,stat is approximated as a function of the ratio between the corresponding shear force VE,stat 
and total shear force VE. The time tV required to attain VE (Figure 5.4) is deduced from the SDOF analysis.  
c,stat
s1,stat
stat
c,y
s1,y = y,dyn
y
h d
As1
b
Initial strain due
to static loads (t = t0)
Total strain (t = ty)
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ε̇cv,av =
εcv−εcv,stat
tV
≈
εcv(1−
VE,stat
VE
)
tV
       (5.20) 
In an equivalent manner, the DIFfyws corresponding to the yield strength of the transverse reinforcement  
involved in the resistance of the tension tie (4.21) close to the beam support cross-sections is inferred 
from average strain rate ε̇sv,av (5.21). This strain rate is a function of the total strain sv in the stirrups 
due to shear force VE, given by Hook’s law, sv = fyw,dyn / Es and contribution sv,stat of the gravitational 
loads. 
ε̇sv,av =
εsv−εsv,stat
tV
≈
εsv(1−
VE,stat
VE
)
tV
       (5.21) 
5.3.3 Beams submitted to load arrangement pEX(-) 
Resistance function 
In contrast to pEX(+), load arrangement pEX(-) (Figure 4.8) is characterized by an explosion load (stage 2) 
which opposes the gravitational loads (stage 1) acting on the beams previously to the accidental sce-
nario. Consequently, the negative bending response mode of the beams under exposure to load-stage 2 
is preceded by a positive bending response due to the static action effect ME,stat in consequence of load-
stage 1 (Figure 5.3). The tensile force induced by moment ME,stat calls for a bottom reinforcement layer 
As2 (according to the definition in Figure 4.10, As1 refers to the tensile reinforcement layer under the 
explosion exposure, i.e. the top reinforcement layer in case of load arrangement pEX(-)). For this purpose, 
the reinforcement obtained in the member design procedure for load arrangement pEX(+) will be adopted.  
The structural response to stage 1 can be described by the following two response functions (RF) of the 
simplified M- relationship at the mid-span cross-section, shown in the left part of Figure 5.9: 
- RF I(+): uncracked state during positive bending response  
MR =
MR,cr(+)
χcr(+)
∙ χ     if  ≤ cr(+)   (5.22) 
- RF II(+): cracked state prior to yielding of the bottom reinforcement layer As2 during positive 
bending response  
MR = MR,cr(+) +
MR,y(+)−MR,cr(+)
χy(+)−χcr(+)
∙ (χ−χcr(+))  ifcr(+) <  ≤ stat  (5.23) 
Within the preceding M- relationships, cracking moment MR,cr(+) is defined by (5.17) whereas the yield 
moment MR,y(+) and the corresponding yield curvature y(+) are deduced from cross-sectional analysis 
under assumption of the bottom reinforcement layer As2 as described above. Since the positive bending 
response is induced by the gravitational loads, the static material properties are used for the description 
of RF I(+) and II(+) and are hence exempt from the iterative updating procedure of the dynamic material 
characteristics (Figure 5.6). 
The interception of RF II(+) at MR = ME,stat delivers the point of origin of the structural response to the 
explosion load (stage 2). Four linear M- functions represent this response (Figure 5.9, left): 
- RF 0: decompression of the cross-section  
MR =
ME,stat
χstat
∙ χ      if 0 <  ≤ stat   (5.24) 
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- RF I(-): uncracked state during negative bending response  
MR =
MR,cr(−)
χcr(−)
∙ χ     if cr(-) <  ≤    (5.25) 
- RF II(-): cracked state prior to yielding of top reinforcement layer As1 during negative bending  
MR = MR,cr(−) +
MR,y(−)−MR,cr(−)
χy(−)−χcr(−)
∙ (χ−χcr(−))  if y(-) <  ≤ cr(-)  (5.26) 
- RF III(-): post-yield state during negative bending response  
MR = MR,y(−) +
MR,u(−) − MR,y(−)
χu(−)−χy(−)
∙ (χ−χy(−))  ifu(-) <  ≤ y(-)  (5.27) 
Response function 0 describes the member response from the initiation of the explosion event at t = t0 
to the moment of the complete decompression of the cross-section at t = tdec (Figure 5.3). It is assumed 
that at the end of this stage, the initial curvature stat will have been reduced to zero. In the following, 
the negative bending response stage is entered with initially uncracked concrete in tension, until, at the 
end of RF I(-), cracking moment MR,cr(-) is reached. The dynamic concrete properties (fct,dyn and Ec,dyn) are 
employed to deduce MR,cr(-) and the corresponding curvature cr(-) for all iteration steps i >1 (Figure 5.6). 
The transition from RF I(-) to II(-) is characterized by a decrease of the cross-sectional stiffness EI. Re-
sponse RF II(-) concludes with the initiation of plastic deformations of the longitudinal reinforcement 
upon reaching the yield curvature y(-). Both the yield- and the ultimate curvature (u(-)) are deduced 
from cross-sectional analysis under use of the relevant dynamic properties of concrete (fct,dyn, Ec,dyn, 
fc,dyn,c1,dyn) and steel (fy,dyn and ft,dyn) for all iteration steps i >1 (Figure 5.6). Response functions II(-) and 
III(-) are thereby fully described and the curvature ductility deduced from (5.9) where y and u are re-
placed by y(-) and u(-), respectively. Based on the established M- diagram (RF 0 to RF III(-)), the re-
sistance function R()(Figure 5.9, right) is subsequently derived as described under section 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.9 Idealised moment-curvature (left) and resistance-displacement (right) functions assumed for the mid-
span cross-section of the beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(-) 
For sake of a simplicity, the derived, multilinear R- function is then converted to a strain energy-
equivalent bilinear function, shown in the right part of Figure 5.10. Both the point of origin (stat, Rstat) 
and the failure point (u(-), Ru(-)) of this bilinear function are adopted from the multilinear graph (Figure 
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5.10, left). The equivalent yield point (y(-),eq, Ry(-),eq) is determined so that the dissipated strain energy 
(red coloured area Ws,BL) is equal as under the multilinear approach (blue coloured area Ws,ML). 
The effective resistances Ry,dyn,eq and Ru,dyn,eq of the bilinear function are then obtained from (5.11) and 
(5.12), respectively, where Ry = Ry(-),eq, Ru=Ru(-) and Rstat < 0. Moreover, this function is characterized by 
an effective stiffness kdyn,eq prior to yielding (Figure 5.10, right) and an effective displacement ductility 
,dyn,eq given by (5.13) where y = y(-),eq, u = u(-). 
 
Figure 5.10 Idealised multilinear (left) and equivalent, bilinear (right) resistance-displacement functions as-
sumed for the mid-span cross-section of the beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(-) 
Average strain rates  
The dynamic increase factors DIFfct and DIFEc for the determination of the dynamic concrete tensile 
strength fct,dyn and the elastic modulus Ec,dyn (Figure 5.11) are based on the average strain rate ε̇ct,av given 
by (5.28).  
ε̇ct,av =
εct
tcr−tdec
         (5.28) 
Strain ct corresponds the most loaded concrete cross-section fiber in tension, induced by the dynamic 
load at time tcr when cracking occurs. Keeping in mind that this fiber is initially under compression stress 
until t = tdec (Figure 5.3), the effective time span for ct to be reached is given by tcr - tdec. Both tcr and tdec 
are deduced from the SDOF analysis. 
 
Figure 5.11 Stress-strain relation for concrete in tension under static (black) and dynamic (red) conditions  
The dynamic increase of the concrete compressive strength fc,dyn and the compressive strain at maxi-
mum stressc1,dyn is determined from the average strain rate ε̇c,av (5.29). This strain rate is defined by 
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the ratio of the total compressive strain c,y in the most loaded concrete cross-section fiber at time t = ty 
to the effective time span (ty – tdec), which considers that this fiber is initially exposed to tensile stress. 
In a similar vein, equation (5.30) defines the average strain rate for estimation of the dynamic increase 
factors for the reinforcing steel yield- and tensile strength. 
ε̇c,av =
εc,y
ty−tdec
          (5.29) 
ε̇s,av =
εs1,y
ty−tdec
          (5.30) 
 
Figure 5.12 Strain distribution in the mid-span cross-section due to initially acting static loads at t = t0 (stage 1), 
and total strain distribution at t = ty  
5.3.4 Columns 
Resistance function 
As previously described in section 4.5, load arrangement NEX(-) considered for the columns is character-
ized by two subsequent load stages (Figure 4.9). In stage 1, the gravitational loads impose an eccentric 
axial compression force in the columns, whereas in stage 2 the explosion-induced actions reduce this 
axial force under simultaneous increase of the bending moment. The development of the resistance 
function, which adequately describes the structural response of the columns under these particular load 
assumptions, is far more complex than in case of the beams. In particular, the following problems must 
be dealt with:  
- The member failure mode is unknown. Depending on the load- and resistance characteristics in 
each case, members might fail due to exceedance of the UMLS or the BLS (Figure 4.12). 
- The location of the failure point (ME=MR, NE=NR) on the M-N interaction diagram (Figure 4.11, 
Figure 4.12) is unknown.  
- The moment-curvature relationship, based on which the resistance function is to be developed, 
depends on the (variable) axial force level.  
The determination of the relevant failure mode and the corresponding failure point calls for a numerical 
solution algorithm, which accounts for the axial force-dependent formulation of action effects and re-
sistance under consideration of both the geometrical and material non-linearity involved. Within this 
algorithm, the explosion pressure and the corresponding statically equivalent load-effects are stepwise 
incremented and the corresponding structural response computed accordingly, until member failure. 
The algorithm is described below. 
h d
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The first step of the numerical solution procedure (s=1), describes the initial situation under the influ-
ence of the gravitational loads (load stage 1). The eccentric action of the corresponding axial compres-
sion force NE,s=1 (5.31) causes a bending moment ME,s=1 (5.32), with a second order eccentricity eII,s=1 in-
ferred from curvature s=1 = stat under the assumption of a sinusoidal curvature distribution along the 
member length, l0 (Figure 5.13). 
NE,s=1 = NE,stat         (5.31) 
ME,s=1 = NE,s=1 ∙ (emin + eII,s=1) = NE,s=1 ∙ (emin + 0.1 ∙ l0
2 ∙ χs=1)   (5.32) 
Curvatures=1 can be found from the equilibrium condition (5.33) where resistance moment MR,s=1 is 
given by (5.34) or (5.35), depending on whether s=1 > or < cr. In the former case, represented in Figure 
5.13, MR,s is function of the yield moment MR,y,s and the corresponding yield curvature y,s, obtained from 
cross-sectional analysis under consideration of axial force NE,s=1 (5.31). The static material properties 
are used for the derivation of MR,s=1, which is hence exempt from the iterative updating of the dynamic 
material properties (Figure 5.6). With s=1 being determined, the point of origin of the M- function de-
scribing the structural response to the explosion event is defined. 
ME,s=1 = MR,s=1         (5.33) 
MR,s =
MR,cr
χcr
∙ χs      if s ≤ cr  (5.34) 
MR,s = MR,cr +
MR,y,s−MR,cr
χy,s−χcr
∙ (χs−χcr)    if s > cr  (5.35) 
 
Figure 5.13 Idealised moment-curvature function for the intermediate cross-section of the columns and corre-
sponding action effects (blue line) – step s =1 (gravitational loads) 
In the following steps (s =2 to n) of the solution algorithm, the explosion pressure is being progressively 
increased. Each pressure increment entails an increment NEX,s of the tensile axial force component NEX 
and consequently a reduction NE,s (=NEX,s) of the resulting axial compression force NE with respect to 
the previous load step s-1 (5.36). Moreover, bending moment ME is being incremented by ME,s (5.37). 
NE,s = NE,s−1 − ΔNE,s         (5.36) 
ME,s = ME,s−1 + ΔME,s        (5.37) 
Increment ME,s (5.38) is composed by a first order and second order term, respectively, ME,I,s and 
ME,II,s (Figure 5.14). The former (5.39), based on (4.35), expresses the difference between increment 
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MEX,s of moment MEX due to the horizontal explosion-load component p̃EX,h and increment MN,EX,s of 
moment MN,EX due to the eccentricity (emin) of the dynamic axial force NE,dyn = NEX. The latter (5.40), based 
on (4.36), accounts for changes in the deformed state of the columns. Formally it represents the differ-
ence between second order moments (NE∙) corresponding to incremental steps s and s-1, respectively, 
expressed as a function of the corresponding curvatures s and s-1 at the intermediate cross-section of 
the columns. 
ΔME,s = ΔME,I,s + ΔME,II,s        (5.38) 
ΔME,I,s = ΔMEX,s − ΔMN,EX,s        (5.39) 
ΔME,II,s = NE,s ∙ δs − NE,s−1 ∙ δs−1 = 0.1 ∙ l0
2 ∙ (NE,s ∙ χs − NE,s−1 ∙ χs−1)   (5.40) 
Curvatures is finally deduced from condition (5.41) where resistance MR,s is given by (5.34) or (5.35), 
depending on whether s > or < cr. In the former case, represented in Figure 5.14 (for s=2), MR,s is func-
tion of the yield moment MR,y,s and the corresponding curvature y,s. Both MR,y,s and y,s are obtained from 
cross-sectional analysis under consideration of axial force NE,s (5.36) and under use of the relevant dy-
namic properties of concrete (fct,dyn, Ec,dyn, fc,dyn,c1,dyn) and steel (fy,dyn and ft,dyn) for all steps i >1 of the 
established iteration procedure (Figure 5.6).  
ME,s = MR,s          (5.41) 
 
Figure 5.14 Development of the idealised moment-curvature function for the intermediate cross-section of the 
columns and corresponding action effects (blue+red lines) – step s =2.  
The successive increase of the explosion pressure and the corresponding statically equivalent action 
effects delivers, through application of equations (5.36) to (5.41), the points of equilibrium (blue dots 
in Figure 5.14) which characterize the pre-yield response stage of the member in question. This stage 
concludes when curvature s equals the yield curvature (s = y,s). At this point, where the yield strength 
of the tensile- or compression reinforcement layer is being reached, the member might buckle in case 
the second order effects would be still sufficiently high, despite the reduction of the compression axial 
force the column has experienced up to that point. As explained in section 4.6.3 (Figure 4.12), the cor-
responding limit state (BLS) is attained when, upon reaching y,s, the step-function representing the ac-
tion effects ME,s() is tangent to the moment-curvature diagram MR,s(), as shown in Figure 5.15, left (for 
s=3). This situation, where any further load increase would imply an immediate stability loss of the 
member, is formally described by condition (5.42), which expresses that the slope mII,s of ME,s() at s = 
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y,s exceeds slope mR,s of the plastic response stage of MR,s(). Hence, members for which the inequality 
(5.42) is fulfilled, are considered buckling-critical. On the contrary, the member will not buckle upon 
initiation of reinforcement yielding and the plastic response stage will be entered, as represented in 
Figure 5.15, right (for s = 3). In this stage, resistance MR,s is defined by (5.43), as a function of the 
moments and curvatures at yield- and ultimate failure, inferred from cross-sectional analysis under in-
fluence of axial force NE,s (5.36). Failure will arise, after further load increase, in consequence of exces-
sive cross-sectional deformations, i.e. exceedance of the UMLS beyond ME,s = MR,u,s.  
mII,s =
ΔME,II,s
χs−χs−1
> mR,s =
MR,u,s−MR,y,s
χu,s−χy,s
    and s ≊ y,s  (5.42) 
MR,s = MR,y +
MR,u,s−MR,y,s
χu,s−χy,s
∙ (χs−χy,s)    if s > y  (5.43) 
It should be noted that the presented algorithm is computed with a variable load step-size s. While the 
first steps are kept comparatively large, s is reduced when approaching the yield curvature y,s in order 
to assure that s ≊ y,s with an accurate precision when checking the inequality (5.42). In Annex D, the 
algorithm is checked for its correct functioning and implementation by means of a case study under the 
assumption of simplified loading conditions.  
 
Figure 5.15 Development of the idealised moment-curvature function for the intermediate cross-section of the 
columns and corresponding action effects (blue+red lines) – step s =3: BLS (left) and UMLS (right).  
A linear connection of the points of equilibrium (blue dots) found for each of the load steps s delivers 
the multilinear M- relationship which represents the structural response of the member to the imposed 
(statically equivalent) load effects. Subsequently, the multilinear M- diagram (Figure 5.16, left) is being 
converted to an effective, dynamic resistance function Rdyn() taking account of the static load level 
immediately prior to the explosion (section 5.2). A simplified, bilinear function is inferred (Figure 5.16, 
right), characterised by effective resistances Ry,dyn and Ru,dyn (the latter is relevant only for UMLS 
members), an effective stiffness prior to yielding, kdyn and the effective ductility ratio ,dyn (5.13) (in 
case of BLS members ,dyn = 1.0). Effective resistances Ry,dyn and Ru,dyn are deduced from (5.11) and 
(5.12) as a function of resistance Rstat, required to withstand the initially present gravitational loads. 
Stiffness kdyn represents the slope of the pre-yield response function, defined by a linear connection 
between the point of origin (Rstat, stat) and the yield point (Ry, y), secant to the R- diagram (Figure 5.16, 
right). Conducted tests showed that a strain energy-based inference of an equivalent stiffness kdyn,eq, in 
a similar vein as done for the beams under load arragement pEX(-) (section 5.3.3), would not entail 
significant changes with respect to the adopted secant approach. 
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Figure 5.16 Multilinear moment-curvature (left) and resistance-displacement (right) function for the intermedi-
ate cross-section of the columns (UMLS  members) 
The effective resistance function can then be employed to determine the dynamic load- and inrease 
factors following the established, iterative analysis procedure (Figure 5.6). It should be observed that 
the dynamic load factor DLFM (5.7), obtained after each iteration step i of this procedure, will entail an 
alteration of the first-order term of the statically equivalent bending moment, ME,I. The corresponding 
increments ME,I,s (5.39) are to be updated accordingly. On the other hand, since DLFN = 1.0 (section 
5.1.2), no such updating of the axial force increment NE,s is necessary.  
Average strain rates  
Although this applies to the minority of the studied members, the initial moment due to the gravitational 
loads acting prior to the explosion event, ME,stat, might not exceed the cracking moment, MR,cr. In these 
cases, concrete cracking is supposed to occur under dynamic loading conditions. Hence, dynamic in-
crease factors (DIF) for the material parameters characterizing cracking are to be derived, i.e., the con-
crete tensile strength fct and the concrete modulus Ec. The corresponding DIF (DIFfct, DIFEc) are based on 
the average strain rate ε̇ct,av given by (5.44). Strain ct corresponds to the tensile stress-state in the most 
loaded concrete cross-section fiber, induced by the dynamic load at time tcr, when the concrete tensile 
strength is reached. Strain component ct,stat is approximated as a function of the ratio between ME,stat 
and MR,cr. Time tcr is deduced from the SDOF-analysis. 
ε̇ct,av =
εct−εct,stat
tcr
=
εct(1−
ME,stat
MR,cr
)
tcr
       (5.44) 
The determination of the structural response in the pre-and post-yield stage requires dynamic increase 
factors DIFfc and DIFc1 for the dynamic concrete compressive strength fc,dyn and the compressive strain 
at maximum stressc1,dyn (Figure 4.24). Moreover DIFfy and DIFft for the yield- and tensile strength of the 
reinforcing steel layers As1 and As2 (Figure 4.10) are needed. The corresponding average strain rates 
ε̇c,av and ε̇s,av are given by (5.18) and (5.19), respectively, introduced before for the beams. In Annex E, 
the herein used DIF equations for fc, c1, fy and ft are applied to formulate the resistance of a column 
tested under dynamic exposure of interacting bending moment and axial force [191]. It is found that the 
resistance of the column can be accurately reproduced. 
The dynamic increase of the concrete compressive strength and the yield strength of the transverse 
reinforcement involved in the shear resistance of, respectively, the compression strut and the tension 
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tie at the beam’s support cross-section, is also computed in an analog manner to the beams. Equations 
(5.20) and (5.21) apply for estimation of the corresponding average strain rates, where VE,stat = 0. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The defined RC beams and columns are submitted to the dynamic analysis procedure described in sec-
tion 5.2 under use of the corresponding resistance function and the average strain rates defined in sec-
tion 5.3. The results for the beams submitted to load arrangements pEX(+) and pEX(-) (Figure 4.8) are pre-
sented in  sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3, respectively. Section 5.4.4 contains the most relevant results obtained 
for the 28512 columns submitted to load arrangement NEX(-) (Figure 4.9). 
5.4.2 Beams submitted to load arrangement pEX(+) 
Dynamic load factors 
As a measure for their deformation capacity, Figure 5.17 (left) presents the displacement ductility ratios 
 (5.10) corresponding to the 486 RC beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(+). The Figure shows 
that  strongly depends on the tensile reinforcement index (=l∙ fyk/fck). In line with the findings 
from other studies, e.g. [192], the plastic deformation capacity of the beams experiences a decay with 
increasing The tendency line included in the figure suggests that this decay follows a power-law func-
tion. The minimum ductility ratio  ≈ 2 is associated with reinforcement indices  larger than 0.2. On 
the contrary, the maximum  of nearly 8 corresponds to a  below 0.05.  
 
Figure 5.17 Displacement ductility ratio  versus tensile reinforcement index  (left); Ratio between  and 
,dyn versus explosion-load ratio acc (4.62) (right); 486 beams subjected to load-arrangement pEX(+) 
The displacement ductility ratio  (5.10) is related in Figure 5.17 (right) to the effective ductility ratio 
,dyn (5.13), which takes account of the initially present gravitational loads. Ratio  /,dyn is shown as 
a function of the accidental load ratio acc (4.62), which represents the ratio between the blast load and 
the total loads acting on the members. It can be observed that the higher the gravitational loads, repre-
sented by smaller acc, the higher is the effective ductility ratio ,dyn with respect to . The point is that 
higher gravitational load Rstat levels cause a shorter elastic response stage ( <y) in relation to the plas-
tic range (y ≤  < u) and consequently a larger effective ductility ,dyn in comparison to  (Figure 5.7). 
In line with the explanations in section 3.3.3 (Figure 3.11), the dynamic load factors DLFM corresponding 
to the flexural failure mode of the beams diminish with increasing deformation capacity of the members. 
This can be drawn from Figure 5.18 (left), where the obtained DLFM (red dots) are shown as a function 
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of the effective displacement ductility ratio ,dyn (5.13). The results manifest that the required re-
sistance to face the applied blast load decreases as the deformation capacity increases. From an alterna-
tive point of view, it might be stated that the resisted explosion pressure increases with rising defor-
mation capacity. In any case, the results clearly evidence the beneficial effect of energy dissipation 
through plastic deformations. The maximum DLFM of 0.96 corresponds to a ,dyn close to 2 whereas the 
minimum DLFM of 0.48 is obtained for an effective ductility ratio larger than 7.  
The ductile flexural response mode can only be developed if the members are able to resist the dynamic 
shear forces that arise concomitantly close to the member supports. The green dots reflected in Figure 
5.18 (left) indicate that this is highly unlikely however. They represent the maximum dynamic load fac-
tors DLFM that are obtained if the peak pressure applied to the beams would not exceed the value the 
member may sustain without undergoing a tension-controlled shear failure scenario at the member 
support, characterized by failure of the stirrups. As indicated by the comparatively higher DLFM, this 
peak pressure is significantly smaller than in case of the flexural failure mode, represented by the red 
dots. The comparatively smaller ,dyn ratios point to the fact that the energy dissipation capacity of the 
members is not fully taken account of at the time of shear failure. This is being confirmed in the right 
part of Figure 5.18 which compares the strain energy Ws dissipated during the explosion event until the 
point of bending failure (Ws,M) and tension tie shear failure (Ws,Vs), respectively. The represented ten-
dency line shows that at the time of shear failure only about 1/3 of the energy dissipation capacity cor-
responding to the flexural failure mode is taken advantage of. 
 
Figure 5.18 Dynamic load factor DLFM for flexural (red) and tension tie shear failure mode (green) versus effec-
tive displacement ductility ,dyn (left); Dissipated strain energy Ws: Tension tie shear failure mode, Ws,Vs vs. flex-
ural failure mode, Ws,M (right); 486 beams strictly designed for acc. load arrangement pEX(+) 
The DLFM shown in Figure 5.18 are again plotted in Figure 5.19 (left) as a function of the ratio between 
the load-pulse duration tp and the member natural period T (3.27). It can be observed that the beams 
perform in the dynamic regime (section 3.3.3). The mayor discrepancies between the represented DLFM 
(red and green dots), and hence the sustained explosion peak pressure until member failure in the, re-
spectively, flexural- and shear mode, arise at non-dimensional time ratios tp/T around 1.0. Towards the 
quasi-static regime (section 3.3.3) these discrepancies logically vanish. 
The fact that the resisted peak pressure until occurrence of a tension-induced shear failure is compara-
tively small is also being reflected in relatively high dynamic load factors DLFVs, defined according to 
(5.4). This can be drawn from Figure 5.19 (right), where the mentioned DLFVs are plotted as a function 
of ratio tp/T (green dots). The maximum DLFVs of about 1.3 indicates that the required resistance to 
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sustain the dynamic shear force may be up to 30% higher than the shear force due to the statically ap-
plied peak pressure. In the most favorable case, corresponding to a relatively small tp/T ratio of about 
0.6, the required resistance amounts to approximately 70% of this force (DLFVs ≈ 0.7). 
 
Figure 5.19 Dynamic load factor DLFM for flexural (red) and tension tie shear failure mode (green) versus non-
dimensional time-ratio tp/T (left); Dynamic load factor DLFV for tension- (green) and compression- (blue) shear 
failure mode versus tp/T (right); 486 beams strictly designed for acc. load arrangement pEX(+) 
In comparison to the tension-induced shear failure, a shear failure associated with crushing of the com-
pression strut seems to be highly unlikely to occur. Precisely speaking, it is found that the peak pressure 
the members are able to sustain until this type of failure occurs largely exceeds the corresponding value 
associated with the tension-controlled shear mode. Likewise, it amply exceeds the sustained peak pres-
sure of the members performing in the ductile, flexural mode. In other words, in order to attain the 
compression-controlled shear force resistance, the member would have to undergo displacements far 
beyond the ultimate value u associated with flexural failure. Since this is not reasonable, the expected 
dynamic shear forces corresponding to the compression-controlled shear failure mode are represented 
by the maximum member reaction forces that arise concomitantly to the flexural response mode. The 
corresponding DLVVc are shown in the right part of Figure 5.19 (blue dots). It can be observed that the 
DLFVc are substantially smaller than the DLFVs values, corresponding to the tension-induced shear fail-
ure (green dots), especially when tp/T ratios around unity are concerned. The minimum DLFVc of 0.55, 
corresponding to a tp/T ratio of about 0.6, represents a dynamic shear force which amounts to 55% of 
the shear force resulting from the statically applied explosion peak-load. 
The minimum, mean and maximum dynamic load factors of the 486 beams designed according to the 
accidental situation are summarized in Table 5.2. It must be recalled at that point that this design situa-
tion is not mandatory in all 486 cases however. As explained in section 4.7 (Table 4.3), according to the 
hypothesis adopted in the present study, the design is to be based on the persistent situation in 273 out 
of the 486 members, since in these cases the normal load conditions demand a higher resistance than 
the accidental load scenario. A higher resistance, in turn, is reflected in a comparatively lower member 
deformation capacity and, hence, in a reduced energy dissipation during the dynamic response under 
the explosion load scenario. Due to this reason, the DLF’s for members strictly designed to the persistent 
situation are comparatively higher, as can be inferred from Table 5.2. The indicated minimum, mean 
and maximum values for the 486 beams designed according to the mandatory situation (213 results for 
the accidental situation and 273 results for the persistent situation) exceed the values obtained if exclu-
sively the accidental situation is considered in the design stage.  
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Table 5.2: Statistical evaluation of dynamic load factors (minimum, mean, maximum value and coefficient of vari-
ation CoV) for 486 beams designed strictly according to accidental and mandatory situation. 
Failure mode Bending Shear (tension) Shear (compression) 
Dynamic load factor DLFM DLFVs DLFVc* 
Design situation Accidental Mandatory Accidental Mandatory Accidental Mandatory 
Min 0.48 0.59 0.69 0.75 0.55 0.64 
Mean  0.79 0.86 1.03 1.09 0.78 0.84 
Max 0.96 1.05 1.29 1.31 0.94 0.98 
* Concomitant to bending failure 
Dynamic increase factors 
Table 5.3 shows the mean, maximum and minimum dynamic increase factors (DIF) involved in the bend-
ing- (M) and shear- (V) response of the beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(+). It is shown that the 
concrete compressive strength fc experiences the comparatively largest dynamic increase with DIF’s up 
to 1.23. Such high DIF’s correspond to concretes of lower strength class (fck = 25 N/mm2), as exposed in 
section 3.2.2. The mean increase of fc is about 13-15%, only slightly above the mean value for the con-
crete compressive strain c1 (11-12%) and the reinforcing steel yield strength fy or fyw (10%). The small-
est dynamic increase corresponds to the tensile strength of the reinforcing steel ft with a mean value of 
about 3%. 
Table 5.3: Dynamic increase factors (DIF) for 486 beams submitted to load arrangement pEX(+) 
Failure mode DIF Mean Max Min 
 
M 
fc 1.13 1.22 1.07 
c1 1.11 1.13 1.09 
fy  1.10 1.12 1.08 
ft 1.03 1.04 1.03 
 
V 
fc 1.15 1.23 1.09 
c1 1.12 1.14 1.11 
fyw  1.10 1.12 1.07 
 
Final observations 
In relation to the presented results, it is interesting to recall that the mid-span and the support cross-
sections of the beams have been strictly designed, respectively for bending and shear, to resist the nom-
inal explosion pressure specified in the applied code (section 4.7). In the flexural design, it was envis-
aged that the mid-span cross-section of the beams behaves in a ductile manner, by limiting the neutral 
axis depth x/d (4.50). Nevertheless, according to the results presented above, it seems likely that the 
beams, as designed, will fail in the more brittle shear (tension tie) mode, before the full flexural response 
might be developed. This finding is consistent with the frequently quoted observation that structural 
members, when exposed to blast loads, might fail in shear, even if they were designed to exhibit a ductile, 
flexural behavior under quasi-static loading conditions (section 3.2.3). In order to perform in the desired 
ductile flexural mode, the beams would require either a higher shear resistance (for instance by provid-
ing a higher transverse reinforcement degree), or a lower bending resistance and/or stiffness, what 
constitutes a parallelism to the capacity design approach for seismic actions. The latter option could be 
achieved by considering the beneficial effect of energy dissipation explicitly in the flexural design stage 
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of explosion-exposed members, for instance by introducing dynamic load factors such as those pre-
sented before*. In addition, the current definition of the design material properties for accidental situa-
tions should be analyzed in detail, as do suggest the findings presented in Table 5.4. The table shows the 
minimum, mean and maximum values of the ratios between the structural resistance of the members 
based on, respectively, mean (including strain-rate effects) and design values. The ratios for bending 
(M)-, tension-induced shear (Vs)- and compression-controlled shear- (Vc) failure are distinguished. As 
can be observed, the resisting bending moments based on mean values, MRm, exceed the design moments 
MRd between 1.29 and 1.38 times. On the contrary, the corresponding ratios for the tension-induced 
shear failure mode, VRm,s/VRd,s oscillate between far lower boundaries of 1.20 and 1.25, whereas in case 
of the compression-controlled shear failure the ratios (VRm,c/VRd,c) are significantly higher as denoted by 
lower and upper bounds of 1.75 and 1.98, respectively.  
Table 5.4: Minimum, mean and maximum values of ratios between mean (including strain rate effects) and de-
sign resistance of 486 RC beams designed for load arrangement pEX(+)  
Ratio MRm / MRd VRm,s / VRd,s VRm,c / VRd,c 
Min 1.29 1.20 1.75 
Mean  1.34 1.23 1.85 
Max 1.38 1.25 1.98 
 
The mentioned discrepancies, which are indicative of the above detected proneness of the beams to fail 
in tension-induced shear, on one hand, and their highly unlikely failure in compression-controlled shear, 
on the other, can be traced back to different circumstances. Among them, the following two should be 
highlighted here: the partial safety factors applied in the member design for concrete and reinforcing 
steel, and the strain rate effects. In line with the current approach in the codes, the latter have not been 
explicitly accounted for in the design stage. As the mentioned results show, this might not only contrib-
ute to an underestimation of structural resistance, but also to an undesired, brittle shear failure mode, 
characterized by a reduced energy absorption capacity, and consequently, to a non-efficient allocation 
of structural resources to face the explosion-induced loads. In this context, it is also suggested to analyze 
in detail to which extent the current partial safety factors for concrete and steel, to be employed in the 
accidental design situation, are based on rational grounds. The fact that there seems to be no clear evi-
dence that the scatter associated with the dynamic resistance of concrete is significantly different from 
concrete under static loading [128], and the fact that model uncertainties associated with dynamic load 
effects are generally higher than under static conditions, do certainly not deliver a rational basis which 
justifies the reduction of the partial factor for concrete c from 1.5, in persistent situations, to 1.3 [72], 
or 1.2 [84], in accidental design scenarios. In case this reduction would have been introduced to account 
indirectly for enhanced material resistance under dynamic loading conditions, i.e. due to strain rate ef-
fects, it seems to be questionable if this would be generally the appropriate way to do so. Besides from 
the fact that in this case a unified reduction of c, independent of the dynamic load type, would not seem 
to be reasonable from a physical point of view, due to fundamentally different orders of magnitude the 
material strain rates might attain in specific accidental situations involving different types of dynamic 
load exposures (Figure 3.5). The introduction of material- and load-specific, dynamic increase factors in 
the design codes would seem to be a more rational approach in this regard. 
* Clause 5.3 (3) in the current Eurocode for accidental actions [17] states that gas explosions might involve peak pressures which are higher 
than the nominal static equivalent pressure pd according to Annex D.2 of the mentioned code, adopted for member design in the present study. 
It further states that such peak pressures should be considered in the context of a maximum load duration of 0.2 s and plastic material defor-
mations. No model is included in [17] for estimation of such peak pressures, however. In [30], where a possible practical implementation of 
the quoted clause is illustrated, the nominal pressure pd has been adopted as a reasonable approximation.  
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In summary, the previously discussed results point to certain scope for improving the current design 
rules for accidental situations in view of a more consistent and rational treatment of structural safety. 
The development of a corresponding, explicit proposal is out of scope of the present thesis. In any case, 
such a proposal should be preferably based on the results of a consistent risk analysis including both 
probabilities of explosion-induced failure scenarios and their consequences, what is the purpose of 
chapters 6 to 8 of the present thesis.  
5.4.3 Beams submitted to load arrangement pEX(-) 
Dynamic load factors 
As shown before in the context of the beams exposed to load arrangement pEX(+) , the displacement duc-
tility ratios  for the 136 beams strictly designed to resist load arrangement pEX(-) are found to decrease 
with rising tensile reinforcement index , as shown in Figure 5.20 (left).  However, unlike observed for 
load arrangement pEX(+), the  - relation shown here is subject to a considerable scatter, in particular 
for small tensile reinforcement indices . The unusually small  (min ≈ 0.01), which are a consequence 
of the opposing directions of gravitational- and explosion design loads and the correspondingly small 
design action effect MEd, cause displacement ductility’s  far larger than found for the beams under 
pEX(+), with maximum values of ≈ 
 
Figure 5.20 Displacement ductility ratio  (multilinear resistance function) versus tensile reinforcement index  
(left); Inverse of ratio between displacement ductility  and effective displacement ductility ,dyn versus inverse 
of explosion-load parameter acc; 136 beams strictly designed for acc. load arrangement pEX(-) 
In section 5.4.2 it was shown that the effective ductility ratio ,dyn (5.13) of the beams under load ar-
rangement pEX(+) depends significantly on the relation acc (4.62) between the explosion load and the 
total loads. This is being confirmed in Figure 5.20 (right) for the members exposed to load configuration 
pEX(-). With increasing influence of the gravitational loads, represented by decreasing ratios acc-1 (expo-
nent -1 is introduced in Figure 5.20 since under configuration pEX(-) the explosion load (EX) exceeds the 
total loads (EX-G)), the effective ductility ratio ,dyn diminishes in comparison to the “potential” ductility 
ratio . In contrast to load arrangement pEX(+), the counteracting effect of the gravitational loads entails 
pronounced elastic deformations ( <y) during the explosion-induced member response and hence a 
reduction of the effective ductility ratio ,dyn. In the most unfavorable cases (acc-1 ≈ 0), ,dyn approaches 
only 70% of . 
In the following, Figure 5.21 (left) compares the effective ductility ratios corresponding to the multilin-
ear and the equivalent, bilinear resistance function (Figure 5.10), respectively ,dyn and ,dyn,eq. It is ev-
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idenced, that the former is generally smaller than the latter. The regression line suggests that, as a gen-
eral tendency, the higher is ,dyn the larger is the difference to ,dyn,eq. In any case, it should be kept in 
mind that ,dyn and ,dyn,eq are consistently related to each other on the basis of the total strain energy 
dissipated by the structural deformations during the dynamic response. Hence, the adoption of the 
equivalent parameter ,dyn,eq, in addition to the equivalent resistance Ry,dyn,eq and stiffness kdyn,eq (Figure 
5.10), is supposed to entail a similar dynamic behaviour as under use of the multilinear resistance func-
tion. This behaviour is represented by the dynamic load factors DLFM, shown in Figure 5.21 (right) as a 
function of ,dyn,eq. As observed before for situation pEX(+), the DLFM, and hence the required resistance 
to oppose the blast, diminishes with increasing ductility capacity of the members. Since due to the rather 
small tensile reinforcement indices (Figure 5.20), this capacity, and hence the energy dissipation, is com-
paratively large, the DLFM are generally smaller than those found for the beams under load arrangement 
pEX(+). The minimum DLFM of 0.28 is obtained for an equivalent ductility ratio of about 28, whereas the 
maximum DLFM of about 0.8 corresponds to a ,dyn,eq close to 3. The mean value of the 136 represented 
DLFM is situated at approximately 0.53. 
 
Figure 5.21 Effective displacement ductility ratios corresponding to the multilinear (,dyn, x-axis) and the equiva-
lent bilinear resistance function (,dyn,eq, y-axis) (left); Dynamic load factor DLFM for flexural failure mode versus 
,dyn,eq (right); 136 beams strictly designed for acc. load arrangement pEX(-) 
Dynamic increase factors 
Table 5.5 shows the mean, maximum and minimum dynamic increase factors (DIF) involved in the dy-
namic response of the beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(-). The DIF for the parameters charac-
terising the behaviour of concrete in compression (fc and c1) as well as the strength of the reinforcing 
steel (fy and ft) are of the same order as those for the beams exposed to load arrangement pEX(+) (Table 
5.4). Interesting to stress here is the very considerable dynamic increase of the concrete tensile strength 
fct and the modulus Ec. According to the results obtained, the latter experiences an increase of 20-30% 
when exposed to the explosion-induced action effects, while the former might even rise to about 40%.  
Table 5.5: Dynamic increase factors (DIF) for 136 beams submitted to load arrangement pEX(-) 
Failure mode DIF Mean Max Min 
 
M  
fc 1.17 1.26 1.09 
c1 1.14 1.17 1.11 
Ec 1.24 1.29 1.21 
fct 1.26 1.42 1.18 
fy  1.16 1.21 1.14 
ft 1.05 1.07 1.05 
,dyn,eq = 1.121,dyn1.211
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5.4.4 Columns 
Failure modes and domains due to M-N interaction 
The structural behavior of the 28512 defined RC columns subjected to the accidental load arrangement 
NEX(-) is characterized by interaction of bending moments (M) - or shear forces (V), with axial forces (N). 
The present subsection refers to the M-N interaction. Figure 5.22 illustrates the possible associated fail-
ure domains according to the distinction into members that fail in the buckling mode (BLS, left) and 
those where cross-section failure concurs with exceedance of the ultimate moment (UMLS, right). For 
BLS members, domains BT (tension) or BC (compression) apply depending on whether the yield strength 
of the tensile- (As1) or the compression-reinforcement layer (As2) is being exceeded. In case of the UMLS 
columns, five possible failure domains can be distinguished (U1 to U5), consistent with the definition of 
the strain limits for ULS-design shown in Figure 4.13 (right).  
 
Figure 5.22 Possible failure domains BC (compression) and BT (tension) corresponding to buckling-limit state 
(BLS) members (left) and U1 to U5 of Ultimate Moment Limit state (UMLS) members (right). 
Figure 5.23 shows, for each of the 28512 analyzed members, the ratio between the axial force NE at 
failure of the intermediate cross-section and the maximum axial force NR,max this cross-section is able to 
resist. Ratio NE/NR,max is represented as a function of eccentricity e (2.51, 2.54), normalized for the cross-
section depth h, given by (5.45). It should be stressed that ratio e/h does not represent a “real” constant 
eccentricity. It is introduced here as a measure for the location of the failure point (ME, NE) on the M-N 
interaction diagram in consequence of the two sequential load-paths due to gravitational loads (path 1) 
and the explosion-induced loads (path 2), respectively (Figure 4.11, Figure 5.23).  
e
h
=
ME
NE∙h
=
MR
NR∙h
          (5.45) 
From Figure 5.23 it can be deduced that the study of the columns covers a wide range of failure domains. 
Positive NE/NR,max ratios are indicative of failure under compression axial forces whereas negative 
NE/NR,max ratios represent cases where failure arises under a tensile axial force. In all cases, a bending 
moment interacts with the axial force in a more or less important way, reaching from negligible (e/h ≈ 
0) to totally prevailing (e/h → ±∞) contributions.  
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Figure 5.23 Ratio between axial force NE at failure and maximum resisting axial force NR,max versus normalized 
eccentricity e/h; 28512 columns strictly designed for accidental load arrangement NEX(-).  
From Table 5.6 it can be deduced that the vast majority of the analysed members fails due to exceedance 
of the UMLS (92.5 %), where failure domain U3, characterised by crushing of the concrete under simul-
taneous yielding of the tensile reinforcement layer, is most frequent. With only very few exceptions, 
yielding of the tensile reinforcement characterises also the failure of the generally less frequent buckling 
critical members (7.5 %). The fact that the explosion entails a reduction of the axial force (Figure 5.23, 
path 2) explains why failure characterized by yielding of the reinforcement in compression occurs in 
comparatively few members. 
Table 5.6: Percentages corresponding to failure domains of the 28512 analysed columns  
Limit state Failure domain 
(Figure 5.22) 
% Examples 
BLS BT 7.5 E5 
BC ≈ 0 - 
UMLS 
U1 0.3 - 
U2 11.1 E4 
U3 52.5 E1, E3 
U4 28.6 E2 
U5 0 - 
Total 100 - 
 
In the following, the structural behaviour and the resulting failure modes of the analysed columns will 
be illustrated by means of examples E1 to E5 (see Figure 5.23 and Table 5.6). The first example-column 
(E1), is situated on the top floor (ns = 0) of a building characterised by relatively small spacing between 
columns of l = 5 m (Figure 4.6). Hence it is characterized by an initially low compression axial force level 
due to gravitational loads (NE,stat) in relation to the maximum cross-section capacity NR,max. This can be 
observed in the left part of Figure 5.24 (left), which shows the idealised action effects corresponding to 
load-paths 1 and 2 (Figure 5.23) as well as the situation of the corresponding failure point (ME, NE) on 
the M-N interaction diagram as obtained after the final iteration-step of the established dynamic analy-
sis procedure (section 5.2). The figure reveals that the explosion scenario reduces the initial axial force 
level only scantly while the corresponding moment, mainly due to the horizontal blast load p̃EX(t) (Fig-
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ure 4.9), is increased until cross-section failure arises in domain U3 under almost pure bending expo-
sure, i.e. NE ≈ 0, e/h ≈ -39 (Figure 5.23). In the right part of Figure 5.24, which shows the accidental 
design situation of example E1, it can be deduced that the scarce contribution of the axial force was an-
ticipated in the design stage.  
 
Figure 5.24 Example E1: M-N interaction diagrams (red) and sequential action effects (black). Mean value analy-
sis (left) versus design situation (right). 
In comparison to the previous case, the initial axial force NEstat corresponding to example E2 is higher in 
relation to the maximum capacity NR,max, what can be drawn from Figure 5.25. The reason for this is that 
example E2 supports the corresponding weight of ns = 10 floors (E1: ns = 0). Moreover, the spacing be-
tween columns (l = 15 m) is significantly higher than in E1. The latter aspect contributes also to a large 
influence area of the explosion pressure on floor and ceiling, and hence to an important axial force re-
duction due to component NEX in relation to the increase of the bending moment MEX stemming from the 
horizontal explosion load (Figure 4.16, left). The failure point of column E2 is situated in domain U4, just 
above the balance point (NE/NR,max ≈ 0.3, e/h ≈ 0.7). Interesting to observe here is that this failure mode 
was not predicted in the member design stage. In the right part of Figure 5.25 it is shown that the design 
point falls into failure domain U5 (x > h, (e/h)d ≈ 0.1). The explanation for this discrepancy is twofold: 
On one hand, and more important, the consideration of more realistic material properties, in terms of 
mean values under inclusion of strain-rate effects, causes load-path 2 to intercept the M-N interaction 
diagram at a far lower axial force level than in the design situation. Secondly, and although far less in-
fluent, the fact that second-order effects are over-estimated in the design stage due to conservative de-
sign assumptions causes a more pronounced slope of load-path 2 in comparison to the design situation, 
what likewise results in an interception point with the interaction diagram at a comparatively lower 
axial force level.  
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Figure 5.25 Example E2: M-N interaction diagrams (red) and sequential action effects (black). Mean value analy-
sis (left) versus design situation (right). 
 
Figure 5.26 Example E3: M-N interaction diagrams (red) and sequential action effects (black). Mean value analy-
sis (left) versus design situation (right). 
The fact that the failure domain of the member differs from the design assumptions applies also to ex-
ample E3, shown in Figure 5.26. However, in contrast to E2 the compression axial force reduction during 
the dynamic response of E3 is far more important, what may be mainly attributed to a larger column 
spacing l (E3: l = 30 m). In consequence of the important reduction of the compression axial force, sec-
ond order effects are mitigated and failure occurs, as before in example E1, in domain U3 under crushing 
of the concrete and simultaneous yielding of the tensile reinforcement layer in the intermediate cross-
section (NE/NR,max ≈ 0.08, e/h ≈ 2.7). In the design stage, on the contrary, failure was associated with 
concrete crushing and yielding of the compression reinforcement in domain U4 (Figure 5.26, right). As 
described before, the particular characteristics of load-path 2, given by a descending axial force and an 
increasing bending moment, along with the assumption of more realistic values for the material prop-
erties and, less important, the conservative estimation of second order effects in the design stage, are in 
the origin of this discrepancy.  
Table 5.6 shows that in about 11% of the analysed members, the explosion-induced axial force reduction 
due to component NEX causes a failure of the tensile reinforcement in failure domain U2. Example E4, 
characterised by an initially high compression axial force NE,stat due to significant gravitational loads (ns 
= 15, l = 40 m), represents such members. As can be observed in Figure 5.27 (left), failure of E4 arises 
under the influence of a resulting tensile axial force (NE < 0, e/h ≈ -0.84). As shown in the right part of 
this figure, such structural behaviour, which is associated with extremely large column spacing l, was 
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neither foreseen in the member design stage, where the failure point was situated in domain U5 (x>h). 
Besides, it should be stressed that the design for the accidental load arrangement of column E4 demands 
a cross-section resistance that is not sufficient to resist the design values of the action effects due to the 
gravitational loads (ME,stat,d, NE,stat,d), acting immediately before the explosion event (Figure 5.27, right). 
Consequently, without any need for further checking, it is clear that column E4, as designed for the ac-
cidental situation, is not a practically relevant member. In this case, the persistent design situation calls 
for a comparatively higher resistance (Figure 4.16, left). It is recalled here that in more than 80% of the 
analyzed 28512 columns, the persistent design situation would be mandatory for design of the interme-
diate cross-section (Figure 4.17). At a later stage of this section this issue will be resumed.  
 
Figure 5.27 Example E4: M-N interaction diagrams (red) and sequential action effects (black). Mean value analy-
sis (left) versus design situation (right). 
The previous examples are all characterized by cross-section failure due to exceedance of the UMLS, 
where second-order effects are negligible. Under the assumptions met in the present study, the follow-
ing three conditions must be simultaneously fulfilled for a member to be buckling-critical: a certain, 
initial compression axial force level in the members due to gravitational loads (NE,stat), a relatively small 
reduction of this level during the explosion response (what according to the asumptions adopted implies 
a relatively small distance l between columns) and, most importantly, a considerable member slender-
ness ratio . One such member is example–column E5 (NE,stat / NR,max ≈ 0.15, l = 5 m,  = 69). In the left 
part of Figure 5.28 it can be observed that the explosion entails an insignificant reduction of the initial 
axial force NE,stat while the bending moment is increased until buckling failure occurs. This failure, which 
concurs with yielding of the tensile reinforcement layer (failure domain BT), manifests an unstable equi-
librium state before the plastic structural response stage can be entered (section 4.6.3). Figure 5.28 
(right) shows that the important second order effects, of about 30%, were anticipated in the design 
stage, although slightly over-predicted (47%). The fact that the failure mode changes from a compres-
sion failure in design (domain B4) to a tensile failure in the mean-value analysis is attributable, once 
more, to the particular characteristics of load path 2 in conjunction with more realistic assumptions for 
the material properties. 
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Figure 5.28 Example E5: M-N interaction diagrams (red) and sequential action effects (black). Mean value analy-
sis (left) versus design situation (right). 
Dynamic load factors 
It was previously stated that the vast majority of the columns designed for M-N interaction is predicted 
to fail due to exceedance of the ultimate moment of the intermediate cross-section (UMLS). For these 
members, energy dissipation during the dynamic structural response can be accounted for to a more or 
less extent, depending on the member deformation capacity in the plastic regime. As a measure for this 
capacity, the effective displacement ductility ,dyn (5.13) is shown in Figure 5.29 (left) as a function of 
the normalised eccentricity (5.45) for the totality of the 28512 members strictly designed for the acci-
dental situation NEX(-) and analysed according to the procedure described in section 5.2. The figure re-
veals that under the influence of a resulting compression axial force (e/h > 0), the effective displacement 
ductility and hence, the potential energy absorption capacity of the members during the response to the 
explosion event, tendentiously increases with increasing e/h, what is a logical finding. As stated before, 
relatively small e/h are representative of comparatively high compression axial forces NE at failure, what 
implies a reduced deformation capacity. An example is column E2 where a normalized eccentricity of 
e/h ≈ 0.7 is associated with almost zero plastic deformation capacity (,dyn ≈ 1.05). It is also recalled 
here that in buckling-critical members (Example E5), no such capacity can be activated (,dyn = 1.0). 
Towards pure bending failure (e/h→ ±∞), the effective displacement ductility ,dyn converges to a con-
stant value, which as can be observed, remains below 10 in all cases. This observation is in good agree-
ment with the findings for the bending failure mode of the beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(+) 
(Figure 5.18). Figure 5.29 (left) further shows that under the prevailing influence of a tensile axial force 
(e/h → -0), the effective displacement ductilities are boosted to values of up to 50. Such large plastic 
deformation capacities correspond to extremely ductile cross-sectional behavior, characterized by fail-
ure of the tensile reinforcement upon reaching the ultimate strain u in failure domain U2 (Example E4: 
e/h ≈ -0.8, ,dyn ≈ 21).  
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Figure 5.29 Effective displacement ductility ratio ,dyn versus normalized eccentricity e/h (left); Stiffness kdyn 
versus compression axial force due to gravitational loads NE,stat (right); 28512 columns strictly designed for acc. 
load arrangement NEX(-). 
In summary, the results shown in Figure 5.29 (left) illustrate that a large fraction of the studied columns 
disposes of a potentially considerable energy absorption capacity. However, it must be taken into ac-
count that most of these members are initially subjected to large gravitational loads what has significant 
consequences on the member characteristics and hence on its dynamic structural performance. Accord-
ing to the adopted design procedure (section 4.7), the larger the axial force level NE,stat due to such loads, 
the larger are the member cross-section dimensions and hence, the higher is the member bending stiff-
ness kdyn (Figure 5.16). This is shown in Figure 5.29 (right). A larger bending stiffness, in turn, involves 
smaller natural periods T (3.27) in relation to the load-pulse duration tp what can be observed in Figure 
5.30 (left), which represents ratio tp/T as a function of kdyn. It is revealed that with a few exceptions, the 
studied members perform in the quasi-static regime (section 3.3.3), where the tp/T ratios are too high 
to cause a notable influence of inertia effects and energy dissipation on the structural behavior (for in-
stance E2, E3, E4). Consequently, the potentially large energy absorption capacity, expressed by the con-
siderably high ,dyn ratios of many members, is clearly put into perspective for in most of the cases it 
can be taken advantage of only to a very small extent.  
 
Figure 5.30 Ratio between load-pulse duration tp and natural period T versus stiffness kdyn (left); Dynamic load 
factor DLF for flexural (red) and shear failure mode (blue) versus ratio tp / T; 28512 columns strictly designed 
for accidental load arrangement NEX(-) 
The ultimate consequence of the generally high tp/T ratios is, that in contrast to the findings for the 
beams, the dynamic load factors DLFM for most of the members do not fall significantly below unity, as 
illustrated by the red dots in Figure 5.30 (right). In case of members with extremely limited- or zero 
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plastic deformation capacity, the DLFM factors may even amount to values larger than unity, in the most 
unfavourable case of up to 1.2. Among these members are the buckling–critical columns which, due to 
their comparatively high slenderness, are characterised by relatively small tp/T ratios.  
In addition to the DLFM, Figure 5.30 (right) shows the dynamic load factors corresponding to the shear 
failure mode of the columns, DLFV. It can be observed that, due to the quasi-static behaviour of most of 
the columns, the difference between the DLFV and DLFM ratios is generally small and vanishes with in-
creasing tp/T ratios. It should also be noted that due to the generally large tp/T ratios, the DLFV factors 
corresponding to the tension- (DLFVs) and compression- (DLFVc) controlled shear failure at the support 
cross-sections of the columns are almost identical, wherefore they are not explicitly distinguished here. 
This could be observed before for the beams performing under comparatively high tp/T ratios (Figure 
5.19, right). 
The previous results refer to the 28512 columns strictly designed according to the accidental situation. 
As was described in section 4.7 (Table 4.3, Figure 4.17), this design situation is mandatory in less than 
20% of the studied cases however. According to the hypothesis adopted in the present study, in 23757 
of the 28512 members the design is to be based on the persistent situation since in these cases the nor-
mal load conditions demand a higher resistance than the accidental load scenario. This was illustrated 
by example E5 presented before (Figure 5.27, right). It should be added here that for these members, 
the increase in resistance with respect to the accidental design situation reflects in even higher tp/T 
ratios. Hence, the before described findings concerning the quasi-static behavior likewise apply to the 
members designed for the persistent situation and the corresponding dynamic load factors are almost 
identical to those presented above. Unlike could be observed for the beams, the mentioned increase in 
resistance does not imply a notable decrease of the member deformation capacity. As explained before, 
the generally high tp/T ratios entail that the energy dissipation capacity of the members can be taken 
account of only to a very small extent, in most cases of any practical relevance. 
Dynamic increase factors 
Table 5.7 shows the mean, maximum and minimum dynamic increase factors (DIF) involved in the dy-
namic response of the columns subjected to M-N or V-N interaction. Concerning the V-N response mode, 
the results are generally similar to those found for the beams under pure shear exposure. Some differ-
ences between beams and columns are detected for bending-influenced member response. The wide 
range of M-N failure domains covered in the study of the columns (Figure Figure 5.23) reflects in com-
paratively large scattered DIF’s. While the maximum values only slightly exceed the values found for the 
beams under pure bending, the minimum values (DIF ≈ 1.0) are situated far below those obtained for 
the beams. The mean DIF’s of bending-influenced columns and beams are of the same order. 
Table 5.7: Dynamic increase factors (DIF) for 28152 columns submitted to load arrangement NEX(-) 
Failure mode DIF Mean Max Min 
 
M-N  
fc 1.12 1.25 1.00 
c1 1.10 1.15 1.00 
fy  1.10 1.13 1.00 
ft 1.03 1.04 1.00 
 
V-N 
fc 1.15 1.23 1.09 
c1 1.12 1.14 1.11 
fyw 1.11 1.12 1.10 
 
 Chapter 5   Dynamic analysis 
171 
Final observations  
The analysis of the example-columns presented above revealed an interesting finding: The failure do-
mains of the members might strongly differ from those anticipated in the design stage what, ultimately, 
could contribute to irrational design solutions. In particular, it was shown that the failure point on the 
interaction diagram based on mean values for the material properties (including strain rate effects) 
might be situated in a failure domain that completely differs from the design predictions, where charac-
teristic values of the material properties are employed along with partial safety factors to define the 
interaction diagrams. It should be highlighted here that only the particular characteristics of the explo-
sion-induced load-path 2, described by a simultaneous increase of bending moment and decrease of 
axial force, make this phenomenon possible. In other words, the observed discrepancy would not appear 
for the assumption of normal use conditions, i.e. under the influence of gravitational loads only. For such 
conditions a constant eccentricity can be assumed in many cases (Figure 2.18, path E2*) and hence the 
consideration of more realistic material properties for the definition of the M-N interaction diagram 
does not imply significant changes of the failure point location with respect to the design situation (see 
e.g. Figure 2.19).  
In order to improve the described situation, it would seem advisable to consider more realistic material 
properties in the design stage of columns involving M-N interaction associated with gas explosions or 
other accidental situations involving similar load path characteristics. Important seems an appropriate 
definition of the representative values of the material properties, including strain rate effects. Moreover, 
as already suggested for the beams (section 5.4.2), it should be analysed whether the current partial 
safety factors constitute a suitable solution for the cross-section design under the combined influence 
of explosion-induced bending moments and axial forces. In the light of the herein obtained results it 
could be even convenient to envisage partial factors of = 1.0 for both concrete and steel in order to 
shift the design M-N interaction diagrams towards more realistic boundaries and thereby to avoid the 
above described inconsistencies concerning the failure point location. In any case, a consistent calibra-
tion of the design rules should be based on rationally established target reliability levels. Such levels 
should be derived taking account of the occurrence probabilities of explosion-induced column failure 
under consideration of the load-path dependant structural behaviour and failure modes (Chapter 6). 
Moreover, they should account for the failure consequences what calls for suitable consequence models 
(Chapter 7). The derivation of such target reliability levels is objective of Chapter 8.   
5.5 Validation of simplified models 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The dynamic analysis procedure described in sections 5.2 and 5.3 is based on a simplified 
characterisation of both dynamic loading and structural resistance. While in view of available test 
results the idealization of the explosion loading by means of a pressure-time function seems to be a 
reasonable approach (section 3.1.4), the representation of structural resistance under such loading 
implies a number of simplifying hypotheses and assumptions that require a validation. For instance, the 
moment-curvature-based definition of the effective resistance function called for a number of 
assumptions related to the member stiffness, deformation capacity, the dynamic properties of its 
constituent materials and the effect of static preloading. Moreover, simplifying assumptions were 
adopted in connection with the conversion of the real system into an equivalent SDOF system by means 
of transformation factors (section 3.3.3), e.g. assumptions regarding the deformed shape of the 
members in the elastic and plastic response stage (Figure 3.10). Finally, hypothesis had to be established 
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concerning the distribution of inertia forces (Figure 3.14) along the members in order to estimate their 
contribution to the dynamic equilibrium formulated for the determination of dynamic shear forces close 
to the member’s support cross-section. 
The mentioned simplifying hypotheses and assumptions were validated with a finite element model that 
factors in the many complex features of structural behaviour under explosive loading. A numerical 
model based on a plane stress assumption was developed with the FE-code DIANA [193] and its 
structural performance compared to test results reported in the literature. That model was 
subsequently used to explore the behaviour of 18 RC beams previously analysed with the simplified 
procedure and models presented in sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
The numerical study was carried out on the occasion of a researcher exchange programme at Delft 
University of Technology (TU Delft), divided into two periods of 6 weeks each. The first stay included 
the model development and validation by means of extensive comparisons to beam tests under both 
static and dynamic loads, taken from the literature. In the further continuation of the work, the 
numerical model was adapted to the geometry, the material characteristics and the loading conditions 
of the 18 beams selected for purpose of the comparative study between simplified analysis (SA) and 
numerical analysis (NA). However, the first analysis trials carried out before performing this study, 
revealed significant plastic strain concentrations in the tensile reinforcing steel cross-sections, situated 
at the locations of the main bending cracks close to the mid-span cross section of the beams. The 
influence of certain modeling parameters on the mentioned strain concentrations and their impact on 
the structural behaviour and failure mode of the beams was subsequently investigated. A particular aim 
of this preliminary study, summarized in Annex F, was to judge the possibility to establish a failure 
criteria based on the ultimate strain of the materials. Besides from influences of the material model for 
the reinforcing steel and bond-slip relationships in the steel-concrete interface, the strain 
concentrations were found to be strongly mesh-size dependent what precluded the establishment of an 
ultimate strain-based failure criterion. On the contrary, the global structural response of the members 
was found to converge reasonably well upon refining mesh-size. It was thus decided to conduct the 
subsequent comparative study between NA and SA in terms of forces and deflections rather than in 
terms of material strain and curvatures. 
After a description of the members selected for the comparative study (section 5.5.2), the characteristics 
of the numerical model finally adopted for this purpose are described in section 5.5.3. This is followed 
by a brief summary of the model validation in section 5.5.4. The numerical analysis procedure is 
presented in in section 5.5.5, before some of the representative results are discussed in section 5.5.6. 
The content of sections 5.5.2 to 5.5.6 is partly summarized in [194, 195]. 
5.5.2 Members studied 
The 18 beams selected out of a total of 486 include members with spans of l = 5 and 15 m (Table 5.8). 
The variations in beam slenderness (11.4<l/h<15) and the aspect ratios (1.7<h/b<2.0) of their 
rectangular cross-sections (Figure 4.10) are nearly negligible. The members are subjected to load-
arrangement pEX(+) (Figure 4.8). A wide range of nominal explosion load to total load ratios, acc (4.62), 
is considered (0.23 < acc < 0.84), as shown in Table 5.8. The members analysed are designed for 
characteristic concrete compressive strengths of fck = 25 or 50 N/mm2, and a reinforcing steel yield 
strength of fyk = 500 N/mm2. The provided longitudinal- and transverse reinforcement, respectively, As1 
and Asw/s, resulted from the strict design at the beams mid-span- and support cross sections (section 
4.7). The numerical model required also a longitudinal compression reinforcement layer, assumed as 
As,2 = 0.2·As,1. The reinforcement ratios for the longitudinal tensile reinforcement, l=As1/(b·d), ranged 
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from 0.004 to 0.02 and the resulting tensile reinforcement index, = l·fyk/fck, from 0.05 to 0.21 (Table 
5.8). The ratio for shear reinforcement, w = Asw/(s·b), fluctuated from 0.001 to 0.005.  
Table 5.8: Some characteristics of the 18 beams selected for the comparative study   
 
5.5.3 Development of a numerical model 
A finite element model was developed using DIANA [193]. Capitalising on the symmetry in the approach, 
a half-beam model simply supported at l/50 from the free end and with constrained horizontal 
displacement at mid-span was defined (Figure 5.31). The concrete is represented by quadratic, 
quadrilateral plane stress elements whose size declines gradually from e=h/8 at the free end of the 
beams to e=h/32 at mid-span. The model envisages truss-type embedded reinforcement [193] and a 
perfect bond. Three-node linear elements are applied at the top of the beams to add a distributed mass 
which accounts for the permanent loads acting on the members, likewise considered in the simplified 
analysis. 
 
Figure 5.31 Numerical model 
The model factors in material non-linearity. Concrete cracking is modelled from a smeared, rotating 
crack approach which aligns the axes of principle strain with the rotating crack orientations during the 
entire loading process [193]. The rotating crack approach was employed in conjunction with a fracture-
energy based, linear tension softening law (Figure 5.32, left). For compression, uniaxial concrete 
stresses are deduced from the parabolic law proposed by Feenstra [196] (Figure 5.32, right). The 
concrete fracture energies in tension (𝐺𝑓
𝐼) and compression (Gc), required to define those constitutive 
models, are derived from the static compressive strength according to [129] and [197], respectively. 
The equations used to factor in multiaxial stress states are based on Selby’s and Vecchio’s studies [198]. 
Reinforcement behaviour is modelled by a uniaxial, bilinear stress-strain law that includes strain 
hardening, likewise considered in the simplified analysis (Figure 4.24). 
L/2L/50
Beam 
nº 
l  
(m) 
acc l 
Beam 
nº 
l (m) acc l 
Beam 
nº 
l  
(m) 
acc l 
1 5 0.23 0.010 0.21 7 5 0.61 0.005 0.09 13 15 0.34 0.009 0.18 
2 5 0.24 0.012 0.12 8 5 0.61 0.004 0.04 14 15 0.34 0.008 0.08 
3 5 0.30 0.010 0.21 9 5 0.68 0.006 0.12 15 15 0.42 0.010 0.21 
4 5 0.30 0.013 0.13 10 5 0.68 0.005 0.05 16 15 0.42 0.009 0.09 
5 5 0.51 0.010 0.21 11 5 0.84 0.010 0.21 17 15 0.62 0.010 0.21 
6 5 0.52 0.020 0.20 12 5 0.84 0.011 0.11 18 15 0.64 0.016 0.16 
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Figure 5.32 Stress-strain relationships for concrete: Linear tension softening law (left) and parabolic law for 
compression [196] (right). 
The increase in dynamic material properties is factored into the model in the same way as in the 
simplified procedure (section 4.8.3, 5.1.3), i.e. by applying DIF’s to concrete compressive strength [129] 
and reinforcing steel yield- and tensile strengths [143] to modify the uniaxial stress-strain laws. DIF’s 
are obtained for the average strain rates in the concrete elements under compressive stress and the 
steel elements under tensile stress, deduced from the numerical analysis. The approach, described in 
Annex G, is iterative but converges quickly since, as mentioned above, the DIF equations are 
logarithmical. From Annex G it can also be inferred that the assumption of a constant, average strain 
rate is indeed defendable within the scope of the present study. 
5.5.4 Model validation 
The numerical model was validated by comparing its behaviour to test results reported by Seabold 
[146], who studied the response of simply supported RC beams (l = 3.91 m) subjected to both quasi-
static- and blast loading. The  rectangular beam cross-sections (h = 381 mm, b = 197 mm) were 
reinforced in the longitudinal direction by two bars in, respectively, the tensile (As1 ≈ 1289 mm2) and 
the compression zone (As2 ≈ 776 mm2). In transverse direction, box-type stirrups (Asw ≈ 22 mm2) were 
hooked to the compression steel in some of the tested beams. Figure 5.33 shows the half-beam model of 
test beam WE-5 [146], with a 76 mm spacing between these stirrups. The fact that the stirrups were 
spaced closer (51 mm) in the other half of test beam WE-5 (in order to preclude shear failure in that 
region) could be disregarded in the model since the tests showed that the departure from symmetry 
was not large enough to cause unsymmetrical flexural response [146]. 
 
Figure 5.33 Numerical model of beam WE-5  
Table 5.9 gives the static and dynamic material properties of test beam WE-5 [146] used in the present 
study to define the constitutive materials laws described in section 5.5.3. With the exception of Ec, Gf
I 
and Gc, which were estimated (as a function of fc) from [72], [129] and [197], respectively, the quasi-
static properties were derived from material tests on concrete and steel specimen [146]. Moreover, 
dynamic tests were carried out in order to characterize the material properties under the rapidly 
applied explosion load. From these tests, DIF formulations were derived as a function of strain rate 
[146]. Factoring average strain rates measured during the beam tests into these formulations, the 
dynamic material properties for fct, fy and fyw given in Table 5.9 were obtained. The indicated dynamic 
values for fc, Ec and ft, were estimated using DIF’s based on [129, 143]. Tensile (Gf) and compression (Gc) 
fracture energies are assumed as under static loading conditions. As far as Gf is referred to, this 
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assumption is validated by [139], where a significant dynamic increase was recorded only under very 
high tensile loading rates (> 15 GPa/s), far higher than the estimated loading rate of about 1-2 GPa/s 
characterising the test of beam WE-5. 
Table 5.9: Material property values used in the numerical analysis of beam WE-5 
1 Quasi-static values for Ec, Gf
I and Gc estimated (as a function of fc) from [72], [129] and [197], respectively 
2 Dynamic values for fc, Ec and ft based on [129] and [143]. 
In the tests [146], the beams were loaded with a uniformly distributed explosion load. Figure 5.34 
depicts the load-time function recorded in the test of beam WE-5 (black line). Multi-linear (green) and 
bi-linear (red) approximations to this load are also shown. Those were applied in the present study in 
conjunction with an implicit time integration scheme [199], using a time step size of t=1.5·10-5 s. This 
t was sufficiently small to avoid numerical convergence difficulties in the nonlinear analysis and, at the 
same time, sufficiently large to keep the computational costs within reasonable limits. 
 
Figure 5.34 Multi-lineal (green) and bi-lineal (red) approximation to the time-dependant evolution of blast load-
ing (black) to beam WE-5. 
The numerical and experimental results for the time-dependant mid-span deflection (left) and reaction 
forces (right) are compared in Figure 5.35. The blue lines reflect the numerical results found with static 
material properties (Table 5.9) and the bi-linear load function (Figure 5.34). The large differences 
between these values and the test results (black lines) identify the need to take the strain rate effects on 
the material properties of the beam into consideration. When those effects are factored in by applying 
the dynamic property values given in Table 5.9, model prediction improves substantially, as indicated 
by the red curves. Using the multi-linear load function (Figure 5.34) also improves the results slightly, 
especially as regards deflection (green curves). 
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Figure 5.35 Comparison of numerical and experimental results of beam WE-5, tested by Seabold [146]: 
Deflection at mid-span (left); Support reaction (right). 
Figure 5.36 shows beam WE-5 after the blast test. Large diagonal shear cracks can be observed which, 
according to the test records, appeared at about t ≈ 9 ms after the impingement of the blast load on the 
member. However, collapse of the beam was prevented by the stirrups, which shortly after diagonal 
cracking experimented a marked increase of the strain rates (t ≈ 10 ms). Their significant contribution 
to the shear force transfer is further characterized by the initiation of yielding at about 12 ms as 
schematically indicated in Figure 5.36 (green arrows). The yielding of the stirrups concurred with 
crushing of the concrete near the critical section (blue arrows). 
 
Figure 5.36 Beam WE5 after blast test [146] 
The numerical model of beam WE-5 is able to reproduce the marked increase in the strain rates of the 
stirrups located around the diagonal cracks, as well as their yield point. On the contrary, crushing of the 
concrete could not be observed in this region nor could the large diagonal shear cracks be reproduced. 
Previous efforts related to validation of beam models under static loads showed that the use of a fixed 
smeared crack model (assumes fixed crack directions during the entire computational process) in 
conjunction with a variable shear retention factor [193] might be more appropriate to this end. Unlike 
the herein employed rotating crack approach (section 5.5.3), where the shear retention factor can be 
implicitly assumed equal to one [193], a variable shear retention factor can account for diminishing 
shear stress transfer upon further crack opening. This is considered a more realistic approach, especially 
for the analysis of shear critical-members [200, 201]. Figure 5.37 shows the principle strain distribution 
corresponding to two different load stages in the model of Seabold’s [146] test beam OE3 (without shear 
reinforcement), where a variable shear stiffness was introduced. The beam was exposed to an 
increasing, uniformly distributed static load until collapse. Stage a represents a load level of 56 N/mm 
where the beam failed in diagonal tension after the shear crack propagated into the upper portion of the 
member. The collapse (stage b) was retarded by dowel action (modelled by replacing the truss-type 
reinforcement for beam-type elements, in addition to the consideration of geometrical non-linear 
behaviour) and finally occurred at a load-level of about 73 N/mm. Figure 5.37 shows that the 
corresponding principal strain distribution matches the crack pattern of the tested beam reasonably 
well. 
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Figure 5.37 Numerically deduced crack patterns (a = failure load, b = collapse) of statically loaded beam OE3 
without shear reinforcement and comparison to test result 
Since the use of the fixed crack approach along with the assumption of a variable shear stiffness entailed 
severe numerical problems during the solution procedure of the blast load-exposed beam WE-5 model, 
the rotating crack approach was finally adopted for this purpose. The results presented above (Figure 
5.35) confirm the validity of this approach for analysing the global structural behaviour of RC beams 
under blast loads. Moreover, these results corroborate the ability of the DIF-based procedure adopted 
to factor strain rate effects into this analysis. 
5.5.5 Numerical analysis procedure 
The numerical model thus validated was subsequently adapted to the geometry, material and loading 
characteristics of all 18 beams selected (section 5.5.2). The sequence followed in the analysis of these 
members was as follows: 
- application of uniformly distributed static preloads, g̃+q̃I (load stage 1, Figure 4.8) in the 
framework of a force-controlled, non-linear static analysis based on a Newton-Raphson iteration 
scheme 
 
- application of uniformly distributed blast loads, p̃EX(t) (load stage 2, Figure 4.8), characterised 
by a triangular load-pulse (Figure 4.7) with peak value p̃EX,peak and duration tp in the framework 
of a non-linear dynamic analysis based on implicit integration [199, 202] using time steps t = 
10-4 to 10-3 s. 
The static preloading (g̃+q̃I) and the explosive pulse duration (tp) values applied were the same as in the 
simplified dynamic analysis, in which the beams were found to resist a specific peak load, p̃EX,peak, just 
within the bounds of their ductility ceiling (5.10). That was the load applied in the numerical analysis.  
5.5.6 Comparative study 
Flexural behaviour 
The present section compares the simplified (SA) to the numerical (NA) analysis findings. By way of 
example, the structural response of beam nº 1 (Table 5.8), submitted to a static preloading of g̃+q̃I = 23.6 
kN/m and an explosion load-pulse characterised by a peak-load of p̃EX,peak = 24.2 kN/m and a load 
a 
b 
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duration of tp = 0.2 s, will be presented in more detail. The flexural response of the beam is graphed in 
Figure 5.38: on the left, bending moment, M, is plotted against mid-span deflection, , and on the right, 
 against time. The SA and NA results are very similar, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. One 
significant difference is observed, however, in the transition from state I (non-cracked) to II (cracked), 
attributable to the fact that the approach to concrete tensile behaviour was more realistic in the 
numerical model (Figure 5.38, left). The transition takes place during the response to static loading. 
Once this load was fully applied, the two models predicted practically identical deflections, stat ≈ 
0.021 m. 
The onset of the explosion at t = 0 elicits a dynamic response in the beams. The M- diagram for the 
sample beam (Figure 5.38, left) shows that the respective stiffness, kM,dyn, is practically the same in the 
two approaches, with kM,dyn,SA = 3196 kNm/m under SA and kM,dyn,NA = 2971 kNm/m under NA. The latter 
was obtained by linear regression analysis of the M- pairs in the interval [stat < < y]. Further to Figure 
5.39 (left), this finding was representative of the 18 beams analysed. The conclusion that may be drawn 
is that stiffness, kdyn, which characterises the effective resistance function used in the SDOF analysis 
(Figure 5.7), in turn directly related to kM,dyn (as per equation (3.32)), was suitably estimated. 
Consequently, the predictions of yield displacement y by, respectively, the SA and NA, are in good 
agreement too, as shown in Figure 5.39 (right). 
 
Figure 5.38 Moment-mid-span deflection (left) and mid-span deflection-time (right) curves for a sample beam 
found with simplified (red) and numerical (green) analysis 
 
Figure 5.39 NA versus SA stiffness kM,II (left) and yield initial deflection y (right) for 18 beams 
The maximum bending moment obtained for the numerically analysed sample beam (by integrating 
stress) slightly exceeded the ultimate moment MR,u deduced with the simplified analysis (Figure 5.38, 
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left). That would appear to be a logical finding, since the contribution of concrete to tensile resistance is 
disregarded in the latter. Of greater interest is the similarity in the ductility demanded of the beam in 
the two types of analysis. According to the plot of the maximum deflections (max) for the 18 beams 
analysed in Figure 5.40 (left), this finding is generally applicable in the scope of the present study. The 
mayor differences observed by Rong and Li [171, 172] between the SA- and NA based displacement 
ductility ratios ,dyn for blast-loaded beams (see section 3.3.6) are not detected here. This can be drawn 
from Figure 5.40 (right) where the percentage deviation ,dyn between ,dyn according to SA and NA, 
given by (3.48), is plotted for the 18 beams analysed (blue dots). Yet it is true that, in line with Rong and 
Li’s findings, the herein obtained ,dyn tend to rise when the longitudinal reinforcement ratio l of the 
beams decreases, they remain considerably below the mean value obtained by the mentioned authors 
(orange line), previously shown in Figure 3.19. To explain this, it must be recalled that the SDOF analysis 
conducted by Rong and Li [171, 172] significantly underestimated the numerical yield displacement y, 
what the authors related to the choice of the member stiffness (section 3.3.6). In the present study, the 
estimated member stiffness, and as consequence, the member yield displacement, concur fairly well 
with the numerical results (Figure 5.39). This confirms once more that the degree of precision in the 
prediction of the structural behaviour by means of simplified dynamic methods, such as SDOF-based 
models, greatly depends on the choice of the corresponding modeling assumptions and hypothesis 
rather than on the methodology itself (section 3.3.6). 
 
Figure 5.40 NA versus SA maximum deflection max for 18 beams (left); Percentage deviation ,dyn between ,dyn 
according to SA and NA versus longitudinal reinforcement ratio l for 18 beams (right) 
Dynamic reaction forces 
As a measure for the dynamic shear forces developing close to the member supports, the support 
reaction forces will be analysed in the following. The reaction force V(t) of the sample beam nº 1 exposed 
to the sequence of gravitational loads and explosion load-pulse (tp = 0.2 s, p̃EX,peak = 24.2 kN/m) is shown 
in Figure 5.41 (left) as a function of time. The two analyses (SA and NA) deliver generally similar results. 
Closer inspection of the figure reveals that, in spite of the introduced numerical damping (HHT-
algorithm [202] with  = - 0.3; for  = 0 the HHT-method reduces to the Newmark algorithm), the finite 
element approach predicts oscillations in the earliest dynamic response. The post-peak reaction force 
determined with NA was also characterised by oscillations, although of a lower frequency. The 
simplified model was unable to reproduce such oscillations, observable also in experimental studies 
(Figure 3.18, Figure 5.35, right). The maximum explosion-induced reaction VEX (excluding reaction force 
VE,stat due to static loads) was around 24 % higher under NA than SA (Figure 5.41, left). Figure 5.41 
(right) shows that, with one exception, the numerical results (VEX,NA) for the 18 beams were 5 to 30 % 
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higher than the simplified values (VEX,SA). Larger differences between both approaches were found for 
comparatively smaller non-dimensional time-ratios tp/T. Similar observations were by made by 
Schachter et al. [170], where the dynamic behaviour of steel beams was analysed (see also section 3.3.6). 
 
Figure 5.41 Reaction force-time curve for a sample beam found with simplified (red) and numerical (green) 
analysis (left); Ratio (VEX,NA - VEX,SA)/ VEX,SA versus ratio tp/T for 18 beams (right). 
As all structures, the beams analysed here are in reality distributed mass systems and, as such, 
theoretically dispose of an infinite number of degrees of freedom [164]. However, generally only few of 
the lower response modes are of any significance, and for many practical situations, only the 
fundamental mode is relevant. In the present study, an equivalent single degree of freedom system, in 
which only the elementary motion type is possible, could adequately describe the flexural behaviour of 
the RC beams, as shown before. On the contrary, the results shown in Figure 5.41 suggest that the 
consideration of the elementary response mode alone is not sufficient for a close representation of the 
member support reactions and could contribute to a significant underestimation of the member shear 
forces close to the supports. In the following, this subject will be analysed in more detail.    
The time-dependant evolution of the three force components of the dynamic equilibrium equation given 
by (3.43), are shown in Figure 5.42 (left) as obtained in the SA of the sample beam: the resultant force F 
of the applied explosion loading p̃EX, the corresponding support reaction VEX and inertia force I. It can be 
observed that shortly after the onset of the explosion (t = 0), the applied force F is mainly resisted by 
the inertia force I, what is attributable to the fact that the beam has had no time to deform at that early 
response stage, i.e. the flexural resistance R is not yet developed. However, in the further course of the 
member response, the inertia I loses increasingly importance, while the force transmitted to the 
supports (VEX) increases progressively. The peak of VEX approximately coincides with the maximum of 
the applied force F at tV,max,SA ≈ tp/2 = 0.1 s. Only a few milliseconds before, the yield strength of the 
longitudinal reinforcement is reached at the mid-span cross-section of the beam (ty,SA = 0.096 s, Figure 
5.38). During the following plastic response stage, VEX experiences a linear decay, until at t = tmax,SA the 
beam experiences its maximum bending response (Figure 5.38), approximately coincident with t = tp = 
0.2 s. The subsequently initiated free vibration response phase (t > tp) is characterised by mutually 
compensating VEX and I forces. 
By means of the dynamic equilibrium equation (3.43), the time-dependant inertia force I contributing 
to the resistance of the numerically analysed beam can be deduced from the applied force F and the 
dynamic support reaction VEX. The result is compared in the right part of Figure 5.42 (green curve) to 
the SA-based inertia force (red curve). It can be observed that, disregarding the high frequency 
oscillations, the SA-based result conforms well to the numerical findings during the elastic response of 
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the member (t < ty). However, at t = ty,NA = 0.099 s, when the plastic hinge begins to form around the mid-
span cross-section, the numerically deduced inertia force I experiences a sudden, pronounced decay , 
which is compensated by further increase of the reaction force VEX, until its peak-value is obtained at 
tV,max,NA ≈ 0.11 s (Figure 5.41, left). On the contrary, in the SA, which cannot reproduce this decay, the 
maximum reaction force reaches peak about 10 ms before, at tV,max,SA ≈ tp/2 = 0.1 s, coincident with the 
peak of the applied force F. 
 
Figure 5.42 Breakdown of dynamic equilibrium (3.43) applied to sample beam (left): F (applied force), VEX 
(support reaction) and I (inertia force); Inertia force-time curve for sample beam found with simplified (red) and 
numerical (green) analysis (right) 
In order to explore the backgrounds of the observed discrepancy between SA- and NA-based inertia and 
reaction forces, Figure 5.43 compares the accelerations ?̈?(𝑥, 𝑡) along the longitudinal x-axis of the 
sample beam at different instants t (Figure 5.42, right) during the member response. The graphs 
corresponding to the SA (red) are at any time proportional to the assumed deflected shapes (x) (Figure 
3.10) (red). The numerical results (green) were obtained at each of the nodes of the FE-mesh (Figure 
5.31). Unrealistic, high frequency noise in the numerical solution could be damped out [202]. 
Within the first milliseconds after initiation of the blast, where the member has not yet undergone any 
notable flexural deformations, the numerical ?̈?(𝑥, 𝑡) plots are subject to rapidly fluctuating oscillations, 
suggesting significant influence of higher response modes (Figure 5.43-a, t = 0.012 s). The integration 
(3.44) of these continually changing ?̈?(𝑥, 𝑡) shapes reflects in the previously mentioned oscillations of 
inertia- and reaction forces during the earliest dynamic response the beam (Figure 5.41, left, Figure 5.42, 
right). On the contrary, the integration of the parabola-type ?̈?(𝑥, 𝑡)-plots laid down in the SA, based on 
the fundamental response mode, entails a continuous inertia-and reaction force-time relationship, 
which does not reflect the influence of higher response modes. In any case, the likelihood of a premature 
shear failure in the first instants after applying the explosive loading on the beam is practically zero 
since the reaction forces remain clearly below the provided shear resistance. More impulsive load 
conditions (e.g. a lower rise time of the explosion load-pulse) could increase this likelihood, as pointed 
out in [148].  
The approximation of the numerical- and simplified ?̈?(𝑥, 𝑡)-plots improves in the further course of the 
member response, suggesting a decreasing influence of the higher response modes. At t = 0.048 s, the 
reaction force contributes significantly to maintenance of the dynamic equilibrium of the beam (Figure 
5.42, left), denoting the participation of flexural stiffness to the resistance mechanism. As shown in 
Figure 5.43-b, the numerical result now reasonably approaches the parabola function assumed in the 
SA, thus suggesting almost proportional behaviour between the intensity of the inertia force i(x) and the 
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ordinate of the deflected shape (x) at any point of the beam. Consequently, the resulting inertia forces 
I(t) according to NA and SA are in very good agreement (Figure 5.42, right).  
The conformity between NA and SA ends when the yield strength of the longitudinal tensile 
reinforcement is being approached. At that time, when the plastic hinge starts to form around the mid-
span cross-section, a jump in the beam acceleration can be observed (Figure 5.43-c), also reported by 
van Wees and Peters [169] and Magnusson [144]. This jump again excites higher vibration modes, which 
seem to become increasingly important as the plastic response stage proceeds. Figure 5.43-d shows that 
at t = tVmax = 0.11 s, a large part of the beam is submitted to positive accelerations. The linear ?̈?(𝑥)-
function, based on the rigid body behaviour during the plastic member response (Figure 3.10) assumed 
in the SA, is clearly not being approached, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively. This circumstance 
reflects in significantly different resulting inertia forces I(t), as already observed in (Figure 5.42, right). 
After having experienced a sharp decay at t = ty, the numerically obtained I(t) approaches zero values at 
tVmax = 0.11 s, i.e. the still applied explosion load is almost entirely counteracted by the reaction forces. 
On the contrary, in the SA this decay cannot be simulated wherefore I(t) still contributes to the 
resistance in a significant manner. This discrepancy reasonably explains the difference in the maximum 
reaction force recorded in both approaches. 
 
Figure 5.43 Acceleration plots ?̈?(𝑥, 𝑡) along longitudinal x-axis of the sample beam (x=0: support; x = 2.5 m: 
midspan) at different instants t during the dynamic response; a: t = 0.012 s (early elastic response); b: t = 0.048 s 
(developed elastic response); c:  t = 0.096 (≈ limit of elastic response); d: t = 0.11 s (plastic response; Vmax). 
Final observations 
From the foregoing analysis it can be concluded that the simplified methods, based on the fundamental 
mode, might underestimate the support reactions of RC members performing in the post-yield response 
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stage, i.e. after the plastic hinge at the critical cross-section starts to develop. The formation of the plastic 
hinge triggers a significant contribution of higher response modes to the distribution of inertia forces 
along the members and hence to their support reactions. Similar observations were made for blast-
exposed steel beams [170]. In the mentioned study, it was found that the prediction capacity of the 
simplified methods based on the fundamental mode significantly diminished with increasing 
displacement ductility ratio  (5.10). This has an important implication for the present study, where 
tension-induced shear failure (failure of the stirrups) close to the member is associated with lower  
ratios than those assumed in the context of a ductile bending failure, and consequently, with lower 
sustainable peak pressures (Figure 5.18, left). In other words, shear failure is likely to occur at far lower 
peak-loads p̃EX,peak than applied in the present comparative study, chosen to comply with the ductility 
ceilings associated with flexural failure of the SA-beams (section 5.5.5), rather than their shear capacity. 
In order to comply with (5.4), which imposes equality between the dynamic reaction forces VEX (= VE,dyn) 
and the corresponding shear resistance VR,dyn, the peak-load applied in the comparative study must 
hence be reduced, in case of the example beam nº 1 in about 50%, from p̃EX,peak = 24.2 kN/m (assumed 
in the calculations presented above) to p̃EX,peak = 12.5 kN/m. The reaction force V(t) of the example beam 
under this reduced peak-load is compared in Figure 5.44. It can be observed that both solutions (NA and 
SA) are very close to each other. The magnitude of the oscillations affecting the post-yield response of 
the NA is notably smaller than shown before in Figure 5.41 (left). In consequence of this, the maximum 
support reaction obtained in the NA (VEX,NA = 38.8 kN) is only about 7% higher than the SA solution 
(VEX,SA = 36.4 kN), i.e. far smaller than the 24% difference detected in Figure 5.41 (left). The conclusion 
is that the above-detected discrepancies between SA- and NA-based support reactions, due to the 
influence of higher response modes, are strongly put into perspective since they are associated with 
unrealistic high peak-load levels (in relation to the provided shear force resistance VR,s limited by failure 
of the stirrups). On the contrary, the mentioned discrepancies appear to be principally relevant for the 
compression-controlled shear failure of the considered RC beams. In any case, it should be kept in mind 
that this failure mode is generally highly unlikely to occur (section 5.4.2) what will be reflected in the 
corresponding reliability analysis (Chapter 6).  
 
Figure 5.44 Reaction force-time curve for the sample beam found with simplified (red) and numerical (green) 
analysis (applied peak-load level complies with tension-controlled shear failure). 
5.6 Summary 
The dynamic load- and increase factors (DLFE and DIFm) by which means the dynamic effects during the 
structural response, such as the contribution of inertia forces, energy dissipation and strain rate effects, 
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are being quantified within the LSFs are deduced from a deterministic analysis of the defined structural 
members, based on mean values for the relevant material properties. Simplified dynamic models and 
methods, previously described in section 3.3, are used for this purpose. Chapter 5 contains the corre-
sponding developments and results. 
The approach for the definition of the DLFE and DIFm is exposed in section 5.1. The former are related to 
the ultimate resistance corresponding to the failure mechanisms analyzed. The latter are based on av-
erage material strain rates deduced from the simplified dynamic analysis of the members. For purpose 
of this analysis, an iterative procedure has been developed that factors in material non-linearity, strain 
rate effects and the gravitational pre-loading of the members prior to the explosion event (section 5.2, 
Figure 5.6). 
The implementation of this procedure for the different structural member types and failure modes is 
subject of section 5.3. Thereby, the focus is placed on the development of the dynamic resistance func-
tion, based on an M- analysis (Figure 5.7) under an appropriate assumption for a relationship between 
curvature- and displacement ductility (see also Annex C). The analysis of the columns under a dynamic 
bending moment-axial force interaction requires a specific solution algorithm that accounts for the axial 
force dependent formulation of structural resistance under consideration of both the material- and ge-
ometrical non-linearities involved (section 5.3.4, Figure 5.13 to Figure 5.16, Annex D). 
The results of the dynamic analysis procedure are described in section 5.4. Concerning the beams, the 
results manifest that the required flexural resistance to face the applied blast load significantly de-
creases as the member deformation capacity increases (section 5.4.2, Figure 5.18, left). Due to compar-
atively low reinforcement degrees, this effect is especially important for the beams subjected to explo-
sion loads acting in opposite direction to the gravitational loads (section 5.4.3, Figure 5.21). On the other 
hand, it seems likely that the beams are not able to resist the dynamic shear forces that arise during the 
flexural response close to the member supports. The results show that at the time of tension-controlled 
shear failure, only about 1/3 of the energy dissipation capacity corresponding to the flexural failure 
mode is taken advantage of (Figure 5.18, right) what reflects in comparatively higher DLF’s (Figure 5.19, 
left). On the contrary, a compression-controlled shear failure seems highly unlikely to occur. It is found 
that the peak pressure the members are able to sustain until this type of failure occurs, largely exceeds 
the corresponding value associated with the tension-controlled shear mode or the flexural mode (Figure 
5.19, right). 
In relation to these results, it is interesting to recall that the mid-span and the support cross-sections of 
the beams have been strictly designed, respectively for bending and shear, to resist the nominal explo-
sion pressure specified in the applied code (section 4.7). In the flexural design, a ductile cross-sectional 
behavior was envisaged by limiting the neutral axis depth x/d. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the 
beams as designed, will fail in the more brittle shear (tension tie) mode before the full flexural response 
might be developed. This finding is consistent with the frequently quoted observation that structural 
members, when exposed to blast loads, might fail in shear, even if they were designed to exhibit a ductile, 
flexural behavior under quasi-static loading conditions (section 3.2.3). In order to perform in the desired 
ductile flexural mode, the beams would require either a higher shear resistance or a lower bending re-
sistance and/or stiffness. The latter option could be achieved by considering the beneficial effect of en-
ergy dissipation explicitly in the flexural design stage of explosion-exposed members, for instance by 
introducing dynamic load factors such as derived in the present thesis. In addition, the current definition 
of the design material properties for accidental situations should be analyzed in detail. The very dis-
persed and failure-mode dependent ratios between mean- and design resistance (Table 5.4) corrobo-
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rate this and suggest that the introduction of failure mode- and load-type specific dynamic increase fac-
tors for the materials might contribute to a more rational design approach for certain accidental situa-
tions. 
In comparison to the beams, the analysis of the columns revealed far less disparity in the energy absorp-
tion capacity associated with the different failure modes considered (section 5.4.4). Due to a compara-
tively high flexural stiffness, accentuated by the influence of compression axial forces, this capacity is 
generally small. This manifests in similar dynamic load factors for bending and shear failure modes (Fig-
ure 5.30), with values larger than unity in many cases. 
In addition, the analysis of the columns revealed that the failure domains of the members might strongly 
differ from those anticipated in the design stage what, ultimately, could contribute to irrational design 
solutions. In particular, it was shown that the failure point on the interaction diagram based on mean 
values for the material properties (including strain rate effects) might be situated in a failure domain 
that completely differs from the design predictions. Only the particular loading characteristics associ-
ated with the explosion, which induce a simultaneous increase of bending moment and decrease of axial 
force (Figure 4.11), make this phenomenon possible. In other words, the observed discrepancy would 
not appear for the assumption of normal use conditions, i.e. under the influence of gravitational loads 
only. For such conditions, a constant eccentricity can be assumed in many cases (Figure 2.18) and hence 
the consideration of more realistic material properties would not imply significant changes of the failure 
point location with respect to the design situation. 
In order to improve the described situation, it would seem advisable to consider more realistic material 
properties in the design stage of columns involving M-N interaction associated with gas explosions, or 
other accidental situations, involving extraordinary load path characteristics. In the light of the herein 
obtained results it could be even rational to envisage partial factors of = 1.0 for both concrete and steel 
in order to shift the design M-N interaction diagrams towards more realistic boundaries and thereby to 
avoid the described inconsistencies concerning the failure point location.  
For purpose of the dynamic analysis procedure described in section 5.2, and implemented in section 5.3, 
a number of simplifying assumptions had to be made, particularly in connection with the dynamic re-
sistance function. The mentioned assumptions were validated, to the extent possible, with a finite ele-
ment model that factors in the many complex features of structural behaviour under explosive loading 
(section 5.5). A numerical model based on a plane stress assumption was developed (section 5.5.3, Fig-
ure 5.31) and its structural performance compared to test results reported in the literature (section 
5.5.4, Figure 5.35). That model was subsequently used to explore the behaviour of 18 RC beams previ-
ously analysed with the simplified analysis procedure and models. The comparative study (section 
5.5.6), carried out on the occasion of a researcher exchange programme at Delft University of Technol-
ogy, showed that numerical results agree closely with the simplified model predictions, particularly with 
respect to flexural behaviour (Figure 5.38 to Figure 5.40). On the contrary, the simplified methods might 
underestimate the support reactions of RC members performing in the post-yield response stage. The 
formation of the plastic hinge triggers a significant contribution of higher response modes to the distri-
bution of inertia forces along the members and hence to their support reactions (Figure 5.41 to Figure 
5.43). In any case, the impact of this finding on the further developments of the present study is negligi-
ble for the critical tension tie shear failure mode occurs far before the yield strength of the longitudinal 
reinforcement of the beams is reached. When performing the analysis with the peak pressure corre-
sponding to the ultimate shear resistance of the beams, numerical and simplified analysis results are in 
good agreement (Figure 5.44).
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Chapter 6 Reliability analysis 
In section 4.1, the basic assumptions for the inference of risk-based requirements in the context of the 
present study were exposed. Acceptable levels for structure-related risks were linked to the risk set out 
in the structural design codes and standards in force, which depends on the reliability level implicitly 
required by these codes (section 4.1.1). The determination of this level in the context of accidental situ-
ations characterized by gas explosions is subject of step 5 of the established analysis procedure (section 
4.3, Figure 6.1). Previous developments included the definition of the LSF’s for the members and failure 
modes to be analyzed (section 4.6), the strict member design based on these functions (section 4.7), the 
stochastic characterization of the basic variables involved (section 4.8) and the dynamic analysis in or-
der to quantify associated dynamic load- and strain rate effects (Chapter 5). 
Based on these developments, the present chapter addresses procedural aspects and the results of the 
First Order Reliability Method (FORM)–based analysis carried out to establish the reliability level im-
plicitly required by the employed codes. Section 6.1 describes the specifically developed reliability pro-
cedure for the analysis of column reliability under M-N interaction, what requires the determination of 
the strain distribution corresponding to the most likely failure point on the LSF (section 4.8.2). Subse-
quently, section 6.2 presents the results for both beams and columns under the influence of the assumed 
accidental load arrangements (section 4.5). Finally, section 6.3 investigates into the accumulated failure 
probabilities of some of these members, taking account of the fact that in addition to the accidental sce-
narios, their failure might be triggered by persistent load arrangements. 
 
Figure 6.1 Procedural flow-chart 
1. Context, scope, objectives
(Chapter 1, section 4.1)
2. Mathematical model (s. 4.2)
4. Hazard scenarios (s. 4.5)
3. Repres. set of structures (s. 4.4)
5. Implicit reliability level
Limit states (s. 4.6)
Strict design (s. 4.7)
Basic variables (s. 4.8)
Dynamic analysis (Ch. 5)
Reliability analysis (Ch. 6)
6. Consequence models (Ch. 7)
7. Implicitly acceptable risks (Ch. 8)
8. Acceptance criteria (Ch. 8)
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6.1 Analysis of columns under M-N interaction 
6.1.1 Introduction 
In section 2.5, it was exposed why the reliability estimation of RC members subjected to M-N interaction 
is in many senses a complex endeavor. It was shown that the reliability level is dependent on the failure 
point location on the interaction diagram, which, in turn, is a function of the member loading sequence 
(Figure 2.18). Taking account of the assumed load-path characteristics for the herein studied columns, 
the limit state corresponding to M-N-induced failure was defined in section 4.6.3 by expression (4.27), 
based on direction of path nº2 (Figure 4.11), which describes the structural response to the explosion-
induced action effects taking account of the static pre-loading due to gravitational loads. The LSF (4.27) 
is a problem-specific implementation of formulation (2.53), which imposes equality of the length of the 
action effect- and resistance vectors (zero safety margin), respectively (E) and (R) (Figure 2.18). 
Important to observe is that the LSF (4.27) is dependent on the strain distribution () across the critical 
cross-section, as well as on the - via curvature - related displacements (), required for quantification of 
second order effects. As already announced in section 4.8.2, performing the reliability analysis requires 
determining the strain distribution corresponding to the most likely-failure point on the LSF (4.27), also 
known as FOSM-design point (Figure 2.12). This can be achieved by coupling the enhanced FOSM-, or 
FORM analysis to the deterministic solution algorithm, presented in section 5.3.4 to determine the rel-
evant failure mode and the location of the failure point on the M-N interaction diagram. An iterative 
analysis procedure that enables this coupling has been developed and applied, in a previous work [99], 
to a set of columns under gravitational load exposure. A generic description of this procedure is given 
in section 6.1.2 below. An application example for the herein studied, explosion-exposed members is 
presented in section 6.1.3.  
6.1.2 Procedure 
The developed iterative procedure for purpose of the reliability analysis of the columns under M-N ex-
posure is schematically represented in the flow chart shown below (Figure 6.2). The different steps 
comprising the procedure are described in advance. 
 
Figure 6.2 Iterative reliability analysis procedure applied to columns under M-N interaction 
FORM analysis
based on (4.27)
(ME*, NE*)j; (MR*, NR*)j
Yes

No
FORM design point (x*)j
(ME*, NE*)j ≈ (MR*, NR*)j    ?
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The mean value-based, deterministic analysis procedure of the columns constitutes the point of depar-
ture. Member failure mode and the corresponding failure point on the M-N interaction diagram are de-
termined as described in section 5.3.4 under consideration of the specific member loading characteris-
tics and the involved geometrical- and material non-linearities. The strain distribution in the critical 
cross-section associated with the obtained failure point provides an initial estimate of the strain distri-
bution corresponding to the FORM design point, (s1*,s2*)j, where j = 1.  
Along with the previously established probabilistic models for the different geometrical, material and 
loading properties of the members (section 4.8), strain distribution (s1*,s2*)j, and the related displace-
ments (*,stat*)j, characterize the set of basic variables Xi involved in the LSF (4.27). Based on this input-
data, the FORM analysis is being carried out. The resulting FORM design point vector, (x*)j, provides the 
coordinates xi,j* of the most likely-failure point on the limit state surface (4.27), in terms of each of the 
involved Xi, as expressed by (6.1) or (6.2). 
(𝐱∗)𝐣
𝐓 = (x1
∗, x2
∗, … , xn
∗)j         (6.1) 
(𝐱∗)𝐣
𝐓 = (b∗, d∗, h∗, As
∗ , … , fc,dyn
∗ , fy,dyn
∗ , … ,MG
∗ , MQ
∗ , MEX
∗ , NG
∗ , NQ
∗ , NEX
∗ , , … , εs1
∗ , εs2
∗ , δ∗, δstat
∗ )j (6.2) 
Based on the design point coordinates xi,j*, the resulting action effects NE,j* and ME,j* are computed from 
(4.22) and (4.23), with input from (4.28) to (4.36). Likewise, the resulting resistances NR,j* and MR,j* are 
determined from equations (4.37) to (4.44). Bending moments ME,j* and MR,j* are normalized to the 
cross-section depth hj*.The obtained pairs (ME*/h*, NE*)j and (MR*/h*, NR*)j constitute the final points 
of the action effect- and resistance vectors, respectively (E*)j, and (R*)j (Figure 2.18), corresponding to 
the most likely failure point on the LSF (4.27). The starting point of these vectors is given by the pair of 
action effects prior to the explosion event (ME,stat*/h*, NE,stat*)j.  
It must be noted that LSF (4.27), as a specific formulation of (2.53), imposes equality of the length of 
action effect- and resistance vectors, (E*)j, and (R*)j, but not of their direction. Hence, although condition 
(4.27) is fulfilled, it is possible that the pairs (ME*/h*, NE*)j and (MR*/h*, NR*)j are not aligned with point 
(ME,stat*/h*, NE,stat*)j, so represented schematically in the left part of Figure 6.3. In this case, although 
|(𝐄∗)j| =|(𝐑
∗)j|, as imposed by (4.27), the limit state is not yet reached since point (ME*/h*, NE*)j does 
fall within the boundaries of the interaction diagram (safe region). The origin of this apparent incon-
sistency lies in the fact that (4.27) is a unidimensional simplification of the generic, two-dimensional 
limit state definition given by (4.24) and (4.25). This generic definition imposes simultaneous fulfilment 
of the equilibrium conditions between acting and resisting axial forces and bending moments, respec-
tively, and, consequently, requires pairs (ME*/h*, NE*)j and (MR*/h*, NR*)j to be merged in a single point, 
as represented in the right part of Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3 Action effect (E*)j - and resistance (R*)j vectors corresponding to design point vector (xi*)j; left: Same 
length but different direction; right: Same length and same direction (final iteration-step j) 
Taking account of these considerations, the obtained pairs (ME*/h*, NE*)j and (MR*/h*, NR*)j are checked 
in a subsequent step for equality. In the affirmative case, the iterative analysis procedure has ended and 
the reliability index  related to design point (x*)j constitutes the desired, final result. On the contrary, 
action effect vector (E*)j is being elongated to obtain interception point (MR
∗ h∗⁄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ , NR
∗̅̅ ̅̅ )j with the interac-
tion diagram, as sketched in Figure 6.3 (left). The strain distribution (εs1∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, εs2∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)j corresponding to this 
updated failure point, as well as the related displacements (δ∗̅, δstat
∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )j, provide input-data to a new FORM 
analysis leading to a new design point vector, (x*)j (6.1), where j = 2. This procedure is being continued 
until, as shown in the right part of Figure 6.3, pairs (ME*/h*, NE*)j and (MR*/h*, NR*)j approximately co-
incide within the established tolerance of max(M*, N*) = 1%. In general, j = 2 to 5 steps suffice to 
obtain convergence of the results. 
6.1.3 Example 
In the following, the previously described procedure will be applied to example column E2 introduced 
in section 5.4.4. Figure 6.4-a reproduces the result of the mean value analysis of the member (Figure 
5.25, left). The failure point is situated in domain U4 (Figure 5.22), just above the balance point. The 
corresponding strain in the compression reinforcement layer, s2 = -3.15 ‰ exceeds the dynamic yield 
strain y,dyn while the strain in tensile reinforcement layer, s1 = 2.91 ‰, remains slightly below.  
Strains (s1, s2) and the – via curvature – related mid-span displacements  and stat, are subsequently 
established as an initial estimation of the FORM design values, (s1*,s2*)j=1 and (*,stat*)j=1, see Table 
6.1. The FORM algorithm is then carried out, based on the LSF (4.27). From the obtained design point 
coordinates xi,j=1*, the resulting action effects, NE,j=1* = 11094 kN and ME,j=1* = 4113 kNm, as well as the 
resulting resistances NR,j=1* = 12118 kN and MR,j=1* = 4816 kNm are determined (Table 6.1). These are 
shown in Figure 6.4-b (red dots). Since (ME*/h*, NE*)j=1 is far away from coincidence with (MR*/h*, 
NR*)j=1, action effect vector (E*)j=1, defined by the points (ME,stat*/h*, NE,stat*)j=1 and (ME*/h*, NE*)j=1, is 
being elongated and intercepted with the interaction diagram, leading to the updated failure point 
(MR
∗ h∗⁄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ , NR
∗̅̅ ̅̅ )j=1, shown in Figure 6.4-b. The corresponding strain distribution (εs1∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, εs2∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)j=1 = (3.93‰, -
2.99‰) as well as the related displacements (δ∗̅, δstat
∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )j=1, provide input-data to a new FORM analysis 
based on (4.27). Thereby account must be taken of the fact that the failure domain has changed from U4 
M/h 
N
(ME,stat*/h*, NE,stat* )j
(Estat*)j
Failure region
Safe region
(ME*/h*, NE* )j
(  ∗/ℎ∗,  ∗)j
(MR*/h*, NR* )j
(E*)j
(R*)j
M/h 
N
(Estat*)j
Failure region
Safe region
(ME*/h*, NE* ) = (MR*/h*, NR* )j
(E*)j = (R*)j
(ME,stat*/h*, NE,stat* )j
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to U3, what implies an exchange of formulations (4.40) and (4.41) for the determination of forces Fs1 
and Fs2 in, respectively, the tensile and compression reinforcing steel layers.  
The results of the new FORM analysis are summarized in Table 6.1 (j = 2) and Figure 6.4-c. It is illus-
trated that action effects (ME*/h*, NE*)j=2 and resistances (MR*/h*, NR*)j=2, deduced from the design point 
coordinates Xi,j=2*, clearly approached and now almost coincide. However, since the tolerance criterion 
is still slightly exceeded (max(M*, N*) = 2% > 1%), the failure point and the corresponding strain 
distribution are once more updated. The findings of the subsequent 3rd iteration step (j=3) are shown in 
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.4-d. Now, coincidence between action effects (ME*/h*, NE*)j=3 and resistances 
(MR*/h*, NR*)j=3 has been achieved under consideration of the established tolerance (max(M*, N*) = 
0.6% < 1%) and thus the procedure has ended.  
 
Figure 6.4 Action effects and resistance during the iteration procedure for the reliability analysis of example col-
umn E2; a) Mean value analysis (starting point), b) Iteration step j = 1, c) j = 2, d) j = 3 
Table 6.1 Summary of results obtained in reliability analysis procedure applied to column E2 (Positive N = 
compression axial forces) 
j 
s1* 
[‰] 
s2* 
[‰] 
MR* 
[kNm] 
ME* 
[kNm] 
NR* 
[kN] 
NE* 
[kN] 
maxM*,N*) 
[%] 
MR
∗̅̅ ̅̅  
[kNm] 
NR
∗̅̅ ̅̅  
[kN] 
εs1∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
[‰] 
εs2∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
[‰] 
1 2.91 -3.15 4816 4113 12188 11094 14.5 4710 9990 3.93 -2.99 
2 3.93 -2.99 4741 4644 10112 9985 2.0 4674 9935 4.02 -2.97 
3 4.02 -2.97 4719 4688 9930 9890 0.6 4675 9924 4.02 -2.97 
 
Attention should be drawn to the fact that the mean value- and FORM analysis provide comparable re-
sults. It might be noted, for instance, that the corresponding interaction diagrams are very similar, al-
most equal in the tension-controlled failure zone, as shown in Figure 6.5 (left). The failure points are 
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both located close to the respective balance points of these diagrams. Hence, unsurprisingly, the initial 
estimation for the corresponding strain distribution, (s1*,s2*)j=1, based on the mean–value analysis, 
was actually relatively close to the final solution, (s1*,s2*)j=3, apart from the observed change of the 
failure domain from compression- to tension-controlled failure. This, in turn, explains the relatively 
moderate decrease the failure probability pf|EX (4.6) of the example column experiences during the iter-
ation procedure, from pf|EX ≈ 4.0∙10-5, after the first iteration step (j=1), to pf|EX ≈ 1.3∙10-5 after step three 
(j=3), as shown in Figure 6.6 (continuous line). As a rule, the closer the initial estimation of the failure 
point and the associated strain distribution to the final solution, the smaller are the variations in pf|EX 
during the iteration procedure. This becomes evident if, for purpose of illustration only, the initial strain 
estimation for the FORM-design point, (s1*,s2*)j=1, is adopted from the code-based design procedure 
following the accidental design rules (section 4.7.2). Figure 6.5 (right) reminds that, as shown earlier 
(Figure 5.25, right), the code-based design point (MRd, NRd) was located in failure domain 5 (Figure 5.22), 
where the entire cross-section is under compressive stresses. The corresponding design strain in the 
reinforcing steel, (s1d,s2d) = (-0.6‰, -3.0‰), is fundamentally different from the FORM-design point 
solution (s1*,s2*), according to which the failure point (MR*, NR*) is located in domain 3. Consequently 
when adopting (s1*,s2*)j=1 = (s1d,s2d), the variations in pf|EX during the reliability analysis procedure 
are large, far larger than if (s1*,s2*)j=1 is based on the mean value analysis. The dashed line in Figure 
6.6 shows this. The failure probability pf|EX decreases from pf|EX ≈ 7.2∙10-3, after the first iteration step, to 
pf|EX ≈ 1.2∙10-5 after the final step six (j=6). Necessarily, the result after the final iteration step is approx-
imately the same as obtained before (continuous line). The difference is that, due to the imprecise initial 
estimation of (s1*,s2*), more iteration steps are required to reach convergence. 
 
Figure 6.5 Comparison between interaction diagrams and failure points corresponding to FORM design point 
(blue curves) and, respectively, mean value analysis (left) and code-based design (right) 
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Figure 6.6 Evolution of failure probability pf|EX during iteration with initial strain distribution according to mean 
value analysis (continuous line) and code-based member design (dashed line). 
The fact that the mean value analysis of the M-N exposed columns provides failure point estimations 
that approach the FORM design point solution in a sufficiently exact manner, suggests that the associ-
ated strain distributions could be employed for purpose of a direct reliability estimate, i.e. a unique 
FORM analysis without the need to follow the iteration-based procedure described in section 6.1.2. On 
the contrary, the erroneous estimation of the failure point location in the code-based design rules out 
the use of the corresponding design strain distribution for such a purpose, since this could entail com-
pletely distorted reliability levels. When the reliability analysis of the explosion-loaded columns should 
be based on the code-based design strain, the application of the iteration-based procedure (section 
6.1.2) seems unavoidable. Previous work showed that this is not the case if only gravitational loads are 
considered [99]. Under assumption of a constant eccentricity (no second order effects were accounted 
for in [99]), the code-based design procedure and the FORM analysis delivered very similar design 
points and associated strain distributions.  
6.2 Reliability level under explosion-induced load-arrangements 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The present subsection addresses the reliability level implicitly required by the codes for the representa-
tive set of strictly designed structural members (section 4.4) subjected to the gas explosion-induced 
load arrangements defined in section 4.5. 
In section 3.1.2, it was exposed that the occurrence rate of gas explosions p(EX) can be modeled by a 
Poisson process, depending on the probability of an explosion event per time unit . The good correla-
tion among the findings reported in studies conducted in different countries and different periods (Ta-
ble 3.1) allows for an assumption of ≈ 10-5 explosions per year and housing-unit supplied with gas. 
Factoring this value into equation (3.1), the occurrence probability p(EX) of a gas explosion in a 50-year 
reference period (Tref) is given by (6.3). 
p(EX) ≈ λ ∙ Tref = 5 ∙ 10
−4     Tref = 5o years   (6.3) 
The advanced FOSM-or FORM analysis (section 2.2.3) deliver the implicitly admissible, conditional fail-
ure probabilities pf,adm|EX for the members, given the occurrence of a gas explosion within the established 
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reference period Tref of 50 years. As a function of both, pf,adm|EX and occurrence probability p(EX), the 
implicitly admissible failure probability pf,adm is then established according to (4.6). 
The implicitly admissible failure probability pf,adm can be converted to required reliability indices req 
using the inverse standard normal distribution (2.31). In line with the nomenclature established in sec-
tion 4.1, the reliability index req,EX is referred to in advance. Where relevant, a distinction between mem-
bers designed according to, respectively, the accidental (Figure 4.1, path a1) and the persistent design 
situations (Figure 4.1, path b1) is drawn.  
In the following sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, the results obtained for, respectively, the beams and the col-
umns will be presented and discussed. Subsequently, in section 6.2.4 the impact of the previously men-
tioned changes in the employed design rules (section 4.7.4) on those results is evaluated. Some final 
remarks regarding the notional character of the obtained results are given in section 6.2.5. 
6.2.2 Beams 
Positive bending failure at mid-span (M(+)) 
Figure 6.7 (left) shows the reliability indices req,EX (Tref = 50 years) corresponding to the flexural failure 
mode M(+) of the 486 beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(+) (Figure 4.8). The results correspond to 
members strictly designed according to the accidental situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), irrespective of the 
fact that this situation might be mandatory for member design or not. On the left, the req,EX are repre-
sented as a function of the accidental load ratio acc between the explosion- and the total loads (4.62). It 
is shown that req,EX decreases as acc increases what might be mainly attributed to the relatively large 
uncertainty associated with the explosion pressure pEX. The strong influence of the explosion load on 
the results, which is moreover reflected in their dependency on the venting coefficient Av/V, can be de-
duced from Figure 6.7 (right), which shows the sensitivity coefficients i (Figure 2.12) corresponding to 
each of the basic variables Xi involved in the limit state function (4.14). The figure reveals that, with the 
exception of a few cases, characterized by very low acc, the explosion-induced bending moment MEX is 
the clearly dominant variable for the considered failure mode. The corresponding i (blue dots) increase 
with rising acc and converge to a value of about 0.98. A similar behaviour is denoted for the model un-
certainty coefficient corresponding to the dynamic load effect, ME,dyn, with i values of around 0.3 for 
the majority of the studied members (red dots). While the influence of MEX and ME,dyn on the failure 
probability increases with rising acc, the contrary is observed for all other variables. The higher acc, the 
smaller is the influence of geometrical or material parameters, as well as static loads, on the likelihood 
of an explosion-induced bending failure of the beams. For most of the studied cases, these variables 
could be treated as deterministic without introducing an appreciable error in the reliability level. 
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Figure 6.7 Reliability index req,EX (left) and corresponding sensitivity coefficients i (right) for failure mode M(+) 
under load-arrangement pEX(+) of beams designed according to accidental design situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), as 
a function of accidental load ratio, acc 
The dominant influence of the explosion load on the member reliability is manifested as well in the fol-
lowing Figure 6.8. The left part shows, as a function of acc, the ratio between the resisting bending mo-
ment MR*, based on components xi* of the FORM design point vector x* (section 2.2.3), to the code-based 
design moment MRd of the beams. It is observed that this ratio increases with rising influence of the 
explosion load, reaching from about 1.11, for small acc, to about 1.34, if acc is very large. On the contrary, 
an optimum design rule calibration, would suggest MR*/MRd ratios close to unity. Interestingly, this is 
achieved when replacing design moment MRd for moment MRm according to the mean value analysis un-
der consideration of strain-rate effects (section 5.4.2). As shown in Figure 6.8 (right), ratios MR*/MRm 
reasonably approach unity with increasing influence of the explosion load on the member reliability. 
This is indeed logical since, as seen before in Figure 6.7, the impact of the resistance variables (geometry 
and material parameters) on the failure probability decreases simultaneously and hence the corre-
sponding design point coordinates xi* approach the respective mean values. These results corroborate 
earlier findings in Chapter 5 that questioned the appropriateness of the current definition of design ma-
terial parameters in the context of accidental design rules. Indeed, Figure 6.8 (right), suggests that a 
more realistic representation of these parameters, by means of their respective mean values, including 
strain rate effects, would seem to provide a more rational solution for accidental design situations in-
volving gas explosion-induced load arrangements. 
 
Figure 6.8 Ratios between FORM design point bending moment MR* and, respectively, code-based design value 
MRd (left) or mean value MRm (right), for failure mode M(+) under load-arrangement pEX(+) of beams designed ac-
cording to accidental design situation (Figure 4.1, path a1);, as a function of accidental load ratio, acc 
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In the left part of Figure 6.9, the before-discussed results corresponding to beams designed for the acci-
dental situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), are compared to reliability indices req,EX for members designed to 
the requirements of the persistent situation (Figure 4.1, path b1). It is shown that the elements designed 
for normal use conditions are characterized by comparatively higher reliability levels if the explosion 
load is small in relation to the total loads, whereas for large acc ratios the contrary is being observed. A 
transition zone between acc ratios of about 0.35 and 0.45 can be identified inside of which the member 
reliability level is found to be almost independent of the design situation.  
In the right part of Figure 6.9, the reliability indices req,EX are distinguished depending on the mandatory 
design situation of the members (Figure 4.1, paths a1 or b1). It can be observed that for small acc, at the 
left of the mentioned transition zone (acc ≲ 0.35), the persistent design situations are mandatory for 
design (path a1, 273 members), i.e. the provided resistance, and consequently req,EX is higher than de-
manded by the accidental design situations (Figure 6.9, left). On the contrary, such situations govern 
member layout for larger acc (path b1, 213 members), situated at the right of the transition zone (acc ≳ 
0.45). For these members, the provided member resistance in the design for normal loads is compara-
tively lower and so are the corresponding . The fact that a smaller resistance likewise entails a higher 
deformation capacity of the members, what is generally favorable to the reliability level, was not found 
to be a decisive influence.   
 
Figure 6.9 Reliability index req,EX for failure mode M(+) under load-arrangement pEX(+) of beams, as a function of 
accidental load ratio, acc; Left: Comparison between accidental and persistent design (Figure 4.1, paths a1 and b1); 
Right: Distinction for mandatory design situation (Figure 4.1, paths a1 or b1) 
The results shown in the right part of Figure 6.9 represent the reliability level, which further to the 
mandatory design situation according to the applied design codes, would be implicitly required for the 
flexural failure mode of the studied RC beams under the explosion load scenario pEX(+). A statistical eval-
uation of these results delivers a mean value of  ≈ 4.3 which is situated above the nominal target ceiling 
demanded by current design codes, t,code = 3.8. However, the scatter affecting the results should also be 
highlighted. Assuming  to be normally distributed, the estimated fraction below t,code is still about 17%, 
as schematically shown in Figure 6.8, right. 
Shear failure at support (Vc or Vs) 
In the following, Figure 6.10 to Figure 6.15 summarize the results corresponding to an explosion-in-
duced shear failure scenario of the beams under load arrangement pEX(+) (Figure 4.8). The results for 
tensile (Vs)- and compression (Vc) controlled shear failure are distinguished on, respectively, the left 
and the right of the mentioned figures.  
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Figure 6.10 shows the reliability index req,EX for members strictly designed according to the accidental 
situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), irrespective of the fact that this situation might be mandatory or not.  The 
corresponding sensitivity coefficients i are represented in Figure 6.11 below. It is shown that, as ob-
served before for the flexural failure mode, the explosion pressure-related action effect, shear force VEX, 
and the corresponding model uncertainty VE,dyn, have greatest effect on the failure probability of the 
members. The influence of other variables is only considerable for very low accidental load ratios acc, 
where the explosion load is small in relation to the total loads. Exceptions to this are the model uncer-
tainty associated with the resistance of the compression strut, VRc, and the concrete compressive 
strength fc involved in the determination of this resistance. As denoted by the corresponding i coeffi-
cients, shown in Figure 6.11 (right), these variables might influence the probability for compression-
controlled shear failure also in cases where explosion loads prevail over the gravitational loads. 
 
Figure 6.10 Reliability index req,EX (Tref = 50 years) for failure mode Vs (left) and Vc (right) under load-arrange-
ment pEX(+) of beams designed according to accidental design situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), as a function of acci-
dental load ratio acc 
 
Figure 6.11 Sensitivity coefficients i for failure mode Vs (left) and Vc (right) under load-arrangement pEX(+) of 
beams designed according to accidental design situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), as a function of load ratio acc 
The ratios between the FORM design point resistances VR* and the code-based design resistances VRd 
are shown in Figure 6.12. As observed before for the bending failure mode, these ratios diverge from 
unity as the influence of the explosion pressure on the reliability level increases. Especially resistance 
VR,c*, associated with failure of compression strut, might largely exceed the code-based design value 
VRd,c, up to about 2.2 times. When replacing the code-based design-values VRd by the corresponding mean 
values VRm, including dynamic material properties, this changes drastically. Figure 6.13 shows that, as 
observed before for bending (Figure 6.8, right), ratios VR*/VRm approach unity for large acc. As already 
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stated before, this is related to the dominant influence of the explosion pressure on the reliability level 
that eclipses the contribution of other variables involved in the problem. The consideration of more 
realistic dynamic material properties and/or dynamic load effects in the design stage could provide a 
possible solution approach to the detected inconsistencies.  
 
Figure 6.12 Ratios between FORM design point shear force VR* and code-based design value VRd for failure mode 
Vs (left) and Vc (right) under load-arrangement pEX(+) of beams designed according to accidental design situation 
(Figure 4.1, path a1), as a function of ratio between explosion- and total loads, acc 
 
Figure 6.13 Ratios between FORM design point shear force VR* and mean value VRm for failure mode Vs (left) and 
Vc (right) under load-arrangement pEX(+) of beams designed according to accidental design situation (Figure 4.1, 
path a1), as a function of ratio between explosion- and total loads, acc 
Figure 6.14 shows the reliability level, which further to the mandatory design situation according to the 
applied design codes (Figure 4.1, paths a1 or b1), would be implicitly required for the shear failure modes 
of the studied RC beams under the accidental load scenario pEX(+). In comparison to the bending failure 
mode (Figure 6.9, right), the relatively high mean values  and the insignificant fractions p below t,code 
= 3.8 associated with an explosion-induced failure of the compression strut (Vc) at the support of the 
beams ( = 4.7, p = 2%) suggest that this failure mode is rather unlikely to occur. On the contrary, the 
failure of the tension tie (Vs) turns out to be especially critical, corroborated by comparatively low  
and high p values ( = 4.0, p = 30%). These results support the findings from the mean-value analysis 
in section 5.4.2, where the proneness of the strictly designed beams to fail in tension-induced shear, on 
one hand, and their highly unlikely shear-compression failure, on the other, was already anticipated. 
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Figure 6.14 Reliability index req,EX (Tref = 50 years) for failure mode Vs (left) and Vc (right) under load-arrange-
ment pEX(+) of beams designed according to mandatory design situation (Figure 4.1, paths a1 or b1), as a function of 
accidental load ratio acc 
Negative bending failure at mid-span (M(-)) 
The reliability index req,EX (Tref = 50 years) corresponding to the negative flexural failure mode M(-) of 
the 136 beams subjected to load arrangement pEX(-) (Figure 4.8) is shown in Figure 6.15 (left). The results 
correspond to members strictly designed according to the accidental situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), 
which, in absence of any persistent influences acting in contrary sense to the gravitational loads, corre-
sponds necessarily to the mandatory situation for failure mode M(-). Characterized by a relatively low 
mean value ( = 4.0) and scatter (v = 4%), the req,EX are represented as a function of the venting coef-
ficient Av/V and the inverse value of accidental load ratio acc between the explosion load (EX) and the 
total load (EX-G), on the abscissae. As a tendency, req,EX is observed to decrease with increasing acc-1, 
what may be mainly traced back to comparatively larger permanent loads (G): In the member design 
stage, the higher the contribution of G to the resistance mechanism, the lower is the required amount of 
reinforcement to resist the explosion induced action effect. A low reinforcing degree, in turn, increases 
significantly the deformation capacity of the members (section 5.4.3) what ultimately contributes to a 
higher reliability level. Due to the comparatively lower reinforcing degrees and the associated larger 
deformation capacity, the influence of energy dissipation on the reliability of the beams is higher than 
for the beams performing in positive bending, where gravitational loads and explosion load act in the 
same direction. 
 
Figure 6.15 Reliability index req,EX (left) and corresponding sensitivity coefficients i (right) for failure mode M(-) 
under load-arrangement pEX(-) of beams designed according to accidental design situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), as 
a function of inverse accidental load ratio, acc-1 
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The mentioned contribution of the permanent loads G to the resistance mechanism may be observed 
likewise in Figure 6.15 (right) which shows the sensitivity coefficients i for the involved basic variables. 
It is shown that for small acc-1, the bending moment due to the permanent loads on the floor system, MGf, 
and the associated model uncertainty ME,stat, do have certain influence on the member reliability, alt-
hough not of significant character. With increasing acc-1, this influence vanishes while other resistance 
variables, such as the yield strength of the reinforcement, fy, or the model uncertainty for the resisting 
bending moment, MR, slightly gain importance. In any case, the influence on the reliability level of all 
these variables is almost negligible in comparison to the contribution of the accidental load effect, MEX, 
and, to a minor extent, the associated model uncertainty ME,dyn. Figure 6.15 (right) shows that these 
variables clearly dominate the failure probability, what also explains the significant benefit of higher 
venting coefficients Av/V observed in Figure 6.15 (left). In compliance with the observations made be-
fore for the beams under load arrangement pEX(+), Figure 6.16 shows that the dominant influence of the 
explosion-related action effect would call for a member design under assumption of more realistic val-
ues for certain resistance variables. Contrary to the code-design based bending moments, MRd, the mean 
values MRm, which include strain rate effects, provide a good estimate of moment MR*associated with 
the FORM design point. 
 
Figure 6.16 Ratios between FORM design point bending moment MR* and, respectively, code-based design value 
MRd (left) or mean value MRm (right), for failure mode M(-) under load-arrangement pEX(-) of beams designed ac-
cording to accidental design situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), as a function of inverse accidental load ratio, acc-1 
6.2.3 Columns 
Failure due to bending-axial force interaction at the intermediate cross-section (M-N) 
Figure 6.17 (left) shows the reliability index req,EX (Tref = 50 years) corresponding to failure of the inter-
mediate cross-section of the columns due to the interaction of bending moments and axial forces (M-N) 
under load arrangement NEX(-) (Figure 4.9). A huge scatter characterizes the results, which correspond 
to members strictly designed according to the accidental situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), irrespective of 
the fact that this situation might be mandatory for design or not. The reliability indices  are observed 
to depend strongly on the normalized design eccentricity, (e/h)d,acc (4.63). Columns subjected to small 
(e/h)d,acc, where design axial compression forces prevail, are characterized by high  On the contrary, 
large (e/h)d,acc, indicative of dominant design bending moments, are associated with small . The mini-
mum value of about 3.6 approximately coincides with the minimum values found for the beams under 
the influence of pure bending (Figure 6.9, Figure 6.15), what is a reasonable finding. 
The dependency of the reliability level on the normalized eccentricity (e/h)d,acc is related to the potential 
safety margin the members dispose in the M-N space to oppose the explosion-induced action effects. 
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This margin is represented by the length of the resistance vector R* (see Figure 6.3), equal to the dis-
tance between the pair of static action effects, acting prior to the explosion event (ME,stat*/h*, NE,stat*), 
and the failure point on the M-N interaction diagram (MR*/h*, NR*). As a rule, the smaller (e/h)d,acc the 
larger is this potential safety margin and, hence, the higher is the required explosion pressure pEX* to 
induce member failure. This, in turn, has a direct consequence on the failure probability. This is visible 
in Figure 6.18 (left), which relates the reliability index req,EX corresponding to example columns E1 to 
E5, introduced in section 5.4.4, to the ratio between the FORM design point coordinate for the explosion 
pressure, pEX*, and its mean value pEX (Figure 4.21). Ratio pEX*/pEX is introduced here as a measure for 
the likelihood of the occurrence of an explosion event where the failure pressure pEX* is generated. The 
higher pEX*/pEX the smaller is this likelihood, and as Figure 6.18 (left) shows, the higher is the reliability 
level.  
Figure 6.17 (right) confirms the strong dependency of the reliability level on the explosion pressure 
magnitude. The sensitivity coefficients i associated with variable pEX are larger than 0.9 in all cases, 
denoting a dominant influence on the member failure probability. All other variables involved are only 
scantly- or not at all relevant. Represented examples are the concrete compressive strength fc or the 
axial force due to permanent loads of the building floor systems, NGf. It should be noted that due to the 
load-path dependent formulation of the LSF (4.7), the distinction of load and resistance variables is not 
straightforward what explains that fc and NGf can adopt both positive and negative values. 
 
Figure 6.17 Reliability index req,EX (Tref = 50 years) (left) and corresponding sensitivity coefficients i (right) for 
failure due to M-N interaction, under load-arrangement NEX(-), of columns designed according to accidental design 
situation (Figure 4.1, path a1), as a function of normalized design eccentricity (e/h)d,acc 
A couple of examples will be shown in advance to provide a better insight into the above-described 
findings. At first, example column E5, previously introduced in section 5.4.4 (Figure 5.28) will be re-
ferred to. Figure 6.18 (right) shows the result obtained after the final iteration step of the reliability 
analysis procedure introduced in section 6.1. Failure occurs due to buckling in the tensile force-con-
trolled domain BT (Figure 5.22) under a normalized eccentricity of (e/h)* ≈ 0.9 what almost matches the 
prediction in member design, (e/h)d ≈ 0.8 (Figure 5.28, right). Given the prior loading due to the gravi-
tational loads and considering the, in this case, significant second-order effects, an explosion-induced 
bending moment ME,dyn* of about 69 kNm and a simultaneous axial force component NE,dyn* of only 22 
kN would cause such a failure. An explosion pressure pEX* of less than 7 kN/m2 would be sufficient to 
induce these action effects. This value still exceeds the assumed mean value pEX around two times, as 
can be drawn from Figure 6.18 (left). However, taking into account the relatively large coefficient of 
variation associated with the explosion pressure (CoVpEX = 0.7), the likelihood for this to happen in a 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

(e/h)d,acc
Av/V = 0,05
Av/V = 0,10
Av/V = 0,15
28512 RC columns
Load arrangement NEX(-)
Flexural failure (M-N)
Strict design according to accidental design situation
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
i
(e/h)d,acc
pEX fc NGf
28512 RC columns
Load arrangement NEX(-)
Flexural failure (M-N)
Strict design according to accidental design situation
Acceptable life safety risks associated with the effects of gas explosions on reinforced concrete structures 
 
202 
realistic gas explosion scenario is relatively high what manifests in an accordingly high admissible mem-
ber failure probability given the occurrence of the explosion (pf,adm|EX ≈ 3.7 ∙ 10-2). Finally, factoring in 
the occurrence probability p(EX) (6.3), a required reliability index associated with a 50 year reference 
period of req,EX ≈ 4.1 is obtained. 
A different conclusion is obtained for example column E2, previously described in sections  5.4.4 (Figure 
5.25) and 6.1.3 (Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5). In spite of the small design eccentricity, (e/h)d,acc ≈ 0.1, which 
locates the design failure point of this column in the compression-controlled domain 5, the reliability 
analysis concludes with a prediction of a tension-controlled failure close to the balance point, with a 
corresponding normalized eccentricity of (e/h)* ≈ 0.7. Taking as a starting point the initial action effects 
due to gravitational loads, (ME,stat*/h*, NE,stat*), such a failure would require an explosion-induced in-
crease of the bending moment of ME,dyn* ≈ 4100 kNm, under a simultaneous decrease of the compression 
axial force of about NE,dyn* ≈ 7000 kN. Therefore, the corresponding peak pressure pEX* acting on the 
closures of the compartment where the explosion occurs, would have to attain an extremely high value, 
about 10 times higher than the assumed mean value pEX, as shown in Figure 6.18, left. Such a value is 
very unlikely to occur under realistic circumstances and, consequently, the probability of failure given 
the occurrence of the explosion is accordingly small (pf,adm|EX ≈ 1.3 ∙ 10-5). When, in addition, the occur-
rence probability p(EX) is factored in (6.3), a practically zero failure probability is obtained. The corre-
sponding reliability index req,EX is 5.7 (Tref = 50 years), hence considerably higher than in example E5. 
 
Figure 6.18 Reliability index req,EX (left) for example columns E1 to E5 as a function of ratio between FORM de-
sign point coordinate for explosion pressure pEX* and mean value pEX assumed in FORM analysis (left); Result of 
reliability analysis for example column E5 (right) 
Example column E2 is representative for a number of members whose failure mode under the assumed 
load arrangement NEX(-) could not be anticipated in the member design stage. The fundamentally differ-
ent normalized eccentricities (e/h) corresponding to, respectively, the code-based design point, 
(e/h)d,acc ≈ 0.1, and the FORM design point, (e/h)* ≈ 0.7, underline this (Figure 6.5). Figure 6.19 shows 
the relationship between (e/h)* and (e/h)d,acc for all the 28512 columns designed according to the acci-
dental situation. It can be observed that, similar to column E2, a large number of members, circled in the 
Figure, are characterized by small (e/h)d,acc and large (positive or negative) (e/h)*. Although many of 
these elements are not of practical relevance, since the persistent design situation would demand a 
higher resistance than the accidental, these results affirm the potential for improvement of the current 
design rules for columns exposed to accidental events, such as gas explosions. In addition to the high 
uncertainties associated with such events, the explicit consideration of the M-N trajectory is thereby of 
crucial importance. While current rules might be appropriate for design of persistent situations, where 
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normal, mainly gravitational actions prevail, they might deliver irrational results if applied to extraor-
dinary sequences of bending moments and axial forces. That was previously detected in section 5.4.4 
and is confirmed by the reliability analysis. The right part of Figure 6.19, where (e/h)d,acc has been re-
placed by the normalized eccentricity (e/h)m found in the mean value analysis (section 5.4.4), suggests 
that an improvement of this situation might envisage a mean-value based design, under explicit consid-
eration of strain-rate effects. It is shown that the mayor inconsistencies regarding the member failure 
mode, detected before in the (e/h)d,acc -(e/h)* representation (Figure 6.19, left) have disappeared. It 
should be noted that the asymptotic branches which can be detected in Figure 6.19 (right) denote a 
moderate deviation in the failure point location, while the failure mode is well represented by the mean 
value analysis. For instance, normalized eccentricites of (e/h)m ≈ 10 and (e/h)* ≈ -50 both denote a 
cross-section failure under prevailing bending moments with almost negligible axial force contribution.  
 
Figure 6.19 Normalized eccentricity corresponding to FORM design point (e/h)* versus normalized eccentricity 
corresponding to code-based design (e/h)d,acc (left) and mean-value analysis (e/h)m (right)  
Figure 6.20 shows the reliability level req,EX (Tref = 50 years), which further to the mandatory design 
situation (Figure 4.1, paths a1 or b1) according to the applied design codes, would be implicitly required 
for failure due to M-N interaction of the studied RC columns under the accidental load scenario NEX(-). As 
previously determined in section 4.7.3, in more than 80 % of the 28512 analysed columns, this situation 
is governed by normal use conditions (persistent design situations) where gravitational loads prevail. 
Such members are associated with small normalized eccentricities (e/h)d,acc and accordingly large req,EX 
(clear dots). On the contrary, for large positive or negative (e/h)d,acc, where bending moments prevail, 
member design is most likely to be performed on the grounds of the accidental design situation. Such 
members are associated with comparatively smaller req,EX (dark dots), in many cases smaller than the 
target ceiling, t,code = 3.8. A zone can be identified were the transition between both design situations 
takes place (0.3 ≲ (e/h)d,acc ≲ 0.8), situated in the vertex of the asymptotic -(e/h)d,acc scatter plot. 
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Figure 6.20 Reliability index req,EX (Tref = 50 years) for failure due to M-N interaction, under load-arrangement 
NEX(-), of columns designed according to mandatory design situation (Figure 4.1, paths a1 or b1), as a function of 
normalized design eccentricity (e/h)d,acc  
Failure due to shear-axial force interaction at the support cross-section (V-N) 
The reliability indices req,EX for column failure due to shear-axial force interaction induced by accidental 
load arrangement NEX(-) are shown in Figure 6.21. The corresponding sensitivity coefficients i for some 
selected basic variables are represented below in Figure 6.22. Results for tensile (Vs)- and compression 
(Vc) controlled shear failure are distinguished on, respectively, the left and the right. It should be kept 
in mind that no distinction is made here for persistent and accidental design situations of the columns, 
since, according to the assumptions met, the persistent load scenario involves exclusively gravitational 
actions, which, in absence of any lateral influence, do not contribute to the probability of column shear 
failure.  
The req,EX corresponding to VS-N failure of the columns (Figure 6.21, left) are plotted as a function of the 
ratio between the design shear force Vsu,d sustained by the transverse reinforcement Asw/s and the total 
design shear resistance, VRd,s, based on (4.48). The higher the contribution of Vsu to the resistance mech-
anism the lower is the influence of component Vcu due to concrete in compression. The lower Vcu the less 
will the more uncertain axial forces be involved in the resistance of the tensile tie, what results in higher 
req,EX values (ratios Vsu,d/VRd,s > 1 indicate the influence of tensile axial forces NEd on the design shear 
resistance VRd,s). Figure 6.22 (left) confirms this. While coefficients NGf, representing the permanent 
loads of the floor system, approach zero with increasing Vsu,d/VRd,s,  fyw, which show the influence of the 
yield strength of the transverse reinforcement, increase. In any case, the influence of these variables on 
the reliability level is small in comparison to the dependency of explosion pressure pEX, which deter-
mines both shear force VEX and axial force NEX acting on the columns. Figure 6.22 (left) shows that vari-
able pEX is dominant in all cases. Moreover, the model uncertainty associated with the dynamic shear 
force VE,dyn is relevant to member reliability.  
The dominant influence of the explosion pressure and the associated action effects on the reliability 
level of the columns under Vs-N interaction is likewise manifested by the strong dependency of the vent-
ing coefficient Av/V (Figure 6.21, left). Unsurprisingly, the results underline the beneficial effect of vent-
ing providing pressure relief during the explosion event. On average, the failure of the tension tie of the 
columns turns out to be comparatively critical, corroborated by a low mean  and a high fraction p 
below the code target value, t,code = 3.8 ( = 3.7, p = 70%).  
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Figure 6.21 Reliability index req,EX (Tref = 50 years) for failure mode Vs-N (left) and Vc-N (right) of columns under 
accidental load-arrangement NEX(-) (Figure 4.1, path a1), as a function of respectively, ratio between design shear 
force Vsu,d and total design shear resistance VRd,s , and shear resistance reduction factor K 
 
Figure 6.22 Sensitivity coefficients  for selected variables corresponding to failure mode Vs-N (left) and Vc-N 
(right) of columns under load-arrangement NEX(-) as a function of respectively, ratio Vsu,d/VRd,s and factor K 
The influence of the axial force level in the columns on the resistance of the compression strut, VR,c is 
accounted for by reduction coefficient K (4.47). Figure 6.22 (right) shows, as a function of K, the sensi-
tivity coefficients i for selected basic variables involved. Small K denote a significant influence of the 
axial compression forces on the failure probability, as manifested by coefficients NGf, representing the 
permanent loads of the floor system. It should be observed that axial compression forces appear here 
as action variables due to their unfavorable contribution to member reliability. The dominating re-
sistance variable for small K is the concrete compressive strength fc, with fc coefficients close to 0.9. 
With reducing influence of the compression axial force level on the resistance of the compression strut, 
i.e. increasing K, the explosion pressure gains increasingly in importance. Positive pEX coefficients rep-
resent the shear force VEX due to the horizontal explosion load, while negative pEX are indicative of the 
here favorable tensile axial force component NEX due to the vertical pressure contribution on floors and 
roof (Figure 4.6, Figure 4.9). For large K, the shear-inducing, horizontal explosion load becomes the 
dominant variable. In addition, model uncertainties for both action effects (VE,dyn) and resistance (VRc) 
have a significant influence on the failure probability.  
The complex dependencies of the reliability level on the different load- and resistance variables reflect 
in the reliability indices req,EX shown in Figure 6.21 (right). For very small reduction coefficients K, req,EX 
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values of around 4.5 are attained, irrespective of the venting coefficient Av/V considered, what is at-
tributable to the almost zero influence of the explosion pressure. For larger K, this influence increases 
and, consequently, the beneficial effect of venting is manifested in the reliability indices. Nevertheless, 
due to the considerable influence of variables different from the explosion pressure and the associated 
dynamic load effects, the dependency of req,EX on Av/V is far less pronounced as observed before for the 
tension-controlled shear failure (Figure 6.21, left). Maximum req,EX values correspond to reduction fac-
tors K around 0.3, whereas minimum reliability indices are attained when the influence of the uncertain 
explosion pressure is maximum, close to K = 1.0. On average, a relatively high mean value and a p-frac-
tion close to zero ( = 4.5, p ≈ 0) suggest that failure of the compression strut due to shear-axial force 
interaction in the columns is comparatively unlikely to occur.  
6.2.4 Influence of changes in design code-rules  
The present study is based on a consistent set of national codes which by now have been substituted by 
updated versions. The most relevant differences (concerning the present study) between the herein ap-
plied codes rules and those contained in the standards in force (national codes or Eurocodes) were de-
scribed before in section 4.7.4. These concern the partial factor c for the concrete compressive strength 
in accidental design situations, coefficient K for modification of the design shear resistance VR,c due to 
the influence of compression axial forces and the nominal eccentricity etot for M-N design of members 
under influence of second-order effects. The following observations are made with regard to these dif-
ferences and their possible impact on the previously described results. 
Partial safety factor for concrete c 
In the present study, a partial safety factor for the concrete compressive strength of c = 1.3 was adopted 
from the Spanish Code [83] for the design of RC members in accidental design situations. The current 
Eurocode [84], on the contrary, prescribes a slightly lower value of c = 1.2. In general terms, a smaller 
partial safety factor implies a less conservative design in the sense that it provides the member with a 
lower resistance, and, consequently, with a comparatively lower reliability level when exposed to a spe-
cific load arrangements (assuming that the same probabilistic models are employed to represent the 
involved basic variables). Most notable this will be for the compression-controlled shear resistance, for 
which the concrete compressive strength is paramount. However, it was observed before that the failure 
of the compression strut is comparatively unlikely, as denoted by relatively small failure probabilities 
(Figure 6.14, Figure 6.21), about 1-2 orders of magnitude smaller than those associated with bending or 
tension-induced shear failure. Hence, the contribution of the compression shear failure mode to the to-
tal, accumulated failure probability of a structural member, Pf (4.7), under consideration of all nk failure 
modes the member might be subject to, is comparatively small, and so is its contribution to the struc-
ture-related risks. The expected increase of the member failure probability due to the slight reduction 
of c from 1.3 to 1.2 will not alter this conclusion. The impact of this reduction on the principal results of 
the present study is hence small. 
Reduction factor K 
In Figure 4.19 it was shown that the formulation of coefficient K (4.47), to be factored into the shear 
resistance VR,c, in order to account for the stress state in the compression chord, has experienced an 
increase from the herein-used standard EHE-98 [83] to the equivalent standards in force [72, 84]. This 
increase will affect the reliability level associated with a failure of the compression strut of the columns. 
In Figure 6.21 (right) it was shown that, except for very small coefficients K, the larger K the lower the 
reliability level. Hence, for the mayority of the columns analised here, a strict design according to the 
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codes in force would probably imply lower reliability levels than obtained in the present study. In this 
sense, the conclusion is similar as formulated before concerning the reduction of c. The fact that the 
compression-controlled shear failure of the columns is comparatively unlikely implies that its contribu-
tion to the structure-related risks is relatively small. Thus, the increase of coefficient K has only a minor 
impact on the principal results of the present study. 
Design eccentricity for design of columns  
In the present study, the design of the RC columns for M-N interaction was based on an approximate 
design procedure, where both first- and second order effects are accounted for by means of eccentricity 
etot, inferred from a nominal curvature (Figure 4.13). In the current version of the Spanish design code 
for structural concrete, EHE-08 [72], this procedure was withdrawn and another, approximate design 
procedure, based on a fictitious eccentricity, provided in its place. Also the Eurocode [84] contains dif-
ferent approximate design methods, based on nominal curvature- or nominal stiffness. The general aim 
of such simplified methods is to provide closed-form solutions to designers which can be applied in the 
context of an ordinary cross-sectional design according to the UMLS (section 4.6.3) under use of the 
corresponding strain limits provided by the codes (Figure 4.13). Necessarily, simplified design ap-
proaches provide generally more or less conservative results. However, it is of minor importance to the 
present study if the design procedures contained in the current codes [72, 84] prescribe a slightly higher 
or lower degree of conservatism in comparison to the method used herein. The important point is that 
all these methods, if used in conjunction with the code-based design values for action effects and re-
sistance in accidental situations characterised by M-N paths similar to those investigated here, might 
lead to an erroneous estimation of the failure point location, and thus to irrational design solutions. As 
stated before, the use of more realistic values for the material properties could be a possible solution to 
this problem.  
6.2.5 Final remarks 
It should be recalled that the reliability indices described in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 must be understood 
as notional values. For several reasons, they do not reflect the actual member failure probabilities even 
though the probabilistic models used represent the physical properties of the structural design variables 
modelled. Among these reasons is the fact that the failure probabilities do not account for the occurrence 
of human error, which is often in the origin of structural failure [3, 4, 7]. In the present context, human 
error might be related, for instance, to negligence or ignorance of the explosion hazard, leading to an 
omission of risk-reducing measures (section 4.1.2). The results described before show that such an 
omission could entail member reliabilities that fall significantly below the level implicitly required by 
the codes for the accidental design situation. 
Moreover, it must be recognized that the present study focusses on strictly designed cross-sections and 
members and hence does not reflect failure frequencies of conservatively designed members in practice. 
This is especially relevant for the shear failure modes. As pointed out in section 4.7.3, the strict design 
of the compression strut at the support cross-sections of both beams and columns requires in many 
cases only very small cross-section widths bw, far smaller than required for purpose of constructive fea-
sibility. Hence, from this point of view, actual failure probabilities might be far lower than the notional 
values obtained here. The same is true for the failure of the tension tie of the columns. Regarding this 
failure mode it must be kept in mind that, in cases characterized by high axial compression forces, a 
strict design is only possible if the contribution of the concrete to the resistance mechanism (Vcu) is being 
reduced by an increase of the longitudinal reinforcement As (section 4.7.2). However, for some members 
this leads to unrealistically high and practically unfeasible reinforcing degrees. For realistic reinforcing 
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degrees, on the contrary, compression axial forces would indeed contribute to the resistance of the ten-
sile tie and thus cross-section design would be conservative with the corresponding consequences on 
the reliability level. 
Regardless of their notional character, the failure probabilities obtained are useful when interpreted 
and employed in the context of a comparative study, always keeping in mind the assumptions adopted 
for their determination.  
6.3 Accumulated failure probabilities 
6.3.1 Introduction 
In section 4.2.3, the accumulated failure probability of a structural member Pf was defined by (4.7) as 
the sum over the nj individual failure probabilities associated with each of the nl load arrangements and 
nk failure modes the member might be subjected to. Here, a single failure mode (nk=1) and two relevant 
load arrangements (nl=2), a persistent load arrangement and an explosion-induced load arrangement, 
will be assumed. Hence, based on (4.7), the implicitly admissible, accumulated probability of failure Pf,adm 
is expressed per (6.4) as the sum of contributions pf,adm,PER and pf,adm,EX in consequence of the persistent 
and the accidental (explosion) load arrangement, respectively. It is assumed that other potential acci-
dental events, such as earthquakes, fire or impact, are not relevant to the reliability level corresponding 
to the member and member failure mode in question. 
Pf,adm = pf,adm,PER + pf,adm,EX        (6.4) 
In the context of a strict code-based design procedure (Ed=Rd), the fact that two different load arrange-
ments are considered, implies a check for the mandatory design situation (Figure 4.1), which according 
to the employed design rules, demands the higher member resistance. In other words, only for one out 
of both considered load-arrangements, the resistance might be strictly adjusted to the corresponding 
load effects, whereas for the other the design will be unavoidably conservative. Consequently, it would 
be expected that the failure probability associated with the non-mandatory design situation would be 
significantly smaller than compared to the probability of failure due to the load arrangement governing 
member design. In the present context it was argued in section 4.1.2, that if member design is based on 
the accidental design rules (Figure 4.1, path a), the provided resistance will probably largely exceed the 
action effects prevailing under normal building use conditions. For these situations, it seems reasonable 
to assume, that the associated failure probability (path a2) is negligibly small in relation to the likelihood 
of explosion-induced member failure (path a1). 
The contrary situation does not seem to be evident, however. As stated in section 4.1.2, if the persistent 
situation is mandatory for member design (Figure 4.1, path b), it cannot be presupposed that load ar-
rangements associated with a potential accidental explosion event, will be insignificant to member reli-
ability. In spite of the fact that the design code rules might demand a higher member resistance under 
normal loading conditions, the large uncertainties associated with the explosion load and the unknown 
consequences of associated dynamic effects on the reliability level do not allow for such a premature 
conclusion. It was concluded that further analysis would be required to this end.  
This subject will be addressed in the following subsection 6.3.2. Precisely it will be analyzed to which 
extent component pf,adm,EX contributes to the accumulated failure probability, Pf,adm. The member failure 
probabilities under persistent load arrangements, pf,adm,PER, required for this analysis, have been 
adopted, where available, from prior studies [78, 99]. Section 6.4 closes with some concluding remarks 
on the impact of the obtained results on the further development of the study. 
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6.3.2 Analysis 
Figure 6.23 (left) shows the ratio between the admissible member failure probability pf,adm,EX associated 
with positive bending failure of the 486 studied RC beams induced by explosion load arrangement pEX(+) 
(Figure 4.8) and the accumulated failure probability Pf,adm (6.3) corresponding to this failure mode. The 
results are presented as a function of accidental load ratio acc and distinguished according to the man-
datory design situation, which is governed in 273 cases by the persistent- and in 213 cases by the acci-
dental load arrangements. The Figure confirms that if the accidental situation is mandatory (dark dots), 
the explosion load arrangement clearly dominates the member failure probability, i.e., persistent load 
arrangements under normal use conditions do, as expected, not contribute significantly to Pf,adm. On the 
contrary, if design is based on the persistent situation (clear dots), what is the case for smaller acc, a 
non-negligible fraction of the corresponding 273 cases is characterized by an important contribution of 
the explosion-related failure probability pf,adm,EX . Ratios pf,adm,EX/Pf,adm higher than 0.9 show that in many 
cases pf,adm,EX corresponds actually to the dominant component, despite the fact that the corresponding 
load arrangement was not found to be decisive in the member design stage. As mentioned before, this 
is primary attributable to the large uncertainties associated with the explosion load. 
In any case, the described finding is relativized when comparing the accumulated failure probability 
Pf,adm to the value pft,code = 7.2∙10-5, associated with the nominal target reliability index established in the 
employed design codes, t,code = 3.8 (Tref = 50 years). This comparison is shown in Figure 6.23 (right). It 
can be observed, that, with a few exceptions, Pf,adm remains below pf,t,code if the design is based on the 
persistent design situation. Only if the accidental situation is mandatory, the nominal target value may 
be exceeded. However, this is attributable, almost exclusively, to the contribution of the explosion sce-
nario since as seen in Figure 6.23 (left), in these cases the persistent load scenario does not contribute 
significantly to Pf,adm.  
Similar conclusions are expected for the shear failure modes of the beams, which might likewise be trig-
gered by accidental or persistent load arrangements. On the contrary, it is recalled that negative bending 
failure of the beams is exclusively associated with explosion-induced load arrangement pEX(-). 
 
Figure 6.23 Ratio of failure probability pf,adm,acc due to accidental load scenarios and accumulated failure proba-
bility Pf,adm (left) and accumulated failure probability Pf,adm (right); Positive bending failure of beams 
Another failure mode that, according to the assumptions met in the present study, can be potentially 
triggered by both accidental and persistent load arrangements is the failure of the intermediate cross-
section of the columns due to M-N interaction. For this failure mode, Figure 6.24 (left) shows by analogy 
to Figure 6.23 (left), ratio pf,adm,EX/Pf,adm between the member failure probability of 9504 RC columns 
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subjected to explosion load arrangement NEX(-) and the accumulated failure probability for the M-N-in-
duced failure mode. For sake of simplicity, only 1/3 of the 28512 studied columns are represented, cor-
responding to members situated in buildings characterized by an explosion venting element resistance 
pressure of pstat = 5 kN/m2. The results are presented as a function of the normalized accidental design 
eccentricity (e/h)acc,d and distinguished according to the mandatory design situation, characterized in 
7951 cases by the persistent- and in 1553 cases by the accidental load arrangements. The figure con-
firms the findings for the beams. As expected, the persistent loads do not contribute significantly to Pf,adm 
when the accidental situation is mandatory (dark dots). In the contrary case, if design of the members 
is based on the persistent situation (clear dots), the probability due to the explosion-induced load ar-
rangement pf,adm,EX contributes significantly to Pf,adm for a large number of cases. In many of these mem-
bers, pf,adm,EX exceeds pf,adm,PER by several orders of magnitude. Nevertheless, also here, the target ceiling 
pft,code is, with a few exceptions, not exceeded for such members, what relativizes the importance of this 
finding (Figure 6.24, right). 
 
Figure 6.24 Ratio of failure probability pf,adm,acc due to accidental load scenarios and accumulated failure proba-
bility Pf,adm (left) and accumulated failure probability Pf,adm (right); Failure due to M-N interaction of columns 
(only members characterized by pstat = 5 kN/m2). 
6.3.3 Concluding remarks 
The findings from the preceding subsection are relevant to the further developments of the study. Pre-
cisely, such developments must account for the fact that a particular structural member may not only 
fail in consequence of different failure modes, but that certain of these modes might be triggered by 
different load arrangements, under similar failure probabilities. In particular, this might be the case 
when the normal load conditions determine the design of the member although it is potentially exposed 
to the hazard gas explosion and the associated action effects. For such members, the risk analysis (Chap-
ter 8) should consider both persistent and accidental load arrangements. Moreover, the results confirm 
that if the accidental design situation is mandatory, the contribution of persistent loads to the failure 
probability might be neglected in the risk computation without introducing a significant error. 
6.4 Summary 
Based on the defined LSF’s for the members and failure modes to be analyzed (section 4.6), the strict 
member design based on these LSF’s (section 4.7), the characterization of the basic variables involved 
(section 4.8), including a quantification of associated dynamic effects (Chapter 5), Chapter 6 addresses 
procedural aspects and the results of the FORM analysis carried out to establish the reliability level im-
plicitly required by the employed design codes. 
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Section 6.1 describes the specifically developed reliability procedure for the analysis of column reliabil-
ity under M-N interaction. The objective of this procedure is the determination of the strain distribution  
corresponding to the most likely-failure point on the limit state surface, also known as FORM-design 
point (Figure 2.12). This can be achieved by coupling the FORM analysis to the deterministic solution 
algorithm, developed in section 5.3.4 to determine the failure mode and the associated failure point lo-
cation on the M-N interaction diagram. An iterative analysis procedure that enables this coupling has 
been developed (Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3) and applied, in a previous work [99], to a set of columns under 
gravitational load exposure. After a generic description of this procedure (section 6.1.2), its implemen-
tation for the herein considered explosion-exposed members is shown by means of an example (section 
6.1.3, Figure 6.4). It is observed that the mean value analysis of the M-N exposed columns provides fail-
ure point estimations that approach the FORM design point solution in a sufficiently exact manner. This 
suggests that the associated strain distribution could be employed for purpose of a direct reliability es-
timate, i.e. a unique FORM analysis without the need to follow the iteration-based procedure developed. 
On the contrary, the erroneous estimation of the failure point location in the code-based design (section 
5.4), rules out the use of the corresponding design strain distribution for such a purpose, since this could 
entail completely distorted reliability levels. Previous work confirms that this a load-path specific prob-
lem. Under the assumption of a constant eccentricity, the code-based design procedure and the FORM 
analysis delivered very similar design points and associated strain distributions [99]. 
The FORM analysis delivers the admissible, conditional failure probabilities pf,adm|EX for the defined 
structural members, given the occurrence of a gas explosion within the established reference period Tref 
(50 years). Taking account of the corresponding occurrence probability p(EX), estimated according to 
the reported findings in section 3.1.2, the implicitly admissible failure probabilities pf,adm are then estab-
lished according to (4.6). The probabilities pf,adm, which represent the occurrence probabilities pj for a 
specific hazard scenario j (section 4.2), can finally be converted to the implicitly required reliability in-
dices req using the inverse standard normal distribution (section 6.2.1) 
The results obtained are presented and discussed in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. The general need for acci-
dental design provisions associated with gas explosions is confirmed. It is shown that in many practi-
cally relevant situations, the accidental design rules might demand a higher member resistance than 
provided in an ordinary design for persistent situations. Ignoring this, the reliability level achieved falls 
below the level implicitly required by the design codes for the accidental situation. Moreover, the anal-
ysis reveals that this level is generally subject to a high scatter. Important differences are observed when 
comparing the obtained reliability indices for different members and, especially, for different member 
failure modes. In many cases, the nominal target ceiling (t,code = 3.8) is not met. The tension tie shear 
failure mode of the studied members turns out to be especially critical, while the failure of the compres-
sion strut is comparatively unlikely (Figure 6.14, Figure 6.21). These results corroborate the findings of 
the previous deterministic analysis (Chapter 5). 
A closer analysis of the sensitivity coefficients i associated with the FORM design point vector x* re-
veals that, almost irrespective of the member type and failure mode, the uncertain explosion-induced 
action effects dominates the failure probabilities of members whose design is governed by the accidental 
situation. The influence of geometrical- or material variables, as well as static loads, on the likelihood of 
an explosion-induced collapse of such members is comparatively small, wherefore they could be treated 
as deterministic quantities in the reliability calculations. 
An analysis of the ratio between the resistance R* of the beams, computed from the individual compo-
nents xi* of vector x*, to the mean resistance Rm found in the deterministic analysis, corroborates this 
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finding. It is shown that ratios R*/Rm approach unity with increasing influence of the explosion load on 
the member reliability (Figure 6.8, right, Figure 6.13, Figure 6.16, right). This is attributable to the sim-
ultaneous decrease of the impact of the resistance variables (geometry and material parameters) on the 
member failure probability, what implies that the corresponding design point coordinates xi* approach 
the respective mean values. On the contrary, the ratios between R* and the code-based design resistance 
Rd are found to deviate from unity with rising influence of the explosion load (Figure 6.8, left, Figure 
6.12, Figure 6.16, left). In accordance with the findings from Chapter 5, these observations question the 
appropriateness of the current definition of design material parameters in the context of accidental de-
sign rules. The results confirm that a more realistic representation of these parameters, including strain 
rate effects, seems to provide a more rational solution for accidental design situations involving gas ex-
plosion-induced load arrangements. The same conclusion is obtained for column failure induced by M-
N interaction, drawn from a comparison of the normalized eccentricities (e/h)* to, respectively, the 
mean values (e/h)m and the code-based design values (e/h)d (Figure 6.19). The comparison confirms 
that the irrationalities associated with the failure point location, detected in Chapter 5, could probably 
be circumvented in most cases by shifting the design values for the material parameters towards more 
realistic limits.  
Finally, section 6.3 investigates into the accumulated failure probabilities of structural members, taking 
account of the fact that, in addition to the accidental load combination, their failure might be triggered 
by persistent load arrangements. The analysis shows that, depending on the particular conditions pre-
vailing in each case, persistent- or accidental load arrangements might be dominant for a certain mem-
ber failure scenario, while in other cases they might equally contribute to the accumulated failure prob-
ability (section 6.3.2). In particular, this latter situation might occur when the normal load conditions 
are mandatory for design of the member. For such members, a dominant load arrangement cannot be 
established a priori, wherefore the risk analysis (Chapter 8) should consider both possibilities (persis-
tent- and accidental load arrangements). On the contrary, if the accidental design situation is mandatory, 
the contribution of persistent loads to the failure probability might be neglected in the risk computation 
without introducing a significant error. In this case, the provided member resistance largely exceeds the 
action effects associated with the normal use conditions of the buildings.
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Chapter 7 Consequence models 
The estimation of gas explosion-induced structural risks to persons requires the disponibility of an ap-
propriate consequence model. The derivation of such a model is subject of step 6 of the analysis proce-
dure (section 4.3, Figure 7.1). A basic requirement to the model is that it can be properly linked to the 
established mathematical framework for risk quantification (section 4.2), what will be briefly addressed 
in section 7.1. In the following, the model development based on statistical treatment of compiled data 
on explosion-induced collapse incidents will be described. Section 7.2 characterizes the general features 
of the established database. Descriptive statistics of the recorded incidents are subsequently provided 
in section 7.3, followed by classification of data according to its relevance to the derivation of the conse-
quence model. In section 7.4, the most relevant data fields are complemented by means of information 
provided by the National Statistics Institute (INE) [112]. Finally, section 7.5, addresses the multiple lin-
ear regression analysis performed in order to obtain the desired model, including a discussion of the 
obtained results and a comparison to prior models. 
 
Figure 7.1 Procedural flow-chart 
7.1 Context 
Gas explosions in buildings might entail a variety of undesired consequences, among them harm to per-
sons and monetary losses. The former include loss of live and injury and may be traced back either to 
the direct effects of the explosion on a person, for instance due to the direct exposure to the pressure 
wave, or to its effects on the building structure with the corresponding probability of structural collapse 
and the associated risks to personal integrity. 
In keeping with the general scope of the study (section 1.2), the focus of the consequence analysis is 
placed on the latter type of personnel consequences, attributable to structural collapse scenarios. In 
particular, the analysis aims at quantifying loss of live as a function of a parameter that characterizes 
the damage extensions associated with such scenarios. Previous studies suggested the building net-
1. Context, scope, objectives
(Chapter 1, section 4.1)
2. Mathematical model (s. 4.2)
4. Hazard scenarios (s. 4.5)
3. Repres. set of structures (s. 4.4)
5. Implicit reliability level
Limit states (s. 4.6)
Strict design (s. 4.7)
Basic variables (s. 4.8)
Dynamic analysis (Ch. 5)
Reliability analysis (Ch. 6)
6. Consequence models (Ch. 7)
7. Implicitly acceptable risks (Ch. 8)
8. Acceptance criteria (Ch. 8)
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room area affected by the collapse (Acol) to be appropriate for this purpose [9, 10, 13]. Based on the 
established hypothesis for description of a structural system collapse, summarized in section 4.5.4, this 
area can be defined in terms of the geometrical building parameters introduced in section 4.4.2 (Figure 
4.4) and the location of the member whose failure triggers the system collapse. The following expres-
sions apply for determination of area Acol,j due to a specific beam- (7.1) or column- (7.2) failure scenario 
j, according to its definition within the mathematical framework for risk quantification established in 
section 4.2.3: 
Acol,j = Cb ∙ l
2          (7.1) 
Acol,j = Cc ∙ l
2 ∙ (ns + 1 − ns,f)        (7.2) 
Where:  
Cb: Constant accounting for location of collapse-triggering beam: Cb = 0.5 for roof beams situated on 
the building perimeter; Cb = 1.0 for roof beams situated inside the building perimeter or floor 
beams on the building perimeter; Cb = 2 for floor beams situated inside the building perimeter. 
Cc: Constant accounting for location of collapse-triggering column; Cb = 0.5 for columns situated on 
the corners of the building perimeter; Cb = 1.0 for columns situated on the building perimeter 
except the corners; Cb = 2 for columns situated inside the building perimeter 
l:  Distance between axes of columns in longitudinal sense of the building (Figure 4.4) 
ns:  Number of storeys excluding ground floor and roof (Figure 4.4) 
ns,f:  Number of storey where column failure occurs  
By means of equations (7.1) and (7.2) the number of fatalities Nj due to a specific member failure sce-
nario j can be readily estimated provided a consequence model is available which relates Nj to the cor-
responding area affected by the collapse, Acol,j. The tasks performed in connection with the development 
of such a model are summarized in the following sections. 
7.2 Data compilation 
7.2.1 Introduction 
In the framework of a press survey, the online archives of the main Spanish national newspapers were 
systematically searched for information on explosion-induced structural collapse events in Spain and 
other western countries. Occasionally, international and local online media sources were also consulted 
in case information on specific incidents was to be amplified. The data collection included all type of gas 
explosions in buildings, as well as explosions involving other explosive agents, as for instance, dust or 
pyrotechnical material. Bomb explosions were excluded from the survey.  
A database was established to compile the information. The format used for data collection is shown in 
Annex H.1. Four different data domains can be distinguished: 
- the affected building (section 7.2.2) 
- the incident (section 7.2.3) 
- the incident consequences (section 7.2.4) 
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- additional data  (section 7.2.5) 
7.2.2 Building data 
The compiled data corresponding to the affected building comprises the following data fields: 
- Use type (residence, hotel, office, shop, etc.) 
- Use category (according to [11]) 
- Location (direction, country) 
- Year of construction 
- Dimensions (net room area A, nº of storeys ns, number of housing-units, nhu) 
- Structural attributes (structural system, construction materials) 
Especially interesting for purpose of the study are the building dimensions, characterized here by build-
ing net room area A, nº of storeys ns or nº of housing-units nhu. While ns or nhu are often indicated in the 
consulted sources, information on the building net room area A is normally not provided. In some cases, 
A can be roughly estimated from photographies or videos added to the press articles. 
Other relevant information for estimating the consequences of structural collapse is related to the struc-
tural attributes of the building, such as the structural system or the construction materials. However, 
such information is generally scarcely reported in the press. In some cases, photographies or videos 
provide some insight into the structural characteristics of the building. 
7.2.3 Incident data 
The characteristics of the explosion incident and its effects on the building are recorded by means of the 
data fields listed below: 
- Date of the incident 
- Involved inflammable substance (natural gas, propane, butane, etc.) 
- Cause (triggering event) and cause category (Cat. C): 
o Cat. C1: Intentionally caused  
o Cat. C2: Accidentally triggered without human intervention  
o Cat. C3: Accidentally triggered through human intervention  
- Qualitative damage description and damage category (Cat. D): 
o Cat. D1: Light damage (broken windows, doors, furniture, light partition walls, etc.) 
o Cat. D2: Medium damage (failure of non-loadbearing walls, claddings, etc.) 
o Cat. D3: Severe damage (collapse of load-bearing structural members) 
- Quantitative damage description by means of the following parameters: 
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o Building area generally affected by the blast wave and building area affected by the col-
lapse, respectively, Abw and Acol  
o Number of storeys generally affected by the blast wave and number of storeys affected 
by the collapse, respectively, ns,bw and ns,col 
o Number of housing-units generally affected by the blast wave and number of housing-
units affected by the collapse, respectively, nhu,bw and nhu,col 
- Occupancy at the time of the incident 
o Building occupancy, Ocu  
o Occupancy of the area affected by the collapse, Ocucol 
Three different categories were established to classify the cause of the incident. Intentionally caused gas 
explosions (Cat. C1), in many cases related to suicide, are distinguished from accidental incidents. The 
latter are further distinguished into events triggered without direct human intervention (Cat. C2), such 
as unforeseen technical defects, and those that involve some kind of direct human error (Cat. C3), as for 
instance, erroneous maintenance- or repair interventions in gas conducts or appliances.  
The present study focusses on explosion incidents involving structural collapse. Most incidents involve 
minor structural damage, however (section 3.1.2). Three categories are established in the present study 
in order to classify explosion-induced damage to the building. Light damage (Cat. D1), such as broken 
furniture or failure of doors and windows (Figure 7.2, left), is distinguished from medium (Cat. D2) or 
severe (Cat. D3) damage to building components. Medium damage is associated with failure of typical 
non-loadbearing elements, such as interior brick walls or masonry façade panels (Figure 7.2, middle). 
Of primary interest here are incidents assigned to Cat. D3, characterized by collapse of loadbearing 
structural members, such as walls, columns, beams or slabs (Figure 7.2, right, Figure 1.2).  
 
Figure 7.2 Examples for incidents involving light (left), medium (middle) and severe (right) damage  
It should be noted that extremely severe collapse scenarios, often associated with a high number of fa-
talities, are amply documented in the media. An example is the collapse of a residential building in Pa-
lencia (Spain) in 2007, involving 9 fatalities and more than 30 injuries (Figure 1.2, right). The case oc-
cupied the media for several days, what contributed to a large amount of available information, includ-
ing exceptionally detailed descriptions of the damage extensions (Figure 7.3). On the contrary, less me-
dia-attractive incidents involving collapse of far smaller extensions, and only few or no fatalities, are 
rather scarcely addressed in the media, lacking detailed damage descriptions in many cases. Moreover, 
such descriptions are generally subjective, subject to the perception of damage by the informing jour-
nalist. For instance, a building described in a press release as “completely destroyed” does not neces-
sarily indicates a total building collapse, but might refer to a destroyed flat without failure of any load-
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bearing structural members, such as shown in Figure 7.2 (middle). Hence, in order to reliably identify a 
structural collapse scenario and to perform a trustworthy, quantitative estimate of its extensions, the 
available information must be cautiously analyzed and evaluated, requiring in many cases a tedious 
comparative study of several data sources, including local media if appropriate. 
 
Figure 7.3 Detailed description of damage extensions after collapse of a residential building in Palencia [203] 
The damage extensions of an incident are quantifed in terms of the affected building area, the nº of sto-
reys or the nº of housing-units. A distinction is made for building portions affected by the blast wave in 
general, and collapsed building parts in particular (damage category D3). Since, as stated before, de-
tailed information on damage extensions is scarce in many cases, though required for the present study, 
some estimates are necessary. This applies especially to damage parameter Acol (section 7.1), which is 
reliably indicated only in exceptional cases (e.g. Figure 7.3). In case Acol can neither be estimated from 
available images or videos attached to the press articles, it might be deduced from equation (7.3) as a 
function of the total building area A and the ratio between the number of collapsed- and total storeys 
ns,col/ns (or housing-units, nhu,col/nhu), in case these parameters are available.  
Acol
A
=
ns,col
ns
=
nhu,col
nhu
         (7.3) 
The nº of persons present at the time of the incident, in the building in general, and on the area affected 
by the collapse (Acol) in particular, is referred to as building- and collapse area occupancy, respectively, 
Ocu and Ocucol. While the total building occupancy (Ocu) can often be extracted or estimated from the 
available information, precise data on Ocucol is normally lacking. As a rough estimation, Ocucol can be 
inferred from (7.4) as a function of the total building occupancy Ocu and ratio Acol/A, substitutable like-
wise by ratio ns,col/ns or nhu,col/nhu according to (7.3).  
Ocucol
Ocu
=
Acol
A
          (7.4) 
7.2.4 Consequence data 
In keeping with the scope of the study, the data compilation on the incident consequences focuses on 
damage to persons. However, for it might be of interest for future studies, data on economic conse-
quences is also recorded. The corresponding data fields are listed below: 
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- Number of fatalities (N) and fatalities attributed to structural collapse (Ncol) 
- Number of severe injuries (Isev) and severe injuries attributed to structural collapse (Isev,col) 
- Number of slight injuries (Isli) and slight injuries attributed to structural collapse (Isli,col) 
- Number of total injuries (I) and total injuries attributed to structural collapse (Icol) 
- Number of disappeared persons (D) 
- Direct economic consequences  
- Indirect economic consequences  
A distinction is made for consequences to persons in general, and those that might be traced back to a 
structural collapse scenario, of primary interest for the present study. This distinction is necessary to 
account for deaths or injuries attributable to the direct exposure to the explosion effects, such as the 
released heat or the pressure wave. Moreover, explosions frequently trigger fire, what entails additional 
risk to persons, e.g. due to suffocation. In many cases, the mentioned distinction is not straight forward, 
however. An extremely detailed and cautious analysis of the available information is necessary to judge 
whether injury or death of a person can be attributed to structural collapse or not. Even then, some 
simplifying hypothesis are required in most cases. As a rule, victims are traced back to structural col-
lapse if there are reliable indications that the person was located on the area affected by the collapse 
(Acol) at the time this collapse occurred and not directly exposed to the explosion effects.  
Direct economic consequences refer to costs that are directly associated with the explosion-induced 
damage to the building, e.g. repair- or demolition costs. Other monetary consequences are designated 
as indirect costs, including, e.g. costs associated with emergency services or the temporary accommo-
dation of persons after a building evacuation. 
7.2.5 Additional data 
In addition to the information described above, the database contains the following fields: 
- Data source(s) 
- Comments 
- Relevance 
The data field Comments contains the hypothesis and assumptions that might have been adopted to es-
timate the different building-, incident or consequence-related parameters. Moreover, doubtful infor-
mation, for instance due to contradictory indications in the same or different data sources, is highlighted 
here. Finally, any interesting complementary information, not included in the previous data fields, is 
compiled. 
The last data field refers to the relevance of a specific incident regarding the inference of a consequence 
model. In particular, an incident is considered potentially relevant to this purpose if the following con-
ditions are fulfilled: 
- The building is classified under use category A or B according to [82]  
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- The incident is classified under damage category D3 (collapse due to failure of loadbearing struc-
tural member) 
- The number of persons on the area affected by the collapse (Ocucol) is different from zero 
- The number of fatalities due to the collapse (Ncol) is known  
- The compiled information seems reliable 
7.3 Data evaluation  
7.3.1 Introduction 
The systematic data collection according to the descriptions in section 7.2 concluded with a total of 233 
recorded explosion incidents. Descriptive statistics are used in first place to provide an overview on the 
compiled data (section 7.3.2). In the following, the incidents that are potentially relevant to the specific 
purpose of deriving a consequence model are screened out and statistically described in terms of se-
lected parameters (section 7.3.3).  
7.3.2 Overview 
Figure 7.4 (left) shows a distribution of the 233 compiled incidents according to the country where these 
incidents occurred. The figure reveals that the vast majority of the incidents, about 77%, occurred in 
Spain what is due to the fact that mainly national data sources were analized in the press survey (section 
7.2.1). Moreover, the database contains incidents in Germany (7%), the U.S. (4%), France (3%), Italy 
(3%) and other western countries (6%). 
In the right part of Figure 7.4, it can be observed that, unsurprisingly, most of the compiled incidents 
occurred in residential buildings (82%). In addition, the database includes a number of explosions in 
shopping areas (8%), areas for storage and industrial use (7%), office areas (2%) and areas where peo-
ple may congregate (1%). It should be noted that a large part of the explosions in shopping areas is 
attributable to accidents in restaurant kitchens.  
 
Figure 7.4 Distribution of compiled incidents per country (left) and per building use category (right) 
Figure 7.5 (left) illustrates the distribution of compiled incidents per time-period during which the in-
cidents occurred. The time-periods are represented by four decades from 1960 to 2009 and a half-dec-
ade from 2010 to 2014. It can be observed that the more recent the considered period the higher is the 
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number of corresponding incidents. Rather than an increasing incident occurrence rate, this result man-
ifests the increasing availability of information in the recent years. Especially remarkable is the notice-
able increase from the end of the last to the beginning of the current century, coincident with the “flash-
over” of the internet era. 
On the right, Figure 7.5 distinguishes the incidents according to the inflammable agents involved. It is 
revealed that many of the compiled incidents are related to cylinder gas (>33%), such as butane and 
propane. Natural gas was in the origin of at least 11% of the incidents, another 18% correspond to other 
substances, such as town gas, dust or pyrotechnical material. In most cases, the explosive agent is un-
known or unspecified (38%) - very frequently, gas is identified in the consulted sources as the accident-
causing element without further specification of the gas type, however. 
 
Figure 7.5 Distribution of compiled incidents per time-period (left) and per gas-type involved (right) 
The distribution of the principle causes of the recorded explosion incidents can be drawn from Figure 
7.6 (left). More than 40% of the incidents are accidentally triggered, in most cases without an apparent 
human intervention (>33%), as represented by cause category C2 (section 7.2.3). Intentionally caused 
explosions (Cat. C1) constitute more than 12% of the compiled events. In most incidents, the available 
information is too scarce to draw reliable conclusions on the explosion causes (46%). 
Figure 7.6 (right) shows that more than 55% of the gathered incidents correspond to the severe damage 
category D3 (section 7.2.3), involving structural failure. Less important for the present study are inci-
dents recorded under Cat. D2 (medium damage, >27%) or D1 (light damage, >7%). In about 11% of the 
recorded cases, the damage category could not be reliably established. 
 
Figure 7.6 Distribution of compiled incidents per incident cause category (left) and per damage category (right) 
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Figure 7.7 contains information on the consequences to persons induced by explosion events in build-
ings. On the left, it can be observed that nearly 60% of the compiled incidents involve fatalities. Around 
7% entailed more than 10 fatalities and still 3% more than 20 fatalities. The mean value is N ≈ 5 fatali-
ties per explosion incident, the corresponding coefficient of variation, CoVN = 645%, denotes large asso-
ciated scatter. However, both values considerably diminish if the explosion-induced collapse of a com-
mercial center in Korea [204] with around 500 fatalities is disregarded in the statistical analysis - in that 
case, N ≈ 3 and CoVN = 241%. 
The right part of Figure 7.7 displays the distribution of injuries. It is shown that explosion incidents 
without injuries are seldom (≈ 13%). Moreover, it is stressed that around 12 % of the recorded explo-
sions entailed 20 or more injuries, and nearly 3% more than 40. Consequently, mean value and associ-
ated scatter are relatively high, with I ≈ 13 injuries and CoVI = 481%, respectively. Disregarding the 
937 injuries in the above-mentioned incident in Korea [204], these values reduce to I ≈ 9 and CoVI = 
177%. 
 
Figure 7.7 Distribution of compiled incidents per number of fatalities (left) and injuries (right) 
7.3.3 Relevant incidents 
Screening 
After the generic data description presented in the previous section, the 233 compiled explosion events 
are analyzed in more detail regarding their relevance to the establishment of a consequence model. In 
line with the requirements defined in section 7.2.5, the model should be applicable to incidents in resi-
dential- or office buildings, corresponding to consequence class CC2 [11], which account for about 84 % 
of the 233 compiled cases (Figure 7.4), i.e. 196 incidents. Out of these, 112 are classified as severe inci-
dents (damage category D3, section 7.2.3), involving collapse of loadbearing structural members and 
hence relevant to the purpose of the present investigation.  
Further to the criteria established in section 7.2.5, it is required for a specific incident to be classified as 
potentially relevant to the study, that the occupancy of the area affected by the collapse (Ocucol) is dif-
ferent from zero at the time the collapse occurs. However, in four cases out of the remaining 112 this is 
not the case, among them delayed collapse incidents that occur due to explosion-induced fire scenarios, 
after people have already been evacuated from the building. Finally, one out of the remaining 108 cases 
has to be ruled out due to considerable uncertainties associated with the available information.  
In summary, a total of 107 incidents are identified as potentially relevant to the deduction of a conse-
quence model. 
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Structural attributes  
Figure 7.8 (left) shows a distribution of the 107 relevant incidents according to the construction mate-
rials of the collapsed structure. It can be observed that in almost 3 out of 4 of these incidents no infor-
mation at all is available on this matter. In at least 15% of the collapse-incidents, failure of reinforced 
concrete members was involved, although it could not always be clearly established whether this failure 
had triggered the collapse or if, on the contrary, it was a consequence of it. An example, although not 
included in the database, for it occurred recently in 2016, is the collapse of a residential building in Ten-
erife. Figure 7.8 (right), shows the rubble of the collapsed building. Remaining parts of failed reinforced 
concrete columns can be observed, although no information is available which could answer the ques-
tion if this failure is attributable to the explosion effects, or if it might have occurred during the progres-
sive collapse of the building, e.g. in consequence of an uncontrolled load distribution due to collapse of 
the upper storeys and/or impact forces. 
In other cases, it was observed that reinforced concrete slabs or beams collapsed after losing their sup-
port in form of a loadbearing brick-wall, as possibly happened in the Palencia-incident (Figure 1.2, Fig-
ure 7.3). The analysis of the 107 potentially relevant incidents revealed that failed brickwork or ma-
sonry loadbearing elements were involved in at least 10%. Moreover, in another 4%, failure of structural 
timber members was observed. 
In general, the uncertainties associated with the involved structural systems and construction materials 
in the collapse scenarios are extremely high due to the scarce and imprecise available information. For 
this reason, such information cannot be accounted for the derivation of a consequence model within the 
present study. 
 
Figure 7.8 Distribution of 107 potentially relevant incidents per construction material (left); Collapsed building 
in Tenerife [205] (right) 
Selected parameters 
Compiled data corresponding to selected parameters characterizing the 107 potentially relevant col-
lapse incidents is provided in Annex H.2. The mentioned parameters are related to the building dimen-
sions (area, A, nº of storeys, ns and housing-units, nhu), the extensions of the collapse (area affected by 
the collapse, Acol, collapsed nº of storeys, ns,col and housing-units, nhu,col), the number of persons present 
on A and Acol at the time of collapse (Ocu, Ocucol) as well as the corresponding number of fatalities (Ncol). 
Table 7.1 provides summarizing descriptive statistics. 
Reinforced concrete
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10%
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4%
n.a.
71%
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Attention should be drawn to the relatively large nº of records corresponding to the total- and collapsed 
nº of storeys, respectively, ns and ns,col, available in around 80% of the 107 incidents. On the contrary, 
data on the areas is rather scarce. For instance, the area affected by the collapse (Acol), fundamental for 
the development of the consequence model (section 7.1), is available in only 21% of the records. This in 
spite of the attempts made to estimate Acol from equation (7.3), in connection with information on the 
number of collapsed storeys ns,col or housing-units, nhu,col. Since, as Table 7.1 shows, data on the total 
building area A is likewise scarce (15%), such estimations were practically feasible only in few cases.  
The occupancy of the area affected by the collapse (Ocucol), on the contrary, could be relatively often 
deduced from the available data sources (54%), in many cases with help of relationship (7.4), in con-
junction with data on the total building occupancy (Ocu) and the ratio between the collapsed- and the 
total nº of storeys (ns,col/ns) or housing-units (nhu,col/nhu). It should be noted that the statistics provided 
in Table 7.1 do not include data on minimum or maximum occupations of the building (Ocu), or of the 
area affected by the collapse (Ocucol). However, such data, which in many cases could be deduced from 
the analyzed press releases, is useful for the validation of statistical, complementary data, as will be 
specified in section 7.4.3. 
Table 7.1: Statistical evaluation of different parameters corresponding to 107 potentially relevant incidents 
Parameter A [m2] ns nhu Acol [m2] ns,col  nhu,col  Ocu * Ocucol * Ncol 
Nº of records 16 91 20 23 81 25 48 58 107 
% of total 15 85 19 21 76 23 45 54 100 
 434 3.3 12.5 268 2.4 3.8 17 11 3 
 433 2.8 5.9 396 1.7 5.0 26 18 5 
CoV [%] 100 85 47 147 72 131 148 167 163 
Max 1864 22 24 1864 11 16 136 88 27 
Min 54 0 6 15 1 1 1 1 0 
                        * Excluding records of minimum or maximum occupancies 
 
Table 7.2 reveals that the mean building area affected by the collapse of the 107 incidents is situated in 
Acol = 268 m2. Moreover, average explosion-induced damage to the buildings is characterized by a mean 
of ns,col = 2.4 collapsed storeys and ns,hu = 3.8 collapsed housing units. While these mean values might 
seem surprisingly high, the corresponding large coefficients of variation (CoV), between 72 and 147%, 
are indicative of a huge associated scatter. This applies as well to the occupancy of the area affected by 
the collapse, Ocucol and the number of fatalities Ncol. In this case, CoV’s of around 160-170% denote a low 
concentration of the data around the arithmetic means of, respectively, Ocucol = 11 persons and Ncol = 3 
fatalities.  
7.4 Data complementation 
7.4.1 Introduction 
The previous sub-section shows that information on the fundamental damage parameter Acol is lacking 
in almost 80% of the potentially relevant collapse incidents. However, in many of those cases the exten-
sion of the collapse could be quantified by means of secondary damage parameters, i.e., the number of 
collapsed housing-units nhu,col or storeys, ns,col, available in, respectively, 23 and 76% of the 107 incidents 
(Table 7.1). In the present section, information provided by the National Statistics Institute (INE) [112] 
will be incorporated into the database that allows for an estimation of Acol based on those secondary 
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damage parameters (section 7.4.2). Moreover, INE provides data for estimation of the occupancy of this 
area (Ocucol) in case it could not be previously deduced from the original data sources (section 7.4.3).  
The information adopted from INE stems from the housing- and population census carried out in 2001. 
It is supposed to provide good average estimates for the evaluation period covered in the present survey 
(Figure 7.5). Although in a strict sense the mentioned census data applies to the Spanish territory only, 
it is considered representative for the other countries included in the study as well (Figure 7.4).  
7.4.2 Area affected by the collapse 
Table H.2 [112] in Annex H.3 provides information on the number of housing units nhu in Spain as a 
function of their net-room area Ahu, distinguished into 10 different categories, and the number of storeys 
ns corresponding to the building to which these units belong. Based on this information, the average net-
room area Ahu,av of a Spanish housing unit can be established as a function of ns, as summarized in Table 
7.2 below.  
Table H.3 [112] in Annex H.3 presents the number of buildings in Spain comprising a certain number of 
housing units and storeys. This data allows for establishment of the average number of housing units 
nhu,av  per building comprising a specific number of storeys ns. The subsequent multiplication of Ahu,av and 
nhu,av delivers the average net room area Aav of a Spanish residential building as a function of ns. In order 
to take account of areas attributable to collective building use, not implied in the housing unit net room 
areas, Aav is enhanced by 10% after performing the mentioned multiplication. Finally, Aav can be divided 
by ns in order to obtain the average area per storey, As,av. The deduced areas As,av and Aav are summarized 
in Table 7.2 as a function of ns. The last column of this table represents the weighted average for the net 
room area of a Spanish residential housing unit (Ahu,av =90 m2), building storey (Ahu,av =122 m2) and build-
ing (Ahu,av =249 m2). 
Table 7.2: Average net-room area per housing unit (Ahu,av), per building storey (As,av) and per building (Aav) as a 
function of the number of building storeys ns 
ns 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ≥10 Weighted Average 
Ahu,av 
[m2/hu] 
97 103 95 82 78 80 85 87 88 87 90 
As,av 
[m2/s] 
116 70 90 169 213 247 271 297 266 240 122 
Aav 
[m2/b] 
116 139 269 680 1064 1483 1896 2378 2401 3611 249 
 
The data given in Table 7.2 is subsequently employed to estimate the net room areas A corresponding 
to the buildings of the 107 potentially relevant incidents (section 7.3.3), in case this data is lacking. 
Therefore, equations (7.5) to (7.7) are applied depending on the knowledge of the number of housing 
units (nhu) and storeys (ns).  
A = nhu ∙ Ahu,av  if nhu and ns known       (7.5) 
A = nhu ∙ 90   if nhu known and ns unknown      (7.6) 
A = ns ∙ As,av   if nhu unknown and ns known      (7.7) 
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Based on the estimated building net room area A, the area affected by the collapse, Acol, can be finally 
deduced from (7.3) as a function of ratio nhu,col/nhu or ns,col/ns. In the rare case neither ns nor nhu is avail-
able, Acol can still be estimated from (7.6) or (7.7), by substituting, respectively, nhu for nhu,col, or ns for 
ns,col, in the latter case in association with the weighted average net room area per storey, As,av = 122 m2 
(Table 7.2).  
7.4.3 Occupancy of the area affected by the collapse 
Table H.4 [112] included in Annex H.3 provides useful statistical information on the building occupancy. 
It gives the total number of persons in Spain per category of housing unit net room area (Ahu). Combining 
this data with the information on the number of housing units within each of these categories (Table 
H.2), delivers the average occupancy per Spanish housing unit, summarized in Table 7.3. The last column 
indicates that on an average around 3 persons share a housing unit. Taking account that the Spanish 
average housing unit disposes of about 90 m2 (Table 7.2), it may be concluded that the available mean 
net room area per building user is around 30 m2. 
Table 7.3: Average occupancy Ocuhu,av per housing unit as a function of the housing unit net room area Ahu  
Ahu [m2]  ≤ 30  
>31 
≤45 
>46 
≤60 
>61 
≤75 
>76 
≤90  
>91 
≤105 
>106 
≤120  
>121 
≤150 
>151 
≤180 
> 180  Weighted Average 
Ocuhu,av 
[persons/hu] 
1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 2.9 
 
Based on the data compiled in Table 7.3, a statistical estimation of the total building occupancy Ocu at 
the time of the incident can be realized by means of equations (7.8) and (7.9) under the following spec-
ified conditions: 
Ocu = nhu ∙ Ocuhu,av  if nhu and Ahu known      (7.8) 
Ocu = nhu ∙ 2.9    if nhu known and Ahu unknown    (7.9) 
In case the number of housing units is not known, Ocu can be estimated from (7.10), which makes use 
of the previously mentioned available average building net room area per building user, of about 30 m2: 
Ocu =
A
30
    if nhu unknown (building net-room area A in m2)  (7.10) 
In going from equations (7.8) to (7.10), the statistical uncertainty associated with the estimation of Ocu 
increases. Additional uncertainty arises from the fact that these equations provide predictions of the 
theoretical building occupancy, i.e., based on the assumption that all persons living in a building are 
actually present at the time the incident occurs. This, however, will depend on a number of factors, such 
as the time span (morning, afternoon, or nighttime) or the day of the week (labor or week-end) during 
which the incidents occurs. Since no statistical data is available which would allow for a more precise 
estimation of Ocu under consideration of such effects, full building occupancy is assumed for sake of the 
data complementation. 
Finally, the occupancy Ocucol of the area affected by the collapse Acol can be estimated by means of rela-
tion (7.4) from the total building occupancy Ocu and the ratio between Acol and the total building net 
room area A. In the exceptional case A cannot be previously established, Ocucol can be obtained from 
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(7.10) by substituting A for Acol. In any case, the estimations for Ocu and Ocucol should comply with avail-
able information on minimum or maximum occupancies. Lower bound values can be derived, for in-
stance, from the sum of fatalities (N) and injuries (I), both of which are normally indicated in the data 
sources. Moreover, in some cases, the press releases contain information on the theoretical building 
occupancy, what can be employed as an upper bound value to the occupancy at the time of the incident. 
7.4.4 Results  
The results of the statistical data complementation described in the previous sub-sections are given in 
Annex H.4. In Table 7.4, which provides a summary, it is shown that in comparison to the original data-
sample (Table 7.1) the nº of records has largely increased. The area affected by the collapse Acol and the 
corresponding occupancy Ocucol are now available in, respectively, 91 and 95 of the 107 incidents. Im-
portant to mention is that the order of magnitude of both average values and scatter is not altered. The 
mean values () of variables Ocucol and Acol have experienced an increase of about 5 and 30%, respec-
tively, while the corresponding coefficients of variation (CoV) decreased in about 20% with respect to 
the original data.  
Table 7.4: Statistical evaluation of complemented data corresponding to 107 potentially relevant incidents 
Parameter A [m2] Acol [m2] Ocu Ocucol 
Nº of records 104 91 101 95 
% of total 97 85 94 89 
 650 345 21 11 
 566 395 25 15 
CoV [%] 87 114 118 134 
Max 2401 2401 150 88 
Min 54 15 1 1 
 
In summary, 91 explosion-induced collapse incidents, for which the fundamental damage parameter Acol 
could be established, are available for purpose of a multiple linear regression analysis aimed at deriving 
a consequence model for estimation of structure-related risks to persons. This analysis is described in 
section 7.5 below. 
7.5 Multiple linear regression analysis 
7.5.1 Introduction 
On the empirical basis of the compiled, evaluated and complemented 91 relevant incidents identified in 
the foregoing section, the objective persuaded in the present section is to derive a mathematical model 
that, with certain accuracy, allows for an estimation of the number of fatalities Ncol due to a specific col-
lapse scenario. The extensions of this scenario should be described by the area affected by the collapse 
Acol, by which means the link to the mathematical framework for quantitative evaluation of risks is es-
tablished (section 7.1). Moreover, it should be analyzed if, besides area Acol, the occupancy of this area, 
Ocucol, has a significant statistical influence on the estimation of Ncol. The data plots shown in Figure 7.9 
(left: Ncol-Acol; right: Ncol-Ocucol) and the corresponding tendency lines seem to affirm this hypothesis.   
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Figure 7.9 Ncol-Acol (left) and Ncol-Ocucol plots (right) including tendency lines for 91 relevant incidents  
The mathematical relationship between Ncol and the explanatory variables Acol and Ocucol, is deduced by 
means of a multiple linear regression model. Section 7.5.2 describes the general characteristics of such 
a model and its associated statistical criteria and parameters. In the following, section 7.5.3 presents the 
most significant models deduced. Finally, the prediction accuracy of these models is discussed in section 
7.5.4, where, in addition, a comparison to prior consequence models is presented.  
7.5.2 Regression model and associated criteria 
Model description 
The general equation for a multiple linear regression model can be written as per (7.11) below [206]. 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 +⋯βkXk + ϵ       (7.11) 
In general terms, this formulation expressed that the dependent variable Y can be described as a func-
tion of k explanatory variables and an error- or disturbance term 𝜖 that encompasses other unspecified, 
omitted factors. The model parameters i gauge the effect of the corresponding explanatory variable Xi 
on the dependent variable Y, holding all other explanatory variables constant [206]. In addition, a con-
stant model parameter  (intercept) characterizes the linear regression model. 
Model evaluation 
The overall statistical significance of the model can be checked by means of the F-test, based on the F 
distribution by Snedecor-Fischer. The objective of this test is to check hypothesis H0 which states that 
all of the model parameters i equal zero (7.12). In particular, H0 can be rejected if the probability (p-
value) that a cut-off value F > F* is less than or equal to a specified maximum probability, in the present 
case established as 0.05. The F-statistic F* will be defined at a later stage (7.23). 
H0:  β1 = β2 = ⋯ = βk = 0        (7.12) 
The model parameters in (7.11) are computed with IBM SPSS Statistics [207] using the ordinary least 
squares method, i.e. by minimizing the sum of squared prediction errors for the data points of the sam-
ple. A so called ‘‘backward elimination’’ regression procedure is applied. This procedure consists in ini-
tially including all the potential explanatory variables and in each subsequent step eliminating the least 
significant one, as determined by the t-test. This test, based on the t-distribution by Student, checks the 
hypothesis H0 (7.13) that a specific model parameter i equals zero, in which case the corresponding 
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variable Xi would be insignificant. Therefore, the t-statistic tbi, defined by the quotient between regres-
sion coefficient bi (which represents the sample estimate of the corresponding population parameter 
i), and its standard deviation sbi, is employed (7.14). In particular, H0 can be rejected if the probability 
(p-value) that t > tbi is less than or equal to a specified maximum probability, in the present case estab-
lished as 0.1. The regression procedure ends when the p-value for all the variables remaining in the 
model complies with this criterion.  
H0:  βi = 0          (7.13) 
tbi =
bi
sbi
          (7.14) 
The coefficient of determination R2 can be used to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the regression model 
to the data points. It indicates the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable Y that can be 
explained by the model through a comparison of the model errors to the errors of a benchmark model 
in which the sample mean Y̅ is used to predict Y [206]. Formally, R2 can be expressed by (7.15), as the 
ratio between the explained sum of squares (ESS) and the total sum of squares (TSS). The former (7.16) 
quantifies the deviations of the n predicted values Ŷi from the mean value Y̅, while the latter (7.18), 
defined as the sum of EES and the residual sum of squares (RSS), is indicative of the variation of the n 
data points Yi around Y̅. The residual sum of squares (7.17) is a measure for the model error, in terms of 
the discrepancy between data points Yi and predicted values Ŷi. 
R2 =
ESS
TSS
= 1 −
RSS
TSS
         (7.15) 
ESS =  ∑ (Ŷi −
n
i=1  Y̅)
2         (7.16) 
RSS =  ∑ (Yi −
n
i=1  Ŷi)
2         (7.17) 
TSS =  ∑ (Yi −
n
i=1  Y̅)
2         (7.18) 
It should be noted that adding explanatory variables Xi to a regression model implies a decrease of the 
RSS while the TSS remains constant. Hence, according to (7.15), R2 increases with each Xi added to the 
model. Consequently, R2 does not provide an objective basis for the evaluation and comparison of the 
goodness-of-fit of models with different numbers of explanatory variables Xi. The adjusted coefficient of 
determination R̅2 (7.19), which takes into account the number of degrees of freedom, can be used in lieu 
of the standard R2 to correct for the over-parameterisation of the latter [206, 208]. 
R̅2 = 1 −
(n−1)
n−(k+1)
(1 − R2)        (7.19) 
Another parameter that provides an overall measure of how well the regression line fits the data sample 
is the standard error of the estimate (SEE). It represents the average distance between the observed 
values Y and the regression line and is hence an estimate for the model’s errors standard deviation. 
Formally, it is defined by the square root of the mean square error (MSE), as expressed per (7.20). The 
MSE (7.21) is a function of the residual sum of squares (7.17) and its corresponding number of degrees 
of freedom, n-(k+1). Similarly, the regression mean square (MSR) is defined by the quotient between 
the explained sum of squares (7.16) and the corresponding number of degrees of freedom, k (7.22). The 
ratio between MSR and MSE delivers the previously introduced F-statistic F* (7.23), required for testing 
hypothesis (7.12) in order to check the global significance of the regression model. 
SEE = √MSE          (7.20) 
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MSE =
RSS
n−(k+1)
          (7.21) 
MSR =
ESS
(k+1)−1
=
ESS
k
         (7.22) 
F∗ =
MSR
MSE
          (7.23) 
Model requirements 
At least the following requirements are to be verified for a multiple linear regression model: 
- Linearity between dependent and explanatory variables 
- Normality of model’s errors 
- Homoscedasticity of model’s errors 
- Independence of model’s errors 
Linearity of the model is provided with previous transformation of the variables, while normality of the 
model’s errors can be checked by means of Q–Q plots. The analysis of studentized residuals ti is used to 
confirm a constant variance of the model’s errors, known as homoscedasticity, and their independency. 
Moreover, the analysis of ti allows for identification of unusual observations (outliers).  In the present 
study, outliers were identified as values with ti outside the range ±3.0. 
Studentized residuals ti (7.24) are obtained by diving the ordinary residuals ei (7.25) by an estimate of 
their standard deviation (√MSE) and the so-called leverage hii, which quantifies the influence that the 
observed response Yi has on the predicted value Ŷi. The leverage hii of an observation Yi corresponds to 
the ith diagonal element of the hat matrix H, which relates the vector of the observations Yi to the vector 
of model predictions Ŷi (7.26). It should be noted that the subscript (i) added to the mean square error 
(MSE) in (7.24) denotes that externally studentized residuals (also called deleted residuals) are referred 
to here, which use the mean square error based on the estimated model with the ith observation deleted, 
in case this observation constitutes a potential outlier. In contrast, internally studentized residuals are 
based on the MSE corresponding to the regression model including all observations Yi. 
ti =
ei
√MSE(i)(1−hii)
         (7.24) 
ei = Yi − Ŷi          (7.25) 
hii = [𝐇]ii          (7.26) 
7.5.3 Results 
A large number of trials was carried out under variation of different combinations and mathematical 
transformations of the variables Ncol, Acol and Ocucol to adjust a multiple linear regression model to the n 
= 91 data points. A common finding in these trials was the impossibility to verify the homoscedasticity 
and independency of the residuals. This problem could be attributed to the relatively large number of 
collapse incidents with zero fatalities, which account for 33 observations within the sample (Figure 7.9). 
This problem is illustrated in Figure 7.10, which shows the externally studentized residuals ti plotted 
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versus the predicted values Ŷi of the dependent variable Y, in this particular case Y = Ln(Ncol/(Ocu-
col/Acol)+1). It can be observed that the ti are not homogenously distributed around the abscissa. The ti 
corresponding to the zero fatality incidents, highlighted in the figure, depart from the abscissa in a sys-
tematic manner denoting that the regression model is inappropriate to explain the variability of the de-
pendent variable. Only when the 33 data points were removed from the sample, this problem could be 
satisfactorily solved. A description of the two most significant models, adjusted to the remaining 58 ob-
servations, is given below. 
 
Figure 7.10 Externally studentized residuals ti versus predicted values Ŷi for Ln(Ncol/(Ocucol/Acol)) 
Model 1 
Regression model 1 is given in equation (7.27) below. All variables were log-transformed to stabilize 
the variance of the regression model error. The response variable of model 1 corresponds to the number 
of fatalities Ncol divided by the occupancy ratio of the area affected by the collapse, Ocucol/Acol. The back-
ward elimination procedure (section 7.5.2) concluded the explanatory variables Ocucol/Acol and Acol to 
be significant. The almost zero p-values associated with the corresponding regression coefficients b1 
and b2 (Table 7.5) indicate strong evidence to reject hypothesis (7.13). 
Ln (
Ncol
Ocucol Acol⁄
) = α + β1Ln(Ocucol Acol⁄ ) + β2Ln(Acol) + ϵ     (7.27) 
Table 7.5: Estimation of regression coefficients of model 1 
Variable 
Non standardized coefficients 
t p-value 
Designation Estimate s  
Intercept a -0.329 0.583 -0.564 0.575 
Ln(Ocucol/Acol) b1 -0.485 0.110 -4.406  0.000 
Ln(Acol) b2 0.566 0.087 6.536  0.000 
 
The ANOVA (analysis of variance) findings for model 1 are listed in Table 7.6. The value obtained for 
test statistic F* (7.23) is 36.12, while the cut-off value associated with the adopted maximum probability 
of 0.05 (section 7.5.2), Fk;n-(k+1);0.05 is 3.17. Given that F* is much larger than Fk;n-(k+1);0.05, equation (7.27) 
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was concluded to provide a statistically significant explanation for the differences in the dependent var-
iable Ln (Ncol/(Ocucol/Acol)). 
Table 7.6: ANOVA (analysis of variance) of model 1 
Source of variance Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F* p-value 
Regresión ESS = 32.51 2 MSR = 16.28 36.21  0.000 
Residual RSS = 24.72 55 MSE = 0.45   
Total TSS = 57.27 57    
 
Based on the ANOVA results given in Table 7.6, the adjusted coefficient of determination (R̅2) is deter-
mined by (7.19) and summarized in Table 7.7. The obtained value of 0.553 indicates that the considered 
explanatory variables explain 55.3 % of the variance of the dependent variable Ln (Ncol/(Ocucol/Acol)), 
what is indicative of a reasonable model fit to the 58 data points. 
Table 7.7: Goodness of fit indicators for model 1  
Model n R R2  ̅2 SSE 
1 58 0.754 0.568 0.553 0.677 
 
Normality was checked with a normality plot of the studentized residuals ti (Q–Q plot), shown in Figure 
7.11 (left). The straight pattern along the bisecting line (y = x) provides evidence that it is reasonable to 
assume normally distributed residuals. This hypothesis is corroborated by a comparison of the coeffi-
cient of correlation rQ associated with the quantile plot and the critical quantiles rQ,. For a sample size 
of n ≈ 60 and a statistical significance of 10%, the critical value is rQ, = 0.984 [208]. Since rQ = 0.991 
> rQ,, the hypothesis of normally distributed residuals cannot be rejected. 
The diagram relating externally studentized residuals ti to predicted values Ŷi is shown in Figure 7.11 
(right). In comparison to Figure 7.10, the ti are homogenously distributed around ti = 0. No systematic 
patterns are detected nor does the variance of the ti seem to experience any significant changes. Hence, 
Figure 7.11 (right) confirms homoscedasticity and independence of the model’s errors. Moreover, the 
Figure shows that no potential outliers have to be analyzed since ti < 3 for all 58 observations (section 
7.5.2). 
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Figure 7.11 Q-Q plot (left) and studentized residuals versus predicted value (right) of model 1 
In summary, model 1 complies with the general requirements associated with multiple linear regression 
models (section 7.5.2). After resubstituting the log-transformed variables in (7.27), regression model 1, 
which allows for an estimation of the fatalities due to a collapse scenario characterized by an area Acol 
and an occupancy Ocucol, is given by expression (7.28): 
Ncol = 0.72 ∙ Ocucol
0.515 ∙ Acol
0.051       (7.28) 
 
Model 2 
Regression model 2 is defined by equation (7.29). Again, all variables were log-transformed. The re-
sponse variable is the ratio between the number of fatalities Ncol and the occupancy of the area affected 
by the collapse, Ocucol. Term “+1” is introduced in order to avoid negative values of the logarithm. Since 
Ln(Ncol/Ocucol) ≈ Ln(Ncol/Ocucol+1), adding this term does not introduce a significant distortion of the 
results. 
The explanatory variables are the same as in model 1 (7.27). Variables Ocucol/Acol and Acol were found to 
have a significant influence as denoted by the almost zero p-values associated with the corresponding 
regression coefficients b1 and b2 (Table 7.8). Evidence for the global statistical significance of the model 
is provided by the F-statistic, F* = 22.61 (Table 7.9), which significantly exceeds the cut-off value Fk;n-
(k+1);0.05 = 3.17. 
Ln (
Ncol
Ocucol
+ 1) = α + β1Ln(Ocucol Acol⁄ ) + β2Ln(Acol) + ϵ     (7.29) 
Table 7.8: Estimation of regression coefficients of model 1 
Variable 
Non standardized coefficients 
t p-value 
Designation Estimate s  
Intercept a 0.539 0.140 3.861  0.000 
Ln(Ocucol/Acol) b1 -0.127 0.026 -4.820  0.000 
Ln(Acol) b2 -0.111 0.021 -5.361  0.000 
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Table 7.9: ANOVA (analysis of variance) of model 2 
Source of variance Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F* p-value 
Regresión ESS = 1.162 2 MSR = 0.584 22.61  0.000 
Residual RSS = 1.422 55 MSE = 0.260   
Total TSS = 2.591 57    
 
The adjusted coefficient of determination (R̅2) of 0.431 (Table 7.10) denotes that the model explains 
43.1 % of the variance of the dependent variable Ln (Ncol/(Ocucol/Acol)). It should be noted that the R̅2 
corresponding to models 1 and 2 are not comparable since the response variables in both models are 
not the same. A comparison of the accuracy of both models is subject of section 7.5.4. 
Table 7.10: Goodness of fit indicators for model 2  
Model n R R2  ̅2 SSE 
2 58 0.672 0.451 0.431 0.162 
 
The Q–Q plot for model 2 is shown in Figure 7.12 (left). The straight pattern along the bisecting line 
provides evidence that it is reasonable to assume normally distributed residuals. The associated coeffi-
cient of correlation rQ equals the critical value at a significance level  = 0.1 , rQ, = 0.984. 
 
Figure 7.12 Q-Q plot (left) and studentized residuals versus predicted value (right) of model 2 
The diagram relating externally studentized residuals ti to predicted values is shown in Figure 7.12 
(right). It is shown that the ti are homogenously distributed around ti=0 confirming homoscedasticity 
and independence of the model’s errors. Neither in this case any potential outliers have to be analyzed 
since ti < 3 for all 58 observations. 
In summary, model 2 likewise complies with the general requirements associated with multiple linear 
regression models. After resubstituting the log-transformed variables in (7.29), regression model 2, 
which allows for an estimation of the fatalities due to a collapse scenario characterized by an area Acol 
and an occupancy Ocucol, is defined as per expression (7.30): 
Ncol = Ocucol(1.7 ∙ Ocucol
−0.127 ∙ Acol
0.016 − 1)     (7.30) 
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7.5.4 Discussion 
Model accuracy 
Several statistical criteria are in place for establishing regression model accuracy. A commonly em-
ployed measure is the M ratio between the observation (Yi) and the model estimate (Ŷi). In the present 
context, this ratio is defined in terms of the observed number of fatalities induced by a specific collapse 
scenario (Ncol,i) and the corresponding predicted value (N̂col,i): 
mi =
Ncol,i
N̂col,i
          (7.31) 
The statistical description of the M ratio as obtained from a comparison of the model predictions N̂col,i, 
by means of model 1 (7.28) and 2 (7.30), to the 58 observations Ncol,i used to derive these models is given 
in Table 7.11. Mean values M larger than unity indicate that, on average, both models tend to underes-
timate the expected number of fatalities in a collapse event, Ncol. Judging from the mean M, model 2 
yields comparatively more accurate predictions. However, coefficients of variation CoVM close to 70% 
for both models are indicative of a relatively large associated scatter.  
Table 7.11: Statistical evaluation of M ratio (mean M, standard deviation sM and coefficient of variation CoVM), 
predictive residual mean (PRM) and cut-off point corresponding to models 1 and 2 
Model M sM CoVM PRM Cut-off point 
1 (7.26) 1.24 0.85 0.69 1.12 1.15 
2 (7.28) 1.07 0.71 0.66 0.51 2.89 
 
The predictive residual mean (PRM) is an estimate of the systematic error in model predictions. Defined 
by (7.32) as the difference between the mean value of the observed number of fatalities, N̅col,i, and the 
mean of the predicted values, N̅̂col,i, it is related to the centroid of the observed-predicted scatter plot 
(N̅̂col,i, N̅col,i), shown in Figure 7.13.  
PRM = N̅col,i − N̅̂col,i         (7.32) 
The positive values obtained for the PRM (Table 7.11) confirm that, on average, the predictions deliv-
ered by both models underestimate the number of fatalities. This is illustrated in Figure 7.13, where the 
centroid of the scatterplot is located above the bisecting line (Ncol,i = N̂col,i). The fact that the PRM as-
sociated with model 2 is smaller indicates a comparatively smaller degree of under-prediction.  
The intersection between the bisecting- and the orthogonal regression line (minimizes the sum of 
squares of the Euclidean distances to the regression line), delivers the so-called cut-off point, shown in 
Figure 7.13.  It divides the observed-predicted values graph in two areas: on the left, the over-prediction 
area and on the right, the under-prediction area. The cut-off points are 1.15 fatalities in model 1 and 
2.89 in model 2 (Table 7.11). In other words, fatalities upward of those values predicted with model 1 
or 2, respectively, will be, on average, below the expected nº of fatalities in a structural collapse event. 
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Figure 7.13 Observed versus predicted number of fatalities: Model 1 (left) and model 2 (right) 
Application boundaries 
Figure 7.14 offers a graphical representation of equations (7.28) and (7.30) corresponding to, respec-
tively, model 1 (left) and 2 (right). Precisely speaking, the figure shows the predicted number of fatalities 
in a collapse scenario (Ncol) as a function of the area affected by the collapse (Acol) and the occupancy 
ratio of this area, Ocucol/Acol. The area Acol, shown on the abscissae, is represented from Acol = 15 to 2400 
m2, corresponding to, respectively, the minimum and maximum areas among the sample data to which 
the models were adjusted (see Figure 7.9 (left)). The occupancy ratio, i.e., the number of persons Ocucol 
per square meter of area Acol, at the time of collapse, is varied between 1/96 and 1/3. The latter value 
corresponds to the maximum occupancy ratio among the sample data. The minimum Ocucol/Acol ratio 
among these data is 1/270. 
The transition between the continuous lines and the dashed lines shown in Figure 7.14 corresponds to 
the maximum number of persons present on the area affected by the collapse among the sample data, 
Ocucol,max = 88 persons (see Figure 7.9 (right)). For instance, assuming an occupancy ratio of Ocucol/Acol 
= 3 (orange curves), the required area to accommodate Ocucol,max = 88 persons is Acol = 264 m2. Beyond 
this limit value, the model predicts outside of its application boundaries. Irrespective of Ocucol, the pre-
viously mentioned minimum and maximum areas of, respectively, Acol,min = 15 m2 and Acol,max = 2400 m2, 
likewise constitute boundaries to the scope of application of the models, outside of which predictions 
should be generally analyzed under extreme caution. The same applies to the minimum and maximum 
occupancy ratios (Ocucol/Acol)min = 1/270 and (Ocucol/Acol)max = 1/3. 
 
Figure 7.14 Graphical representations of model 1 (left) and 2 (right) 
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Figure 7.14 (left) shows that model 1 reasonably predicts a higher number of fatalities Ncol with increas-
ing Acol. Moreover, for a certain Acol, Ncol rises with larger occupancy ratios Ocucol/Acol, what is likewise a 
logical finding. The larger Acol, the stronger is the influence of ratio Ocucol/Acol. 
Model 2 (Figure 7.14, right) likewise estimates a higher Ncol with increasing Acol. However, only up to 
certain point, beyond which the predicted Ncol significantly decrease. Interestingly, this point is located 
close to the before-mentioned application boundary, represented by the transition between continuous 
and dashed lines. This suggests, that upon approaching this boundary, the uncertainties associated with 
the model predictions largely increase, what is supported by the observation that incidents with large 
occupancies Ocucol are generally scarce among the sample data used to derived the model (Figure 7.9, 
right). It is concluded that model 2 delivers a priori reasonable predictions only up to a certain area Acol, 
depending on the occupancy ratio. For instance, assuming Ocucol/Acol = 1/30 m-2, which represents a 
mean value for residential buildings (section 7.4.3), model 2 should not be used for Ncol predictions on 
areas Acol larger than approximately 2000 m2.  
Comparison to prior models 
In previous studies [9, 10, 13], consequence models were derived to predict the number of fatalities Ncol 
due to structural collapse events in buildings associated with consequence classes CC2 and CC3 accord-
ing to [11]. The approach for deriving these models was generally the same as followed herein, with two 
mayor differences however. The first is that, in contrast to the present study, the majority of the com-
piled incidents occurred under normal building-use circumstances, i.e. without the influence of a col-
lapse-triggering accidental action. The second mayor difference to the present approach is that Ncol is 
predicted in terms of a single explanatory variable, the area affected by the collapse, Acol. The regression 
models derived in [9, 10, 13] are given by equations (7.33) and (7.34). 
Ncol = 0.27Acol
0.5 − 1    for CC2 buildings   (7.33) 
Ncol = 0.59Acol
0.56 − 1   for CC3 buildings    (7.34) 
The mi ratios (7.31) for the adjustment of models (7.33) and (7.34) to the 58 collapse incidents compris-
ing data sample employed for deriving models 1 (7.28) and 2 (7.30) are shown in Table 7.12. As was 
observed before for the herein derived models, the CC2 model (7.33) tends to underpredict the number 
of fatalities in a structural collapse scenario. The mean M-ratio, M = 1.54, is larger than the correspond-
ing values found for models 1 (M = 1.24) and 2 (M = 1.07) what indicates a comparatively stronger 
degree of underprediction. Moreover, the coefficient of variation CoVM associated with model (7.33), 
CoVM = 1.90 (Table 7.12) is significantly larger than the values close to 0.7 (Table 7.11) found for models 
1 (7.28) and 2 (7.30) what denotes a comparatively larger scatter inherent to the model fit.  
The comparatively better adjustment of the herein derived models to the data sample is partly attribut-
able to the incorporation of the number of persons present on the area affected by the collapse, Ocucol, 
which, as shown in section 7.5.3, turned out to be a statistically significant influence variable for expla-
nation of the variability in Ncol. In other words, the inclusion of variable Ocucol in addition to Acol enhances 
the model’s prediction capacity.  
Related to variable Ocucol is the physical nature of, respectively, an explosion-induced collapse scenario 
and a collapse under normal building use conditions. An explosion is likely to induce a sudden and un-
announced collapse event that does not allow persons evacuating the building. Hence, the number of 
persons present on the area affected by the collapse (Ocucol) in such events is possibly higher compared 
to non-accidental (referring to the leading action or influence) collapse scenarios, which due to their 
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eventually less abrupt nature, provided that the failure mechanism is ductile, might enable building us-
ers to leave the building before collapse occurs. Keeping in mind that CC2 model (7.33), which does not 
consider Ocucol in an explicit manner, was deduced from data on mainly non-accidental collapse scenar-
ios, hence contributes to explain the comparatively worse fit to the data sample constituted by explo-
sion-induced collapse scenarios. The fact that, on average, model (7.33) underestimates the number of 
fatalities in a more pronounced way than the herein derived models (7.28) and (7.30) corroborates this 
theory.  
Table 7.12: Statistical evaluation of M ratio (mean M, standard deviation sM and coefficient of variation CoVM), 
predictive residual mean (PRM) and cut-off point corresponding to models derived in [9, 13] 
Model M sM CoVM PRM Cut-off point 
CC2 (7.33) 1.54 2.92 1.90 0.51 ≈ 0 
CC3 (7.34) 0.31 0.26 0.84 -10,6 ≈ 0 
 
The CC3 model given by (7.34) is based on collapse incidents where persons congregated on the area 
affected by the collapse [9, 10, 13], characterized by large occupancy ratios Ocucol/Acol. Fitting this model 
to the 58 explosion-induced collapse events in CC2 buildings (residential or office use), with compara-
tively lower Ocucol/Acol ratios, furnishes unsurprising results. Table 7.12 shows that model (7.34) clearly 
overpredicts the number of fatalities in CC2 buildings. This is manifested by a M ratio far below unity 
and a negative predictive residual mean (PRM). The observed versus predicted Ncol-plot and the corre-
sponding orthogonal regression, which falls significantly below the bisecting line, confirms the overpre-
dictive character of model (7.34) in the context of a consequence analysis in CC2 buildings. 
Finally, Figure 7.15 shows a very good qualitative concurrence between the previous consequence mod-
els (7.33) and (7.34) for, respectively, CC2 and CC3 buildings, and the herein derived model 1 (7.28). 
Assuming for the latter an occupancy ratio of Ocucol/Acol of about 1/24 m-2, entails a practically coinci-
dent result to the CC2 model (7.33). It should be observed that this value is close to the mean occupancy 
ratio in Spanish residential buildings, of about 1/30 m-2 (section 7.4.3). On the contrary, the graphical 
representations of the CC3 model (7.34) and model 1 (7.28) roughly match if ratio Ocucol/Acol is assumed 
to be approximately 1/1.8 m-2. Keeping in mind that in typical buildings classified under CC3, such as 
assembly halls, theatres, cinemas or grandstands, the available area per building user is estimated to 
range from 0.5 to 2 m2 [13], this is likewise a reasonable finding. In summary, these results suggest that 
different consequence classes can be adequately accounted for by an explicit consideration of the build-
ing occupancy ratio in the consequence model. Future studies should envisage deriving a unique model 
from a joint database comprising collapse events due to all kind of influences in and on buildings asso-
ciated with all types of consequence classes. 
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Figure 7.15 Comparison of model 1 (7.28) to previous models [9, 10, 13] derived for collapse incidents in build-
ings associated with consequence class CC2 (7.33) and CC3 (7.34) 
7.6 Summary 
Chapter 7 addresses the development of a consequence model which provides a prediction of the num-
ber of fatalities Nj associated with a specific structural collapse scenario j. A basic requirement to such a 
model is that it can be properly linked to the defined mathematical framework for risk quantification 
(section 4.2.3), what is briefly addressed in section 7.1. Previous work [9, 10, 13] showed that this link 
can be suitably established by damage parameter Acol, which represents the building area affected by 
the collapse. Based on the adopted hypothesis for description of a system collapse (section 4.5.4), the 
area affected by the collapse of a specific structural member, Acol,j, is defined in terms of the parameters 
describing the global geometry of the structure (Figure 4.4) and the specific member location within 
this structure.  
In order to establish a relationship between Nj and Acol,j, data on explosion-induced structural collapse 
events in Spain and other western countries was gathered in the framework of a systematic press-sur-
vey (section 7.2). A database was established to classify the information depending on whether it refers 
to the characteristics of the affected building, of the incident or the incident consequences. Three cate-
gories are established in order to distinguish heavily damaged buildings involving structural collapse 
scenarios from light- or medium damage to buildings (section 7.2.3, Figure 7.2). This distinction is not 
always straight forward, however. Especially less “attractive” incidents involving collapse of far smaller 
extensions, and only few or no fatalities, are rather scarcely addressed in the media, lacking detailed 
damage descriptions in many cases. Moreover, such descriptions are generally subjective, subject to the 
perception of damage by the informing journalist. Hence, in order to reliably identify a structural col-
lapse scenario and to perform a trustworthy, quantitative estimate of its extensions, the available infor-
mation had to be cautiously analyzed and evaluated, requiring in many cases a tedious, comparative 
study of several data sources, including local media if appropriate.  
The systematic data collection concluded with a total of 233 recorded explosion incidents. In section 7.3, 
descriptive statistics are used in first place to provide an overview on the compiled data (section 7.3.2). 
In the following, 107 incidents that are potentially relevant to the specific purpose of deriving a conse-
quence model are screened out of the data sample according to previously established selection criteria 
(section 7.3.3). A detailed evaluation of selected parameters characterizing these incidents (Table 7.1) 
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shows that information on the fundamental damage parameter Acol is lacking in almost 80% of the inci-
dents, what would suppose a severe limitation to the objective persuaded. However, in many of those 
cases the extension of the collapse can be quantified by means of secondary damage parameters, i.e., the 
number of collapsed housing units (nhu,col) or storeys (ns,col). 
Following this observation, in section 7.4, information provided by the National Statistics Institute (INE) 
is incorporated into the database, which allows for an estimation of Acol based on the mentioned second-
ary damage parameters (section 7.4.2). Moreover, INE provides data for estimation of the occupancy of 
this area (Ocucol), which could be deduced from the original data sources in about 54% of the 107 po-
tentially relevant incidents (section 7.4.3). The results of the statistical data complementation are sum-
marized in section 7.4.4 (Table 7.4). It is shown that in comparison to the original data sample (Table 
7.1) the nº of records has largely increased. In summary, 91 relevant collapse incidents are available for 
purpose of the multiple linear regression analysis aimed at deriving a consequence model for estimation 
of structure-related risks to persons.  
This regression analysis is subject of section 7.5. Orienting scatter plots suggest that, in addition to the 
area affected by the collapse Acol, the occupancy Ocucol has a significant statistical influence on the esti-
mation of the number of fatalities associated with the collapse, Ncol (section 7.5.1, Figure 7.9). A large 
number of trials was carried out under variation of different combinations and mathematical transfor-
mations of the variables Ncol, Acol and Ocucol to adjust a regression model to the 91 data points. A common 
finding in these trials was the impossibility to verify the homoscedasticity and independency of the re-
siduals, a problem attributed to the relatively large number of collapse incidents with zero fatalities 
(Figure 7.10). Only when the corresponding data points were removed from the sample, this problem 
could be satisfactorily solved. 
A description of the two most significant regression models fitted to the remaining 58 data points (sec-
tion 7.5.3), which comply with all previously established statistical requirements and criteria (section 
7.5.2), is followed by a discussion of the corresponding model accuracy (section 7.5.4). The commonly 
employed M-ratio between the observation Ncol,i and the model estimate N̂col,i is evaluated for this pur-
pose (Table 7.11). Mean values M larger than unity indicate that, on average, both models tend to un-
derestimate the expected number of fatalities in a collapse event. Coefficients of variation CoVM close to 
70% are indicative of a relatively large associated scatter. Judging from a comparison of mean M, model 
2 (7.30) yields more accurate predictions than model 1 (7.28). This is corroborated by the predictive 
residual mean (PRM), which is an estimate of the systematic error in model predictions. The cut-off 
points, beyond which the model predictions will be, on average, below the expected nº of fatalities in a 
structural collapse event, correspond to about 1 fatality in model 1 and about 3 fatalities in model 2 
(Figure 7.13). 
From Figure 7.14 it can be drawn that model 1 and 2 deliver similar predictions for Ncol up to a certain 
limit value for Acol. However, upon approaching the boundaries of the data sample to which the model 
was adjusted, the predictions of both models largely diverge. While model 1 reasonably predicts an in-
creasing Ncol with increasing Acol, model 2 predictions close to and beyond these boundaries are unrea-
sonable, what is attributable to large associated statistical uncertainties. It is concluded that model 2 
delivers a priori reasonable predictions only up to a certain area Acol, depending on the occupancy ratio. 
In previous studies [9, 10, 13], consequence models were derived to predict the number of fatalities due 
to structural collapse events in buildings associated with consequence classes CC2 and CC3 according 
to [11]. The models were obtained from data on collapse scenarios that mainly occurred under normal 
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building use circumstances, i.e. without the influence of a collapse-triggering accidental action. An ad-
justment of the CC2 model to the data sample constituted by the 58 explosion-induced collapse scenar-
ios reveals a lower accuracy compared to the herein derived model 1 (7.28), what seems to be partly 
attributable to parameter Ocucol included in the latter, which turned out to be statistically significant for 
the explanation of the variability in Ncol (section 7.5.3). A comparison of the CC2 model predictions to 
those of model 1 (7.28) reveals almost identical results if an occupancy ratio Ocucol/Acol ≈ 1/24 m-2 is 
assumed for the latter, whereas the CC3 model roughly matches the model 1 results for                                  
Ocucol/Acol ≈ 1/1.8 m-2, what are reasonable findings (Figure 7.15). The results suggest that possible fu-
ture studies should envisage a unique model, derived from a joint database comprising collapse events 
due to all kind of influences in and on buildings associated with all types of consequence classes.
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Chapter 8 Risk-based acceptance criteria 
In the present study, a hazard scenario is defined as a particular collapse event triggered by failure of 
one of the principle loadbearing members constituting a particular building structure (section 4.2). The 
corresponding occurrence frequencies pj, are represented by the implicitly acceptable member failure 
probabilities pf,adm (Chapter 6). The associated failure consequences Nj are expressed in terms of the 
number of fatalities, which are estimated by means of the consequence model previously derived (Chap-
ter 7). As a function of both pj and Nj, the present chapter addresses the determination of the implicitly 
acceptable risks associated with each of the representative building structures defined under section 
4.4. Based on the obtained findings, acceptance criteria for structure-related life safety risks are de-
duced. These tasks correspond to steps 7 and 8 of the established analysis procedure (Figure 8.1). 
After a summary of the main assumptions adopted for the establishment of pj and Nj (section 8.1), the 
obtained risk profiles (Figure 4.2) are presented in section 8.2. The integration of these risk profiles 
furnishes the implicitly acceptable risks to persons associated with a particular building structure, for 
which, in addition to the normal building use conditions, gas explosions are a relevant hazard to struc-
tural safety. A comparison to previous studies, dedicated to risks associated with structures where ac-
cidental scenarios were excluded from the analysis, is provided. Finally, based on the results described 
in section 8.2, section 8.3 addresses the development of acceptance criteria. 
 
Figure 8.1 Procedural flow-chart 
8.1 Hazard scenarios 
8.1.1 Introduction 
In section 4.2.3, a hazard scenario was defined as a particular collapse event triggered by failure of one 
of the principle loadbearing members constituting a particular building structure. Such a failure is char-
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(Chapter 1, section 4.1)
2. Mathematical model (s. 4.2)
4. Hazard scenarios (s. 4.5)
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Limit states (s. 4.6)
Strict design (s. 4.7)
Basic variables (s. 4.8)
Dynamic analysis (Ch. 5)
Reliability analysis (Ch. 6)
6. Consequence models (Ch. 7)
7. Implicitly acceptable risks (Ch. 8)
8. Acceptance criteria (Ch. 8)
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acterized by a specific failure mode (k) to arise under a particular load arrangement (l). The correspond-
ing occurrence probability pj, i.e. the probability for the member to fail in mode k under the influence of 
load arrangement l, is represented by the implicitly acceptable member failure probability, pf,adm. The 
associated consequences are expressed in terms of the number of fatalities Nj due to the collapse. Sec-
tions 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 summarize the main assumptions adopted for the quantification of occurrence 
probabilities pj and consequences Nj. 
8.1.2 Occurrence probabilities 
The implicitly acceptable structural failure probabilities for members potentially exposed to explosion-
induced load arrangements were presented in section 6.2, in terms of the implicitly required reliability 
index req,EX. Thereby, account was taken of the occurrence probability p(EX) of a gas explosion event in 
a housing unit supplied with gas (6.3). In the context of a risk analysis on a building level, it must be 
further considered that not all constitutive members will be potentially exposed to the effects of such 
an event for they might be located in a part of the building that is out of reach of these effects. In order 
to account for this circumstance, the member exposure probability pe is introduced. Therefore, the fol-
lowing hypothesis are established:  
- Each housing unit in a building is equipped with one gas connection 
- The area of one housing unit, Ahu, is a function of the beam span l (Figure 4.4) 
- The tributary area for a structural member under explosion-exposure, AEX, is a function of the 
distance between frames in the longitudinal sense of the building, l (section 4.5.2) 
Based on these assumptions, the exposure probability pe of a particular structural member is estimated 
as a function of ratio Ahu/AEX. The obtained results are summarized in Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1 Member exposure probability pe as a function of beam span l 
l [m] Ahu/AEX pe 
5 6.0 0.30 
10 3.0 0.50 
15 2.0 0.67 
20 1.5 0.80 
30 1.0 1.00 
40 1.0 1.00 
 
In section 6.3 it was concluded that the risk analysis of building structures in the context of the present 
study should account for the fact that in addition to the accidental hazard scenarios defined in section 
4.5, certain member failure modes might be triggered by persistent load arrangements associated with 
normal building use conditions. In particular, it was shown that this is especially relevant when such 
conditions also govern the member design, since in such situations the associated failure probabilities 
pf,adm,PER may contribute significantly to the accumulated member failure probability Pf,adm. Contrarily, if 
the accidental situation is mandatory for design, the contribution of persistent load arrangements to 
Pf,adm can be neglected without introducing a considerable error. 
Considering these findings, all potentially explosion-exposed members in a building structure (fraction 
pe according to Table 8.1) shall be designed according to the mandatory design situation. If this situation 
corresponds to the persistent situation, two separate hazard scenarios shall be distinguished with their 
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corresponding occurrence probabilities pj: member collapse induced by, respectively, an explosion load 
arrangement (EX), with an associated admissible occurrence probability pf,adm,EX (Figure 4.1, path b1),  
and a persistent load arrangement (PER), characterized by probability pf,adm,PER (Figure 4.1, path b2). On 
the contrary, if the accidental design situation is mandatory, only probability pf,adm,EX corresponding to 
the accidental load arrangement (EX) shall be considered in the computation of risks (Figure 4.1, path 
a1). 
All potentially non-exposed members in a building structure (fraction 1-pe according to Table 8.1) shall 
be necessarily designed according to the persistent situation and only the hazard scenario under the 
corresponding load arrangement (PER), characterized by probability pf,adm,PER, shall be considered in the 
risk analysis (Figure 4.1, path b2). 
8.1.3 Consequences 
In section 7.5.4 it was shown that the derived consequence model 2 (7.30) delivers reasonable predic-
tions of the collapse-induced nº of fatalities Nj only up to a certain limit value of the area affected by the 
collapse, Acol (Figure 7.14), what constitutes a severe limitation and rules out its application for estima-
tion of failure consequences in the framework of the present study. Consequently, in spite of the com-
paratively lower accuracy, consequence model 1 (7.28) is chosen for this purpose. This model allows for 
an estimation of Nj as a function of the area Acol,j and the occupancy ratio of this area, (Ocucol/Acol)j. The 
area Acol,j is established by equations (7.1) and (7.2) as a function of the hypothesis adopted for charac-
terization of system collapse given a member failure (section 4.5.4) and the geometrical building char-
acteristics (section 4.4.2). For the occupancy ratio, a value of 1/30 m-2 is adopted, which corresponds to 
the inverse value of the theoretical average net room area per person in Spanish residential buildings 
(section 7.4.3). 
For sake of simplicity, model (7.28) is employed irrespective of the nature of the considered hazard 
scenario (accidental or persistent). As shown in section 7.5.4, a previous consequence model deduced 
in the context of normal building use conditions entails similar predictions to those of model (7.28), 
what justifies this simplified approach. 
8.2 Implicitly acceptable risks  
8.2.1 Introduction 
The occurrence probabilities pj and the consequences Nj for each of the nj hazard scenarios associated 
with a particular building structure can be represented in risk profiles (Figure 4.2). These are presented 
in section 8.2.2. The areas under these risk profiles correspond to the implicitly acceptable risks to per-
sons associated with a particular structure, Radm. Following their analysis and statistical evaluation in 
section 8.2.3, the admissible risks Radm are compared to findings from prior studies [10, 13] where ex-
clusively hazard scenarios associated with persistent load arrangements were considered (section 
8.2.4). 
8.2.2 Risk profiles 
The lower and upper envelopes of 48 implicitly acceptable risk profiles corresponding to the 48 differ-
ent parameter combinations studied (section 4.4.5) for each of the 94 defined geometrical building con-
figurations (Table 4.1) are shown in Figure 8.2.  
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According to the general description of a risk profile in section 4.2.3, the maximum value on the ordinate 
represents the implicitly acceptable, accumulated failure probability Pf,adm associated with the structure, 
i.e. the probability that the structure will be affected by a collapse scenario induced by failure of one of 
its constitutive members within the reference period Tref. According to the results obtained, Pf oscillates 
between approximately 4.4∙10-4 and 1.3∙101 within Tref = 50 years. 
The maximum value represented on the axis of abscissa of the risk profiles represents the maximum 
consequences due to a structural collapse event. In the present case, the maximum number of fatalities 
Nmax due to a partial- or total collapse in the studied building structures varies between 1 and 40 fatali-
ties, approximately. 
The large variation in both Pf and Nmax is a first indication of the high scatter associated with the implic-
itly acceptable risks to persons associated with the analized building structures.  
 
Figure 8.2 Lower (left) and upper (right) envelopes of 48 risk profiles corresponding to a specific geometrical 
building configuration 
8.2.3 Evaluation and representation of risks  
The implicitly acceptable risks Radm associated with all nj relevant and statistically independent hazard 
(collapse) scenarios for one particular building structure correspond to the area under the correspond-
ing implicitly acceptable risk profile, as expressed by (4.10). Since the structures analysed are consti-
tuted by statically determinate members (section 4.4.4), they may be interpreted as series systems (sec-
tion 2.4.2) for which the assumption of statistical independency between failure scenarios leads to con-
servative estimates of the probabilities of failure. The simplification adopted is also justified because the 
resulting probabilities and risks are interpreted in comparative terms [13]. 
Figure 8.3 shows Radm plotted against the total net room area A for the buildings analysed; each point 
represents the risk associated with one of the 4512 analyzed building structures. The expected number 
of fatalities is observed to be significantly higher in buildings characterised by smaller venting coeffi-
cients (Av/V) what is reasonable for the corresponding member failure probabilities were found to be 
comparatively larger (section 6.2). In addition to this anticipated result, the figures on admissible risks 
to persons associated with the structures analysed are observed to vary widely due to the scale effect 
(section 4.2.3). As expressed by (4.10), risks associated with structures designed in strict accordance 
with the existing legislation rise with the number of hazard scenarios (nj), which, in turn, rise with the 
number of structural members (nm), failure mechanisms (nk) and load arrangements (nl) that may trig-
ger these mechanisms. Since, to some extent, the total building net room area A encompasses these pa-
rameters, Radm increases likewise with rising A, as shown in Figure 8.3. 
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Figure 8.3 Risks Radm vs. building area A and explosion venting coefficient Av/V; Tref = 50 years 
A statistical analysis of the results shown in Figure 8.3, based on the assumption that variable Radm has 
a lognormal distribution, yields the mean values Radm,m and the 5% and 95 % fractile values Radm,5% and 
Radm,95% respectively, shown in Figure 8.4 (left). In a similar vein, Figure 8.4 (right) and Figure 8.5 show 
the relationships between admissible risks Radm and, respectively, the total number of members com-
prising the structure analysed (nm), the corresponding total number of failure mechanisms (nk) and, as 
a function of both, the total number of hazard scenarios (nj) associated with the structure. The previ-
ously mentioned scale effect is clearly visible in all figures. 
 
Figure 8.4 Risks Radm vs. building net room area A [m2] (left) and vs. nº of members nm (right); Tref = 50 years 
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
1.E+01
1.E+02
1.E+03
1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 1.E+05 1.E+06
R
A
Av/V = 0.05 [1/m]
Av/V = 0.15 [1/m]
2256 RC buildings (per shown series)
200 m2 < A < 990000 m2
0 < ns < 30
6 < nm < 40931
Tref = 50 years
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
1.E+01
1.E+02
1.E+03
1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 1.E+05 1.E+06
R
A 
4512 RC buildings 
200 m2 < A < 990000 m2
0 < ns < 30
6 < nm < 40931
Rm = 3E-05 ∙ A
1.00
R95% = 8E-05 ∙ A
1.00
R5% = 8E-06 ∙ A
1.00
Tref = 50 years
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
1.E+01
1.E+02
1.E+03
1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 1.E+05
R
nm
4512 RC buildings 
200 m2 < A < 990000 m2
0 < ns < 30
6 < nm < 40931
Rm = 5E-04 ∙ nm
1.03
R95% = 3E-03 ∙ nm
1.03
R5% = 8E-05 ∙ nm
1.03
Tref = 50 years
Acceptable life safety risks associated with the effects of gas explosions on reinforced concrete structures 
 
246 
 
Figure 8.5 Risks Radm vs. nº of failure mechanisms nk (left) and vs. nº of hazard scenarios nj (right); Tref = 50 years 
The scale effect can be eliminated by normalizing the results as shown in Figure 8.6 (left), which plots 
the implicitly acceptable risks Radm normalized for the total building net room area A as a function of A. 
Here, too, each point represents the result for one building structure. Similarly, Figure 8.6 (right) and 
Figure 8.7 offer representations of Radm normalized for the number of structural members nm, failure 
mechanisms nk or hazard scenarios nj. In all the figures, the relationship between the normalized risks 
Radm and these parameters can be statistically characterised by a constant mean value and an associated 
scatter, expressed in terms of the lognormal-based 5 and 95% fractile values shown. In part, the scatter 
may be attributed to the incomplete and not fully consistent calibration of the rules for designing struc-
tural members laid down in the existing standards (section 2.3.3). 
It might be observed that Radm/nm > Radm/nk > Radm/nj (compare for instance the mean values shown in 
Figure 8.6 and Figure 8.7) what is a logical finding since each structure is constituted by a specific num-
ber of members nm, which in turn might fail under different failure mechanisms nk. Since moreover some 
of those failure mechanisms might be potentially triggered by different load arrangements nl of persis-
tent- or accidental character (section 4.2.3, section 8.1.2), it is obvious that nj > nk > nm. 
 
Figure 8.6 Risks Radm normalized for building net room area A vs. A [m2] (left) and R normalized for nº of 
structural members nm vs. nm (right); Tref = 50 years 
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Figure 8.7 Risks Radm normalized for nº of failure mechanisms nk vs. nk (left) and R normalized for nº of hazard 
scenarios nj vs. nj; Tref = 50 years 
8.2.4 Comparison to prior studies 
Before approaching the task to derive acceptance criteria based on the previously presented results, it 
is essential to compare these to the findings from prior studies on risks to persons associated with struc-
tures exposed to persistent design situations [9, 10, 13]. The comparison is possible since the methodol-
ogy followed and the basic assumptions and hypothesis adopted in both studies are consistent to each 
other. The following aspects should be kept in mind when performing the comparison: 
- The representative set of structures analyzed in the mentioned previous studies includes struc-
tures with members of different constitutive materials, such as RC, structural steel, composite 
and glue-laminated timber. However, to keep the comparison consistent, only the results corre-
sponding to the RC structures are evaluated here. 
- The representative set of RC structures considered in [9, 10, 13] is constituted by a total of 2256 
different nominal building configurations, characterized by 94 different building geometries and 
24 different assumptions concerning both permanent and variable loads (only gravitational 
loads) acting on the structures. The same 2256 building configurations were analyzed in the 
present study, where, in addition, two different explosion pressure scenarios are considered, 
leading to a total of 4512 analyzed structures (section 4.4.5). 
- In the previous studies, each hazard scenario was characterized by a specific structural member 
failure mode triggered by a particular persistent load arrangement. With regard to the corre-
sponding occurrence probability pj, it was considered that this load arrangement is dominant 
over all other potential (persistent) load arrangements. Consequently, the number of hazard 
scenarios per structure was considered equal to the number of failure modes (nj = nk). 
- In the present study, on the contrary, it has been previously shown that, under certain condi-
tions, load arrangements of different nature entail the potential to trigger a specific failure mode. 
Precisely, it could be observed that explosion-induced load arrangements might significantly 
contribute to the occurrence probability of certain member failure modes that are also relevant 
under persistent load arrangements due to gravitational loads. Consequently, in the present 
study the number of hazard scenarios per structure is larger than the number of failure modes 
(nj > nk), as previously exposed. 
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+01 1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 1.E+05 1.E+06
R/nk
nk
4512 RC buildings 
200 m2 < A < 990000 m2
0 < ns < 30
6 < nm < 40931
(R/nk)5% = 2.7E-05
(R/nk)m = 2.5E-04 (R/nk)95% = 8.0E-04Tref = 50 years
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+01 1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 1.E+05 1.E+06
R/nj
nj
4512 RC buildings 
200 m2 < A < 990000 m2
0 < ns < 30
6 < nm < 40931
(R/nj)5% = 2.3E-05
(R/nj)m = 1.8E-04 (R/nj)95% = 5.6E-04Tref = 50 years
Acceptable life safety risks associated with the effects of gas explosions on reinforced concrete structures 
 
248 
- Moreover, the explosion hazard entails the potential to trigger additional failure modes, which 
are not relevant under the considered persistent load arrangements due to gravitational loads. 
Among those, the negative bending failure of the beams or the potential shear failure of the col-
umns, with comparatively high failure probabilities in many cases due to the high uncertainties 
involved (section 6.2). 
- In consequence of both, a higher number of relevant load arrangements nl and a higher number 
of relevant failure modes nk, the number of hazard scenarios nj associated with the structures 
analysed in the present study is higher than in the previous studies [9, 10, 13].  
Due to the aforementioned scale effect, a larger number of hazard scenarios nj associated with a specific 
structure reflects ultimately in comparatively higher implicitly acceptable risks Radm. This is shown in 
Figure 8.8, which compares the risks Radm associated with the structures analysed in both studies, nor-
malised for the building net room area A. The blue dots represent the Radm/A values found in the present 
study (shown before in Figure 8.6, left), where, in addition to the gravitational loads, gas explosions 
constitute a potential hazard for structural safety. The corresponding mean value shown in the figure is 
termed (R/A)TOT,m, where subscript TOT alludes to the total risks, i.e. due to both the persistent (PER) 
and the explosion (EX) load arrangements (excluding any other potential accidental scenarios). The red 
dots reflect the risks per unit of net room area obtained in the previous studies [9, 10, 13] where exclu-
sively persistent (PER) situations where considered. It can be observed that the corresponding mean 
value (R/A)PER,m is about 4.4 times lower than the herein obtained mean (R/A)TOT,m.  
 
Figure 8.8 Risks Radm normalized for building net room area A vs. A [m2] (blue dots); Comparison to results from 
prior studies (red dots) [9, 10, 13]; Tref = 50 years 
Since the number of failure modes nk per unit of net room area A is comparatively higher in structures 
where, in addition to the persistent scenarios, the accidental load arrangement is considered, the ob-
served difference between the results obtained in both studies can be reduced by performing the com-
parison in terms of ratio Radm/nk, shown in Figure 8.9 (left). The ratio between the corresponding mean 
values (R/nk)TOT,m and (R/nk)PER,m is situated in about 2.2. 
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Figure 8.9 Risks Radm normalized for nº of failure mechanisms nk vs. nk (left) and Radm normalized for nº of hazard 
scenarios nj vs. nj (right); Comparison to results from prior studies (red dots) [9, 10, 13]; Tref = 50 years 
Finally, due to the fact that only in the present study the number of failure scenarios associated with a 
particular structure nj is higher than the number of failure mechanisms nk, a further reduction of the 
difference between the implicitly acceptable risks obtained in both studies is obtained when normaliz-
ing these for nj. This can be drawn from Figure 8.9 (right). The ratio between the mean values (R/nj)TOT,m 
and (R/nj)PER,m is situated in approximately 1.6. The comparatively high failure probabilities associated 
with many explosion-dominated hazard scenarios, which may be mainly attributed to the large uncer-
tainties affecting the explosion pressure (section 6.2), reasonably explain that this ratio is larger than 
unity in spite of the normalization of risks for the number of hazard scenarios nj.  
8.3 Acceptance criteria  
8.3.1 Introduction 
In the previous section, the implicitly acceptable risks to persons associated with building structures 
designed in accordance with current best practice were evaluated. It was shown, that users of building 
structures, where gas explosions constitute a potential hazard for structural safety, are exposed to com-
paratively higher risks than in similar structures, where the occurrence of accidental actions is not con-
sidered. This intuitively reasonable finding could be attributed to two circumstances, a higher number 
of relevant hazard scenarios nj in explosion-endangered structures (scale effect), on one hand, and the 
high uncertainties associated with the explosion event, on the other.  
The first of the mentioned circumstances (scale effect) constitutes the starting point for the definition 
of acceptance criteria concerning life safety risks associated with structures potentially exposed to the 
effects of gas explosions. As shown before in section 6.3, depending on the prevailing circumstances in 
each case, such effects might influence the failure probabilities of members, which under normal use 
conditions would be exclusively exposed to persistent load scenarios, in a more or less important man-
ner, reaching from non- or scantly relevant to totally dominating contributions. All relevant influences 
reflect in a higher number of hazard scenarios and, ultimately, in higher risks to persons. The accumu-
lated or total risk, stemming from all relevant persistent- and accidental situations should be limited to 
a specific target value. Regarding individual risks ri (4.13), for instance, a performance criteria could be 
expressed in terms of condition (8.1), where ri,PER and ri,EX, represent the structure-related individual 
risks due to, respectively, persistent (PER) and explosion (EX)-induced load arrangements (considered 
statistically independent from each other). Added up, ri,PER and ri,EX deliver the total individual risk ri,TOT 
to be assessed with regard to a target value rit,TOT. In the same sense, a performance criteria based on 
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societal risks to persons (4.10) could be established, as expressed through (8.2), where F(n)TOT repre-
sents the accumulated or total frequency of a collapse scenario with n≥N fatalities and F(n)t,TOT the cor-
responding target value.  
ri,TOT = ri,PER + ri,EX ≤ rit,TOT        (8.1) 
F(n)TOT = F(n)PER + F(n)EX ≤ F(n)t,TOT       (8.2) 
Decision criteria as expressed per (8.1) or (8.2) could be useful for explicit risk analysis. In routine prac-
tice, however, criteria expressed in terms of structural failure probabilities are preferable, as they may 
serve as a basis for calibrating partial factors in such contexts. A corresponding acceptance criterion can 
be defined per (8.3), where pf,TOT is the accumulated or total occurrence probability for a particular fail-
ure mode k of a specific structural member potentially exposed to persistent (PER) and gas explosion-
induced (EX) load arrangements, and pft,TOT is the corresponding target value. 
pf,TOT = pf,PER + pf,EX ≤ pft,TOT        (8.3) 
Based on the results presented in section 8.2, the objective of the following sections (8.3.2 and 8.3.3) is 
to derive target values for the different performance indicators expressed in (8.1) to (8.3), in terms of 
individual risks rit,TOT, societal risk-based failure frequencies F(n)t,TOT or member failure probabilities 
pft,TOT. On the grounds of the results obtained, and following their comparison to the findings in previous 
studies [10, 13], section 8.3.4 addresses the development of an acceptance criterion for the conditional 
failure probability of structural members, given the occurrence of a gas explosion and the following 
member exposure to the associated load effects. Some remarks on an implementation of this criterion 
in the light of the current safety requirements for accidental design situations are made in section 8.3.5. 
8.3.2 Individual risk 
The graphs in Figure 8.6 (left) can be used to define acceptance criteria for individual risks to persons, 
or the probability that a building user will lose his or her life due to structural collapse in a specific 
reference period Tref. They represent the expected number of fatalities Radm per unit of net room area A 
over a 50- year period which would be acceptable pursuant to the existing legislation. In line with the 
mathematical framework defined in section 4.2.3, the individual risk can be estimated by relating nor-
malized risks (R/A) to the building occupancy rate, i.e. the number of risk-exposed people (ni) per unit 
of net room area (A), which depends on building use. For residential buildings the available average net 
room area A per person i (inverse of occupancy rate) found from Spanish Statistics Institute data [112], 
Ai = 30 m2/person (section 7.4.3), is adopted here as a representative value for consequence class CC2 
buildings. Factoring this value into (8.4) yields the target value rit,TOT given in Table 8.2, based on, re-
spectively, the mean value (Radm/A)TOT,m and the 5- and 95 % fractile values, (Radm/A)TOT,5% and 
(R/A)TOT,95% (Figure 8.6, left). From Table 8.2 it can also be drawn that the obtained rit,TOT exceed the 
target values rit,PER deduced in prior studies on risks associated with structures exposed to normal use 
conditions [9, 10, 13] in about 3 to 5 times. This can be attributed to the comparatively higher implicitly 
accepted risks Radm per unit of net room area A (Figure 8.8). 
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Table 8.2 Mean, 5 and 95 % fractile values for individual risk target values rit and associated target failure 
probabilities pft; Comparison to results from prior studies [9, 10, 13]; Tref = 50 years. 
Scenarios 
Explosion and Persistent 
(TOT) 
Only Persistent  (PER) [9, 10, 
13] 
Parameter rit,TOT pft,TOT rit,PER pft,PER 
5% fractile 2.5E-04 5.0E-03 9.3E-05 1.9E-03 
Mean 1.0E-03 2.0E-02 2.4E-04 4.7E-03 
95% fractile 2.5E-03 5.0E-02 4.7E-04 9.4E-03 
 
rit,TOT ≅ (
Radm
A
)
TOT
∙ Ai         (8.4) 
The rit,TOT values given in Table 8.2 refer to a 50-year period. They can be converted to a 1-year reference 
period via equation (8.5). This yields values which oscillate between 5∙10–6 y–1 and 5∙10–5 y–1, corre-
sponding to the 5 and 95% fractile values of Radm/A, respectively, with a mean value of around               
2∙10–5 y–1. These findings are generally consistent with the criteria laid down in standards, guidelines 
and technical papers on the safety requirements for built systems in general and structures in particular. 
As reported in section 2.1.3, the consensus is that the individual risk to persons due to structural col-
lapse should be limited to values ranging from 10–6 y–1 to 10–5 y–1. The close agreement between the 
implicitly accepted individual risk levels calculated here and the values set out in the standards and 
recommendations cited, supports the validity of the former as a basis for rational decision-making in 
connection with structural safety.  
rit,TOT,1y ≅
rit,TOT,50y
50
          (8.5) 
Target failure probabilities (pft,TOT) consistent with the rit,TOT values can be deduced based on equation 
(2.5) introduced in section 2.1.3. The conditional probability of death of a person present in the building 
at the time of collapse (pd|f), required for this purpose, can be estimated from the statistical analysis of 
the database built to derive the consequence model (Chapter 7). However, the results obtained have to 
be interpreted with caution, as the fairly high coefficients of variation of about 100 % denote significant 
uncertainties in the estimation of pd|f. In order to enable a consistent comparison to the previous studies 
on persistent design situations [10, 13], the estimate proposed by Steenbergen et al. [58] is adopted 
here: pd|f = 0.05 (for CC2 structures). Factoring this value into (2.5) yields the individual risk-based tar-
get failure probabilities pft,TOT given in Table 8.2 (Tref = 50 years). The fact that the obtained pft,TOT exceed 
the corresponding target probabilities pft,PER obtained in previous studies on persistent situations [10, 
13] is attributable to the higher acceptable individual risks, rit, as seen before (Table 8.2).  
8.3.3 Societal risk 
The scale effect observed in Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5 rules out the possibility of defining an acceptable 
level for societal risks in absolute terms. Rather, the acceptance criterion may be expressed as a function 
of some parameter accounting for the size of the reference system considered, such as the total net room 
area A of the buildings. 
Figure 8.4 (left) shows the admissible risks Radm as a function of A, where Radm represents the expected 
number of fatalities associated with a particular building structure in a 50-year period. In turn, the ex-
pected number of fatalities associated with a specific system E(N) is given by the area under the respec-
tive F-n curve (2.7), introduced in section 2.1.3, which can be calculated approximately with equation 
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(2.9) if a risk aversion exponent  > 1 is assumed. Hence, when Radm is substituted for E(N) in (2.9), the 
target 50 year cumulative frequency of occurrence for structural collapse events with N ≥ 1 fatalities, 
F(1)t, can be deduced as a function of net room area A, whereby the size of the reference system associ-
ated with a given F-n criteria is being defined. Given F(1)t and risk aversion exponent α, assumed as α = 
2 [10, 13], the F-n acceptance criteria are defined as per equation (2.6). This procedure avoids possible 
contradictions in the expected number of fatalities and, consequently, ensures that the acceptance cri-
teria calculated for individual and societal risks are fully consistent, as expressed by (2.13) and (4.13). 
The F-n curves obtained for building structures with a range of net room areas A between 102 and          
106 m2 are reproduced in Figure 8.10 and Figure 8.11 (blue curves). The former shows the criteria based 
on the mean value of Radm while the latter is based on the 5%- (left) and the 95 % (right) fractile values 
for Radm. The scale effect is visible here in the form of the higher cumulative frequencies F(n)t for larger 
reference systems, measured in terms of the net room area A. This is reasonable, since, as mentioned 
earlier, larger building structures comprise a larger number of structural elements and consequently 
the number of possible hazard scenarios contributing to the cumulative probability of an accident with 
N ≥ n fatalities is also larger in such cases.  
For sake of comparison, the F-n curves deduced in the prior studies on structure-related risks associated 
with persistent situations [10, 13] are also plotted in Figure 8.10 and Figure 8.11 (red curves). It is ob-
served that the herein obtained target frequencies F(n)t,TOT are remarkably higher what is reasonably 
explained by the accordingly higher implicitly acceptable risks Radm based on which these frequencies 
were derived. 
 
Figure 8.10 F-n acceptance criteria for building structures with a range of net room areas A, based on the 
mean value of expected number of fatalities Radm,m; Comparison to results from prior studies (red lines) 
[10, 13]; Tref = 50 years. 
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Figure 8.11 F-n acceptance criteria for building structures with a range of net room areas A, based on the 5%- 
(left) and 95% (right) fractile value of expected number of fatalities, Radm,5% and Radm,95%; Comparison to results 
from prior studies (red lines) [10, 13]; Tref = 50 years. 
When the reference system is reduced from whole buildings to individual failure scenarios, i.e. a specific 
failure mode in a given structural element, the F-n curves can be more readily interpreted. In the present 
context, this can be achieved by establishing F-n criteria consistent with the expected number of fatali-
ties R normalized for the total number of failure modes nk associated with a specific building structure, 
plotted in Figure 8.9 (left). Therefore, the target failure frequency F(1)t is derived from equation (2.9), 
where E(N) is replaced by, respectively, the mean (Radm/nk)m or the fractile values, (Radm/nk)5% and 
(Radm/nk)95%. Assuming α = 2, as above, supplies the normalized F-n curves shown in Figure 8.12 (blue 
curves), associated with Tref = 50 years. The left part contains the criteria consistent with (Radm/nk)m, the 
right part shows the results based on (Radm/nk)5% and (Radm/nk)95%. It can be observed that the deduced 
target frequencies F(n)t,TOT are about 2 times higher compared to the corresponding values obtained in 
prior studies on persistent situations, F(n)t,PER [10, 13] (red graphs). This is reasonable taking account 
of the fact that F(n)t,TOT accounts for both persistent and explosion-induced hazards with comparatively 
high uncertainties in case of the latter.  
 
Figure 8.12 Normalized F-n acceptance criteria F(n)t,TOT for structural members based on the mean value (left) 
and the 5% or 95% fractile values (right) of the expected number of fatalities Radm,TOT normalized for the number 
of failure modes nk; Comparison to results from prior studies (red lines) [10, 13]; Tref = 50 years. 
The F(n)t,TOT frequencies shown in Figure 8.12 are converted to target failure probabilities pft,TOT with 
equation (2.11), where pN|f describes the conditional probability of N ≥ n fatalities in the event of failure. 
As a reasonable approximation, pN|f can be replaced by the conditional probability pd|f [10, 13] intro-
duced in the previous section. The obtained result is shown in Figure 8.13 (left: mean values; right: 5% 
and 95% fractile values), where the variable on the horizontal axis has been converted from the number 
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of fatalities (n) to the area affected by the member collapse (Acol) using consequence model (7.28) em-
ployed to derive the implicitly acceptable risks (section 8.2). It can be observed that the higher the po-
tential structural damage a member collapse might induce, the smaller is the target failure probability 
pft,TOT. Once more, the results are compared to the values derived in the previous studies, pft,PER (red 
graphs). It is found that pft,TOT exceeds the corresponding pft,PER in about 2-3 times.  
 
Figure 8.13 Target failure probabilities pft,TOT for structural members based on the mean value (left) and the 5% 
or 95% fractile values (right) of the expected number of fatalities Radm,TOT normalized for the number of failure 
modes nk; Comparison to results from prior studies (red lines) [10, 13]; Tref = 50 years. 
8.3.4 Conditional failure probability 
In the previous sections, target values for risk-based performance indicators related to safety of RC 
structures have been derived and compared to the results obtained in previous studies [10, 13] where 
the occurrence of accidental scenarios was excluded from the analysis. It was shown that due to the 
comparatively higher level of intrinsically acceptable risks associated with structures where in addition 
to persistent load scenarios the explosion hazard must be accounted for, the derived safety require-
ments are accordingly lower. This is a principally sound finding and could be traced back to a compara-
tively higher number of hazard scenarios (scale effect) on one hand, and the high uncertainties associ-
ated with the explosion scenario, on the other. 
The mentioned high uncertainties deliver additional arguments to establish the safety requirements for 
potentially explosion-exposed members at a comparatively lower level. In this sense, the Probabilistic 
Model Code issued by the Joint Committee on Structural Safety states that in case of “large uncertainty 
in either loading or resistance (coefficients of variations larger than 40%), as for instance the case of many 
accidental or seismic situations, a lower reliability class should be used. The point is that for these larger 
uncertainties the additional costs to achieve a high reliability are prohibitive….” [80]. Following this rea-
soning, a proposal in [55] is to establish a lower target reliability level for wind load-dominated struc-
tural members ( = 1.0). It is argued that due to the high uncertainties associated with wind loads, the 
use of the corresponding partial safety factor Q = 1.5 would entail reliabilities below the target levels 
established for members where wind is not the dominating influence. Since, on the other hand, increas-
ing Q would be prohibitive due to large economic consequences, compliance with safety requirements 
for wind-load dominated structures is assured by a reduction of the target reliability index. 
Applying this line of argumentation - more demanding safety levels involve prohibitive costs in case of 
large uncertainties - to the present study, higher target failure probabilities pft,TOT would seem to be de-
fendable in case explosion-induced effects would be dominating the failure probability associated with 
the failure mechanism of the structural member in question. For the elements studied herein, this would 
be appropriate, for instance, for the explosion-induced negative bending failure mode of the beams, or 
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the shear failure scenario of the columns, where under the adopted assumptions, exclusively persistent 
load scenarios are not relevant for failure. For these member failure modes, the corresponding reliabil-
ity level is in any case dominated by the explosion-induced load arrangements. On the contrary, in case 
of other member failure modes, such as positive bending or shear failure of the beams, and failure due 
to M-N interaction of the columns, it is not straightforward to decide a priori to which extent the explo-
sion load dominates the corresponding failure probability. As shown in section 6.3, there are multiple 
situations in practice where, notwithstanding that a member might be potentially exposed to accidental 
loads, the normal use conditions and the associated gravitational loads, have a considerable influence 
on the failure probability, being totally dominant in many cases, i.e. pf,EX ≈ 0 in (8.3). For such situations, 
alluding to the high uncertainties associated with the potential accidental scenario and the associated 
required higher costs to achieve a certain reliability level would not justify the adoption of higher target 
failure probabilities. Indeed, these considerations suggests that the target value for members potentially 
exposed to the effects of gas explosions should rather be a function of the degree of influence of the 
normal load conditions on the member reliability. As a rule, the lower this influence, the higher should 
be the target failure probability.  
In the following, a proposal will be developed based on this approach. The starting point is the general 
performance criterion given by (8.3), which can be reformulated as expressed per (8.6), where pft,EX 
represents the target probability for a specific member failure mode k to occur in consequence of an 
explosion-induced load arrangement (EX). 
pf,EX ≤ pft,EX =  pft,TOT − pf,PER       (8.6) 
The occurrence probability of an explosion event p(EX) can be factored into (8.6) as shown by (8.7), 
where pf|EX  is the conditional failure probability given an explosion event and the subsequent member 
exposure to the corresponding action effects, and pft|EX  the corresponding target value. 
pf|EX ≤ pft|EX =
pft,EX
p(EX)
=
pft,TOT − pf,PER
p(EX)
        (8.7) 
According to expression (8.7), the target failure probability for an explosion-exposed member decreases 
with rising contribution of the persistent load arrangements to the member failure probability what is 
in line with the general idea outlined above. The maximum value for pft|EX corresponds to situations 
where this contribution is not relevant or non-existing (pf,PER ≈ 0). A minimum value for pft|EX  can be 
defined by limiting probability pf,PER to a target value pft,PER, whereby consistency to the prior studies [10, 
13] is assured: 
pf,PER ≤ pft,PER          (8.8) 
The mean and 5% or 95% fractile values of the target failure probabilities pft,TOT based on individual risks 
to persons are given in Table 8.2 (Tref = 50 years). Substituting these into (8.7) along with a 50 year 
occurrence probability p(EX) = 5∙10-4 (section 6.2.1), the following expression is obtained for the indi-
vidual risk-based target value for the conditional failure probability, pft|EX, where C1 is a constant and 
pf,PER is associated with a reference period Tref = 50 years. 
pft|EX,IR = C1 − 2 ∙ 10
3  ∙ pf,PER ≤ 1        (8.9) 
Where: 
C1,5% = 10 (5% fractile value) 
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C1,m = 40 (mean value) 
C1,95% = 100 (95% fractile value) 
On the other hand, the total target failure probabilities pft,TOT based on societal risks are shown in Figure 
8.13 as a function of the area affected by the member collapse, Acol. Factoring the corresponding equa-
tions into (8.7), along with p(EX) = 5∙10-4, pft|EX is defined by equation (8.10) as a function of constant C2 
and pf,PER,  associated with Tref = 50 years. 
pft|EX,SR = C2 ∙ Acol
−1.14 − 2 ∙ 103   ∙ pf,PER  ≤ 1        (8.10) 
Where: 
C2,5% =  36 (5% fractile value) 
C2,m = 331 (mean value) 
C2,95% = 1061 (95% fractile value) 
The target values pft,PER for the member failure probability pf,PER due to persistent load arrangements 
(8.8), are adopted from [10, 13] and were previously shown in Table 8.2 and Figure 8.13, based on ad-
missible individual and societal risks, respectively. Factoring the former into (8.9) delivers pft|EX,IR values 
larger than unity what denotes that individual risks are not decisive for definition of a conditional failure 
probability of explosion-endangered members. In a wider sense, this finding is consistent with the “phi-
losophy” of the current design codes on accidental actions (section 1.1.2), which claims that structural 
design against explosions should, in first place, aim at avoiding collapse events with large failure conse-
quences.  
In conformity with this general design approach, the societal risk turns out to be relevant for definition 
of the conditional member target reliability given the explosion and the subsequent exposure to the 
action. Factoring the equations corresponding to the pft,PER - Acol graphs shown in Figure 8.13 (red lines) 
into (8.10), the minimum target value for the conditional failure probability, pft|EX, is obtained, as a func-
tion of constants C2 and C3: 
pft|EX,SR,min = C2 ∙ Acol
−1.14 − C3  ∙ (0.27 ∙ Acol
0.5 − 1)
−2
 ≤ 1      (8.11) 
Where: 
C2 as in (8.10) 
C3,5% =  0.2 (5% fractile value) 
C3,m = 2.3 (mean value) 
C3,95% = 7.8 (95% fractile value) 
An approximate, simplified expression of (8.11) is given by (8.12) below, where C4 is a constant and 
Acol,min is the minimum value for the area affected by the collapse for which (8.12) applies (Acol values 
below Acol,min correspond to pft|EX values larger than unity).  
pft|EX,SR,min ≈ C4 ∙ Acol
−1.11       , Acol ≥ Acol,min      (8.12) 
Where: 
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C4,5% =  20 (5% fractile value) 
C4,m = 167 (mean value) 
C4,95% = 565 (95% fractile value) 
Figure 8.14 (left) plots the minimum target value pft|EX,min (subscript SR will be omitted in advance) ac-
cording to expression (8.12). The results based on, respectively, the 5% fractile- (dash-dotted line), the 
mean- (dashed line) and the 95% fractile value (continuous line) of the implicitly accepted risks are 
shown. The most restrictive criterion (5% fractile) applies for members whose collapse would affect an 
area of at least Acol,min ≈ 15 m2. When the mean value criterion is referred to, Acol,min increases to 100 m2, 
whereas the result based on the 95% fractile value is not valid below Acol,min ≈ 300 m2. 
The maximum target value pft|EX,max for the conditional failure probability pft|EX is given by (8.10) where 
pf,PER = 0. The corresponding graphs are plotted in Figure 8.14 (right). Again, the result based on the 5% 
fractile- (dash-dotted line), the mean- (dashed line) and the 95% fractile value (continuous line) of the 
implicitly accepted risks are distinguished. The corresponding Acol,min thresholds are 23 m2, 160 m2 and 
450 m2, respectively. 
 
Figure 8.14 Minimum (left) and maximum (right) target value for conditional failure probabilities pft|EX for 
structural members; Tref for concomitant gravitational loads: 50 years. 
A comparison between the graphs shown on the left and the right of Figure 8.14 reveals that the maxi-
mum values pft|EX,max (right) are not fundamentally higher than the corresponding pft|EX,min (left). How-
ever, it could still make a difference to adopt one or the other, for the generally high conditional failure 
probabilities given the member exposure to the explosion effects, to be compared to these criteria, are 
generally less sensitive to variations in load- or resistance parameters than failure probabilities of usual 
order of magnitude (10-4-10-6). In case it could be assured that the explosion loads are dominant for a 
certain structural failure type, for instance, in case of failure modes not- or only scantly affected by per-
sistent load arrangements, the maximum values pft|EX,max (Figure 8.14, right) could be established as a 
target criterion. On the contrary, when a significant contribution of the persistent situations to the fail-
ure probability could not be precluded, the target failure probabilities should be reduced according to 
(8.10) as a function of pf,PER. For sake of simplicity and since it is a conservative approach, the minimum 
values pft|EX,min (Figure 8.14, left) could be of general application for verification of structural safety in 
relation with explosion-exposure. In addition, requirement (8.8) applies in all cases. 
In comparison to the rather small differences between the pft|EX,min and pft|EX,max criterion, the discrepan-
cies between the 5% and the 95% fractile values for pft|EX are substantial (more than one order of mag-
nitude). The election of an appropriate criterion should comply with the national safety policy what 
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requires tackling a number of issues that fall out of the purview of structural engineers. Some consider-
ations and recommendations regarding this election can nevertheless be made: 
The established criteria are based on implicitly acceptable risks within the framework of the employed 
design codes, for all the members in all the buildings analysed comply exactly with the respective struc-
tural safety requirements. For this reason, even the criterion corresponding to the superior fractile value 
(95%), can be considered to provide acceptable solutions. Figure 8.14 shows that the adoption of this 
criterion would imply relatively high target values for the conditional failure probabilities. For applica-
tion in practice, this suggests that most structural solutions would be probably acceptable without need 
for specific measures for reducing explosion-related risks. Only for very large expected failure conse-
quences, such measures might be required. 
In the previous studies on structure-related risks to persons associated with normal building use con-
ditions [10, 13], the 95% fractile criteria was suggested for the assessment of existing structural mem-
bers, whereas the more demanding criteria based on the mean values was associated with member de-
sign. It was argued that more demanding safety levels normally involve lower costs in the design phase 
than in assessment procedures of existing structures, wherefore higher acceptable risks may be reason-
ably established for the latter. Interestingly, the mean value of the inferred individual risk in [10, 13] is 
of the order of 10–6 y–1, whereas the 95 % fractile value corresponds roughly to an individual risk of 
about 10–5 y–1, what complies with commonly acknowledged values for, respectively, design and assess-
ment of structures and other technical facilities (see section 2.1.3). 
As in the mentioned previous studies, in the present study, individual risks and societal risks are con-
sistently related to each other (section 4.2.3). Hence, irrespective of the fact that an individual risk-based 
target value for the conditional failure probability could not be established, the proposed target values 
shown in Figure 8.14 are implicitly associated with a specific individual risk level. In section 8.3.2, it was 
shown that implicitly acceptable individual risks associated with RC structures where gas explosions 
pose a threat to structural safety oscillate around a mean value of around 2∙10–5 y–1. Keeping this in mind, 
and following the general consensus on acceptable individual risk levels for new and existing facilities, 
it might be reasonable to adopt the mean value criteria shown in Figure 8.14 for purpose of assessment 
of members in existing structures, while the 5% fractile criteria, associated with an individual risk of 
about 5∙10–6 y–1, could be envisaged for design of new elements.  
The present findings may also be used to determine risk acceptance criteria in the As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP) approach [2, 50] (Figure 2.5). In that context, risks higher than those defined by 
the 95 % fractile values (or the mean values) could be regarded as intolerable, and risks lower than the 
mean values (or the 5 % fractile values) as broadly acceptable. Risks between these two limits would be 
tolerable only where reducing them is impracticable or the cost of the necessary measures is grossly 
disproportionate to the improvement gained [13]. 
It should be stressed that the target values for the conditional failure probabilities shown in Figure 8.14 
are associated with a reference period of Tref = 50 years for the variable loads (imposed loads on building 
floors and snow loads on roof), which act concomitant to the explosion pressure. A conversion to differ-
ent reference periods, e.g. Tref = 1 year, would require, in first place, an adaption of the probabilistic 
models corresponding to these loads. The reliability level implicitly required by the codes could then 
again be deduced according to step 5 of the established analysis procedure (Figure 8.1). Finally, follow-
ing the descriptions in the previous subsections, target values for the conditional failure probabilities 
could be established based on the implicitly acceptable risks associated with Tref = 1 year. The corre-
sponding developments are out of scope of the present thesis. 
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8.3.5 Final remarks 
The preceding section proposes risk-based acceptance criteria for RC structures and their constitutive 
members. These criteria are in accordance with the general performance requirement laid down in the 
current Eurocode on accidental action EN1991-1-7 [17], which claims that a structure shall be designed 
and executed in a way that it will not be damaged by accidental events to an extent disproportionate to the 
original cause. This criterion calls for measures suited to avoid structural collapse scenarios with im-
portant failure consequences and, as such, generally tolerates member or component failure, provided 
that it would not put in danger the stability of the whole structure nor of a significant part of it (section 
1.1.2). 
In this regard, the herein deduced acceptance criteria for explosion-induced structural failure suggest 
that risks would be acceptable without any need for verification of structural safety in relation to the 
explosion hazard if the potential collapse of the member in question would affect an area less than a 
specific minimum value Acol,min (Figure 8.14). In that case, the member could be designed according to 
the persistent situation under consideration of normal load conditions only, without any further provi-
sions for the accidental loads. The failure consequences due to a potential member failure induced by 
such loads would be tolerable. Interesting to note is that the Acol,min values corresponding to the obtained 
mean values for the target failure probabilities, of Acol,min = 100 m2 and 160 m2 (Figure 8.14), are of the 
same order of magnitude as the thresholds suggested by EN 1991-1-7 for limiting the extent of localised 
failure due to an unspecified cause (section 2.3.4). The mentioned standard considers an area of Acol = 
100 m2 or 15% of the floor area, whichever is less, on two adjacent floors caused by the removal of any 
member, as acceptable and likely to provide the structure with sufficient robustness regardless of 
whether an identified accidental action has been taken into account [17]. This observation supports the 
plausibility of the herein obtained criteria for rational decision-making in connection with structural 
safety related to accidental situations.  
In case the potential member collapse would affect an area larger than the established Acol,min, verifica-
tion of structural reliability associated with the accidental situation would be required. The diminishing 
target failure probabilities pft|EX with increasing Acol (Figure 8.14) account for aversion to collapse events 
with large consequences and, in this regard, constitute a powerful tool for the design or the assessment 
of key elements, upon which, according to the definition in EN 1991-1-7 [17], the stability of (the remain-
der of) the structure depends. For explosion-endangered buildings classified under consequence class 
CC2 or CC3, the design of such elements is mandatory and should be based upon static load models or 
prescriptive design and detailing rules, as already remarked in section 1.1.3. However, besides from the 
above-mentioned limit for admissible local failure due an unspecified cause, no distinctions are made 
regarding acceptable failure consequences, nor is the required reliability level associated with the de-
sign of such elements explicitly established. The implicit, nominal target ceiling demanded in the Euro-
code [11] can be inferred from (8.13) under consideration of the 50 year target reliability index t,code = 
3.8 and the herein considered explosion occurrence probability during this reference period, p(EX) = 
5∙10-4. The result, pft|EX,code ≈ 0.14,  is compared in Figure 8.15 to the herein derived pft|EX - criteria. It can 
be observed that for relatively small areas Acol, the Eurocode requirement is stricter then the herein 
proposed target values based on the intrinsically accepted risks. On the contrary, if the collapse of a 
structural member entails a very large Acol, hence very high expected consequences in terms of loss of 
human life, the herein deduced acceptance criteria imply lower target failure probabilites than the cur-
rent Eurocode requirement. For instance, the herein developed mean value falls below pft|EX,code when 
member collapse might affect an area larger than Acol = 590 m2 or Acol = 910 m2, depending on whether 
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the minimum or the maximum pft|EX - value is under consideration (Figure 8.15). This consequence-de-
pendant differentiation of  the reliability level supposes a substantial improvement of the current ap-
proach for treatment of structural safety in relation to accidental situations. 
pft|EX,code =
pft,code
p(EX)
=
7.2∙10−5
5∙10−4
≈ 0.14        (8.13) 
 
Figure 8.15 Comparison of deduced minimum (left) and maximum (right) target value for conditional failure 
probabilities, pft|EX, to Eurocode target value pft|EX,code (red line) 
Strictly, the deduced criteria are applicable to reinforced concrete structures, constituted by beams and 
columns (Figure 1.3). However, in the absence of other guidelines, they might as well be applied to more 
vulnerable structural typologies, such as panel systems. The incident in Palencia in 2009 (Figure 1.2, 
Figure 7.3), where a building structure (built in 1973), constituted by loadbearing masonry panels sus-
taining reinforced concrete slabs, entirely collapsed as a consequence of a gas explosion, shows that 
such structures are prone to the risk of progressive collapse with corresponding large failure conse-
quences. In Spain, as well as in other countries, for instance the UK [38], loadbearing panel structures, 
constructed several decades ago, are expected to remain in service for an extended period. However, 
the current version of the Spanish building code [71] does not contain any safety requirements, nor any 
associated accidental load models, which would allow for an assessment of the risks associated with the 
effects of gas explosions on building structures. The herein developed models and acceptance criteria 
could contribute to this purpose. 
In summary, the deduced criteria would facilitate the adoption of rational decisions on both, the need 
and the appropriate choice of risk-reduction measures to counteract the effects of gas explosions in 
buildings. They could be used in the framework of an explicit risk- or reliability analysis in the context 
of performance-based design or evaluation, or serve as a basis for the calibration of the implicit rules in 
structural codes and standards for verification of structural safety in relation to gas explosions (section 
2.3.2).  
8.4 Summary 
Having established the occurrence frequencies pj of the nj hazard scenarios associated with a particular 
building structure (Chapter 6), and following the derivation of a model, which allows for an estimation 
of the corresponding failure consequences Nj (Chapter 7), Chapter 8 addresses the determination of 
implicitly acceptable structure-related life safety risks as a function of both, pj and Nj. Based on the ob-
tained findings, acceptance criteria for such risks are deduced. 
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A summary of the main assumptions adopted for the determination of pj and Nj is provided in section 
8.1. In addition to the explosion occurrence probability p(EX), the frequencies pj should account for the 
probability that the member in question is indeed exposed to the explosion-induced effects (pressure 
wave) when it occurs (section 8.1.2). For this purpose, the exposure probability pe is introduced (Table 
8.1) and factored into the risk analysis, whereby findings from section 6.3 on the relevance of explosion- 
and persistent load-controlled hazard scenarios on the accumulated member failure probabilities are 
taken into account. On the contrary, for the estimation of the failure consequences Nj, the nature of the 
hazard scenario is not being distinguished (section 8.1.3). Model (7.28) will be employed in association 
with all nj hazard scenarios regardless of whether their leading influence is of accidental- or persistent 
character. An occupancy ratio (Ocucol/Acol)j of 1/30 m-2 is adopted in (7.28), which corresponds to the 
inverse value of the average building net-room area per building user in residential buildings in Spain 
(section 7.4.3). 
The implicitly acceptable risk to persons associated with building structures (Radm) are analized in sec-
tion 8.2. These risks are obtained by integration of the implicitly acceptable risk-profiles associated with 
each of the 4512 building structures analized (section 8.2.2, Figure 8.2). Their representation as a func-
tion of different parameters characterizing the building size reveals a scale effect (section 8.2.3, Figure 
8.4 and Figure 8.5). Risks associated with structures designed in strict accordance with the existing leg-
islation rise with the number of hazard scenarios (nj), which, in turn, rise with the number of structural 
members (nm), failure mechanisms (nk), and load arrangements (nl) that may trigger these mechanisms. 
The mentioned scale effect can be eliminated by normalizing the results (Figure 8.6 and Figure 8.7). 
Even then, the results are found to be widely scattered what, in part, is attributable to a lack of a fully 
consistent calibration of the code design rules. 
The obtained implicitly acceptable risks Radm are larger compared to findings of previous studies [10, 
13] where risks stemmed exclusively from normal building use conditions (section 8.2.4, Figure 8.8). 
The difference is attributable to the fact that the explosion risk in a building enhances the number of 
potential hazard scenarios nj associated with the building structure (scale effect). Interestingly, even 
after normalization of Radm for nj, this difference cannot be entirely eliminated (Figure 8.9). The compar-
atively high member failure probabilities associated with the uncertain explosion load arrangements 
(section 6.2) reasonably explain this circumstance. 
Based on the described results, section 8.3 addresses the development of risk-based requirements for 
structural safety. Different performance criteria are defined in compliance with the basic requirement 
that the total risk, stemming from the sum of the relevant persistent- and accidental load-controlled 
hazard scenarios is to be limited to a specific target value (section 8.3.1). According to the explanations 
in Chapter 2, a distinction is drawn for structure-related individual (ri)- and societal risks, the latter 
expressed in terms of frequencies F(n) of a structural collapse scenario with n≥N fatalities. Moreover, 
in view of applications in routine practice, performance criteria in terms of structural failure probabili-
ties (pf) are established. 
Target values (rit,TOT, F(n)t,TOT and pft,TOT) for the established risk-based acceptance criteria are derived in 
accordance with the basic assumptions adopted in prior studies [10, 13] on risks associated with struc-
tures under normal use conditions (section 8.3.2 and 8.3.3). A comparison of the results obtained here 
(Table 8.2, Figure Figure 8.10  to Figure 8.13), to those of the mentioned previous studies, shows that 
due to the comparatively higher level of intrinsically acceptable life safety risks, Radm, the derived safety 
requirements are accordingly lower, what is a sound finding. In addition, economical criteria, although 
not specifically addressed in the present study, deliver reasonable arguments to establish the safety 
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requirements for potentially explosion-exposed structural members at a comparatively lower level (sec-
tion 8.3.4). Keeping in mind that more demanding safety levels might involve prohibitive costs in case 
of large uncertainties, lower requirements, would seem to be defendable in case the reliability level as-
sociated with a specific member failure mode is dominated by the uncertain explosion-induced load 
arrangements. However, in section 6.3 it was shown that there are multiple situations in practice where, 
notwithstanding that a member might be potentially exposed to accidental loads, the normal use condi-
tions and the associated gravitational loads, have a considerable influence on the member failure prob-
ability, being totally dominant in many cases. For such situations, alluding to the high uncertainties as-
sociated with the potential accidental scenario, and the associated higher costs to achieve a certain reli-
ability level, would not justify the adoption of less demanding target values. Indeed, this suggests that 
these values should rather be a function of the degree of influence of the relevant persistent load ar-
rangements on the member reliability. As a rule, the lower this influence the less demanding should be 
the decision criteria. 
Based on these arguments, target values pft|EX for the conditional failure probability of structural RC 
members (given that a gas explosion occurs and the member in question is exposed to the associated 
pressure wave) are proposed in the present study (Figure 8.14). The target value pft|EX is defined as a 
function of the contribution pf,PER  due to the relevant persistent load arrangement to the total failure 
probability pf,TOT. A maximum value for pft|EX is established, which corresponds to situations where per-
sistent load arrangements are not relevant to member failure, i.e. where the associated failure probabil-
ity pf,PER approaches zero. A minimum value for pft|EX is defined by limiting probability pf,PER in all cases 
to an admissible value pft,PER, whereby consistency to the prior studies [10, 13] is ensured.  
The developments show that individual risks are irrelevant to the derivation of pft|EX, what is consistent 
with the “philosophy” of the current design codes on accidental actions (section 1.1) which claims that 
structural design against explosions should aim at avoiding collapse events with large failure conse-
quences. Related to such events are societal risks, which turn out to be relevant for the definition of pft|EX. 
In particular, the pft|EX are defined as a function of the area affected by the collapse (Acol), which is related 
to the number of fatalities by means of the consequence model employed to determine the implicitly 
acceptable risks. Minimum areas Acol,min are derived below which a specific design solution would be 
acceptable without need for any intervention regarding explosion-related structural safety, i.e. where 
member design could be based on the persistent situation under consideration of normal load condi-
tions only, without any further provisions for the accidental load. Beyond these threshold areas, dimin-
ishing pft|EX with increasing Acol account for aversion to collapse events with large consequences. In this 
regard, the deduced criteria constitute a powerful tool for the design or the assessment of key-elements, 
upon which, according to the definition in EN 1991-1-7 [17], the stability of the structure depends (sec-
tion 8.3.5). In comparison to the constant, nominal target ceiling in EN 1990 [11], the consequence-de-
pendent differentiation of the target reliability level supposes a substantial improvement of the current 
approach for treatment of structural safety in connection with gas explosions (Figure 8.15).
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and future research 
The present and last chapter of the thesis recalls the background of the study, the objectives persuaded 
and the methodology followed to achieve these objectives (section 9.1). Subsequently, the obtained con-
clusions are presented in section 9.2. In the following, section 9.3 summarizes briefly the most relevant 
contributions of the thesis. Finally, possible future lines of research are indicated in section 9.4. 
9.1 Introduction 
Background 
In a technical context, risks are understood as a mathematical expectation of the consequences of an 
undesired event (1.1). While not avoidable (Figure 1.1) risks can be analysed, assessed and, if required, 
reduced by appropriate measures. In daily structural design practice, risks are treated in an implicit 
manner, i.e. they are not explicitly quantified and the question of their acceptability is judged on the base 
of prescriptive, codified rules. One of the associated drawbacks is that many objectively known hazards 
remain undetected. Moreover, the lack of a fully consistent calibration of these rules causes the associ-
ated risks to diverge widely what alludes to non-optimal allocation of the available resources for risk 
reduction (section 1.1.1). 
The treatment of risks associated with accidental actions on structures is an especially challenging issue. 
Due to the high uncertainties involved, decision-making related to structural safety accounting for such 
actions is generally difficult and prone to be based on irrational grounds. Explicit risk analysis offers 
substantial advantages in this regard. A systematic qualitative risk analysis might contribute to the de-
tection of objectively known, but difficult to recognize accidental actions. In the context of a quantitative 
risk analysis, specific characteristics inherent to accidental actions, such as low occurrence probabilities, 
on one hand, and potentially high consequences, on the other, can be judged in a rational manner (sec-
tion 1.1.2). 
Among the accidental actions, gas explosions in buildings are a good example. Despite the continuous 
modernization of gas installations and appliances, available statistics from different countries show that 
the occurrence rate of such explosions in buildings does not seem to decrease in a significant way. While 
the hazard potential is known and recognized, and although dealt with in many design codes, gas 
explosions are seldom accounted for in the design and evaluation of ordinary building structures. The 
low occurrence probability evokes reluctance to allocate resources to mitigate the associated risks, 
which, as a consequence, are often ignored and sometimes consciously accepted. Whether this is, or not, 
a justified practice cannot be easily answered however, since these risks are not quantified nor are 
acceptable risk levels established (section 1.1.3). 
Objectives 
On this background, the present thesis aims at exploring practical methods and tools for the analysis 
and evaluation of structure-related risks associated with the effects of gas explosions on reinforced con-
crete structures. The particular objectives of the study are (section 1.3): 
- To deduce and establish methods and models for estimation of both the probabilities and the 
consequences of a gas explosion-induced collapse in ordinary RC building structures. 
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- To employ these models in order to determine the implicitly accepted risks to persons associ-
ated with such structures.  
- To deduce rational acceptance criteria that may be employed for the assessment of explosion- 
related structural risks within the context of an explicit risk analysis, or serve as a basis for a 
risk-based calibration of semi-probabilistic models used in daily practice. 
Approach 
Decision-making related to technical facilities in general, and structures in particular, unavoidably re-
quires addressing life safety risks in order to assure that persons are safeguarded from undue threats to 
their life or health to the highest affordable level [209]. According to the Marginal Life Saving Cost 
(MLSC) principle established in the international standard [36] on the reliability of structures, this level 
is closely related to the societal willingness to pay for saving one statistical individual and can be quan-
tified by means of the Life Quality Index (LQI) (section 1.2). However, the standard also states that “an 
activity which is found to be acceptable should be assessed in regard to the corresponding absolute level 
of life safety risk”, and that the practical implementation of the MLSC principle by using the LQI might 
require the specification of “absolute values of the acceptable life safety risks”. Indeed, in the opinion of 
social scientists the public at large would be unlikely to accept higher failure rates than associated with 
current best practice [10, 13] and practice would change if the frequency of collapse with a certain de-
gree of consequences were to rise to unacceptable levels [3]. For these reasons, the present study ex-
plores life safety risk-related acceptance criteria associated with building structures compliant with cur-
rent best practice, in turn reflected by the structural design codes and standards in force. Risk accepta-
bility therefore depends on the degree of reliability implicitly required by these codes and standards, 
which is unknown and which, as previous studies show, might differ fundamentally from nominal target 
ceilings established in these standards.  
Mathematical framework 
In section 4.2, a mathematical framework for the quantification of structure-related risks is defined. The 
developments, which are in line with the main principles established in prior studies dedicated to risks 
in buildings under normal use conditions [9, 10, 13], are based on the state of knowledge regarding 
explicit approaches for the analysis, assessment and management of risks associated with technical sys-
tems, outlined in Chapter 2. In the present context, such a system is described by a particular building 
structure. Each of the nj hazard scenarios (j) associated with such a structure is represented by a specific 
collapse scenario triggered by failure of one of its principle loadbearing members, where member fail-
ure is characterized by a specific failure mode induced by a particular load arrangement. The hazard 
scenarios are mathematically described by their occurrence probability pj and the associated conse-
quences Nj. Assuming statistical independency between the nj hazard scenarios, these can be repre-
sented in a probability (pj) -consequence (Nj) diagram, also termed risk profile (Figure 4.2). The integral 
of the risk profile corresponds to the risk R associated with the structure in question.  
Procedure 
Based on the established mathematical framework, in section 4.3 a procedure (Figure 4.4) is defined 
which specifies the tasks performed to comply with the established objectives. The procedure comprises 
the definition of a representative set of ordinary building structures with RC elements (beams and col-
umns) in section 4.4, followed by an identification of the most relevant hazard scenarios (j) associated 
with these structures and elements in section 4.5. The determination of the occurrence probabilities pj 
and the associated consequences Nj forms part of the subsequent quantitative risk analysis. Probabilities 
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pj are expressed in terms of implicitly acceptable member failure probabilities pf,adm, which represent 
the reliability implicitly required by the structural standards. The tasks performed for their determina-
tion comprise the translation of the defined hazard scenarios into limit state functions (LSF) (sections 
4.6), a strict design of the members (Ed = Rd) based on these LSF (section 4.7) and the characterisation 
of basic variables involved (section 4.8). Moreover, the estimation of probabilities pf,adm called for the 
quantification of different dynamic effects associated with the defined member limit states (Chapter 5) 
and, finally, a reliability analysis (Chapter 6). For the estimation of consequences, Nj, in terms of the 
number of fatalities associated with the hazard scenario, a model is required what is subject of Chapter 
7. As a function of both, pj and Nj, in Chapter 8 the implicitly acceptable risks associated with the selected 
structures are established and acceptance criteria deduced from the findings. 
Codes and standards employed 
For the purpose of the present study, the Spanish building codes (CTE) on basis of design and actions 
are used while structural resistance is based on standard EHE (section 4.7.1). To a large extend, these 
codes are compatible with the respective Eurocodes (sections 4.7.4, 6.2.4). 
9.2 Developments and conclusions 
9.2.1 Introduction 
In the following, the most relevant developments and the obtained conclusions of the study are outlined, 
classified according to the three main objectives persuaded (sections 9.2.2 to 9.2.4). Important addi-
tional findings are presented in section 9.2.5. 
9.2.2 Methods and models for estimation of structure-related risks 
Occurrence rate of gas explosions 
The occurrence probability of gas explosions is quantified based on a literature survey (section 3.1.2) 
from which the following conclusions can be drawn: 
- The good correlation among the findings of different studies suggests that the probability of an 
explosion event per time unit  seems to be almost independent of the considered time period 
what in light of the continuous modernization of gas installations and appliances could not have 
been expected (Table 3.1). 
- A value of =10-5 provides a good estimate for the annual occurrence of a gas explosion in a gas-
supplied housing-unit in western countries. 
- Assuming a uniform distribution in time, this figure can be used to model the occurrence prob-
ability p(EX) in a specific time period Tref based on a Poisson process. 
Hazard scenarios and limit states  
Accidental hazard scenarios and associated limit state functions (LSF) for the defined building struc-
tures and their constitutive members were established based on the findings of a previous literature 
study, complemented by sound assumptions (section 4.5, section 4.6). The following aspects are high-
lighted in this context: 
Acceptable life safety risks associated with the effects of gas explosions on reinforced concrete structures 
 
266 
- Accidental load arrangements for members in building structures are defined under considera-
tion of gravitational loads acting simultaneously to the explosion pressure (Figure 4.8 to Figure 
4.10). As a reasonable simplification, this simultaneous action is accounted for by means of 
standardized coefficients for combination of loads in accidental situations, 1 (section 2.3.4). 
- Under the defined load arrangements, bending and diagonal shear failure, in case of the columns 
influenced by axial forces, are identified as the relevant member failure modes. Direct- or punch-
ing shear failure modes are not relevant to member reliability in connection with gas explosions 
(section 3.2.3).  
- The definition of the LSF for column failure under bending moment-axial force interaction takes 
account of the fact that the reliability level is strongly load-path dependent (Figure 2.18, Figure 
4.11). A possible cross-section failure upon reaching the ultimate moment is distinguished from 
buckling failure (Figure 4.12). 
Pressure generation in gas explosions 
A probabilistic model for the peak pressure generated in a gas explosion (pEX,peak) is derived from a re-
gression analysis on the experimental results which constitute the fundament of the Eurocode load-
model. The probabilistic model is characterized by the following features: 
- A lognormal distribution. 
- A mean value, which is defined in function of the characteristics of the venting panels providing 
pressure relief during the explosion event, i.e. the resistance pressure pstat and the venting coef-
ficient Av/V (Figure 4.21). 
- An associated coefficient of variation of 0.7, which, under a required confidence level of = 0.95, 
takes account of statistical uncertainties due to the limited number of available test results (Ta-
ble 4.9, Table 4.10). Its magnitude corroborates indications in [24] and is indicative of the com-
plex physical relationships and dependencies between the many variables involved in the pres-
sure build-up process (section 3.1.3). 
Dynamic effects on loads and structural resistance 
Dynamic effects on the structural behavior during blast load exposure, such as the contribution of inertia 
forces and energy-dissipation due to plastic deformations are accounted for by means of dynamic load 
factors DLFE (Figure 4.20). Moreover, the study takes into account the alteration of the material proper-
ties (strain rate effects) under relatively high loading rates, for which purpose dynamic increase factors 
DIFm are introduced (Figure 4.24). 
Simplified dynamic models (section 3.3) are deployed in the framework of a deterministic analysis pro-
cedure (Figure 5.6) to quantify both DLFE and DIFm under the explosion load exposure of the RC mem-
bers. For this purpose, the explosion load is represented as an idealised pressure-time function (Figure 
4.7). The development of the dynamic resistance function is built upon a moment-curvature analysis 
what, in case of the columns, required a specific solution algorithm to accommodate the axial force de-
pendent formulation of structural resistance under consideration of the material- and geometrical non-
linearities involved (Figure 5.13 to Figure 5.16). The most important results obtained in the determin-
istic member analysis are summarized below. 
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- The DLF corresponding to the flexural failure mode of the beams manifest a significant decrease 
of the required resistance with rising deformation capacity with up to 50% in case of the mem-
bers subjected to load arrangement pEX(+) (Figure 5.18), where the explosion load acts in the 
same direction as the gravitational loads (Figure 4.8). When exposed to load arrangement pEX(-) 
(Figure 5.21), where gravitational- and explosion load act in an opposed sense (Figure 4.8), this 
decrease may rise up to approximately 70%. 
- On the other hand, it seems likely that the beams are not able to resist the dynamic shear forces 
that arise during the flexural response close to the member supports. At the time of tensile-con-
trolled shear failure, only about 1/3 of the energy dissipation capacity corresponding to the flex-
ural failure mode is taken advantage of (Figure 5.18). On the contrary, a compression-controlled 
shear failure of the beams seems highly unlikely to occur (Figure 5.19). 
- In comparison to the beams, the analysis of the columns, reveals far less disparity in the energy 
absorption capacity associated with the different failure modes. Due to a comparatively high 
flexural stiffness, accentuated by the influence of compression axial forces, this capacity is gen-
erally small what manifests in similar DLF for bending and shear failure modes, with values 
larger than unity in many cases (Figure 5.30). Among them are the buckling-critical members, 
whose maximum deformation capacity concurs with initiation of yielding of the longitudinal re-
inforcement. 
- Although the material strain rates which gas explosions might induce in RC members are rela-
tively low in comparison to those associated with other explosion types, the mechanical material 
properties are nonetheless substantially enhanced. 
- The highest dynamic increase is experienced by the concrete tensile strength and Young’s mod-
ulus involved in the computation of the dynamic resistance function for the beams exposed to 
load arrangement pEX(-), which as an average, increase by around 25% (Table 5.5). The average 
increase of the concrete compressive strength oscillates between 12 and 17 %, depending on 
the considered failure mode. Slightly below these values, between 10 and 14%, is the average 
increase of the concrete compressive strain under maximum stress (Table 5.3, 5.5, 5.7) 
- The dynamic increase of the reinforcing steel yield strength is characterized by an average DIF 
between 1.10 and 1.16, while the alteration of the tensile strength is almost negligible as denoted 
by an average increase between 3 and 5 % only (Table 5.3, 5.5, 5.7). 
The simplified dynamic analysis procedure and the associated assumptions were verified by means of a 
previously validated non-linear finite element model (section 5.5). A comparative study for 18 RC beams 
was conducted with the following conclusions:  
- The numerical results agree closely with the simplified model predictions, particularly with re-
spect to flexural behaviour (Figure 5.38 to Figure 5.40) 
- The simplified methods might underestimate the support reactions of RC members performing 
in the post-yield response stage (Figure 5.41). This can be attributed to the contribution of 
higher response modes to the distribution of inertia forces along the members, triggered upon 
formation of the plastic hinge (Figure 5.43). 
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- The impact of this finding on the present study is negligible for the critical tension tie shear fail-
ure mode occurs far before the yield strength of the longitudinal reinforcement of the beams is 
reached.  
Regarding a stochastic characterization of the dynamic load effects and structural resistance, the follow-
ing remarks should be made: 
- Uncertainties associated with the simplified dynamic models are factored to the DLFE by means 
of coefficients E,dyn (Figure 4.23), characterized by lognormal distributions with mean E,dyn = 
1.0 and a standard deviation E,dyn, based on test observations (section 3.3.6) and/or subjective 
estimations (M,dyn = 0.2, V,dyn = 0.3, N,dyn = 0.05).  
- Due to a lack of evidence, the scatter associated with the dynamic material strength involved in 
the LSF (concrete compressive strength, yield- and tensile strength of reinforcement) is assumed 
as under quasi-static loading conditions (Figure 4.25). 
Reliability method for columns under M-N exposure 
A reliability procedure for the analysis of columns under the considered M-N interaction-sequence due 
to the occurrence of a gas explosion is presented (section 6.1). The principal objective of this procedure 
is the determination of the strain distribution in the critical member cross-section, corresponding to the 
most likely-failure point on the limit state surface, also known as FORM-design point (Figure 6.2, Figure 
6.3). Application of the procedure entails the following findings: 
- The assumption of mean values for the relevant material properties, including strain-rate ef-
fects, provides failure point estimations that approach the FORM design point solution in a suf-
ficiently exact manner (Figure 6.4). 
- On the contrary, the use of the strain distribution obtained in the code design stage of the explo-
sion-exposed columns could entail distorted reliability levels for the corresponding failure point 
location might be completely different from the FORM solution (see also section 9.2.5). This is 
particularly the case if the code design predicts failure in the compression-controlled region of 
the M-N interaction diagram (Figure 6.5). For such cases, the developed reliability procedure 
provides close approximations to the FORM design point in an iterative manner (Figure 6.6). 
Failure consequences 
For purpose of the establishment of a consequence model, data on explosion-induced structural collapse 
events in Spain and other western countries is gathered in the framework of a systematic press-survey 
(section 7.2). Following an evaluation and statistical complementation of the compiled data, a rigorous, 
multi-linear regression analysis on the relevant observations is carried out (section 7.5). The obtained 
model predicts the number of fatalities (Ncol,j) due to a specific member collapse scenario. The following 
conclusions are obtained: 
- In addition to the area affected by the collapse (Acol,j), the occupancy ratio of this area (Ocu-
col/Acol)j is relevant to the explanation of the generally large variability in Ncol,j.  
- Under the adoption of reasonable assumptions for (Ocucol/Acol)j, the derived regression model 
shows a good conformity to models derived in previous studies to predict the number of fatali-
ties due to structural collapse events in the context of persistent situations [9, 10, 13] (Figure 
7.15). 
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9.2.3 Implicitly accepted risks to persons  
Reliability level implicitly required by the codes 
The implicitly accepted risks to persons depend on the reliability level implicitly required by existing 
structural standards (section 9.1). This level is analyzed in section 6.2 for a representative set of struc-
tural RC members, with the following conclusions: 
- The general need for accidental design provisions associated with gas explosions is evidenced. 
It is shown that in many practically relevant situations, the accidental design rules might de-
mand a higher member resistance than provided in an ordinary design for persistent situations. 
Ignoring this, the reliability level might fall below the level implicitly required by the design 
codes for the accidental situations (see e.g. Figure 6.9). 
- This level is generally subject to a high scatter. Important differences are observed when com-
paring the obtained reliability indices for different members and, especially, for different mem-
ber failure modes. In many cases, the nominal 50 year-target ceiling (t,code = 3.8) is not met. The 
tension tie-shear failure mode of the studied members turns out to be especially critical, while 
the failure of the compression strut is comparatively unlikely, results that corroborate the find-
ings of the deterministic structural analysis.  
- The sensitivity coefficients i associated with the FORM design point vector reveal that, almost 
irrespective of the member type and failure mode, the uncertain explosion-induced action ef-
fects dominate the failure probabilities of the members where the accidental design situation is 
mandatory. The influence of geometrical or material variables, as well as static loads, on the 
likelihood of an explosion-induced collapse of these members is comparatively small wherefore 
they could be treated as deterministic quantities in the reliability calculations (see e.g. Figure 
6.7, right). 
Implicitly accepted risks 
The determination of the implicitly acceptable risks accounts for the fact that not all members consti-
tuting a building structure are potentially exposed to the considered accidental load combinations. 
Moreover, it is considered that, in addition to the potential accidental load exposure, certain member 
failure modes might be triggered by persistent load arrangements associated with normal building use 
conditions (section 8.1.2). Under these assumptions, implicitly acceptable risk profiles (Figure 4.2) are 
obtained for each of the representative building structures and integrated, what leads to the following 
conclusions: 
- The implicitly acceptable risks Radm associated with structures designed in strict accordance 
with the existing legislation rise with the number of hazard scenarios (nj), which, in turn, rise 
with the number of structural members (nm), failure mechanisms (nk), and load arrangements 
(nl) that may trigger these mechanisms (Figure 8.4, Figure 8.5). 
- In consequence of this scale effect, the obtained Radm are about 4 times larger compared to find-
ings of previous studies, where risks stemmed exclusively from normal building use conditions 
[10, 13] (Figure 8.8). Even after normalization of Radm for nj, this difference cannot be entirely 
eliminated what is attributable to the comparatively high member failure probabilities associ-
ated with the uncertain explosion load arrangements (Figure 8.9). 
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9.2.4 Acceptance criteria 
Different performance criteria are defined in compliance with the basic requirement that the total risk, 
stemming from the sum of the relevant persistent- and accidental load-controlled hazard scenarios is to 
be limited to a specific target value. According to the explanations in Chapter 2, a distinction is drawn 
for structure-related individual (ri)- and societal risks, the latter expressed in terms of frequencies F(n) 
of a structural collapse scenario with n≥N fatalities. Moreover, in view of applications in routine practice, 
performance criteria in terms of structural failure probabilities (pf) are established (section 8.3.1). 
Target values (rit,TOT, F(n)t,TOT and pft,TOT) for the established risk-based acceptance criteria are derived in 
accordance with the basic assumptions adopted in prior studies [10, 13] on risks associated with struc-
tures under normal use conditions (Table 8.2, Figure 8.10 to Figure 8.13). A comparison of the results 
obtained here, to those of the mentioned previous studies, shows that due to the comparatively higher 
level of intrinsically acceptable life-safety risks Radm, the derived safety requirements are accordingly 
lower, what is a sound finding. In addition, economical criteria, although not specifically addressed in 
the present study, deliver reasonable arguments to establish the safety requirements for potentially ex-
plosion-exposed structural members at a comparatively lower level. Keeping in mind that more demand-
ing safety levels might involve prohibitive costs in case of large uncertainties, lower requirements, i.e. 
higher target failure frequencies, would seem to be defendable in case the reliability level associated 
with a specific member failure mode is dominated by the uncertain explosion-induced load arrange-
ments. In other words, the lower the influence of persistent load arrangements on the member reliabil-
ity, the less demanding should be the decision criteria. 
In line with these considerations, target values pft|EX for the conditional failure probability of structural 
RC members (given that a gas explosion occurs and the member in question is exposed to the associated 
pressure-wave) are proposed in the present study. The main findings are summarized as follows: 
- The target probability pft|EX is defined as a function of the contribution pf,PER  due to the relevant 
persistent load arrangement to the total failure probability pf,TOT. A maximum value for pft|EX can 
be established for situations where such loads are not relevant to member failure, i.e. where 
pf,PER approaches zero. A minimum value for pft|EX is defined by limiting pf,PER in all cases to a target 
value pft,PER, whereby consistency to the prior studies [10, 13] is ensured. 
- Individual risks are found to be irrelevant for the derivation of pft|EX, what is consistent with the 
“philosophy” of the current design codes on accidental actions claiming that structural design 
against explosions should aim at avoiding collapse events with large failure consequences. Re-
lated to such events are societal risks, which turn out to be relevant for the definition of pft|EX. In 
particular, pft|EX is defined as a function of the area affected by the collapse (Acol) which is related 
to the number of fatalities by means of the consequence model employed to derive the implicitly 
acceptable risks (Figure 8.14). 
- Minimum areas Acol,min are derived below which a specific design solution would be acceptable 
without need for any intervention regarding explosion-related structural safety, i.e. where mem-
ber design could be based on the persistent situation under consideration of normal load condi-
tions only, without any further provisions for such accidental load. The obtained Acol,min values 
based on the mean value of the implicitly acceptable risks are 100 m2 and 160 m2, respectively, 
for the minimum and the maximum pft|EX criteria (Figure 8.14). The fact that these values are of 
the same order as the threshold areas suggested by EN 1991-1-7 [17] for limiting the extent of 
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localised failure due to an unspecified cause, supports the plausibility of the herein deduced ac-
ceptance criteria.  
- Beyond Acol,min, the pft|EX diminish with increasing Acol expressing aversion to collapse events with 
large consequences. In this regard, the deduced criteria constitute a powerful tool for the design 
or the assessment of key elements, upon which, according to the definition in EN 1991-1-7 [17], 
the stability of (the remainder of) the structure depends. In comparison to the constant, nominal 
target ceiling in [11], the consequence-dependent differentiation of the required reliability level 
supposes a substantial improvement of the current approach for treatment of structural safety 
in connection with gas explosions (Figure 8.15). 
- In the absence of other guidelines, the deduced criteria could also be applied to more vulnerable 
structural typologies, such as panel systems. As denoted by several incidents, these systems, 
which are still relatively common in the existing Spanish building stock, and elsewhere, are 
prone to the risk of progressive collapse with corresponding large failure consequences. The 
current version of the Spanish building code [71] does not contain any safety requirements, nor 
any associated accidental load models, which would allow for an assessment of the associated 
risks to persons (section 4.7.1). The herein developed models and criteria could contribute to 
this purpose. 
- In summary, the deduced criteria would facilitate the adoption of rational decisions on both, the 
need and the appropriate choice of risk-reduction measures to counteract the effects of gas ex-
plosions in buildings.  
9.2.5 Additional findings 
The deduced models, methods and criteria could be used in the framework of an explicit risk- or relia-
bility analysis, or serve as a basis for the calibration of the implicit rules in structural codes and stand-
ards for verification of structural safety in relation to gas explosions. Regarding such a possible calibra-
tion, both the deterministic- and the reliability analysis of the RC members carried out in the present 
study have furnished a number of important collateral findings, which are summarized below: 
- The RC beams, in spite of being designed a in strict manner (Ed = Rd) for both, bending and shear, 
to resist the nominal explosion pressure specified in the applied code, are likely to fail in shear 
much before the ductile, flexural response might be fully developed. This finding is consistent 
with the frequently quoted observation that structural members, when exposed to blast loads, 
might fail in shear, even if they were designed to exhibit a ductile, flexural behavior under quasi-
static loading conditions (section 3.2). 
- In order to perform in the more energy absorbing flexural mode, the beams would require either 
a higher shear resistance or a lower bending resistance and/or stiffness, what constitutes a par-
allelism to the capacity design approach for seismic action. The latter option could be achieved 
by considering the beneficial effect of energy dissipation explicitly in the flexural design stage of 
explosion-exposed members, for instance by introducing dynamic load factors (DLF), such as 
obtained in the present thesis.  
- In addition, the very dispersed, failure-mode dependent ratios between the mean and design 
resistance of the beams, Rm/Rd (Table 5.4), suggest to analyze to which extent the current for-
mulations for the design values of the material parameters are based on rational grounds. The 
subsequent reliability analysis of the members corroborates the need for such an investigation. 
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It is shown that the ratios between resistance R*, computed from the individual components xi* 
of FORM design point vector x*, to the mean resistance Rm approach unity with increasing influ-
ence of the explosion load on the member reliability (Figure 6.8, right, Figure 6.13, Figure 6.16, 
right). This is attributable to the simultaneous decrease of the impact of the resistance variables 
(geometry and material parameters) on the member failure probability, what implies that the 
corresponding design point coordinates xi* approach the mean values. On the contrary, the ra-
tios between R* and the code-based design resistance Rd are found to deviate from unity with 
rising influence of the explosion load (Figure 6.8, left, Figure 6.14, Figure 6.16, left). 
- These observations indicate that a more realistic representation of the design material parame-
ters, including the explicit consideration of failure mode- (and load-type) specific dynamic in-
crease factors (DIF) might contribute to a more rational design approach for certain accidental 
situations. 
- A similar conclusion is drawn from the analysis of the columns under M-N interaction. The anal-
ysis reveals that the failure domains of the members might strongly differ from those anticipated 
in the design stage. In particular, it is shown that the failure point on the interaction diagram 
based on mean values for the material properties (including strain rate effects) is located close 
to the FORM design point solution, while it might be situated in a failure domain that completely 
differs from the code-design predictions (Figure 5.25 to Figure 5.27, Figure 6.19). 
- Only the particular characteristics of the explosion-induced load-path 2 (Figure 4.11) make this 
phenomenon possible. Hence, while current design rules might be appropriate for member de-
sign under persistent situations, where mainly gravitational actions prevail, they might deliver 
irrational results if applied to accidental situations characterized by extraordinary sequences of 
bending moments and axial forces. For such situations, a shift of the design values for the mate-
rial parameters towards more realistic boundaries, including dynamic effects, could help to cir-
cumvent irrational design solutions. 
9.3 Original contributions 
The most relevant contributions of the present study can be briefly summarized as follows: 
- Definition, implementation and validation of a procedure for the simplified dynamic analysis of 
structural members under consideration of strain-rate effects, material- and geometrical non-
linearities and the influence of gravitational loads acting previously to the explosion exposure. 
- Validation of this procedure and the associated adopted hypothesis by means of a numerical 
model for RC beams, where especially the analysis of the member reaction forces in the post-
yield stage constitute an original contribution to a scantly explored research field. 
- Definition and implementation of a procedure for the reliability analysis of RC columns under 
M-N interaction with an, a priori, unknown failure point.  
- Establishment of the reliability level implicitly required by the codes for RC members under the 
influence of gas explosion-induced loads, including the previous definition of appropriate limit 
states. 
- Improvement of available models for the estimation of structural collapse-related consequences 
to persons. 
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- Quantification of the implicitly acceptable risks to persons associated with RC structures poten-
tially exposed to the gas explosion-hazard and comparison to risks stemming exclusively from 
persistent design situations. 
- Inference of a consequence-dependent target reliability level for the design or the assessment 
of key-elements under potential explosion-exposure, including threshold values for a minimum 
consequence level (Acol,min) below which a particular design solution would be acceptable with-
out need for any intervention regarding explosion-related structural safety. 
9.4 Future research 
Among the many possible subjects for future research related to the present study, the following should 
be prioritised: 
- The scope of this study is limited to RC structures constituted by beams and columns. An exten-
sion to other construction materials and structural typologies is important, among them panel 
structures, which are prone to the risk of explosion-induced progressive collapse. 
- In line with the assumption of static determinate structural members, reasonable assumptions 
were adopted in the present study to describe the extensions of a system collapse scenario given 
a local member failure (section 4.5.4). Future studies could involve static indeterminate systems 
including an analysis of structural robustness under consideration of the system collapse prob-
ability given a specific local failure. 
- The scope of the present study is limited to gas explosions. An extension to other accidental ac-
tions is paramount. Among such actions, the seismic action should be prioritised for its crucial 
role in the context of life safety risks.  
- In addition to life safety risks, economic aspects, based on the Life Quality Index (LQI), should 
be considered for the derivation of structure-related acceptance criteria. Establishing a relation 
between the results obtained in the present study to economic requirements would also facili-
tate the evaluation of fire-related risks. 
- The comparison between the derived consequence model to those obtained in prior studies sug-
gests to derive a unique model from a joint database comprising collapse events due to all kind 
of influences in and on buildings associated with all types of consequence classes (section 7.5.4). 
Moreover, the estimate of the conditional probability for one or more persons to lose their life 
given a structural collapse event should be improved. 
- The derived failure probabilities and risks are to be undertstood as nominal quantities. Estab-
lishing a relation to “real” values, taking account of human error and a certain degree of conserv-
atism in current structural design practice (section 6.2.5), would facilitate a comparison to risks 
associated with other technologies and thereby contribute to a global approach for rational de-
cision-making. 
- The present study reveals significant scope for improving the implicit design rules in structural 
codes and standards for verification of structural safety in relation to accidental situations (sec-
tion 9.2.5). Future studies should envisage a consistent calibration of these rules.
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Annex A SDOF Analysis of columns 
including 2nd order effects 
A.1 Introduction 
The present Annex pretends to illustrate the implementation of the singe degree of freedom (SDOF) 
analysis under the influence of axial forces (section 3.3.4) by means of an example column. Special at-
tention is being paid to the influence of second order effects on the dynamic member performance. The 
sensitivity of expression (5.7) for the dynamic load factor associated with failure due to M-N interaction 
to varying second order levels is to be quantified.  
A.2 Example 
For sake of simplicity, a simply supported column subjected to a uniformly distributed explosion load 
following a equilateral triangular pressure pulse, pEX(t), and a constant axial compression force NE with-
out initial eccentricity nor initial deformation will be considered here (Figure A.1). For this case, the 
dynamic second order moment ME,dyn,II is given by the following simple expression, where  is the mid-
span displacement in transverse direction. 
 𝐸,𝑑𝑦𝑛,𝐼𝐼 =  𝐸 ∙ 𝛿         (A.1) 
 
Figure A.1 Schematic representation of considered column 
Assuming, elastic structural behavior ( = 1.0), the resisting moment MR,dyn is defined as a function of 
mid-span displacement , member stiffness k (inferred from cross-sectional stiffness EI), and the col-
umn height, l0 (section 3.3.3). 
 𝑅,𝑑𝑦𝑛 =
𝑅∙𝑙0
8
=
𝑘∙𝛿∙𝑙0
8
         (A.2) 
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) can be substituted into the definition of second order ratio M,II given by (5.6). 
If moreover the difference between a quadratic and a sinusoidal curvature distribution along the mem-
ber is being disregarded, it can be shown that M,II is approximately equal to the ratio between axial 
force NE and the critical buckling force according to the first Euler case, Ncr. 
l 0
 =
 4
 m
pEX(t)
NE
NE
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𝜑𝑀,𝐼𝐼 ≈
𝑁𝐸
𝑁𝑐𝑟
=
𝑁𝐸
𝜋2𝐸𝐼
𝑙2
         (A.3)  
The definition of the dynamic load factor DLFM for the simplified example considered here is given as 
follows where moment MEX,peak would result from a static application of peak-pressure pEX,peak. 
𝐷𝐿𝐹𝑀 =
𝑀𝐸𝑋 
 𝑀𝐸𝑋,𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘
=
𝑀𝑅,𝑑𝑦𝑛 ∙(1−𝜑𝑀,𝐼𝐼)
 𝑀𝐸𝑋,𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘
        (A.4) 
In the following, it will be assumed that the duration of the equilateral triangular load-pulse acting on 
the described example-column is equal to three times the natural period, i.e., tP / T = 3.0. Under this 
assumption, Figure A.2  shows, for different M,II ratios (A : M,II = 0; B : M,II = 0.3; C : M,II = 0.6; D : M,II = 
0.9), the resistance, MR,dyn(t) (black, dashed curves), the second order moment, ME,dyn,II(t) (blue curves), 
the difference between both, MR,dyn(t) - ME,dyn,II(t) (red curves), and moment MEX (t) (green lines) which 
would be obtained if the lateral pressure pEX(t) would be applied statically to the member. All curves are 
normalized to the maximum value of MR,dyn.  
 
Figure A.2 Elastic response MR,dyn(t) to applied moment MEX(t) following a triangular load-pulse of duration tp = 
3·T, under influence of second order moment ME,dyn,II(t): M,II = 0 (a), M,II = 0.2 (b),M,II = 0.6 (c),M,II = 0.9 (d). 
From Figure A.2-a it can be deduced that if no second order effects are present (M,II = 0), the required 
resistance MR,dyn (peak of black curve) is about 15% higher than the peak-pressure related bending mo-
ment MEX,peak (peak of green curve), i.e., DLFM ≈ 1.15. From an alternative point of view, it may be stated 
that the column can sustain a moment MEX,peak of not more than 1/1.15 · 100 ≈ 87% of the provided 
maximum resistance MR,dyn.  
When second order effects (blue curves) are being introduced, the resistance available to oppose the 
laterally applied explosion pressure diminishes as illustrated by the red curves, which reflect the differ-
ence between the total resistance MR,dyn(t) and the second order moment ME,dyn,II(t). Hence, the explosion 
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peak-pressure, which can be sustained by the member, reduces. As can be inferred from Figure A.2-b to 
dFigure A.1, MEX,peak reduces from 87% of the provided resistance MR,dyn (when M,II = 0), to, respectively, 
70%, 36% and 7%, when M,II is being increased to 0.3, 0.6 or 0.9. Since, as can be deduced from these 
numbers, the decrease of MEX,peak is almost proportional to (1-M,II), the DLFM (A.4) experience only small 
changes from 1.15 (M,II = 0) to, respectively, 1.00 (M,II = 0.3) and 1.11 (M,II = 0.6). Only in case of very 
high second order effects, i.e. M,II = 0.9, this proportionality gets lost as denoted by the DLFM of 1.50. 
However, this finding of reduced importance, since in this unrealistic case the problem has been con-
verted into an almost static second-order analysis, where the laterally applied explosion load is of neg-
ligible magnitude (Figure A.2-d), and only serves as triggering event for inducing member buckling. 
A.3 Final observations 
The previous example suggests that the DLFM as defined per (5.7) is almost insensitive to the influence 
of second order effects. The reduction of the maximum resisted explosion peak-load upon introducing 
such effects is counteracted by the almost proportional reduction of the available structural resistance, 
what, in consequence, entails only insignificant variations of the DLFM. Figure A.3 shows that this finding 
applies to all tp/T-ratios, which may characterize the dynamic performance of the studied columns.  
It should be kept in mind that elastic behavior ( = 1.0) was assumed in the present example, which is 
representative for the buckling-critical members (BLS members), where second order effects are rela-
tively important. On the contrary, non-bucking-critical columns (UMLS members), with certain plastic 
deformation capacity, are associated with comparatively lower resulting axial force levels or slender-
ness ratios, i.e. lower second order effects. As a general rule, the lower such effects, the larger is the 
ability of the columns to undergo significant plastic deformations. This is duly taken accounted for in 
the definition of the member resistance functions in section 5.3.4. 
 
Figure A.3 Dynamic load factor DLFM (A.4) as a function of ratio between duration of the triangular load-pulse tp 
to the natural period T, ductility ratio  and second order ratio M,II (A.3). 
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Annex B Analysis of the longitudinal 
oscillations in blast-exposed columns 
B.1 Introduction 
The simplified analysis of the RC columns by means of the equivalent SDOF system under the inclusion 
of axial forces provides the flexural response in the transverse direction of the members. However, this 
system cannot capture the dynamic effects in the longitudinal sense of the columns. In order to analyse 
these effects, numerical calculations have been carried out under use of the FE-code Ansys [1]. The pre-
sent Annex briefly summarizes this preliminary study and the results obtained. 
B.2 Numerical model 
A schematic representation of the numerical model is shown in Figure B.1. The columns are modelled 
by 2-D elastic BEAM3 [1] elements with tension, compression and bending capabilities. These elements 
are defined by their cross-sectional area A, moment of inertia I and mass m. In addition, material prop-
erties have to be assigned to the beams elements, in the present case, modulus E and Poisson ratio . 
The plastic deformation capacity of the columns due to yielding of the longitudinal reinforcement is be-
ing accounted for by a rotational spring-element, COMBIN40 [1], connected to the beam elements at the 
intermediate cross-section. The element has one degree of freedom at each of its two coincident nodes. 
Rotation s is triggered when moment M reaches the previously defined yield moment, MRy. Prior to this 
point, the assignment of an extremely high stiffness ks (ks → ∞) impedes the rotation of the spring. 
 
Figure B.1 Schematic representation of FE model 
The pin-ended columns are subjected to load arrangement NEX(-) (Figure 4.9), with the exception that the 
initial eccentricity emin is not considered here. The explosion, characterized by the triangular load-pulse 
of peak-load pEX,peak and duration tp (Figure 4.6),  generates a uniformly distributed explosion load pEX(t) 
acting laterally on the members. Simultaneously, the explosion induces a tensile force component NEX(t) 
which opposes the previously present static compression force NG+Q due to the gravitational actions. The 
fact that the gravitational force NG+Q might act with certain inertia when the columns are stroke laterally 
by the pressure wave [2], is not considered here. 
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B.3 Example 
A column of l0 = 4 m height is considered. The strict design (section 4.7) of the intermediate cross-section 
(b = 0.2 m; h = 0.28 m; A = b∙ h) delivered the required amount of longitudinal reinforcement to resist 
the combined influence of bending moments and axial forces. Subsequently, the simplified analysis of 
the column (section 5.2) yielded cross-sectional stiffness EIdyn = 5688 kNm2, related to stiffness kdyn (Fig-
ure 5.X), assigned to the BEAM3 elements.  Moreover, a yield moment MRy = 93 kNm was inferred from 
the simplified analysis and allocated to the spring (Figure 5.16). 
The example column is subjected to a static axial force of NG+Q = 81 kN. The explosion induces a dynamic 
tensile force NEX(t) characterized by a triangular-shaped pulse of duration tp=0.2 s and a peak value of 
NEX,peak = 62.5 kN. The simultaneously acting lateral explosion load-reaches its peak-value at pEX,peak= 50 
kN/m.  
The numerical solution procedure (full transient dynamic analysis [1]), which took account of geomet-
rical non-linear behavior, yielded the results shown in Figure B.2. On the left, the bending moment is 
plotted versus deflection . The yield-plateau at M = MRy = 93 kNm is clearly visible. The obtained dis-
placement ductility ratio,  = 1.75, matches unsurprisingly well the estimations according to the sim-
plified SDOF analysis. This was expected, since the established FE model, by means of linear-elastic 
beam elements and a rotational spring at the intermediate cross-section, is actually a numerical repre-
sentation of the SDOF system.  
 
Figure B.2 Moment-deflection (left) and axial force-time (right) relationships of the studied column 
The added value of the FE model (with respect to the analytical SDOF model) is the possibility to analyze 
the evolution of the dynamic response in the longitudinal direction of the columns. To this end, Figure 
B.2 (right) shows the axial force–time plot. It can be observed that the axial force level follows clearly 
the applied triangular-shaped pressure pulse, suggesting that oscillations in the longitudinal direction 
of the column are practically insignificant. The maximum of about Nmax = -15 kN (compression) is 
reached at tp/2 = 0.1 s and at tp = 0.2 s, the axial force level has returned to the initial load, NG+Q = 81 kN. 
Consequently the explosion induced a tensile axial force of about 66 kN in the member, which is only 
about 5% larger than the peak-value of the externally applied tensile force, NEX,peak = 62.5 kN, hence DLFN 
≈ 1.05. It should also be observed that the mentioned tensile axial force of 66 kN includes a contribution 
of around 2 kN due to second order effects (the perpendicular action of the laterally applied load pEX(t) 
on the deformed column induces an additional tensile force component in the column), which the sim-
plified analysis does not consider. Without this effect, DLFN would reduce to about 1.02. Dynamic load 
factors close to 1.0 are indicative of quasi-static behavior. This is related to the comparatively small 
natural period corresponding to the axial response mode of the column, in the present case T ≈ 8∙10-3 s. 
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This value is very small in relation to the load-pulse duration tp (tp/T ≈ 25) and hence the influence of 
inertia effects on the structural behavior is practically negligible. 
B.4 Final observations 
In an analogous manner to the previous example, a number of columns with varying geometrical and 
loading properties were modeled and simulated. The main conclusion which can be drawn from these 
simulations is that a dynamic load factor of DLFN = 1.0 (mean value) is a reasonable assumption for 
purpose of the simplified analysis of the RC columns. Possible minor deviations from this value, such as 
detected in the presented example, are accounted for in the reliability analysis (chapter 6) by the corre-
sponding coefficient of variation of 5 % (section 4.8.2). 
B.5 References 
[1] Ansys, Academic Research, Release 12. 
[2] Comité Euro-International du Beton (CEB), Bulletin d'information Nº 187, Concrete structures under 
impact and impulsive loading. 1998. 
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Annex C Models for the deformation 
capacity of RC members 
C.1 Introduction 
The definition of the resistance function for purpose of the simplified dynamic analysis of the beams and 
columns under the influence of the explosion load implies assumptions concerning their deformation 
capacities. In section 5.2.2, member deformation capacity was introduced in terms of the displacement 
ductility ratio , given as a function of the curvature ductility ratio  through expression (5.10), 
adopted from [1]. By means of a comparison to alternative approaches, the objective of the present An-
nex is to validate the usefulness of (5.10) for the purpose of the present study. 
C.2 Deformation capacity based on equivalent plastic hinge length 
For simple structural elements, the relationship between curvature and displacement ductility ratios, 
respectively  and , can be expressed by integrating the curvatures  along the length x of the mem-
bers [2]: 
𝜇𝛿 =
𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝛿𝑦
=
∫𝜒𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥) 𝑥 𝑑𝑥
∫𝜒𝑦(𝑥) 𝑥 𝑑𝑥
= 𝐾 ∙ 𝜇𝜒       (C.1) 
Constant K depends on the shape of the curvature distribution along the member axis at yielding of the 
tensile reinforcement, y(x), and at maximum response, max(x). However, the integrations of equation 
(C.1) are tedious and some approximations are necessary [2]. Figure C.1 [3] shows an idealized bending 
moment and curvature distribution along a simply supported beam under a concentrated load F applied 
at mid-span. In the elastic range, the curvature increases linearly from the supports towards the mid-
span until moment My is reached upon the initiation of yielding of the tensile reinforcing steel. Beyond 
this point, in the so-called plasticity-, or plastic hinge region, of length ly, the curvature experiences a 
sudden increase due to the inelastic deformations. The integral of the corresponding plastic curvature 
p(x) (shaded area), i.e., the difference between total and yield curvature, max(x) and y(x), delivers the 
plastic hinge rotation p according to (C.2). For purpose of a simplified mathematical description of the 
plasticity region, p may be conveniently represented by an equivalent rectangle of height p (plastic 
curvature at mid-span) and length lp, commonly referred to as the equivalent plastic hinge length, e.g. [2, 
4-6] . It should be noted that p and lp as defined here, refer to the rotation and the length on one side of 
the plastic hinge. 
𝜃𝑝 = ∫[𝜒𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥) − 𝜒𝑦(𝑥)]𝑑𝑥 = 𝜒𝑝 ∙ 𝑙𝑝       (C.2) 
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Figure C.1 Idealized moment and curvature distribution of a simply supported beam under a concentrated load 
at mid-span; adapted from [3] 
As proceeded with the total curvature, the total mid-span deflection max can as well be idealized into an 
elastic and plastic contribution, respectively, y and p (C.3), and hence equation (C.1) can be rewritten 
as per (C.4). 
𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝛿𝑦 + 𝛿𝑝         (C.3) 
𝜇𝛿 =
𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝛿𝑦
=
𝛿𝑝+𝛿𝑦
𝛿𝑦
= 1 +
𝛿𝑝
𝛿𝑦
        (C.4) 
Based on the assumption of a linear curvature distribution along the member (Figure C.1), y can be 
obtained from (C.5), while p is expressed as a function of the equivalent plastic hinge length lp (C.6). 
𝛿𝑦 = ∫   𝜒𝑦(𝑥) 𝑥 𝑑𝑥
𝑙
2⁄
0
= 𝜒𝑦
𝑙2
12
        (C.5) 
𝛿𝑝 = ∫   𝜒𝑝(𝑥) 𝑥 𝑑𝑥
𝑙
2⁄
𝑙
2⁄ −𝑙𝑝
= 𝜒𝑝
𝑙𝑝
2
(𝑙 − 𝑙𝑝)      (C.6) 
Factoring (C.5) and (C.6) into (C.4), the displacement ductility ratio  is defined as a function of the 
curvature ductility ratio , the shear span ls (here ls = l/2) and the equivalent plastic hinge length, lp.  
Moment
Curvature
F
My
2ly
2lp
y
pl
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l
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𝜇𝛿 = 1 + 3
𝑙𝑝
𝑙𝑠
(1 −
𝑙𝑝
2𝑙𝑠
)(𝜇𝜒 − 1)       (C.7) 
The total hinge rotation max, which under the rigid body assumption (Figure C.2) is related to the max-
imum displacement max by (C.8), can likewise be formulated as a function of the equivalent plastic hinge 
length lp, as given by (C.9): 
𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 = atan (
2∙𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑙
) ≅
2∙𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑙
        (C.8) 
𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 = χ𝑦 ∙
𝑙𝑠
3
+ l𝑝(1 −
𝑙𝑝
2𝑙𝑠
) ∙ (χ𝑚𝑎𝑥 − χ𝑦)      (C.9) 
 
Figure C.2 Rotation  of a simply supported beam assuming the beam-halves to behave like rigid bodies 
C.3 Comparisons 
By means of equations, (C.7) and (C.9) the displacement-ductility ratio  and the support rotation max 
of a simply supported (or cantilevered) member can be readily derived from a simple cross-sectional 
analysis at mid-span.  The difficulty lies, however, in the estimation of the equivalent plastic hinge length, 
lp. A number of experimental studies have been carried out in the past with the aim to quantify lp, e.g. [2, 
4], with quite different results. The large number of influence parameters on the rotation capacity of 
reinforced concrete members, the complex interaction between those parameters and more basic is-
sues, like differences in the test conditions or a lack of a unique definition of the ultimate limit state [5], 
hinder a straightforward definition of lp in practice. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate an order of 
magnitude. The study by Panagoitakos and Fardis [6], who systematically analyzed and evaluated a da-
tabase comprising 875 results of flexure-controlled tests of RC members (beams, columns, walls) under 
monotonic and cyclic loads, seems to be suitable for this purpose. The study focused on the ultimate 
rotation capacity u of the members, which was associated with a drop of at least 15% of the applied 
peak force in the tests. Taking as a base previous research from Paulay and Priestly [2], Panagoitakos 
and Fardis [6] suggested the equivalent plastic hinge length lp to be a function of shear span ls, which 
they considered to be the most influent parameter on the rotation capacity, and the product between 
bar diameter db and yield strength fy. Regression analysis showed expression (C.10) to provide the best 
fit of equation (C.9) to the experimentally obtained ultimate rotations u of the monotonically loaded 
members, among which a large number were cantilevered or simply supported under concentrated load 
exposure [6].  
𝑙𝑝 =  0.18 ∙ 𝑙𝑠 + 0.021 ∙ 𝑎𝑠𝑙 ∙ 𝑑𝑏 ∙ 𝑓𝑦       (C.10) 
The second term on the right-hand-side of equation (C.10) accounts for an additional rotation capacity 
due to the anchorage of the rebars beyond the section of maximum moment according to [2]. For the 
herein considered simply supported members, this term can be neglected (asl = 0) and hence lp is found 
to be proportional to ls. Factoring the remaining term (lp = 0.18∙ls) into (C.7), the - relationship 
shown in Figure C.3 (blue line) is obtained. Surprisingly, the result practically coincides with equation 
(5.10), likewise represented in Figure C.3 (red line). Although this probably rather casual coincidence 

2

l
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should not be paid too much attention, it provides evidence for the adequacy of (5.10) for the estimation 
of the deformation capacity of simple RC members, such as those analyzed in the present study. The fact 
that the herein considered beams and columns are subjected to uniformly distributed loads, which en-
tail larger plastic rotation capacities compared to members under concentrated loads [5], does not 
lower the meaningfulness of this statement.  
 
Figure C.3 Relation between displacement- and curvature ductility ratio according to (5.10) and (C.7) (the latter 
in connection with (C.10)) 
In order to judge the prediction capacity of equation (C.9) in conjunction with (C.10), Panagoitakos and 
Fardis [6] statistically evaluated ratio M of predicted to experimental rotation capacities u. The ob-
tained mean value M of 1.37 showed that the experimentally deduced rotations are underestimated by 
use of equations (C.9) and (C.10). Moreover, a coefficient of variation of CoVM = 0.94 denotes an im-
portant associated scatter which partly can be attributed to the fact that several of the important influ-
ence parameters on the rotation capacity u are implicitly dealt with through lp. The study conducted by 
Panagoitakos and Fardis [6] shows that when considering these influences in a more explicit way, the 
model accuracy can be significantly enhanced. A regression analysis including all statistically relevant 
variables for the rotation capacity of the monotonically loaded members included in the database 
yielded a model with an improved prediction capacity (in relation to the lp-based model) as denoted by 
an associated mean value and coefficient variation for ratio M of M = 1.17 and CoVM = 0.57, respectively. 
When performing the regression analysis on all available test results, including the cyclically loaded 
members, these values could be further reduced to M = 1.06 and CoVM =0.47. The corresponding model, 
given by equation (C.11), depends on: 
- the steel type (coefficients st and cyc) 
- the anchorage characteristics of the rebars beyond the section of maximum moment (sl = 1 if 
bond slippage must be accounted for, 0 if not) 
- the element type (awall = 1.0 for shear walls and 0 for beams or columns) 
- the influence of axial load ratio  = N/fcAc 
- the relation between compression and tensile reinforcement index ’/ 
- the cylindrical concrete compressive strength fc 
1
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
k
Equation (5.10)
Equation (C.7) with equivalent plastic hinge length according to (C.10) [Panagiotakos and Fardis]
 = 0,5(k +1)
 = 0,49k+0,51
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- the shear span ratio at the section of maximum moment ls/h 
- the influence of confinement (term including confinement factor  [MC90], transverse reinforce-
ment ratio w and yield strength fyw) 
-  the diagonal reinforcement ratio d 
𝜃𝑢(%) =  𝛼𝑠𝑡𝛼𝑐𝑦𝑐 (1 +
𝛼𝑠𝑙
2.3
) (1 −
𝛼𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙
3
) 0.2𝜈 [
max(0.01;𝜛′)
max(0.01;𝜛)
𝑓𝑐]
0.275
(
𝑙𝑠
ℎ
)0.451.1
(100𝛼𝜌𝑤
𝑓𝑦𝑤
𝑓𝑐
)
1.3100𝜌𝑑    (C.11) 
Equation (C.11) is used in the following to predict the ultimate rotation capacities u of the 18 RC beams 
analyzed in section 5.5. The beams are characterized by a ratio between compression and tensile rein-
forcement index of ’/ = 0.2. A medium reinforcing steel ductility class (st = 1.25; cyc = 1.0) and per-
fect bond conditions (asl = 0) are assumed for this purpose. For the plastic hinge of the simply supported 
members is assumed to develop around the mid-span cross-section, no confinement of the concrete core 
due to transverse reinforcement is considered ( = 0). Concrete compressive strength fc is replaced by 
the dynamic value fc,dyn including dynamic increase factor. Following these assumptions, equation (C.11) 
delivers ultimate rotations u between 2.6 and 3.6 degrees for the 18 members analyzed, as shown in 
the left part of Figure C.4 (blue dots). Interestingly, these rotations are far less dependent on the tensile 
reinforcement index  than those deduced from equation (C.8) in conjunction with max based on (5.10), 
assumed in the simplified analysis of the RC members (red dots). When beams characterized by small 
tensile reinforcement indices  are referred to, the herein adopted simplified approach overestimates 
the rotation capacity predicted by the regression model (C.11) and vice versa. However, the degree of 
over- or underestimation is influenced by other factors too, such as, for instance, the amount of com-
pression reinforcement. This can be drawn from Figure C.4 (right) which compares u according to (C.8) 
and (C.11) under the assumption that the compression reinforcement is being omitted (’= 0) in the 
calculation of the rotation capacity of the 18 beams. It can be observed that under this hypothesis equa-
tion (C.11) is far more sensitive to changes in . Both approaches deliver now very similar u for the 
majority of the 18 example beams considered (significant deviations only for very small ). 
 
Figure C.4 Rotation capacity u of 18 simply supported beams (section 5.5.2) according to simplified approach 
(C.8) and empirical regression model by Panagiotakis and Fardis (C.11); Left: ’/ = 0,2; Right: ’ = 0 
C.4 Final observations 
Without exploring in further detail the numerous influences on the rotation capacity of RC members and 
the corresponding modelling approaches, the above presented comparisons suggest that equation 
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(5.10) provides reasonable estimates of the average ductility capacity of simple RC members, such as 
those analyzed in the present study. Moreover, the presented results indicate that (5.10) tends to un-
derestimate the actual deformation capacity to some extent. This appreciation is corroborated by sug-
gestions in the design manual TM 5-1300 for structures exposed to accidental explosions [7], where 
rotation capacities u < 5, as obtained for most of the beams analyzed herein (Figure C.4), are associated 
with a moderate damage level. These observations should be kept in mind when analyzing the influence 
of energy dissipation on the reliability level of the blast load exposed RC members (chapter 6).  
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Annex D Validation of the moment-
curvature algorithm for columns  
D.1 Introduction 
The objective of the present Annex is the validation of the proper functioning and implementation of the 
developed algorithm for the moment-curvature (M-) analysis of the columns under the influence of 
variable axial forces and bending moments presented in section 5.3.4. The validation will be carried out 
by means of a case study under simplified load assumptions what facilitates the interpretation of the 
results.  
D.2 Example-column 
The main characteristics of the example column are shown in Figure D.1. The simply-supported member 
of length l0 is exposed to a monotonically increasing axial force NE (D.1) applied with an eccentricity emin 
= 50 mm with respect to the center of gravity of the quadratic, simmetrically reinforced cross-section. 
Since no horizontal load will be considered here, the increase of the first order bending moment ME,I,s 
is exclusively defined by the eccentric action of the applied axial force, as expressed by (D.2). 
Expressions (D.1) and (D.2) substitute (5.36) and (5.39), respectively. All other equations constituting 
the algorithm maintain their validity. 
 𝐸,𝑠 =  𝐸,𝑠−1 + Δ 𝐸,𝑠         (D.1) 
Δ 𝐸,𝐼,𝑠 = Δ 𝐸,𝑠 ∙ 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛         (D.2) 
In order to study the influence of second order effects, a short and a slender column will be analised in 
the following, characterised by a length of l0 = 1 m (slenderness ratio ≈ 11) and l0 = 8 m ( ≈ 92), 
respectively.  
 
Figure D.1 Static system and loading of the example-column studied for purpose of the validation of the M- algo-
rithm (left) and corresponding cross-section geometry and principal material characteristics (right) 
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D.3 Results 
D.3.1 Short column 
The present section summarizes the results obtained for the short column ( ≈ 11). Figure D.2 shows 
the M-N interaction diagram corresponding to the ultimate resistance of the column’s cross-section. 
Moreover, the sequentially applied (in s = n steps) action effects are plotted in the figure, which can be 
splitted into a first and a second-order contribution. As could be expected, for the short-column analised 
here, the second order effects are virtually negligible and hence the increase of the bending moment 
with respect to the axial force is almost proportional. The failure point is defined by the intersection of 
the applied action effects with the interaction diagram.  
The almost negligible influence of second order effects can also be drawn from Figure D.3, which shows 
the obtained moment-curvature response MR,s() at the intermediate cross-section to the step-wise 
applied action effects ME,s() (red). It is shown that the increase of the first order moments ME,I,s is far 
more important than the corresponding second-order component ME,II,s. The latter is characterised by 
slope mII,s (5.42), which slightly increases with each load-step due to the monotonic increase of both 
axial force and the member deflection. Nevertheless, due to the small member slenderness, this increase 
is too small to cause the member to buckle. Indeed, as can be observed in Figure D.4, which offers an 
amplified view of Figure D.3, at s = y slope mII,s is still clearly below slope mR,s of the plastic response 
stage of the moment-curvature diagram MR,s() and hence condition (5.42) is not fulfilled. Consequently, 
the plastic response stage can be taken account of and failure will not occur before the ultimate bending 
moment MRu is being reached, when concrete deformation c at the intermediate cross-section will 
exceed the ultimate deformation cu under simultanous yielding of the compression reinforcement layer. 
The resulting first order moment ME,I,y at the yield point (s = y) can be obtained by summing up 
increments ME,I,s corresponding to the ny load-steps applied up to that point, as expressed by (D.3). It 
can then be readliy verified that the obtained ME,I,y equals the product between the axial force NE,y and 
eccentricity emin. Assuming NE,y to be a constant quantity (NE,y = NE = const.), the total moment ME is 
expressed by (D.4) as a function of curvature . As expected, function ME, plotted in Figure D.3 and 
Figure D.4 (blue, dashed line), intersects MR() at  = y.  
 𝐸,𝐼,𝑦 = ∑ Δ 𝐸,𝐼,𝑠 =  𝐸,𝑦 ∙ 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑛𝑦
𝑠=1         (D.3) 
 𝐸 =  𝐸 ∙ 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 0.1 ∙ 𝑙0
2  ∙  𝐸 ∙ 𝜒       (D.4) 
  
 Annex D   Validation of the moment-curvature algorithm for columns 
303 
 
Figure D.2 Moment-axial force diagram, and sequentially applied action effects to short column (l0 = 1 m) 
 
Figure D.3 Moment-curvature diagram, and sequentially applied action effects to short column (l0 = 1 m) 
 
Figure D.4 Moment-curvature diagram (ultimate resistance), and sequentially applied action effects to short col-
umn (l0 = 1 m) – amplified view around the yield point. 
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D.3.2 Slender column 
The present section summarizes the results obtained for the slender column ( ≈ 92). Figure D.5 shows 
the M-N interaction diagram corresponding to the yield resistance of the column’s cross-section. In 
addition, the sequentially applied action effects, splitted again into a first and a second-order 
contribution, are plotted. Contrary to the findings of the short column, the second order effects are 
important in the present case, and consequently, the bending moment gains increasing importance with 
rising axial force level in the columnm. This is clearly indicated by the progressively decreasing slope of 
the graph representing the resulting action effects (Figure D.5, red, continuous line). The intersection of 
this graph with the M-N interaction diagram signalises failure of the member, in this case due to 
buckling. The corresponding axial force level of about 1200 kN is far below the value at failure of the 
short column, of almost 2900 kN. 
The importance of second order effects can also be drawn from Figure D.6, which, as before for the short 
column, shows the obtained moment-curvature response MR,s() at the intermediate cross-section to 
the step-wise applied action effects ME,s(). It might be observed that the slope mII,s (5.42) of second-
order component ME,II,s significantly increases with each load-step. Since at s = y, mII,s exceeds slope 
mR,s of the plastic response stage of the moment-curvature diagram MR,s(), i.e. condition (5.42) is 
fulfilled, an irreversible equilibrium loss occurs before the plastic response stage can be entered - the 
member buckles. The same conclusion is obtained if the axial force and the first order moment 
corresponding to this point ( = y) are assumed to be constant quantities. As introduced before in the 
context of the short column, the total moment ME() is then given by a linear function (D.4) in the M- 
space, which as shown in Figure D.6, is tangent to the MR() diagram at  = y (blue, dashed line). 
 
Figure D.5 Moment-axial force diagram (yield resistance), and sequentially applied action effects to slender col-
umn (l0 = 8 m) 
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Figure D.6 Moment-curvature diagram, and sequentially applied action effects to slender column (l0 = 8 m) 
D.4 Final observations 
The above presented results for the studied example column analised confirm the proper functioning 
and implementation of the developed algorithm for the moment-curvature (M-) analysis of the RC 
columns under the influence of variable axial forces and bending moments presented in section 5.3.4. 
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Annex E Resistance of a short column under 
dynamic M-N interaction 
E.1 Introduction 
In section 5.1.3, it was stated that the approach for accounting the material behaviour under dynamic 
loading in the present study is in several ways a rough simplification. The associated doubts and 
uncertainties are mainly related to the adequacy of the average strain rates to be employed in the DIF 
formulations and to the suitability of these formulations for their application in problems beyond the 
limited scope of the empirical studies from which they were derived. Concerning the latter aspect, it is 
of special interest to analise if the DIF models, which were deduced from uniaxial strain-rate tests on 
concrete or steel specimen, can be suitably employed in the structural response prediction of RC 
members under more complex load arrangements.  
In this context, the objective of the present Annex is to determine the ultimate resistance of a short 
column tested in [1] and to compare the result to the experimental findings. 
E.2 Example-column 
The column in question (Figure E.1) was submitted to a dynamic axial force N(t) in a way that a specific, 
compressive strain rate 𝜀?̇?  at the intermediate cross-section was kept constant troughout the test. The 
imposed strain rates were 𝜀?̇?  = 3.3∙ 10-6 s-1, representative for quasi-static loading, and 𝜀?̇?  = 1.67∙ 10-2      
s-1. The axial force was applied at the center of gravity of the members (e = 0) and, in order to introduce 
M-N interaction, at an eccentricity of e = 49 mm.  
 
Figure E.1 Characteristic of column studied by Scott et al. [1] 
E.3 Prediction of ultimate resistance 
The M-N interaction diagrams associated with the ultimate cross-section resistance of the member 
(UMLS) are derived under adoption of the stress-strain relationships shown in Figure 4.24. The corre-
sponding material parameters for the quasi-static load assumptions are indicated in Figure E.1. Figure 
E.2 shows the result obtained (blue curve).  
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Figure E.2 M-N interaction diagrams obtained for the example-column shown in Figure E.1. Blue: Static material 
parameters; Red: Dynamic material parameters. 
The DIF formulations summarised in section 5.1.3 are used for the determination of the dynamic 
concrete compressive strength fc,dyn, the compressive strain at peak-stressc1,dyn, as well as for the dy-
namic yield and tensile strength of the reinforcing steel, respectively fy,dyn and ft,dyn. For the estimation 
of fc,dyn and c1,dyn, the concrete compressive strain rate imposed in the tests, 𝜀?̇?  = 1.67∙ 10-2 s-1, is factored 
into the corresponding DIF equations. The strain rates 𝜀?̇?,𝑖 in the different tensile and compression 
reinforcing steel layers As,i (i = 1 to 4) are then deduced from equation (E.1), based on the assumption of 
proportionality between curvature  and curvature velocity ?̇? (Figure E.3). It should be noted that this 
assumption is implicitly laid down in the approach followed in the present study for the estimation of 
average strain rates under the influence of bending stresses. 
𝜀?̇?,𝑖 = 𝜀?̇? ∙  
𝜀𝑠,𝑖
𝜀𝑐
           (E.1) 
 
Figure E.3 Assumed strain and strain rate distribution in the intermediate cross-section of the studied column 
Based on the modified stress-strain relationships, the M-N interaction diagram corresponding to the 
dynamic load exposure of the column is subsequently derived and shown in Figure E.2 (red curve). It is 
shown that the difference to the static diagram (blue) is considerable, especially in the compression-
controlled failure zone what can be attributed to the relatively large DIF for the concrete compressive 
strength (in relation to the comparatively lower DIF for the reinforcing steel yield strength). In that 
context it should be highlighted that the relatively low static value of the concrete compressive strength, 
of fcm = 25.2 N/mm2 contributes to a particularly high dynamic increase, as explained in section 3.2.2. 
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E.4 Comparison 
Figure E.4 suggests that the herein followed analytical approach can reasonably well predict the 
ultimate-resistance of the cross-section. It is shown that the experimentally deduced capacities (dots) 
obtained for the concentric (e = 0) and the eccentric (e = 0.049 m) load application under both quasi-
static and dynamic conditions are close to the corresponding M-N interaction diagrams (continuous 
lines). Moreover, Figure E.4 compares these diagrams with those deduced by Soroushian and Obaseki 
[2] (dashed lines) who integrated strain-rate sensitive material models for concrete in compression and 
reinforcing steel into a fiber model for RC cross-sections. The parabolic model for concrete in 
compression takes account of the confinement of the cross-section due to the transverse reinforcement. 
The properties of the reinforcing steel were represented by an empirically derived model providing 
similar DIF’s for fy,dyn and fu,dyn as the model used in the present study [3]. However, unlike considered 
here, the model deduced in [2] suggests an increase of the yield strain sy beyond fy,dyn/Es, and an increase 
of the ultimate strain su. Despite these and other differences to the model assumptions laid down in the 
present study, the M-N curves in both studies are in reasonably good agreement (Figure E.4).  
 
Figure E.4 Comparison of M-N interaction diagrams obtained (continuous lines) to tests results from Scott et al. 
[1] (dots) and analytical results from Soroushian and Obaseki [2] (dashed lines). Blue: Static material parame-
ters; Red: Dynamic material parameters. 
E.5 Final observations 
The previous comparisons corroborate the adequacy of  the herein followed simplifed approach for the 
estimation of dynamic material properties. It is shown that this approach entails sufficiently accurate 
predicitions of the structural resistance of RC members, even under more complex stress states, such as 
those induced by M-N interaction in columns. 
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Annex F Preliminary FE study 
F.1 Introduction 
During the first stay at TU Delft, a numerical model has been developed and validated. In the further 
continuation of the work, the model has been adapted to the geometry, the material characteristics and 
the loading conditions of each of the beams selected for purpose of the comparative study envisaged 
(section 5.5). 
However, the first analysis trials revealed significant plastic strain concentrations in the tensile rein-
forcing steel cross sections situated at the locations of the main bending cracks close to the mid-span 
cross section of the beams. From the physical point of view, such strain concentrations seem to be gen-
erally reasonable, since cracking induces a tensile stress transfer from the concrete to the reinforcement 
with a corresponding increase in tensile strain confined to a relatively small length of the bar. The point 
is, however, that in case the concentrated strain would approach the ultimate strain, the beam runs the 
risk to fail in a brittle manner by premature fracture of the tensile reinforcement before significant com-
pressive stresses could develop and induce crushing of the concrete. Consequently, although the critical 
cross section would be ductile, a premature tensile failure of the reinforcing steel would prevail the 
plastic hinge from undergoing large rotations and hence, from dissipating significant amount of energy 
during the explosion event. Experimental evidence for such an undesired, brittle failure mode related to 
local strain concentrations, is given in [1] , where the static load-carrying capacity of one-way slabs con-
taining low-ductility reinforcement has been explored (Figure F.1).  
 
Figure F.1 Curvature diagram prior to collapse of a one-way concrete slab reinforce with low-ductility steel [1] 
For the present study, it was of concern to investigate the influence of certain modeling parameters on 
the mentioned strain concentrations and to evaluate their impact on the global behavior of the beams 
and their failure modes. With respect to the latter aspect, it had to be judged whether it is generally 
reasonable to establish the failure criteria for the analyzed beams based on ultimate strain of the mate-
rials. The investigated model parameters are the slope of the plastic branch of the reinforcing steel 
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stress-strain diagram, the bond condition between reinforcing steel and the surrounding concrete and 
the mesh size of the finite element model. 
F.2 Overview 
For purpose of the preliminary analysis, the geometry and loading conditions of beam nº 11 (Table 5.8) 
are modeled. The assumed material properties (based on design values) are given in Table F.1. 
Table F.1: Material parameters of an example beam considered in the preliminary analysis 
Ec 
[N/mm2] 
fc 
[N/mm2] 
fct 
[N/mm2] 
Gf 
[N/mm] 
Gc 
[N/mm] 
fy 
[N/mm2] 
fu 
[N/mm2] 
27264 19.2 2.56 0.069 30 500 540 
 
A total of 4 model series are studied (Table F.2). The beams corresponding to series A1-A5 are modeled 
under the assumption of perfect plastic reinforcing steel behavior and perfect bond conditions to the 
surrounding concrete. The effect of strain hardening of the longitudinal reinforcement steel and bond-
slip behavior between steel and concrete on the detected steel strain concentrations is being investi-
gated in model series B and C, respectively. Finally, series D is dedicated to the influence of mesh-size 
on the results, with particular emphasis on the material response in terms of material strain. 
Table F.2: Summary of parameter study carried out (Example beam) 
Model Series Strain hardening  Bond condition Mesh size PEX,peak [kN/m] 
A1-A5 No Perfect fine 25 - 29 
B Yes Perfect fine 29 
C Yes Bond-slip fine 29 
D1-D3 Yes Perfect variable (normal-extra fine) 29 
 
As in the simplified dynamic analysis (section 5.2), a symmetrical, triangular shaped pressure pulse of 
duration tp = 0.2 s is applied to the beams in model series A to D. The corresponding peak pressures are 
varied between pEX,peak = 25 to 29 kN/m in series A (models A1 to A5), whereas in series B, C and D the 
applied peak-pressure is kept constant to 29 kN/m. 
F.3 Results 
F.3.1 Series A 
Figure F.2 reflects the flexural response of beam models A1 to A5, where perfect plastic reinforcing steel 
behavior and perfect bond conditions to the surrounding concrete were assumed. The left part depicts 
the beam’s mid-span deflection due to the explosion pressure, dyn, as a function of time, whereas the 
latter shows the evolution of the corresponding bending moment, ME,dyn (= MEX), obtained by stress in-
tegration over the cross section height, as a function of dyn. As could be expected, the maximum deflec-
tion caused by the explosion, dyn,max, as well as the corresponding point in time, tmax, rises with increasing 
peak-value of the applied explosion pressure pulse, pEX,peak. Figure F.2 (left) shows that the maximum 
deflection of dyn,max = 0.031 m (at tmax ≈ 0.11 s), corresponding to a peak-pressure of pEX,peak = 25 kN/m 
(Model A1), increases todyn,max = 0.048 m (at tmax ≈ 0.13 s) under pEX,peak = 29 kN/m (Model A5). In 
accordance with this observation, Figure F.2 (right) illustrates that the beam’s displacement ductility 
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demand increases from ,dyn = 0.99, under pEX,peak = 25 kN/m to ,dyn = 1.56, if pEXpeak = 29 kN/m. More-
over, Figure F.2 illustrates how increasing displacement ductility contributes to energy dissipation re-
flecting in a reduction of the dynamic load-factor DLFM (5.2). 
 
Figure F.2 Series A results: Mid-span deflection due to the explosion as a function of time and different peak-
loadings (left); Mid-span bending moment – deflection curves for different peak-loadings (right) 
In the following, a closer look will be taken to the material response. Figure F.3 (left) shows the evolution 
of the tensile strain in the maximum curvature cross-section (in advance referred to as critical cross 
section) of beams A1 to A5, normally coincident with the location of a large bending crack. It can be 
observed that once the yield strength of the reinforcing steel is being reached at sy = 0.0025, the strain 
rate experiences a significant increase. Naturally, the higher the applied explosion pressure, the higher 
is the strain, varying between peak-values s,max = 0.0025 (pEX,peak = 25 kN/m) and s,max = 0.04 (pEX,peak = 
29 kN/m). After reaching the maximum flexural response, the reinforcing steel strain slightly decreases 
according to the definition of the elastic unloading branch of the stress-strain diagram. 
Figure F.3 (right) shows the time dependent evolution of the concrete strain c on top of the critical cross 
section of the series A beams. It may be observed that the transition from the elastic to the plastic range 
strain rates, at about ty = 0.08 to 0.1 s, depending on the pEX,peak applied, is not as abrupt as seen before 
for the reinforcing steel strain (Figure F.3, left). Once the maximum response (max) is reached, the con-
crete strain decreases according to the unloading branch of the corresponding constitutive material law. 
 
Figure F.3 Series A results: Reinforcing steel strain at maximum curvature cross section for different peak-
loadings (left); Concrete compressive strain at maximum curvature cross section for different peak-loadings 
(right) 
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Figure F.4 depicts, at different points in time, the curvature distribution between support and mid-span 
of beam model A5 (pEX,peak = 29 kN/m), determined from the compressive strain on top of the concrete 
cross section, c, and the tensile reinforcing steel fiber, s, according to (F.1). 
𝜒(𝑥) =
|𝜀𝑐(𝑥)|+𝜀𝑠(𝑥)
𝑑
         (F.1) 
𝜒𝑦(𝑥) =
4
𝐿2
∙ (𝑥 ∙ 𝐿 − 𝑥2) ∙ 𝜅𝑦,𝑚𝑖𝑑−𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛       (F.2) 
Additionally, the theoretical yield curvature distribution, y(x), according to (F.2), based on elastic 
beam-theory, is represented by the black, dashed line, where y,mid-span is the corresponding value at mid-
span, obtained from the numerical analysis. Indicative of an adequate structural behavior in the elastic 
range, y(x) matches reasonably well the shape of (x) at ty = 0.078 s, where yielding of the tensile rein-
forcing steel is being initiated. Of more interest, however, are the curvature peaks for t > ty, which arise 
as a consequence of plastic strain concentrations in the tensile reinforcement at the dominant bending 
cracks, visualized by the plot of the first principal strain distribution at maximum response (t = tmax). 
 
Figure F.4 Crack pattern at maximum response (t=tmax) and curvature distribution at different points in time 
along beam A5 as a function of the distance from the support. 
As a measure for the plastic strain concentrations, the ratio kp (F.3) between the maximum plastic cur-
vature at the critical cross section p,max and the average plastic curvature, p,av, along the length of the 
plasticity region ly is introduced. This can be observed in Figure F.5, which again represents the curva-
ture distribution (x) at t = tmax along with the theoretical yield curvature distribution y(x).  
𝑘𝑝 =
𝜒𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜒𝑝,𝑎𝑣
          (F.3) 
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Figure F.5 Theoretical elastic curvature distribution and curvature distribution at maximum response (t=tmax) 
along beam A5 as a function of the distance from the support. 
The average plastic curvature p,av is defined as the height of an rectangle with length ly and an area given 
by the integral enclosed by the curvature distribution max(x) at t = tmax, and the elastic curvature distri-
bution y(x) at t = ty. Note that the mentioned area represents the plastic hinge rotation, p, given as: 
𝜃𝑝 = ∫[𝜒𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥) − 𝜒𝑦(𝑥)]𝑑𝑥 = 𝜒𝑝,𝑎𝑣 ∙ 𝑙𝑦      (F.4) 
In case of beam model A5 the length of the plasticity region is ly = 0.71 m and the plastic hinge rotation 
p = 0.012 rad (Table F.3). Thus, according to (F.4) an average plastic curvature of pl,av ≈ 0.017 m-1 is 
determined which is about kp = 8.2 times smaller than the maximum plastic curvature at the critical 
section, pl,max ≈ 0.14 m-1. It must be stated that factor kp should be used for comparative purpose only. 
This is because the rectangular shape of the plastic curvature distribution has been chosen for purpose 
of a simplified mathematical treatment only but in fact lacks any physical background. 
Table F.3: Lenght of plasticity region ly, plastic rotation p, average plastic curvature pl,av, maximum plastic 
curvature pl,max and plastic strain concentration factor kp for beam models A5 and B 
Model Strain hardening ly [m] p [rad] p,av [m-1] p,max [m-1] kp 
A5 No 0.71 0.012 0.017 0.140 8.2 
B Yes 0.84 0.011 0.013 0.040 3.1 
F.3.2 Series B 
In beam model B (Table F.2) strain hardening has been introduced in the constitutive stress-strain re-
lationship of the reinforcing steel. Figure F.6 shows the obtained mid-span deflection-time curve in com-
parison to the response of beam A5 (perfect plastic behavior), submitted to the same explosion pressure 
(pEX,peak = 29 kN/m). It can be observed that the difference between both solutions is very small, as was 
to be expected. However, when analyzing the response at the material level, significant differences are 
obtained as depicted in Figure F.7. Precisely, it is shown that both the maximum tensile strain in the 
reinforcing steel (left) and the maximum compressive strain in the concrete (right) reduce considerably 
when strain hardening is introduced in the reinforcing steel stress strain law. While the former is being 
reduced from about 4% to about 1.3%, the latter diminishes from about 6.1‰ to 3.8‰. It can further 
be observed that the increase in strain rate upon entering the plastic response stage is less pronounced 
in case of model B, where strain hardening has been factored in. 
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Figure F.6 Mid-span deflection as a function of time, for models A5 (perfect plastic behaviour of reinforcing steel) 
and B (including strain hardening)  
 
Figure F.7 Reinforcing steel strain (left) and concrete compressive strain (right) at maximum curvature cross 
section for models A5 (perfect plastic behaviour of reinforcing steel) and B (including strain hardening). 
In Figure F.8 the plastic curvature distribution at maximum response of beam model B is shown. Again 
plastic rotation pl, average curvature p,av and strain concentration factor kp are determined as de-
scribed before. The results, compared in Table X to those of model A5, show that the plastic hinge rota-
tion pl remains almost unaffected when introducing strain hardening in the constitutive model of the 
reinforcing steel. On the contrary, the strain concentrations considerably decrease, as reflected by a 
comparatively smaller strain concentration factor of kp = 3.1. Figure F.8 shows that the curvature distri-
bution along the plasticity region ly is more continuous than in model A5 (Figure F.5), and characterized 
by comparatively smaller peak strains at the crack locations. This comparison clearly affirms that, as 
long as the ultimate strain of the reinforcing steel is higher than the localized strain peaks (what is the 
case in the present example), the global structural behavior of the beams is not influenced by the strain 
concentrations in the cross-sections affected by mayor bending cracks.  
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Figure F.8 Theoretical elastic curvature distribution and curvature distribution at maximum response (t=tmax) 
along beam model B as a function of the distance from the support. 
F.3.3 Series C 
The purpose of model series C was to study the impact of the bond-slip mechanism between the longi-
tudinal reinforcement and the surrounding concrete on the structural behavior of the beams, especially 
at the material level. Therefore, DIANA [2] offers the use of so-called bond-slip reinforcements, which 
are defined similar to standard embedded reinforcements. The main difference to the latter is the con-
nection, by an interface element (with zero thickness), to the mother element (in the present case the 
plane stress elements) in which they are located. The interface element characterizes the mechanical 
behavior of the slip zone between concrete and reinforcement. The linear relationship between the nor-
mal stresses, n, and the normal relative displacement, n, is given by (F.5), whereas the stresses in the 
tangential direction (bond stresses), t, are defined as a nonlinear function of the corresponding relative 
slip, t (F.6).  
𝜎𝑛 = 𝑘𝑛 ∙ Δ𝛿𝑛          (F.5) 
𝜏𝑡 = 𝑓(Δ𝛿𝑡)          (F.6) 
The linear relationship (F.5) assumed in the normal direction requires the assumption of stiffness con-
stant kn which, based on indications in [3] will be assumed to kn = 20000 N/mm3. In the tangential di-
rection, the model deduced by Dörr [4], implemented in DIANA, will be used to express the non-linear 
relation between bond stress and slip. The bond-slip model is defined by equations (F.7) and (F.8). It is 
described by a cubic function up to a certain slip limit Δ𝛿𝑡0 beyond which a constant bond stress of t = 
1.9 times the concrete tensile stress fct is being assumed. The recommended slip limit according to Dörr 
[4] is Δ𝛿𝑡0 =0.06 mm what will be adopted herein. Unloading and reloading of the interface behavior is 
modeled by a secant approach. 
τt = fct(5
Δδt
Δδt0
− 4.5 (
Δδt
Δδt0
)
2
+ 1.4 (
Δδt
Δδt0
)
3
)    if   0 ≤ Δδt ≤ Δδt0   (F.7) 
𝜏𝑡 = 1.9𝑓𝑐𝑡         if   Δ𝛿𝑡 > Δ𝛿𝑡0   (F.8) 
For the example beam with a total cross-sectional area of As,tot = 683 mm2, three different bar diameters 
(= 12, 16 and 20 mm) have been assumed. The corresponding number of (fictitious) rebars ns, their 
perimeters Ps and the total perimeter Ps,tot = Ps · ns are given in Table F.4.  
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Table F.4: Geometrical description of bond-slip rebars 
[mm] As,tot [mm2] ns Ps [mm] Ps,tot [mm] 
12 683 6.0 38 228 
16 683 3.4 50 171 
20 683 2.2 63 137 
 
The first trials under use of the bond slip reinforcements revealed severe numerical problems at the 
symmetry plane located at the beams mid-span cross section. In order to avoid those problems, it was 
decided to model the full beam geometry. In a next step, the correct implementation and functioning of 
the bond slip reinforcement was verified. For this purpose, the equilibrium condition of an infinitesi-
mally small reinforcement element (Figure F.9), given by (F.9), was checked. For sake of simplicity, this 
was done under assumption of static loading conditions and linear-elastic concrete behavior. The result 
of this exercise is shown in Figure F.10. It compares the left and the right part of the equilibrium condi-
tion (F.9), i.e., the increment in the tensile force (left part of (F.9)) and the bond force along length dx of 
the reinforcement element (right part of (F.9)), which in the present case is equal to the length of the 
finite elements defined in the numerical model. As was to be expected, the bond-stress () distribution 
along the beam is antisymmetric with a maximum at the supports. Towards the mid-span diminishes 
and entirely disappears at the location where the reinforcing steel stress (s) reaches the defined yield 
strength. From Figure F.10 it can be concluded that the bond and tensile force along the reinforcing bar 
are in equilibrium suggesting hence the correct implementation and functioning of the bond-slip rein-
forcements in the numerical model. 
dσs
dx
∙ As = τ(x) ∙ Ps             (F.9) 
 
Figure F.9 Stress distribution in an infinitesimal reinforcement element [5]. 
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Figure F.10 Right and left part of force equilibrium (F.9) along the beam. 
After the correct implementation of the bond-slip reinforcements, the example beam was analyzed un-
der the same dynamic loading conditions as before model B (perfect bond), as specified in Table F.2 
(series C). Figure F.11 compares the time-dependent mid-span deflection under the perfect bond as-
sumption to the results obtained under use of the bond-slip model described before, assuming rebar 
diameters of  = 12, 16 and 20 mm, respectively. It can be seen that the global beam response to the 
dynamic load is practically unaffected by the bond condition between the reinforcement and the con-
crete.  
 
Figure F.11 Comparison of mid-span deflection-time curves under perfect bond assumption and under use of 
bond-slip relation according to Dörr [4], assuming different bar diameters. 
However, when analyzing the response at the material level some differences can be detected. This can 
be observed in Figure F.12 which shows the evolution in time of the strain in the maximum curvature 
cross section located at mid-span, respectively, in the tensile reinforcement steel (left) and in the con-
crete (right). It is shown that the steel strain decreases when bond-slip is being considered. As could be 
expected, the decrease is higher the smaller the total rebar perimeter Ps,tot (Table F.4), i.e. the smaller 
the bond stress between rebars and concrete. On the contrary, in accordance with the equilibrium con-
dition of the internal cross section forces, the concrete strain in the critical cross-section increases as 
the bond stress diminishes. Nevertheless, the most relevant conclusion, which can be drawn from Figure 
F.12, is the fact that the results are not altered in a significant manner upon introducing a bond-slip 
condition into the numerical model. The strain concentrations in the reinforcing steel, detected at the 
mayor bending cracks, are only scarcely reduced when allowing for slip between concrete and steel. 
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Since moreover, the need for modeling the full beam implies significantly higher computational costs, it 
was decided to proceed with the perfect bond condition in the further development of the work. 
 
Figure F.12 Comparison of time dependant evaluation of tensile reinforcing steel strain (left) and concrete 
compressive strain (right) at maximum curvature cross section under perfect bond assumption and under use of 
bond-slip relation according to Dörr [4], assuming different bar diameters. 
F.3.4 Series D 
In series D, the influence of the mesh size on the behavior of the example beam has been analyzed. The 
mesh is characterized by a declining size of the quadrilateral plane stress elements, via a transition zone, 
from e=h/8 at the beams free end, to a smaller size in the zone around the mid-span cross-section. Three 
different mesh sizes of the refined mid-span zone have been analyzed here, named “coarse”, “interme-
diate” and “fine” mesh, with element sizes of e=h/16, e=h/32, and e=h/64, respectively, shown in Figure 
F.13. 
 
Figure F.13.“Coarse”(upper), “intermediate”(middle) and “fine”(lower) mesh size analyzed in model series D. 
The mid-span deflection-time curves obtained for the example beam are compared in Figure F.14. It is 
shown that, compared to the coarse mesh size, the use of the intermediate mesh size entails an increase 
of the maximum deflection of the order of 4%. The use of the fine mesh does not produce any further 
significant increase of the deflection, i.e. the results clearly converge upon mesh-size refinement. The 
obtained results suggest choosing the intermediate mesh size for purpose of the further calculations. 
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Figure F.14 Mid-span deflection-time curves obtained with “coarse”, “intermediate” and “fine” mesh size.  
In contrast to the deflections, the response at the material level does not seem to converge upon refining 
the mesh size. The strains in both the tensile reinforcing steel and the concrete fiber on top of the max-
imum curvature cross section increase moderately as the mesh size is being refined, as can be observed 
in Figure F.15. Hence, the before-mentioned strain concentrations do have, at least to some extent, a 
numerical background. In any case, no change in the beam’s failure mode is to be expected when em-
ploying finer mesh sizes for purpose of the numerical analysis of the example beam, i.e., the element fails 
in a ductile manner, after the ultimate concrete compressive strain is being reached in the critical cross-
section under simultaneous yielding of the tensile reinforcement. Nevertheless, the mesh-size sensitiv-
ity is too significant to establish a failure criterion for the beam based on material strain. Moreover, a 
further mesh-size reduction is not considered as an option due to sharply increasing computation time. 
  
Figure F.15 Tensile reinforcing steel strain (left) and concrete compressive strain (right) at the maximum 
curvature cross section obtained with “coarse”, “intermediate” and “fine” mesh size.  
F.4 Final observations 
The conclusions from the preliminary numerical analysis are the following: 
- The numerically analyzed beams are affected by significant strain concentrations in the tensile 
reinforcing steel, which arise at the mayor bending cracks. 
 
- Although not entirely eliminated, the mentioned strain concentrations are significantly reduced 
when introducing strain hardening in the constitutive model of the reinforcing steel, whereas 
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the global structural behavior of the beams remains almost unaffected by this measure. Moreo-
ver, considering strain hardening in the constitutive model of the reinforcing steel contributes 
to numerical stability. 
 
- Considering a bond-slip relationship between the reinforcing steel and the concrete has only a 
small impact on the magnitude of the material strain. Since, moreover, the introduction of such 
a relationship into the numerical model entailed the need for representing the full beam geom-
etry, with a corresponding important increase in computational cost, it was decided to proceed 
with a perfect bond assumption in the further development of the work. 
 
- In contrary to the global structural response, the material strain does not converge upon refining 
mesh-size. The strain in both the tensile reinforcing steel and the compressed concrete fiber at 
the maximum curvature cross-section increase as the mesh size is being refined. Hence, the 
strain concentrations are influenced, at least to some extent, by numerical circumstances what 
precludes the establishment of a failure criterion based on ultimate material strain. 
 
- The strain concentrations in the reinforcing steel do not entail a potential to change the (ductile) 
failure mode of the beam, characterized by concrete crushing close to mid-span, after a signifi-
cant amount of energy, liberated by the explosion, could be dissipated by plastic structural de-
formations. However, their presence rules out the possibility to draw on the numerical model to 
verify the usefulness of relationship (5.10), which provides the deformation capacity of the stud-
ied RC members as a function of the curvature ductility ratio at the mid-span cross-section. This 
verification is addressed in Annex C. 
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Annex G Approach for dynamic material 
properties in the numerical study  
G.1 Introduction 
The numerical analysis (NA) of the RC beams exposed to blast loads (section 5.5) required the definition 
of dynamic material properties. Since the FE-code employed [1] did not include any strain-rate 
dependent constitutive material models, the dynamic increase was factored into the numerical model 
in a similar manner as in the simplified analysis (SA) (section 5.1.3, 5.5.3): by applying DIFs to the 
principal mechanical material properties of concrete and steel to modify the uniaxial stress-strain laws. 
The DIFs were obtained for the constant average strain rates for the concrete elements under 
compressive stress and the steel elements under tensile stress, deduced from the NA. After a description 
of the procedure adopted in the following sub-section, its application will be illustrated by means of an 
example.   
G.2 Procedure 
The approach for the determination of dynamic material properties laid down in the numerical analysis 
is iterative. It comprises the following steps: 
1. Definition of the static material properties of concrete and reinforcing steel and association to 
the constitutive models used in the FE analysis, described in section 5.5.3. 
2. Sequential NA (static and dynamic) of the member according to section 5.5.5. 
3. Determination of the average strain rates for the concrete element under maximum compressive 
stress and the longitudinal reinforcing steel element under maximum tensile stress, in advance 
termed “most loaded” elements. 
4. Determination of the DIF for the concrete compressive strength and the reinforcing steel yield- 
and tensile strength using the DIF-models adopted [2, 3] in conjunction with the deduced aver-
age strain rates (step 3). 
5. Updating of the uniaxial stress-strain curves for concrete under compression stress and rein-
forcing steel under tensile stress by means of the DIF determined in step 4. 
6. Repetition of steps 2 to 5 until the updated material properties do not deviate from those ob-
tained in the previous iteration step by more than the established tolerance (1%). 
G.3 Example 
Figure G.1 shows the time-dependent evolution of the strain in the most loaded elements of, 
respectively, concrete in compression (left) and reinforcing steel in tension (right), obtained in the NA 
of a RC beam (section 5.5). According to step nº 2 of the above-defined procedure, the analysis was 
carried out under use of the initially defined static material properties, summarized in Table G.1 (1st 
iteration). As shown in Figure G.1, a constant, average strain rate (d/dt)av can be deduced (step nº 3) 
by linear regression analysis on the pairs (, t) within the time range 0<t<tc, in case of concrete in 
compression (left), and 0<t<ty for the reinforcing steel under the influence of tensile forces (right). The 
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limit tc = 0.082 s describes the point in time when, in the considered element, the maximum compressive 
stress reaches the concrete compressive strength, c,max = fc. This can be well observed in Figure G.2 
(left), which shows the time-dependent evolution of c in the mentioned element. The limit ty = 0.075 
s corresponds to the time needed to attain the yield strength of the reinforcing steel, fsy, as highlighted 
in Figure G.1 and Figure G.2 (right). The example shows that the assumption of a mean strain (or stress) 
rate seems to be reasonable within the specified time ranges, limited by tc and ty, respectively.  
In step nº 4 of the above described procedure, the obtained average strain rate for concrete under 
compression, (dc/dt)av = -2.2·10-2 s-1, is employed to determine the dynamic increase factor DIFfc = 1.22 
for the concrete compressive strength, according to [2]. In an equal manner, average strain rate 
(ds/dt)av = 4.4·10-2 s-1 is used to determine factors DIFfy = 1.13 and DIFft = 1.04 from the formulations 
suggested in [3] for the dynamic increase of the reinforcing steel yield and tensile strength, respectively. 
The results are summarized in Table G.1 (1st iteration step). 
Subsequently, in step nº 5 of the outlined procedure, the deduced DIF are employed to update the 
material properties fc, fy and ft (Table G.1, 2nd iteration step), and consequently, the uniaxial stress-strain 
laws for concrete in compression and steel in tension. As proceeded in the SA of the beams, the 
reinforcing steel yield strain y is implicitly updated by applying a DIF to the yield strength fy, whereas 
both the elastic modulus Es and the ultimate strain u are kept constant. Regarding concrete, it should 
be noted that, on the contrary to the SA, the compressive strain at peak-stress (c1) is not being explicitly 
updated since the uniaxial stress-strain relationship for concrete under compression laid down in the 
NA (Figure 5.32) is entirely defined in terms of concrete modulus Ec and compressive strength fc only. 
For sake of consistency to the SA (section 5.3.2), the modulus Ec will be assumed as under static loading 
conditions. 
With the updated stress-strain relationships, the sequential NA of the beam is then being repeated (step 
nº 6) and the average strain-rates in the most-loaded elements are deduced as described before (Figure 
G.3, Figure G.4). In Table G.1 it can be observed that those average strain rates (2nd iteration) do not 
differ substantially from those obtained in the first iteration. Since the DIF formulations are 
logarithmical, and hence not sensitive to relatively small variations of the strain rates, the obtained DIF 
almost equal those of the previous iteration step. Consequently, the difference between the 
subsequently updated material properties (Table G.1, 3rd iteration) and the previous ones (2nd iteration) 
is almost inappreciable and falls clearly below the established tolerance of 1%. The analysis procedure 
has ended. 
 
Figure G.1 Determination of constant mean strain rates in the most loaded element of, respectively, concrete in 
compression (left) and steel in tension (right) – 1st iteration (static material properties). 
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Figure G.2 Determination of constant mean stress rates in the most loaded element of, respectively, concrete in 
compression (left) and steel in tension (right) – 1st iteration (static material properties). 
 
Figure G.3 Determination of constant mean strain rates in the most loaded element of, respectively, concrete in 
compression (left) and steel in tension (right) – 2nd iteration (updated, dynamic material properties). 
 
Figure G.4 Determination of constant mean stress rates in the most loaded element of, respectively, concrete in 
compression (left) and steel in tension (right) – 2nd iteration (updated, dynamic material properties). 
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Table G.1 Summary of material properties, average strain rates (d/dt)av, and dynamic increase factors (DIF) 
obtained in the iteration procedure. 
 
G.4 Additional considerations 
It should be remembered that the DIF formulations employed herein [2, 3] were derived from tests on 
uni-axially loaded concrete or steel specimen by applying a constant strain rate and measuring the 
dynamic increase in the material properties. Hence it seems to be a reasonable approach to base the 
dynamic increase of, for instance, the uni-axial concrete compressive strength on the average strain rate 
(dc/dt)av within an interval limited by time tc where this strength is being reached. It might be noted 
that beyond tc, the concrete compressive strain rate experiences a significant increase as can be inferred 
from Figure G.1 or Figure G.3, which is considered to be meaningless for purpose of the estimation of 
DIFfc. On the same grounds, the determination of the DIF for the reinforcing steel yield strength, DIFfy, is 
reasonably based on the average strain rate (d/dt)av within an interval limited by time ty, where fy is 
being attained (Figure G.1 or Figure G.3). Regarding the tensile strength ft, the noticeable increase in the 
strain rate beyond ty  might have some influence on DIFft although it is assumed that the dynamic 
material behavior in the elastic range, prior to ty, constitutes the prevailing influence. In that context it 
should be kept in mind that the formulation for DIFft (3.44, 3.46) is a function of the yield strength fy 
what seems to justify the use of the yield point as a reference for the derivation of a corresponding 
average strain rate, as already stressed in section 5.3.2. 
The average-strain rates employed for the determination of the DIF correspond to the most-loaded 
concrete (in compression) and steel (in tension) elements of the FE model (see step nº 3 of the above-
defined procedure). In the example shown before, the average strain rate for the most loaded concrete 
element in compression, (dc/dt)av = -2.3·10-2 s-1, was obtained from a regression of the c-t plot  within 
the interval 0 < t < tc (Figure G.3, left). At t = tc = 0.1 s the compressive strength fc is obtained in the 
mentioned element under a corresponding strain of c1 = -2.1·10-3. Since the beam has not yet reached 
its maximum deflection, the concrete stress in the adjacent elements will likewise reach fc a few instants 
later. This is evident and can be observed in Figure G.5 (left), which plots strain c versus time in all the 
concrete elements situated in the upper row of the FE-model mesh (Figure 5.31). At t = tmax = 0.125 s, 
when the beam undergoes its maximum flexural response, the “last” element reaches fc when c = c1 = -
2.1·10-3 (Figure G.5, left). The corresponding average strain-rate (dc/dt)av deduced by regression on the 
corresponding c-t plot within the interval 0 < t < 0.125 s is naturally smaller than found for the most-
loaded element. However, the difference is too small to cause any significant changes in the resulting 
DIF. The fact that the DIF equations are logarithmical assures that the average strain-rate deduced from 
the most-loaded concrete element provides a sufficiently exact estimation of the dynamic increase of 
the compressive strength even for the surrounding, less-loaded finite elements. The same conclusion is 
valid for the strength increase of the reinforcing steel under the influence of tensile forces (Figure G.5, 
right). 
Iteration  
fc fy ft (dc/dt)av (ds/dt)av DIFfc DIFfy DIFft 
 
𝑚𝑚2
 
 
𝑚𝑚2
 
 
𝑚𝑚2
 s-1 s-1 - - - 
1st 28,1 560 670 -2,2 ·10-2 4,4 ·10-2 1,21 1,13 1,04 
2nd 34,1 632 698 -2,3 ·10-2 4,8 ·10-2 1,22 1,13 1,04 
3rd 34,1 633 699 
-  
- - - - 
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Figure G.5 Strain versus time in the concrete elements corresponding to the upper row of the FE-model mesh 
(left) and in the tensile reinforcing steel elements (right) 
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Annex H   Database for the derivation of a consequence model 
329 
Annex H Database for the derivation of a 
consequence model 
H.1 Format for data compilation 
 
Figure H.1 Database format  
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H.2 Original database  
Table H.1: Selected parameters for 107 potentially relevant incidents 
Case ID A [m2] ns nhu Acol [m2] ns,col nhu,col Ocu Ocucol Ncol 
1 240 3  120 2   6 0 
3  4   2     4 
7  4   3     3 
8  3   4     3 
9 600 3 8 480 4  14 14 11 
11  5   3  21 7 2 
14  4            0 
15  3 16  2     2 
16  3   4  20 20 4 
19  2   3  5 5 2 
20 120 1  60 1  2 2 0 
21  3 24          2 
22 500 4  175 2  18 6 0 
23  1   2  1 1 0 
26  4 10  5 10    17 
30  1   1  4 4 2 
31 400 3  300 3  3 3 1 
32  2   3  1 1 1 
33  1   2  1 1 1 
39               0 
41      3     16 
42               7 
46  4   2  1   0 
47  2   4    9 
50  3   4    3 
54               5 
57  1   4    7 
58 200 2  200 3    5 
59         2 
60  1   1  1 1 0 
62 54 0  54 1 1 2 2 1 
63  1   2  2 2 0 
64  3            0 
66 320 2  160 1  20 10 0 
71  1   2  5 5 3 
74 300 3  200 2    0 
76 240 2  120 3  11 11 1 
77 660 22 22 480 10.5 16   3 
80               10 
81  2 6  2  15 10 0 
83  5   2    0 
84  1   2  2 2 0 
85  5   6  36 36 1 
86  2        1 1 0 
87    80 0.5 1   0 
89  1   2  2 2 0 
91  3   2    0 
92  3 12  2 6   5 
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Case ID A [m2] ns nhu Acol [m2] ns,col nhu,col Ocu Ocucol Ncol 
93 1864 1  1864 2  42 42 27 
94     0.5 1  1 0 
96  3 8  4  11 11 0 
98 300 1 6 80 0.5 1  1 0 
100  1   1  5 5 0 
101  4   2  32 16 0 
103  6   3  58 25 4 
104     1  50 50 4 
105       3 3 2 
107     1   4 0 
108  1   2  7 7 4 
109  2 6  2   8 1 
111           1 1 1 
112  4            1 
113      4 5 5 2 
115  12   0.5 1  1 0 
116  2   3  1 1 1 
118  2          2 0 
119  3   4  11 11 10 
120  5   1 1  2 1 
121  1   0.5  3 3 0 
124  2 6  0.5 1  1 0 
125           6   0 
127  3   1 1 4 4 0 
129  8   1    3 
133  2   3  1 1 0 
136  5            0 
137  8   1 1   0 
138  3    1   0 
139         1 
140  5 16  3 8   2 
141  4  40 1 1   2 
143 240 8  90 3    3 
144  4   2    2 
145  3   4    3 
146  8   9  88 88 7 
147  2 11          2 
148 120 3 6 40 1    0 
149 785 4 10 785 5  20 20 7 
150  4    1  1 1 
152  7 18 15   41  1 
161  5 15  5 15   6 
165  4   2    8 
169  2   1  3 1 1 
172  2    1   1 
181               0 
184  2   3  3 3 2 
193  5   0.5 0.5   0 
195  3 12 150 1 3   0 
196  4 16 200 1 3   1 
197  2  30 1    0 
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Case ID A [m2] ns nhu Acol [m2] ns,col nhu,col Ocu Ocucol Ncol 
201  2  450 2  50 35 17 
203  5   3  136 82 19 
207  2    1  2 0 
208  5    0.5 26  4 
210  1   1   2 1 
211  0   1   1 1 
232  1          5 5 
233  4 22  3 15 35 23 12 
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H.3 Data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) 
Table H.2: Number of housing-units as a function of housing-unit net-room area Ahu and the number of storeys ns 
corresponding to the building to which these units belong (INE, housing and population census 2001) 
Ahu  
[m2] Total 
Ahu ≤ 
30  
31≤ Ahu 
≤45 
46≤ Ahu 
≤60 
61≤ Ahu 
≤75 
76≤ Ahu 
≤90 
91≤ Ahu 
≤105 
106≤ 
Ahu 
≤120 
121≤ 
Ahu 
≤150 
151≤ 
Ahu 
≤180 
Ahu > 
180 
ns 
Total 1.418e07 55797 427630 1527792 2652889 4162623 2276807 1315680 919379 363975 481454 
1 2185326 14372 70268 191741 260186 581098 421180 271936 192836 74480 107229 
2 2952549 10791 66986 198001 307279 760094 546550 399897 317432 141986 203533 
3 1214799 5321 40251 122506 195960 342584 183577 117793 91131 42277 73399 
4 1425948 5253 56631 191090 343448 466310 189382 85028 49186 17588 22032 
5 1788299 6746 70147 308975 492382 538045 210090 88002 46381 14453 13078 
6 1290742 4361 42517 192942 330201 403164 171836 79074 42670 12715 11262 
7 837649 2928 26794 99072 181294 268443 131752 64345 39197 12927 10897 
8 1111746 2693 24462 101871 235580 360919 189786 96618 62856 20178 16783 
9 261232 597 5653 22758 56107 86692 43873 21583 14291 4957 4721 
>=10 1115736 2735 23921 98836 250452 355274 188781 91404 63399 22414 18520 
  
Acceptable life safety risks associated with the effects of gas explosions on reinforced concrete structures 
 
334 
Table H.3: Number of buildings in Spain comprising a certain number of housing units nhu and storeys ns (INE, 
housing and population census 2001) 
nhu 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 – 9 10 – 19 20 – 39 ≥ 40 
ns 
Total 8623875 6885843 623788 174345 121046 356282 302102 129658 30811 
1 3457833 3258714 162505 19168 6916 8115 2281 71 63 
2 3591827 3120927 353738 50327 36617 22339 5808 1990 81 
3 775177 468018 97006 66513 35184 86724 18223 2699 810 
4 285973 33711 9014 34369 23031 126049 51635 6798 1366 
5 214849 3049 1364 3552 17040 78186 88099 21391 2168 
6 121190 1221 126 364 2008 24599 64956 25171 2745 
7 61847 124 22 40 203 6182 33184 19303 2789 
8 61497 60 6 10 39 2973 25437 27735 5237 
9 13509 10 3 2 6 540 5269 6701 978 
>=10 40173 9 4 0 2 575 7210 17799 14574 
 
Table H.4: Number of persons per housing unit net-room area Ahu (INE, housing and population census 2001) 
Ahu [m2] Nº of persons 
Ahu ≤ 30 106951 
31 ≤ Ahu ≤ 45 905815 
46 ≤ Ahu ≤ 60 3652975 
61 ≤ Ahu ≤ 75 7134239 
76 ≤ Ahu ≤ 90 12020841 
91 ≤ Ahu ≤ 105 6831506 
106 ≤ Ahu ≤ 120 4119937 
121 ≤ Ahu ≤ 150 2966046 
151 ≤ Ahu ≤ 180 1210596 
Ahu ≥ 180 1646955 
Total 40595861 
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H.4 Complemented database  
Table H.5: Selected parameters for 107 potentially relevant incidents 
Case ID A [m2] ns nhu Acol [m2] ns,col nhu,col Ocu Ocucol Ncol 
1 240 3  120 2  12 6 0 
3 1064 4  426 2  35 14 4 
7 1064 4  638 3  35 21 3 
8 679 3  679 4  23 23 3 
9 600 3 8 480 4  14 14 11 
11 1483 5  741 3  21 7 2 
14 1064 4         17   0 
15 1308 3 16 340 2  35 11 2 
16 679 3  679 4  20 20 4 
19 269 2  269 3  5 5 2 
20 120 1  60 1  2 2 0 
21 1867 3 24       11   2 
22 500 4  175 2  18 6 0 
23 139 1  139 2  1 1 0 
26 778 4 10 778 5 10 32 32 17 
30 139 1  70 1  4 4 2 
31 400 3  300 3  3 3 1 
32 269 2  269 3  1 1 1 
33 139 1  139 2  1 1 1 
39 249               0 
41     367 3    16 16 
42 249               7 
46 1064 4  426 2  1 1 0 
47 359 2  359 4  14 14 9 
50 679 3  679 4  23 23 3 
54 249               5 
57 279 1  279 4  11 11 7 
58 200 2  200 3  9 9 5 
59 249   249   11 11 2 
60 139 1  70 1  1 1 0 
62 54 0  54 1 1 2 2 1 
63 139 1  139 2  2 2 0 
64 679 3         150   0 
66 320 2  160 1  20 10 0 
71 139 1  139 2  5 5 3 
74 300 3  200 2  10 7 0 
76 240 2  120 3  11 11 1 
77 660 22 22 480 10.5 16 22 16 3 
80 249           49   10 
81 569 2 6 180 2  15 10 0 
83 1483 5  494 2  49 16 0 
84 139 1  139 2  2 2 0 
85 1483 5  1483 6  36 36 1 
86 269 2         1 1 0 
87 249   80 0.5 1 8 3 0 
89 139 1  139 2  2 2 0 
91 679 3  340 2  23 11 0 
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Case ID A [m2] ns nhu Acol [m2] ns,col nhu,col Ocu Ocucol Ncol 
92 981 3 12 491 2 6 33 16 5 
93 1864 1  1864 2  42 42 27 
94 249   90 0.5 1 8 1 0 
96 679 3 8 679 4  11 11 0 
98 300 1 6 80 0.5 1 10 1 0 
100 139 1  70 1  5 5 0 
101 1064 4  426 2  32 16 0 
103 1896 6  813 3  58 25 4 
104 249   122 1  50 50 4 
105 249   249   3 3 2 
107 249   122 1  8 4 0 
108 139 1  139 2  7 7 4 
109 569 2 6 180 2  20 8 1 
111 249           1 1 1 
112 1064 4         6   1 
113    360  4 5 5 2 
115 2273 12  87 0.5 1 76 1 0 
116 269 2  269 3  1 1 1 
118 269 2         2 2 0 
119 679 3  679 4  11 11 10 
120 482 5  80 1 1 16 2 1 
121 139 1  35 0.5  3 3 0 
124 569 2 6 95 0.5 1 19 1 0 
125 249           6   0 
127 327 3  82 1 1 4 4 0 
129 2401 8  267 1  80 9 3 
133 269 2  269 3  1 1 0 
136 1483 5         17   0 
137 788 8  88 1 1 26 3 0 
138 679 3  82  1 23 3 0 
139 249   249   8 8 1 
140 1286 5 16 643 3 8 43 21 2 
141 200 4  40 1 1 13 2 2 
143 240 8  90 3  14 14 3 
144 1064 4  426 2  35 14 2 
145 679 3  679 4  30 30 3 
146 2401 8  2401 9  88 88 7 
147 1043 2 11       9   2 
148 120 3 6 40 1  5 1 0 
149 785 4 10 785 5  20 20 7 
150 967 4  78  1 32 1 1 
152 1572 7 18 15   41 1 1 
161 1206 5 15 1206 5 15 40 40 6 
165 1064 4  426 2  35 19 8 
169 269 2  90 1  3 1 1 
172 269 2  95  1 9 2 1 
181                 0 
184 269 2  269 3  3 3 2 
193 482 5  40 0.5 0.5 16 1 0 
195 981 3 12 150 1 3 43 11 0 
196 1245 4 16 200 1 3 36 7 1 
197 90 2  30 1  3 1 0 
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Case ID A [m2] ns nhu Acol [m2] ns,col nhu,col Ocu Ocucol Ncol 
201 675 2  450 2  50 35 17 
203 1483 5  741 3  136 82 19 
207 269 2  95  1 9 2 0 
208 1483 5  40  0.5 26 4 4 
210 139 1  70 1  5 2 1 
211 116 0  116 1  4 1 1 
232 139 1           5 5 
233 1712 4 22 1167 3 15 35 23 12 
 
